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OBITUARY

We deeply mourn the death of Prof. J. de Marneffe of the Jñāna Deep Vidyapeeth (De Nobili College), Pune which occurred on Saturday, the 11th of July, 1998. He was 80. He was associated with the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* as a member of the Board of Consulting Editors for over last 25 years.

Born on 21st February, 1918 in Liege, Belgium, he came to India in 1945 and dedicated rest of his life in academics. He had a colourful scholarly career at De Nobili College and Jñāna Deep Vidyapeeth as a teacher, thinker and writer and also as Rector and Principal both at Pune and in Calcutta. He was recognised as a Philosopher and scholar both on national and international planes. He has to his credit many scholarly articles and papers, which he presented in several seminars and conferences in India and abroad.

He was a member of the Poona Philosophy Union, All India Philosophical Congress and the Council of the Marathi Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, He was also associated with the Department of Philosophy, University of Pune, informally. He will be remembered by his friends all over, as a very lively personality and a good conversationalist. The academic circle of the city of Pune will certainly miss him because of his death. For the last two years, he was extremely ill. In his passing away, we have lost one of our elderly friends and advisers.

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NOTICE

This issue does not contain Students' Supplement as we did not have good papers submitted by students for publication.

-- Chief Editor

IS "TATTVAM ASI" THE SAME TYPE OF IDENTITY STATEMENT
AS "THE MORNING STAR IS THE EVENING STAR"?

DAYA KRISHNA

"*Tattvam Asi*" is the well-known statement from one of the oldest Upanisads which has been the subject of interminable controversy of the Indian philosophical tradition where the question is raised as to how exactly it is to be understood or interpreted. It has at least two thousand years of history behind the diverse attempts at determining what it means. The statement, "the morning star is the evening star", on the other hand, does not have such a long history behind it as it was first formulated by Frege in the nineteenth century to bring to the attention of the philosophical world in the West a distinction which has since become famous and has led to a great deal of philosophical discussion. There has been, as far as I know, no controversy regarding its interpretation, or any discussion concerning what exactly it means. Yet, both the statements share a common problematic as they point to two seemingly different entities which are regarded as totally different from each other and yet which are really identical in a fundamental sense that is not known to those who see them as different. In fact, normally the question of denying their difference does not arise as the difference is rooted in a foundational experience which normally does not permit the raising of any doubt about it.

The assertion of identity, therefore, derives from a more powerful, deeper and fundamental source negating the certitude of the experience on which the assertion of difference was earlier based. But what can be the possible grounds for preferring the asserted identity over the earlier assertion of the difference which was also based on seemingly substantive grounds? Why should the assertion of identity overrule the assertion of difference, or be regarded as now fundamental and truer is the essential question in both the contexts.

There are two different questions involved in any consideration of these two statements deriving from two very different traditions of philosophizing in

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the two major traditions of the world. The first relates to the problem as to what an identity statement exactly means. The second relates to the question as to why the identity statements even if true, be regarded as more fundamental or "truer" than the statement asserting the difference between the two. And though the discussion until now, both in the Indian and the Western tradition, has been confined to the assertion of an identity statement in respect to entities which were earlier considered to be different, there is no need to do so, as there is, at the same time, the problem of coming to know that two things which were considered to be identical are really different, thereby annulling the identity which was asserted earlier. The objection may be raised that the very statement that the two entities were regarded as identical points to the fact that there was some difference between the two, as otherwise they would not have been regarded as "two". However, the objection assumes that a "true" identity statement cannot in principle be made about any entities which are even numerically different. This would, of course, imply that no difference whatsoever could ever be permitted in the context of the assertion of a "real" identity. But then even the assertion of identity in the case of such statement as "*Tattvam Asi*" or "the morning star is the evening star", will be deceptive as there will be some difference between the two arising from the fact they they were considered to be different. In fact, the difference between the "morning star" and the "evening star" does not disappear when it comes to be known that both the expressions refer to an identical objects, that is, the planet "Venus". The distinction between "sense and reference" is itself based on this difference, as it is held that while the senses of the two expressions are different, their referent is the same. However, even when the identity of the referent is known, the difference in the senses does not disappear.

Traditionally in order to avoid this difficulty, it was usually held that proper names have no connotation and that they derive their meaning only from the object that they name. On the other hand, it was held that common nouns have only connotation but no denotation, and that was supposed to be the reason for the view that the existence of what they connoted was still to be established as one did not know whether the properties connoted by those words actually applied or belonged to some entity. But such a view, though widely prevalent, goes counter to the fact that most proper names have a "meaning" attached to them which one can easily read off from the name itself. One can, for example,

easily tell whether the name belongs to a Hindu or a Muslim or a Christian and not only this, but also whether one is a German, Russian, Chinese or Japanese. One may, of course, be sometimes mistaken in this, but then one can always be mistaken about anything. The point is that one can, in most cases, tell correctly the properties which belong to the person whose name it is supposed to be. Moreover, as the same name belongs to many different persons and sometimes even to pet animals, to consider such proper names as purely denotative seems obviously mistaken. It is perhaps only in an ideal language that each existent object in the world will have its own name which would be applied to no one else and which would designate no other properties which would belong to the person or object whose "name" it is. The numerical identification of objects tries to do just this as in such a language the object is given to no one else. But even in such a language after one has become acquainted with the object to which the number has been assigned, one begins to associate the number itself with the peculiar specification of the object to which the number was assigned. From that point onwards, the numerical designation ceases to be purely denotative as is known to everyone who has tried to give numbers to individuals and called them by that name.

In fact, the problem of identity arises in the context of proper names also. The same child who is known by his or her pet name has also a formal name at school and other children in the school know him or her by that name. In such a situation, if a friend comes home for a visit and hears the child called by her pet name, he would normally think that it was someone else who was being addressed. So it becomes a learning experience to find that her friend whom she called "Sidhant" at school is known as "Tin Tin" at home. Thus, for her, "Tin Tin" is "Sidhant" would be as much a piece of information as "the morning star is the evening star" was for Frege or "*Tattvam Asi*" was for "Śvetaketu". In fact, the same situation would obtain if in place of two proper names which apply to the same object, we would have a definite description for one of the proper names, say for example, that "Sidhant" is the one who stood first in his class or who had obtained the highest score in the cricket match which his school team had played against another school. The definite description can be made as precise as one wants so that it may apply only to the object which bears that name.

A definite description functions as uniquely denotative, even though it

connotes specific properties, for it connotes them in such a way that they apply only to one individual in the world. But it is not necessary that an object may have only one definite description, which applies to it alone. In fact it may have more than one definite description which uniquely designates it, and then there can be a significant identity statement asserting that the object designated by one definite description is the same as the one designated by the other definite description. The statement "the morning star is the evening star" may thus be constructed as a statement of identity between two definite descriptions which were not known to apply to the same object earlier.

The theory of proper names and definite descriptions has gone through a complicated discussion, but the niceties and the subtleties introduced by it are irrelevant to the point that we are making in the context of the analysis and understanding of what an identity statement involves and means. In the statement "the morning star is the evening star", both the "morning star" and the "evening star" are objects of perception, the only difference between them being that one is observed in the morning while the other is observed in the evening. The identical object to which these two expressions refer is supposed to be the planet "Venus". The identity asserted, therefore, can only be on some other ground which would most probably be theoretical one as even if we admit that the planet Venus is observable through other means, the identity of the perceptual object with the one that is perceived as the morning star and the evening star will most probably be on theoretical considerations.

In the Upaniṣadic statement, on the other hand, the "Brahman" which is one term in the identity statement cannot normally be taken to be an object of perception or introspective experience, while the "ātman" which is the other term in the identity statement may be regarded as the object of introspective experience. In case this is accepted, one term of the identity statement deriving from the Upaniṣads would have to be held to be theoretical in nature. While the other term is considered to refer to something that is experienced. However, it may also be held that the self, which is introspectively known can never be regarded as the *ātman*. for the *ātman* is that which can never be the object of experience, whether introspective or perceptual. This, of course, has been the usual contention at least among the Advaitins; however, in case this is accepted, the *ātman* would also have to be treated as a theoretical postulate introduced to understand the unity of experience underlying the changing mental states which

alone are the objects of introspective experience. The theoretical necessity of postulating the unity of the world or all that is "object" in the concept of Brahman, is matched by the theoretical necessity of postulating the *ātman* to account for the unity of all that is experienced by the self. The identity statement, according to this interpretation, asserts the identity between two theoretically postulated entities for understanding experience in its objective and subjective aspects, and thus will be radically different from the statement of identity between the morning star and the evening star.

In the second statement, the two entities whose identity is being asserted are already objects of perceptual experience and hence after the realization that the two objects which were seen at different times are really the same, nothing further need be done except the annulment of the mistaken notion that they were different. As against this, the identity statement concerning the *ātman* and the Brahman results in the demand for the experiential realization of that identity, for the two are still experienced as different. In fact, the two are not experienced at all as they are the result of a theoretical insight, and hence demand experiential realization of the identity between them. Neither the *ātman* nor the Brahman are directly experienced, and hence require a special spiritual praxis for their existential realization in experience. There has, therefore, to be a two-fold *sādhana*, one for the actual realization in one's experience of the *ātman* and the other for the realization of the Brahman. There seems, however, to be a radical difference between the two as the *ātman* refers to the unity of the self which in some sense is already included in all experience. But while the *ātman* has the unity which is a part of all experience, that which is experienced as object is obviously not experienced in the same way. The difference would become clearer if instead of the *ātman* and the Brahman, we talk of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. The *Puruṣa* as the witness consciousness is an essential element of all conscious experience, and though in the Śāṃkhyan framework it cannot be regarded as the unity underlying all experience or as even unifying it in any sense whatsoever, it still is present in all experience. *Prakṛti* on the other hand, is only the postulated unity of all that is "object", including not only mental and physical processes but also the functioning of intellect and reason, along with even the sense of egoity or "I-ness". But it is never directly experienced as the witness - consciousness is.

In the Śāṃkhyan framework what is attempted to be realised is only the

Puruṣa as bereft of all identification with the "object" in any sense whatsoever, and not the *prakṛti*. The Sāṃkhyan paradigm thus starts with the assertion that the experienced identity of the self with the "object" at any level is mistaken for the two are radically different from each other. Here, we start with an experienced identity which on theoretical grounds is supposed to be mistaken and hence what is asserted as the difference between that which is experienced as identity. The self naturally identifies itself with "I-ness", reason and other mental processes. It also identifies itself with the body and its various organs, particularly in the processes of knowing, feeling and willing. I open my eyes and see; I feel pain and say that I am in pain; I will to lift my hand and I do so. Thus the act of identification is existential and experiences all the time. It is only some theoretical considerations which lead one to the conclusion that such an identification is mistaken and that "I" cannot be the one who knows, feels, wills or reasons. The demand in this case then, is to realize that one is not what one usually considers oneself to be and therefore one has to successively de-identify oneself from all that is "object" to one's consciousness, that is the body, the mind, the intellect, the sense of "I-ness", or anything else which may appear as object to one's consciousness and with which one identifies almost naturally.

The theoretical considerations which lead one to the realization of oneself as "*Puruṣa*" should therefore be different from the theoretical considerations which lead one to postulate oneself as "*Ātman*" and attempt to realize or actualize it in one's lived experience, if one is to maintain a distinction between the "*Puruṣa*" of Sāṃkhya and the "*Ātman*" of Vedānta. But somehow the Vedāntins, including the Advaitins, have failed to make this distinction, even though they have interpreted the Upaniṣadic statements such as "*Tattvam Asi*", "*Aham Brahmāsmi*", "*Sarvam Khalvidam Brahman*" differently. Not only this as we had pointed out long ago in an article entitled "*Adhyāsa -- a non-Advaitic beginning in Sāṃkhya Vedānta*", Sāṃkhya himself starts his well-known "*Bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtras* with a *Sāṃkhya adhyāsa* and not with an Advaitic *adhyāsa* as one would have expected him to do. The difference between the two emanates from what one considers to be mistaken, the difference or the identity. In Sāṃkhya, as everyone knows, the fundamental mistake consists of *identifying* the self with anything else. While in Advaita Vedānta, it consists of thinking oneself to be *different* from anything else. The

fundamental assertion therefore in the former is of radical difference where, because of ignorance, identity is experienced. In the latter, on the other hand, what is asserted is identity where, because of ignorance, one experiences distinction and difference. In both cases, however, the mistake is actually experienced and when, on theoretical grounds, it is realized that the mistake is a real mistake, the demand is for such a transformation of experience that the mistake is existentially annulled and that which was considered to be real on theoretical grounds is actually experienced existentially in place of what was experienced earlier. Thus, neither in Sāṃkhya nor in Advaita Vedānta is the mere theoretical realization of what is regarded as true sufficient, as from their perspective the theoretical apprehension of reality is never sufficient in itself since it only provides a ground to actually strive for an existential realization in one's experience. There is little point in knowing that the way one experiences reality in one's consciousness is fundamentally mistaken without trying to change that way of experiencing so that one begins to live a life in which one's consciousness undergoes such a transformation that one experiences reality in a different way. The usual correlation of theoretically argued philosophical positions in Sāṃkhya and Advāita Vedānta with techniques of spiritual praxis are supposed to result in this transformation of what was theoretically grasped into an actual lived experience that can be made intelligible in some way.

The paradigmatic example of a mistaken apprehension given in the tradition confirms this, for the snake which was seen and which aroused fear in one completely disappears when one realizes that it was not a snake but a rope. In the rope/snake example, which is usually given by the Advaitins in this connection, when the snake appears, the rope is completely absent and when one realizes that one was mistaken, what appears is only the rope and not the snake. But though the example is usually given and entails the complete disappearance of the snake after one has realized that it was really a rope, the question is raised as to what happens to the multiple differentiated reality of the world after one has realized that the *ātman* is not different from anything else. The problem of *jīvana-mukti* or the achievement of complete liberation even while one is alive raises this problem in a tangential way.

The Advaitin starts from the postulate of the unity of everything and the Sāṃkhya starts from the fact that anything which is an object to consciousness cannot have consciousness as its property. This appears, paradoxically, to share

the same view of “*adhyāsa*”, which is regarded as the foundational mistake in both the systems. It is, of course true that the Advaitin also asserts the primacy of consciousness especially in its witness aspect and focusses attention upon the fact that it alone remains constant while all that appears to it as object is variable. It does not emphasize the identification aspect of the consciousness with that which appears as “object” to it. It seems to be more interested in the constancy and invariability of consciousness vis a vis all that appears to it; but it gives no ground for holding that what is inconstant or variable is unreal. Not only this, it does not appear to make a distinction between the variability within an object and the variation that arises from the succession of one object by another in consciousness. In fact, it does not even distinguish between the change and variation in objects of consciousness which are due to consciousness itself and those which are due to changes in the objects of consciousness themselves. Normally it ascribes change in consciousness either to objects or to *samskāras* left by past experience, or even by *anādi vāsanā* for which no explanation is given.

The close affinity between the Sāṃkhya and the Advaitic analysis arises perhaps from the fact that the advaitin has not taken seriously his own insight deriving from the Upaniṣadic statement “*Sarvam khalvidam Brahman*” and has concentrated more on such statements as “*Tat Tvam Asi*” or “*Aham Brahmasmi*”, which dominates Advaitic thinking, and not that of the Brahman. Had it done so, the advaitin would have tried to discover how he reached the concept of Brahman in the first place. If our attention shifts from the *ātman* to the Brahman, then we would see that it arises from our search for the unity underlying the multiplicity of the world and as we ourselves are a part of the world, it, that is, the Brahman, would also be one’s innermost reality, just as it is of everything else. But then one need not postulate *ātman* as a distinct element is one’s thought. It is the *ātman*-centric thought of the Advaitins that has created all the problems which could have easily been avoided if they had taken the Brahman-centric thought of the Upaniṣadic tradition more seriously. But then the identity statement would have been that the Brahman which underlies the multiplicity of the world and provides it with both unity and reality does the same for me and hence the reality in me is identical with it.

The Advaitin, on the other hand, seems to have started with the *ātman* as the underlying reality of all our conscious experience providing the both unity

and reality, and as this cannot be something unconscious, it gives it the essential quality of consciousness or even considers it as identical with consciousness. There seems, however, no necessity for attributing consciousness to the reality that provides unity to the whole world as the *Jaḍa Prakṛti*, or inanimate matter, can also be considered to provide it adequately as the Sāṃkhya thought. But the Sāṃkhya had to postulate a separate principle for understanding consciousness, unlike the thoroughgoing materialists such as the Cārvākas who regarded consciousness as one of the emergent properties of matter. Ultimately, then the dispute between the materialistic identification of everything with matter or energy and the spiritualist's identification of everything with the ātman or the Brahman consists in the fact that the latter is supposed to be intrinsically, inalienably and substantively conscious. But then the problem arises as to how to understand the inert matter that surrounds us everywhere; if it is essentially unconscious, it cannot be derived from a principle the essential reality of which consists of being conscious. Sri Aurobindo is perhaps the only thinker who has taken this problem seriously and argued that the denials of both the spiritualists and the materialists are one-sided as matter could not be so "material" if it could give rise to consciousness. However, he has not argued that the spirit could not be so "spiritual" if there was such a thing as matter in the world. Instead of taking this line which was implicit in his own argument, he has tried to explain matter in terms of the realization of one of the possibilities, inherent in consciousness itself, that is, of forgetfulness of seemingly putting everything aside and for the moment losing oneself almost completely in the given content of itself. Matter, therefore, for him is a seeming forgetfulness of consciousness where the latter appears to be completely concealed behind the mask of unconsciousness.

The worlds between matter and self-conscious mind have not been the subject of much attention in either Sāṃkhya or Advaitic thought. But there is the large world of life as in the plants or of consciousness in the animal world which also demands unity and reality of its own. Similarly, there is also the problem of the reality of these worlds to the world of matter and to the world of human beings who create cultures and civilizations and live primarily in a world consisting of symbols and meanings devised by themselves. The theory of evolution tries to realize these worlds, but fails to account for the radical discontinuities between them. Sri Aurobindo, on the other hand, has taken into

account the principle of life independently of the world of mind but does not seem to have paid attention to the radical distinction between the world of plants and the world of animals nor does he discuss the distinctive autonomy of these realms and the significance of each in terms of its own reality.

However, the problem of an identification statement with respect to each of these realms and to all the realms together poses the same problem, that is, whether the identity asserted denies the differences within the realm or between the realms and if it does so, what does this denial actually mean. The assertion of the identity, however, always entails the fact that the asserted identity is more fundamental and "real" than the apparent difference which seems to be "real" in the first place, but on reflection, is not found to be so. The status of the "apparent" difference may, however, be a matter of dispute, as some may regard it to be only secondary in character, while others may consider it to be totally illusory or delusory or even the result of a delusion which is rooted in the psychology of the perceiver. The psychological foundations of the delusion may be side to lie not in the mind of the individual person but rather in what constitutes the psyche of humanity as a whole, thus giving the delusion the character of a shared, "objective" appearance which is common to all human beings. The difference between the illusion of which we talked about earlier and this delusion lies in the fact that while the former illusion is normally a result of the structure of the physical senses that all human beings have, the delusion occurs because of the common psychic propensities which all human beings possess just because they are human. Also, just as there can be a difference between a psychic delusion belonging to one single individual or a group of individuals and those that belong to all human kind as such, the illusions may also be the result of the specific physical structure of an individual human being or group of human beings and those which result from the fact that one shares the common biological structure with all human beings by virtue of the fact that they are human beings. The appearance, then, may result from many different causes, but its essential character lies in the fact that it is shown to be "unreal" by critical reflection which uncovers the ground of the "appearance" and reveals why that which "appears" to be so ought not to be regarded as real. But, as we have already pointed out, the "appearance" may not only be of differences, but also of identity, as the critical reflection has no special bias towards either identity or difference. In either case, one is presented with the problem as to how one is

to conceive of that which the critical reflection has shown to be mistaken, and what exactly happens to this mistake when it is realized to be a "mistake". The problem relates to the issue as to whether after the mistake is realized as a "mistake", it disappears or continues to persist in one's consciousness even though it is realized to be a mistake. In the former case, the realization dissolves the experience of what was taken to be a mistake, while in the latter case, the correction operates only at a theoretical level and has only a marginal influence on the "appearing" illusion or delusion, as the case may be.

Besides this important difference, there is another which does not seem to have been noticed until now, particularly in the context of the distinction between the Sāṃkhyan and the Advaitic examples of what constitutes the foundational ignorance of which we are required to get rid of. In the Advaitic perspective, as we had noted earlier, it is the experience of difference which is regarded as illusory, while in the Sāṃkhya analysis it is the identity which is regarded as the basic mistake. But what is this "identity" which is regarded as the foundational mistake in the Sāṃkhyan perspective? The identity, obviously, if it is to be meaningful, has to be between things which are different in some sense. When, for example, one regards oneself as "identical" with the body or the mind, or the *buddhi*, or the sense of "I-ness", or egoity, one is identifying oneself with something which one also regards as different in some way or other. The realization that the identity is in some sense mistaken is merely to become aware that the underlying difference which was being presupposed by the experience of identity is more fundamentally real than one had taken it to be. The de-identification achieved through the Sāṃkhyan process of realization does not, or ought not to, result in the non-awareness of that from which one realizes oneself to be utterly and absolutely different. Is it possibly the same in the Advaitin realization which may be regarded as the opposite pole of the Sāṃkhyan realization? In other words, does the Advaitic analysis imply that the appearance of "difference" somehow presupposes or implies an identity between those that are experienced to be different, and that the difference merely consists in the awareness that the "identity" which was presupposed was more fundamental and real than the difference which one had accepted to be the primary reality?

This of course, is not the Advaitic position as it is usually presented, though if the ideal of *jivana-mukti* or liberation within life is accepted, then it would follow that it is only the interpretation that we have given above which

will be in accord with the ideal. In fact even the usual interpretation of Sāṃkhya is done in such a way that in the state of complete de-identification or *kaivalya* one is not supposed to be aware of anything at all. But as we have argued elsewhere, if this were to be accepted as the true Sāṃkhyan position, then there would remain nothing to distinguish it from the Advaitic position as it is usually understood. On the other hand, if the ideal of *jīvana-mukti* is accepted for Sāṃkhya also, as is usually done for Advaita Vedānta, then the only difference between them would consist in the fact that while for the former the experience of the difference of the self from everything else will be a primary fact of self-consciousness; in the case of the latter, it will be the experience of identity and not the difference.

However, in the cases of both Sāṃkhya and Vedānta, the problem of identity and difference is primarily related to the experiencing consciousness and not to the objects of which the consciousness is aware. The Fregean example of the "the morning star is the evening star" relates to two objects of consciousness which are really identical but are supposed to be different. One will, therefore, have to distinguish between those problems of identity which arise in respect to objects of consciousness and others which arise from the relation of the experiencing consciousness to any object whatsoever. Nevertheless, as the objects themselves may be of a different order, the problem with regard to them may also occur at different levels. The identity, for example of five plus three and four plus four or six plus two is an identity of a different kind than the one between "the morning star" and "the evening star". Similarly, the identity between two theories in science which were earlier supposed to be different is a matter of a very different order as here the assertion of identity only means that whatever can be derived from one can also be derived from the other and what cannot be derived from the one cannot also be derived from the other. The basic difference in all such cases where the identity asserted belongs to two different objects of consciousness, whether at the perceptual or the non-perceptual level, is that one generally ignores the ontological status of the illusory apprehension and the problem of what happens to it when the illusion gets corrected. On the other hand, as consciousness itself can become an "object" in introspective apprehension or self-consciousness, the problem of an illusory apprehension of identity or difference with respect to it begins to have "existential" consciousness for self-consciousness. This, to a certain extent,

occurs also in all those cases where the primary reference is not to physical objects but to psychic states themselves or to meanings which are apprehended or feelings and emotions as generally happen in cases of aesthetic apprehensions.

The problem of the assertion of identity in the context of an illusory difference that was previously apprehended as real, has to be differentiated depending upon the types of objects between which identity is being asserted. Not only this, one has also to distinguish the levels at which the identity is being asserted; unless this is done, one will have the mistaken impression that the problem of the assertion of an alleged "real" identity in the face of an apprehended difference would be seen as of only one type. This would necessarily lead to avoidable controversies regarding what an alleged statement of "real" identity means, as has been the case until now. The western discussion on the subject has generally been confined to statements asserting identity between statements which primarily belong to a cognitive discourse, and where the "referents" are usually clearly identifiable physical objects. This seems to be the basic ground of the distinction between "sense" and "reference" which Frege indicated in his well-known paper on the subject. The Indian discussion, on the other hand, appears to have confined itself primarily to epistemological issues at the psychological or experiential level, little caring about the identity issue in respect to physical objects which Frege points out in his famous example. The issue then, has been discussed in the two traditions in limited contexts and it is time that it is widened to cover not only these two diverse traditions of philosophizing but that it should go beyond them.

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A JOURNEY TOWARDS ESSENCE OF MANDUKYO UPONISHOD FOR A THEORY OF TIME¹

J. K. BARTHAKUR

Introduction

There is a dearth of material in modern India on research done on time. The studies made abroad have not evolved a cogent theory overcoming the impassess posed in the last century. In these studies, and in some literature of Indian origin, the Indian philosophical view on time has been projected as "circular". This "circularity" has the basis in the writings about recreation of the universe after every *Kolpo*^a. The matter of kolpo-wise creation, following destruction in *prôlôyô*^b, had been discussed and rejected by âdi Shônkhôchäryyô of the ninth century - Shonkaro in short - in his commentary on Mändükyô üpônîshôd, or MU. In addition, he allows time to be taken as a concept; assumes time-constrictions during *sopno*^c, and *sushupti*^d; grants a multiplicity of conscious time; and disallows event-idea based conscious time to be anywhere near the terminal oneness. He arrives at oneness by discarding duality step by step; every step carrying him nearer to the goal. Shonkoro had met long ago the logical deadlock that stalls the contemporary philosophy in comprehending time. To recapitulate, the understanding of time, as perceived in its connection and association with events, escapes its commonplace meaning mainly in two paradoxes. The first is that a duration of time has to be open at least on one end because the events are separate from each other. Secondly, separate events cannot be observed or conceived without a measure of temporality, or *time is not definable*... India's *Shruti*^e has a good, ancient and misread doctrine of time that had taken care of suchlike paradoxes centuries ago.

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Scope and objective

The scope of the essay will cover the text and the commentary of Shonkoro on MU. Its Part II flashes the basic text of MU.

Part III of the essay locates time in *Om*^f and derives time's definition via *odvoito*^g. The multiplicity of conscious time is a corollary. These aspects are the Indian philosophical heritage. The expressions² secured from this ancestry, are adequate to meet the requirements of the modern age.

Apologies are offered to Sanskrit scholars for writing Sanskrit in Roman script; and apologies are offered to the scholars not familiar with Sanskrit for the use of so many Sanskrit words in this essay. A pronunciation guide is provided for the latter in Endnote No. 1.

About the material that is being used in this essay

MU is included in the *Brāhmôn* or the philosophy part of ôthôrvô Vedo or AV. MU contains twelve *montro*^hs; and it is the shortest and possibly the most abstract *uponishod*ⁱ. MU deals with the sound of *Om*^j that occupies an important position in the Hindu philosophy³; and defines it. The concept of oneness or monism or *odvoito* emerges from it. The logical pattern of *Om* may be used as an anchor and a foundation for a theory of time.

The *odvoito* propounded by Shonkoro is called *Kéâvôlâdvôitô* or "only *odvoitao*" and the same is different from the *odvoito* concept that emerged in the later ages like *Védâvédé* Bhāskārô, *Vishishtâdvôitô* of Rāmānūjô, *Dvôitâdvôitô* of Nimbārô, *Shūddhâdvôitô* of Völlôbhô, and so on. These later versions of *odvoito* will not figure in this essay. Also, the alternatives to *odvoito* provided in *ôchiintyôbbhédâbhédô* by Shrî Chôityônyô will not be discussed.

The differences with Shonkoro in interpreting MU : 2 and MU : 8 in the essay, are not discords.

The *Shônkôrôbhāshyô* on *Gôûrôpâdeeyôkārîkā* of *Māṇḍūkya* *uponishod* is shortened to MU : G : SB :. This will be the general pattern of references. Some abbreviations are defined in Footnote i.

Shonkoro had very clear ideas regarding time and he had extracted these

with a deep study of *shruti*. He had provided much material to resolve the contemporary problems of time. Shonkor's views in MU may be recounted, in advance, as below :

1. Time is a concept. Conscious time is associated with real or unreal events or ideas. Space is a physicality. Conscious time, space and real event or idea are jointly comprehensible. A blending of conscious time with unreal event or idea may distort space or make space appear as a concept.
2. There has to be a multiplicity of conscious time to be associated with the multiplicity of events and ideas.
3. There is no circularity in creation. Therefore, time also does not have to end.
4. *Odvoito* is the terminal result of a chain of arguments. So, the path to monism is a process of continually narrowing down of the prevailing multiplicity.

A few terms that were used by Shonkoro, are employed in this essay in their original form. A translation of the expressions does not do justice because they contain compressed forms of understanding. An attempt has been made to explain two of such terms before use; because without them the discussion can not begin.

***BROHMO*^k**

Brôhmô is the first or the nominative singular form of *Brôhmôn*. The concept of *Brohmo*, has been developed at some length in *uponishods*. With comments that indeed bear very fine arguments on a number of *uponishods*, Shankoro has laid the path to consider that *Brohmo* is the culmination of the logical development of an argument -- any argument. It is fair to say at the outset that this version of *Brohmo* is not acceptable to most of the Hindu theologians. Regardless of such dissensions, one may sand-bag behind the verb root *brîh* and the adjunct *môn* : *brîh+môn* literally means that which generates or spreads by itself : A step beyond the terminal cloture of an argument. The concept of *Brohmo* is the containment of the totality of all sequences of reasoning in one source.

It is not easy to satisfy theologicians with this type of arguments. Examples can be cited in SV⁴ in SV : 6 : 21 & 22 that reveal a cult-study of the concept of *Brohmo*; and to the worship in SV : 6 : 18 & 19. Shonkoro has used the word *pôrômätmä* to explain this idea of *Brhhmo* contained in SV:6:18. He had added *pôrôméshvôrô* before *pôrômätmä* while commenting on *Eeshôn* included in the first *montro* of EV⁵. EV is the first of the *uponishods* and it begins by saying that the universe, as *jôgôt* (*gôm+kkip*) in the form of a moving universe or as *sômsärô* (*sôm+sri+ghôn*) in the form of equilibrium and equinamity, is covered by *Eeshôn*. Shonkoro explains *Eeshôn* as *pôrôméshvôrô* and *pôrômätmä* after assigning the meaning of "ruling or governing" to *Eeshôn*. Thus, the requirements of theology seem to be adequately answered with the concept of *Pôrôméshvôrô* or *Pôrômätmä* or *Eeshôn*, which may yet cover the concepts concerning creation even if such concepts are transients.

Brohmo that is there where all locigal processes terminate, is referred, understandably, sometimes as *Không Brôhmô* or "that *Brohmo*" : That *Brohmo* which is reached at the end of any argument. No more can be said about it because it exists without a definable character or quality. And "it is there" *tôt sôt - that or there exists*'. The other widely acceptable reference to *Brohmo* is made as *Nirgünô Brôhmô* or *Brohmo* without quality.

There were attempts at understanding *Brohmo* as an inductive process. An example is provided in Shonkoro's comments on BU : 2 : - 4 : 7 to 10. The basic point is to accept *Brohmo* as a premise because all derivatives from it fall in place without any conflict.

It is interesting that generations have distorted the concept, used the same word for so many different ways, attempted worship and placement of *Brohmo* in theogony; but all these are of no avail, *Brohmo* remains a concept, stays an intellectual pursuit, continues as an ultimate shield for logic.

OM

The linkage of *Brohmo* with the sound form of *Om* is a profound thought. *Om* is almost *Brohmo*.⁶ Shonkoro has provided an introduction to *Om* in the chapter called *ägômô prôkôrôn* of his commentary on MU. He quotes KU : 1 : 2 : 14 and 1 : 2 : 17, PR : 5 : 2, MO : 6 : 3, TU : 1 : 8 : 1 and CH 2 : 23 : 3.

He tells, but not very clearly, how *Om* came to be. CH : 3 comes the closest to explaining the origin of *Om*. It says that *Om* was realised by Prôjâpôtî in meditation. *Om* precedes Prôjâpôtî and Prôjâpôtî precedes Creation¹. Thus, *Om* is a pre-creation concept. It is a *Brohmo*-like concept. But there is not much convincing argument as to why *Om* is "the word" and not some other. CH 1 : 1 : 8 gives an interesting reason. *Om* is a universal expression of acquiescence and therefore, it is the highest possible intellectual attainment. It is true that *Om* provides, as proved by Shonkoro in various parts of *uponishod*, an excellent methodology to tackle the limiting thoughts. But it is not clear why the theologician assigns a magical property to *Om* and insists that it is the sound that reverberates as the totality of all the sounds of the universe. On the other hand, the *uponishod* by and large say that *Om* is a *Brohmo*-like concept. Shonkoro quotes as beolw :

" <i>Om</i> is this"	KU : 1 : 2 : 14
" <i>Om</i> is support"	KU : 1 : 2 : 17
" <i>Om</i> is what is <i>Brohmo</i> "	PR : 4 : 2
" <i>Om</i> is the prayer word"	MO : 6 : 3
" <i>Om</i> is <i>Brohmo</i> "	TU : 1 : 8 : 1
"All is <i>Om</i> "	CH : 2 : 23 : 3

Shonkoro provides varieties of arguments for acceptance of *Om* as a conceptual heavyweight. He summarises the scholarly discourse saying that the naming of a concept is a valid exercise in accordance with erudite tradition.^m He quotes CH in "the alternatives are only names and provide the luxury of words"ⁿ; "that (*Bromho*) spreads tied over everything with rope made of threads of names"^o; and "all these are only names as stated in *Shruti*"^p. There will be no harm if, for the purpose of this essay, *Om* is taken as a name of a *Brohmo*-like concept and *Pôrômô Brôhmô* is taken to be another name of *Brohmo*.

Part II

AN EXAMINATION OF THE MÃÑḌÜKYÔ *Uponishod*

MU : 1 : *Om* this letter is everything. This letter is the explanation of all that is past, future and present; therefore, all these are

Om. If anything in time is left out of these three divisions of time, then that remainder of time is also *Om*.

Shonkoro has expanded this direct understanding of the *montrô*. According to his commentary, what is to be established in argument, or *óbhiđháyô*, is finally the same as what is established in argument, or *óbhiđhân*; and therefore, together, both *óbhiđháyô*, and *óbhiđhân*, are only *Om*. Since *Pôrômô Brôhmô* is also *Om*. This expansion is in order if the limiting termination of the questions that arise and the envisioned unlimited contents from where to draw a strain of inductions, are, as in a theory of time, the objectives. Thus, MU : 1 is an important *montrô* for a theory of time. *Om* is the origin of time. Beyond *Om* is *Brohmo*; where neither time nor any other identity can survive. *Om* falls short of the concept of *Brohmo*. *Om* is to be worshipped. This is confirmed by other texts.

CH:1:4:1 Pray to the expression (*udgeetho*⁹) *Om* : *Om* expresses : *Om* explains expression.


This is not *Brohmo* that has been explained as the terminal of deductive argument and at the start of the inductive reasoning. *Om* stems from the concept of *Brohmo*; an inductive step below *Brohmo*; it is pure, it is not a derivative of anything; it is worshipped; it is used. For "time", CH : 1 : 4 ; 1 may support that "*Om* exposes time" and "*Om* explains time" and MU : 2 says that "*Om* contains time" in its purest form : Past, future, present and what is not past, future and present. This is a confirmation of AV : 19 : 53 : 3^r. Listen to Shonkoro in the first *môntrô* of ET :

Commentary of Shonkoro on ;

ET 1:1:1 äq meaning "spread" or ôd meaning "eat" or ôt meaning "constant movement" provides the root meaning to *atma*^s. What is called the universe and under stood by the differences supplied by name, shape and property, was *atma* who was

.....

Question	:	Was not <i>atma</i> also time.
Answer	:	No.
Question	:	Why then use "was"?
Answer	:	Time is different It is there with <i>atma</i> like



Mandukyo Uponishod for a Theory of Time

“foam” in water; “foam” and water may be same in substance but their difference ought to be understood.....

Naturally, the emergence of the concept of *atma* can not precede the concept of time. *Om* contains time. This unformed time remains unassociated with anything; and does not require time to be divided into past, present or future or any other possible segmentation. *Om* presents a limiting state for the study of time. It is worthwhile to accompany Shonkoro in MU.

For a theory of time, the secular circularity of indirection will be like this : *Om* is a pre-creation concept. *Om* is that part of *Brohmo* which is a pure sound or a pure abstraction and can be worshipped : Downwards, *atma* is a post-creation concept. *Atma* is that part of *Om* that has crossed over to a post-creation station; *atma* allows an understanding of *Om* through itself. Upwards, *Om* may be used as a methodology to approach the concept of *Brohmo*. *Brohmo*, *Om* and *atma* may not be in existence in the same conceptual level together; and it may not be possible to comprehend all three of them collectively. It may not also be correct to expect that there may be a common product-region of all the three. But the fact remains that these post-creation and pre-creation “speculations” emerge out of human logic which is a post-creation phenomenon. “Logic” is expected to be continuous in all directions; the singularities appearing only due to lack of or incomplete information. Thus, it is “logical” to assume that there can be a pre-creation-logical-reason or PCLR that may contain “impressions” of the trio of *Brohmo*, *Om* and *atma*; however restricted those “impressions” may be, PCLR allows the “impressions” to acquire inter-relation within PCLR. PCLR is the home of applied human intelligence. PCLR allows freedom to geometry to tackle mundanely the awesome; in this case, try to fasten in mind the amazing trio of Hindu philosophy. Further discussions may be presumed to be taking place either within PCLR or within “space”, the latter being a physicality.

A few terms may be adopted for the shake of brevity of discussing MU:2 and MU : 3.

Proponcho¹ : This term basically means “doubt” or “confusion”. Very often the term carries wider and more complicated meanings

like “alternative interpretation” or “misrepresentation”. It is better to retain the term in English whenever it appears in the Sanskrit text since a detail explanation for its every use is not required for the purpose of this essay; and, on the other hand, without a detailed explanation, the attempted translations may mislead.

- Vôhishprôjnô:** One who has acquired knowledge by oneself (without formal training). A vôhishprôjnô's knowledge relates to the stage of being fully awake and to observable matter or idea.
- Vôishvânôrô:** The term literally means “relating to the man form of universe” and really used for that specific meaning. The term helps to use parables for the universe.
- Ôgnihôtrô :** It may mean the undying sacrificial fire. Also, it may mean one who attends to such sacrificial fire; all well as the pursuit of attainable knowledge or material wealth.

The *montros* may now be introduced as below :

- MU : 2 :** All these are *Brohmo*. This *atma* is also *Brohmo*. This *atma* has four divisions.
- MU : 3 :** The first division is of the *Vôishvânôrô* and *Vôhishprôjnô* of the fully awakened stage that has seven limbs and nineteen mouths.

Shonkoro explains that the seven parts of the body of *Vôishvânôrô atma* are outer-space which is the head, sun -- the eye, wind - the ... In the imagery of *ôgnihôtrô*, the sacrificial fire or the attainable knowledge is in the mouths. The nineteen mouths are ... Shonkoro raises the doubt himself as to why the third *montro* brings in the concepts of body and mouths instead of explaining the four parts of *Brohmo* that had been spoken of in MU : 2. He supplies the answer saying that there can be no harm in explaining the scope of discussion like this because the ultimate aim is to comprehend the totality of the plural existences as condensed into a conclusive oneness or singularity or monoism.

Shonkoro comments that it is the inner self or *atma* with which the four aspects of *proponcho*, and that which overlords them, are to be related. In that case, the overcoming and consequently discarding the *proponchos* establish the

oneness or *odvoito*. What is stated in other texts as "all that exist" and so on, so says Shonkoro, need not necessarily, or any longer, mean a plurality : The basic aim of *uponishod* is to establish a universal rule, which is, for Shonkoro, *odvoito*; and where this *odvoito* rests, becomes the source of all reasonings. Shonkoro cites Mōdhūbrāhmōñō part of BU. He begins in BU : 2 : 5 : 1 saying that all are extracts (honey) of one and one is the extract of all, to say that the concepts that come into the existence instantly^u, the concepts that do not become non-existent^v, the concepts that base on observation^w and the concepts that base on physicality^x, are the extracts^y of existence^z; and the existence is the extract of suchlike concepts. Shonkoro states that inertia and movement are really the aspects of "one", the end of inertia is movement and the end of movement is inertia; what moves and what is inert is the same. Shonkoro attacks the issue from two directions : If one starts with the mutliplicity of concepts alone, then one ends with the combination of concepts and a physicality : If one starts with the multiplicity of physicalities alone, then one ends with a combination of physicalities and a concept. Possibly, the ideas of Shonkoro are more easily comprehended by some as below :

Proposition : COMBINATION OF CONCEPT WITH PHYSICALITY
LEADS TO ONENESS OR ODVOITO.

If c_1, c_2, \dots, c_n are mutually exclusive concepts and p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n are mutually exclusive physicalities, where N and n are numbers and $N > n$, such that there is no subset of $(c_1p, c_2p, \dots, c_np)$ and of $(cp_1, cp_2, \dots, cp_n)$ where p is not compatible to combine with c 's or c is not compatible to join with p 's or by deduction since no condition is put to the process of combinations p 's not combining with c_1 's and c 's not combining with p_i 's are non-existent, or "zero's" for ordinary comprehension.

The product terms are understood in a general form of multiplication such that the product term $c\hat{p}$'s may not even be compatible with one another. The same may be the case with $cp\hat{i}$'s. When they are not compatible to combine then n number of c_i , c_{ip} s or n number of cp_i 's are zeros. This cannot happen unless m_i number of c_{ip} 's or c_j 's are zeros, where $1/2\mu_1 \leq \mu$, or n_1 number of cp_i 's or cp_j 's are zeros, where $1/2\pi n_1 \leq \pi$. Or at least m_i or n_1 number of combinations that do not combine any further are zeros.

In this understanding, if twos of $c_i p$'s are compatible to combine, they combine to form $c_i c_j p$, which is less than any of $c_i p$ or $c_j p$, to occupy positions either of $c_i p$ or of $c_j p$ and leave out notionally resultant vacant positions. Similarly, if twos of $c p_i$'s are compatible to combine, they combine to form $c p_i p_j$, which is less than any of $c p_i$ or $c p_j$, to occupy positions either of $c p_i$ or of $c p_j$ and leaves out notionally resultant vacant positions. This is because c 's not included in $c_i p$ and p 's not included in $c p_i$ are not comprehensible, or their values are zeros; as are the zero-values of any other of their combinations that do not combine any further. The process of further combinations like ... $p c_i c_j c_k$... and ... $c p_i p_j p_k$... create more vacant positions and ultimately only one combination remains with nothing more to combine with.

The complement of zeros that are generated at different levels of combination, may not appear to be zeros at the previous level; because, as for example, it was possible for (m_i, μ) and (n_i, n) to contain zero-values but such zero-values could not be assigned to them automatically, or with a presumption, without introducing a flaw in the logic of constructing m_i and n_i . These zeros, that had remained unseen at the lower stage, rendered the next higher combinations as zero. And when the final pairs of combinations are arrived at, then they either combine or one of them carry a zero-value.

This is one of the ways of initial introduction of *odvoito* by Shonkoro in MU. Seen from many angles, or probably from any angle, MU is a summary of number of other presentations of the same idea of *odvoito* as explained in other texts of *uponishod*. The journey has just begun and yet it is yielding so rich dividend : It has to be continued.

Another term is required to be adopted for the next *môntrô* of MU.

sopno : The term literally means "dream". According to Shonkoro, when the visible or understandable cause-effect ends and awareness arises regarding an inner cause-effect which is like understandable cause-effect but not exactly the same, then that awareness is called the *sopno*. *Sopno* can also be due to "effect" or due to "cause" alone.

The second term that will be necessary to adopt is *tôijôsô*. But the term is explained by the *montro* itself and Shonkoro explains this very important term

further in his commentary. Therefore, the *montro* will be introduced first *tôijôsô* will be explained later.

MU : 4 : The second division is of that *tôijôsô* whose place is in *sopno*, who is wise at that stage as in the ordinary level of staying awake, who has seven parts of the body and nineteen mouths and who enjoys expression of wisdom without material aim.

Shonkoro states that the conscious mind bears tradition^{aa} which contains imprints of experiences and learning as in a printed cloth. The effects of such a tradition bound mind surface along with what is desired and derived without learning or experience. It then suggests that the instinct based, pre-printed and traditional mind is the cause of the conscious existence. Shonkoro refers to BU : 4 : 3 : 9 to say that, basically, there are two types of mind : The mind of "this world" and the mind of the "next world". The dream or *sopno* is a junction^{bb} of this two types of mind and provides the support^{cc} for ideas to cross over from one level of existence of mind to another. Shonkoro explains that there is an inner expression of mind^{dd} which gets distributed in seeing, hearing, speaking, etc. while one is awake. This inner expression remains present in an undistributed form when one is in the stage of *sopno*. Shonkoro minces no word while stating that *sopno* is not an extra-experience : It is a memory of what had happened before.^{ee}

Shonkoro also refers to PU : 4 : 2 and PU : 4 : 4 to explain that the inner faculties get concentrated during *sopno*. Therefore, it is possible to be as wise during *sopno* as while awake and some remain so. When such a wisdom remains without a material aim, then only the freeing of its expression stays. This is *tôijôsô* of the second stage which is under consideration.

Shonkoro clarifies that the main aim of the *montro* is to emphasise the distinction between *vôishvânôrô* of the previous *montro* and *tôijôsô* of this. *Vôishvânôrô* is connected with external objects and ideas; therefore, the concept "is linked with the awakened state and tied to the obvious"^{ff}. The mind is in a deeper region than what is seen, heard or felt with senses. It is possible for some who are wise^{gg}, to keep their mental status at the same level while awake and while in a state of *sopno*. Such wise persons can also be without a material aim and be concerned only with the expression of wisdom that is revealed during

sopno. Such a concept of wise and the wisdom is called *tôijôsô*. The association of *tôijôsô* is with refined^{hh} knowledge.

Simplification : If 'e' represents external objects, events and ideas, 'a' *vôishvânôrô*, 'ε' *sopno* cause-effect and 't' *tôijôsô* then (e, a) and (ε, t) exist; (ε, a) does not exist.

Closely associated with *sopno* is the concept of *sushupti* which can be stated as below :

sushupti : The state of *sushupti* is slumber (i) when there is no desire and (ii) which is not a state of *sopno*.

The other term that will be required for adoption is *prôjnô*. The term is defined by MU : 5 and the commentary of Shonkoro thereon. Therefore, this term will also be used first and explained later.

MU : 5 The third division is of that *prôjnô* whose place is in *sushüpti*, who enjoys a concentrated form of superior wisdom at the stage of exceptional happiness that has the opening only to consciousness *chétómükhô*.

Shonkoro defines *prôjnô* as the knowledge which is complete and true for the past and true for the future. "By definition established" by the previous two stages "it is called *prôjnô*". "Otherwise, becoming a *prôjnô* is an exceptional stage, it has to be called *prôjnô* because other two stages" (which had been called *vôishvânôrô* and *ôntôh prôjnô*, and) "concern specific knowledge as against the sensual and intellectual realisation of the third stage". Incidentally, "the ascetics reach this stage of *prôjnô* through control of body by *yôgô*, control of mind through transcendental meditation and enhancement of knowledge through the study of *shruti*. The "happiness" contained in the *montro* is also of exceptional calibre. Shonkoro refers to BU : 4 : 3 : 32 for its understanding. The usual and ordinary "observation" and the "knowing" come in smaller doses of satisfaction; but when these extend upto the limiting stages of sensual and intellectual understanding, then supreme happinessⁱⁱ results. It is this supreme happiness of "application of mind" that has found place in MU:5. The concept introduced in this *montro* is continued onto the next *môntrô*.

MU : 6 This (*prôjnô*) is the Lord *Eeshvôrô*, this is the omniscient this is the omni-science of the knowledge yet to be born; and being omnific cause of creation and secession, is also the ultimate cause of all.

Shonkoro explains that the *Eeshvôrô*, used in this *montro* is not the God of theology. Being a derivation of *Eeshôn*, the word means, for this *môntrô*, "one who rules". Thus, to call *prôjnô* the *Eeshvôrô* does not add a concept which is additional to what has been described as *pôrômô Brôhmô* in other parts of *shruti*. Shonkoro's analysis is as follows : Since *prôjnô* is on the divide of consciousness and lack of it. it has to be omniscient : Therefore, it is omniscience of any knowledge that will ever be born : Therefore, the cause of what is created or seceded is also *prôjnô* .j

Shonkoro elaborates the concept to say that difference, identity and singularity of *atma* prevails in the outward manifestation of *prôjnô*, inward mainfesation of *prôjnô* and the potent manifestation of *prôjnô*. Similies are drawn to a big fish that swims between two banks no matter how different the banks are; and a big bird that flies smoothly no matter how turbulent the different parts of the wind-cover may be. Shonkoro explains that *vôishvônôrô* is vision or that which is lighted^{kk}; *tôijôsô* is inside mind; and *prôjnô* is in intellect. After a profound scholarly journey, Shonkoro explains that the *sôdbrôhmô* is but *sôt+brohmo* : Or, the existence+of+*Brohmo* can be said to be that which causes creation^{ll} and also that which is not related with creation^{mm}. "In both ways *Brohmo* satisfies the definition of existence and lack of existence realating to consciousness."

Is this then "zero"? No. Without the opposite a doubt cannot exist. Opposite of *sôdbrôhmô* is the doubt for it. Therefore, it is not zero or emptiness. Is that then "meaningless"? No. It is at the end of a self-journey of intellect. If the journey was not meaningless, then *Sôdbrôhmô* is also not meaningless.

The adoption of another term *türeeyô* is unavoidable. The term is introduced in MU : 7, a translated version of which states as below :

MU : 7 : *Türeeyô* is not *ôntôhprôjnô* not *vôhishprôjñô*, not the both of them, not the potency of *prôjnô*, not *prôjnô*, not the

opposite of *prôjnô*. It is invisible, unusable, unacceptable, undefinable, unthinkable, not manipulatory, essence of the evidence of oneness, end of the *proponcho*, unmoveable, unalienable and oneness of *odvoito*. This is the fourth division, this is the *atma*, this is that which ought to be learnt.

Shonkoro reases a doubt. Why should this *montro* be sung at all? Is it not enough that in the earlier *montros* and in other parts of the *shruti* the nature of *ätmä* has been described? Why all these 'no's and 'yes'es are devised now? Shonkoro also provides an answer saying that if a snake is wrongly taken to be a rope, then the rope is to be understood. If there is a pot in the total darkness and the state of darkness is not terminable, then a knowledge regrading the pot is to be acquired by means other than the termination of darkness. Shonkoro establishes in very fine arguments that the refutalⁿⁿ also can lead to a proof. What is "done" is the result of "doing". Who or what "does" is the cause or reason of "doing". The part of the "reason" passes on to "done" when "done" is understood. There remains a part of "reason" which is yet to be understood^{oo}. For this Shonkoro refers to BU : 4 : 3 : 23 to compare its statement that an observer can not conceive the opposite of observation. Similarly, the cause of "doing" as separated from "done", and the "reason" which is refined to the state of "yet to be understood", can not be conceived to have an opposite or alternative. This finality of "reason" can not contain vagueness^{pp} which leads to *maya*^{qq} or illusion that influences *prôjnô* which influences knowledge itself. Thus, Shonkoro makes a case for MU : 7.

The concept of *türeeyô* is a preparation to come to the concept of *Om*. In this attempt, Shonkoro takes man possibly to one of the highest pinacles of human capability of reasoning. Out of the pen of Shonkoro, the language and the literature flow out as the finest of the music; and the reasonings roll out as a form of art. This is a piece of superb writing of arguments ever written or read, and for many, nothing more lofty than Shonkoro's exposition of *türeeyô* has been accomplished; or can be accomplished. One is astounded to think about the uses to which this level of thinking can be put in mathematics and physics.

However, for a theory of time, securement of a mere introduction to *türeeyô* is enough; because the problem of time beyond creation, and its associative conscious time, is mainly locational. The aim is to seek out where the mathematical argument for conscious time is. Thus, the companionship with the lofty *türeeyô* will be discontinued rather reluctantly.

The discussion done this far allows introduction of all the remaining *montros* of MU together; because it is the methodology of treatment of the limiting ideas which is important for a study of time. The concept of *atma* is already presented as the consciousness which has a time counterpart. This is also a composite concept which is divisible in four successive parts in such a way that the first part *vôishvânôrô* links with the concepts of creation of matter, energy and ideas, and ordinary existence of these, whereas the last and the fourth part *türeeyô* is almost as abstract as the next higher concept of *Om*.

Om has no "counterpart" of time but "contains" time - past, future and present and parts of time that are not past, future and present. For a theory of time, the limiting thought of *Om* may be sufficient and this is what the remaining *montros* of MU analyse. For the same reasons, two terms, that will be used as they are to avoid confusion, will now be assigned rather limited meaning. The first is *pädô* which may carry multiple meanings; but for the purpose of the remaining five *montros* of MU, it will mean the four stages of *vôishvânôrô tôijôsô prôjnô* and *türeeyô* which have already been introduced and explained to some extent. The next word is *mâtrâ*. This word will communicate only the letter-divisions or the sound ingredients of *Om*. The game plan is to associate four *pädôs* with the four *mâtrâ* of *Om*. MU:8 breaks in the concept of "finality of reason". It requires but a short reflection to accept that this "finality of reason" is the same as the concept of *atma* and not "the termination of the logical process".

MU : 8 : The finality of reason or *atma* is best defined by letter and that letter is *Om* which is best established by *mâtrâ*. *Pädô* is *mâtrâ* and *mâtrâ* is *pädô* rendered ô, ü, mô.

MU : 9 : The *vôishvânôrô*, who is in the awakened stage, is the first *mâtrâ ô*, because of His spread over all physicality,

observation, the concepts related with observation and the initial position of these (*while evolving an understanding of ātmā and Om*). Whosoever knows this, wins all that are desired and becomes the first amongst the doers (*doing and winning become the same*).

MU : 10 : The *tôijôsô* who is in the *sopno* stage, is the second *mātrā* *ü*, because of His superiority (compared to *vôishvânôrô*) and the middle position (between *vôishvânôrô*, and *prôjnô*). Whosoever knows this, improves the results of their knowledge, becomes capable of treating (*opposites and extremities*) equally and none of them remain without the comprehension of *Brohmo*.

MU : 11 : The *prôjnô*, who is in the *sushupti* stage, is the third *mātrā* *mô*, because of His role of assessment (of *vôishvânôrô* and *tôijôsô* at the points of their entrance into and the exit from the stage of *süshüpti*) and ending by integration (of *vôishvânôrô* and *tôijôsô* at the stage of *süshüpti*) Whosoever knows this (*about this onenes of assessment with the ending by unifying*), also assesses all and ends all by unification.

MU : 12 : The consonent ending of *m*, which is an *ô* without a *mātrā*, which can not be used independently, which ends all *proponcho* (*like the consonent ending removes all doubts regarding the consonent*), which is benovolent (*like consonent ending is benevolent to the sound of the consonent*), which is singlar and "one" without duality (*like the consonent ending has the unrepeated finality*), is the *türeeyô ātmā*. Whosoever knows this, can enter his own *atma* (*for understanding the türeeyô ātmā*).

The portions in italics that are placed between brackets, have been picked up from or have been understood as such in the commentaries of Shonkoro on the above *montros*. This is done for a better comprehension of the *montros*, and such a more careful grasp of the presentation has become necessary, because a stage and surprising situation is met : Shonkoro has raised no objection to saying that the *pädô* of *atma* is same as the *mātrā* of *Om*!

PART III

A REVIEW

It is Shonkoro who distinguishes *Brohmo* from *Om* and *Om* from *atma*. He has referred to KU : 1 : 4 that states clearly as below :

“Know that *Brohmo* is that which is not revealed by words but that which exposes words; whom you can worship is not *Brohmo*.”

Against this, the clear verdict of Shonkoro, as has been dictated in his own commentary on CH : 1 : 4 : 1 and quoted earlier, is conclusively that *Om* is to be worshipped. CH : L 1 : 1 : 1 states that *Om* is an expression of *udgeetho* which is to be worshipped. CH : 1 : 3 : 7 states that *udgeetho* stands for Sām, Yōjūr and Rīk Vedo and the term means extraction of essence from these. CH : 1 : 1 : 5 and CH : 1 : 1 : 6 say that the combination of Rīk and Yōjūr Vedo is *udgeetho* which is *Om*. *Om* certainly stands out as a heavyweight of Indian philosophy placed above *atma* or any other such concepts. In its *tūreeyô* form, *atma* may come very close to *Om*; but its *vôishvânôrô* stage is far removed from the concept of *Om*. Shonkoro separates *Om* from *Brohmo*. Similarly, *atma* and *Om* are not the same concepts for Shonkoro and have been shown to be so in the earlier discussions. How *pädô* is *mātrā* and *mātrā* is *pädô*? It is not like Shonkoro to miss such an obvious point.

Time is not included in *atma* : It is an associate of *atma*. But it is included in *Om*. This understanding is specific : It is the first thing that MU speaks about in its very first *môntrô*. *Om* contains “everything” of consciousness : Consciousness of the past, of the present and what it will be in future. *Om* has to be a current concept if new consciousness is to be included in it as the same is created¹¹. That *Om* is to be worshipped is also because it is a current concept: Worship includes endearment and endearment is “what it is” for “what it was” as well as “what it will be”. Therefore, how *Om* is related with *Brohmo* is also a current topic. Therefore, all the concepts involved, like those of *Brohmo*, *Om*, *atma* and so on, are the current issues in PCLR : Nothing can be assigned the position of a “had been”. How can *pädô* of *atma* be the *mātrā* of *Om* ?

It appears that the chance of misreading MU : 2 is quite a possibility. A second look will be in order. MU : 2 says that “all these are *Brohmo*”, which

means that *Om* is *Brohmo* because *Om* is everything by virtue of the first *montro*. This assertion is followed by "this *atma* is *Brohmo*". The initial misreading can be due to overlooking that *Brohmo* is *không brôhmô* that which (enlarges) (is understood to have enlarged) by itself. In the previous sentence, the choice of the word "brôhmô" is deliberate to emphasise the point that the word may not always mean a respectable and distant "supreme" in the limits of human imagination, but may also indicate merely a characteristic of "selfgrowth". Now, *atma* does take in a continuous input of consciousness created by the unremitting addition to human knowledge^{ss} and similarly, the scope of *Om* is also ceaselessly expanded with what is added to *atma* and augmentation of consequent perceptions that are required to be stored in *Om* by such rule, or with such guidance, that may have originated from *Brohmo*. Whatever may be the nature of that rule of guidance, it is perfectly in order to say that "*Om* is brôhmô" and "atma is brôhmô", and that is what MU : 2 says: "That this *atma* has four *pädôs* sô (silence) *yômätmä chotüshpäť*". Can *pädôs* expand ?

The second misreading may be to ignore the significance of the order of repetitions of the words *ātma* and *brôhmô* which should read as, with " #" working as a meaning-separator, "+" indicating *sôndhi* combination and "&" indicating *sômäsô* combinations as below :

"all (emphatised) + that &" (who is) + *brôhmô* #

+ this + *atma* (who is expandable) &" (who is part of or understood with) *brôhmô*, #

That + this + *atma* (is with) &" four + *pädôs*".

Without such meaning separations, one may conclude that *Om* and *atma* are the same because the *montro* prescribed that *Om* is *Brohmo* and *atma* is *Brohmo*, whatever meaning that *Brohmo* may carry for itself.

The silence of Shonkoro in MU : 2 is intriguing. One explanation for this may be the traditional relationship that exists between the Guru and a disciple. If Guru *Gôüreepädô*, the propagator of highly abstract *Ôjätôvädô* took a considered view against the conviction of his disciple Shonkoro, then the only recourse left to Shonkoro was to remain silent over the issue. No other

explanation regarding the hush is available; and the one offered in this paragraph is entirely speculative. It supports, however, the appearance of Shonkoro's views elsewhere.

The MU : 3, MU : 4 and MU : 5 name *ṛōishvānōrō* as the first *pādō* *tōijōsō* as the second *pādō* and *tūreeyō* as the third *pādō*. MU : 6 confirms that *prājñō* of the *tōijōsō* stage relates to ordinary existence. MU : 7 names *tūreeyō* to be the fourth *pādō* and Shonkoro establishes that *tūreeyō* is not a stage of ordinary existence.

MU : 8 should be read, therefore, more carefully to cover the possibility that it was misread. Thus restructured, it deviates from the common translations and says as below :

The *pādōs* of *atma's* "shelter of letters" are the *mātrās* of *Om's* "shelter of *mātrās*"; and the *mātrās* are the *pādōs* rendered *ō*, *ū* and *mō*.

Here, one real and one unreal situations are presented. Although *atma* may seek a shelter of *Om* to accommodate at least its *tūreeyō* stage, there is no reason why *Om* will require a shelter of *mātrā* excepting for the involved reason of its definition or a theoretical or arbitrary division. These arbitrary divisions, called *mātrā* in general, are sought out and arranged in sequence. Then, the *pādōs* associate themselves with the names of the divisions.

A geometrical generalisation

Geometrically, a *pādō* projects upon a predestined part of *Om*. Naturally, *pādō* cannot cover the destined part of *Om* completely. As for example, no *pādō* contains conscious or any other form of time. On the other hand, *Om* contains all the forms of time. Therefore, all the divisions of *Om* will contain slots that remain uncovered by the projections of *pādōs* on them. As for example, *Om's* Division *ō* will have a vacant place for Conscious Time; *Om's* Division *ū* will keep a vacant place for *sopno* Time; *Om's* Division *mō* will have a vacant place for *sushupti* Time; and *Om* Division "consonent ending" will have room for a Definitive Time. Apart from time, there may be other concepts that are not contained in *atma*⁸. All these will have to be accommodated in *Om*; because "Om

is all". There ought to be large areas, or groups of ideas, that remain uncovered by the projections of *pādōs* on the *Mātrā Divisions* carved out of *Om*. And there is no claim that *Om* is completely divisible by the *mātrās*. In this also *Om* differs from *ātmā*. The division of *atma* into *pādō* is comprehensive by virtue of MU : 2. The same is not the case with *Om*. It is not very difficult to see why it is so. The example of *tūreeyō* stage of *atma* provides an obvious case. The stages of *vôishvânôrô*, *tôijôsô* and *tūreeyô* are envelopes. The stage of *tūreeyô* is based upon the form of *sushupti*. The base of *sushupti* is to be

- (a) not awakened
- (b) not *sopno* and
- (c) should not have any desire.

There may be another base, let us call it *prôshüpti*, which is

- (a) and (b) same as for *sushupti*
- (c) not *sushupti*, and
- (d) same as (c) for *sushupti*.

Naturally, *prôshüpti* can not be an *atma* related base and therefore, its resident, call it *trāñ*, can not be also *atma* related, by virtue of the "four *pādō*" division given for *atma* in MU : 2. On the other hand, the division given in MU : 2 should be taken to be orthodox and literal, and *prôshüpti* and *trāñ* may be taken to be the limiting concepts common to the concepts of *atma* and *Om*, say, the mystery of the prayer phenomena because of which *atma* prays for *trāñ*.

There may be yet another base, let us call it *pôrishüpti* (1), which is

- (a), (b) and (c) same as the *prôshüpti*
- (d) not *prôshüpti* and
- (e) same as (c) for *sushupti*.

By the definition already accepted, *pôrishüpti* (1) has to be part of *Om* alone and its resident, say, *pôritrāñ* (1) has also to be an *Om* related concept. There may be more bases called *pôrishüpti* (2), *pôrishüpti* (3) The *pôritrāñ* class of residents of the *pôrishüpti* class of bases are now entirely *Om* based and there had to be room for them in the

Divisions of *Om* other than the four already allotted to the four *pādōs* of *atma*. Thus *Om* may contain more than four *mātrās*. A suggestion may be to extend the "consonent ending", which is a vowel sound not ordinarily depicted in other languages⁹, and divide them into *mātrās* of same duration required to reach the consonent-ending from *ô* while producing the sound of "*Om*".

It must be said, with apology, that no disrespect is intended to the theologists while expanding the domain of *sushupti* or *türeeyô* and no material gain, like helping to create yet another sectarian creed, lies at the bottom of it all. The above thoughts are supported by *shruti* and summarised in Geeta.¹⁰ The intention is only to show that the projections on *Om* of any part or whole of *atma*, can not cover the entire extent of *Om*. And there is no reason why any part of *Om* should be synonymous with any part of *atma* excepting for the limiting form of the parts of *atma* that are conceived with the intention of indentifying in *Om* a location where such parts of *atma* may find a logical asaylum. The instance of prayer can be such a possible commonality between *atma* and *Om*.

Introduction of the limitation of irreverasibility of "Rules that flow from *Brohmo*."

Proposition : OUT OF BROHMO FLOW RULES

An inflictment of a geometry of projections to picture the elemental relationship between *Om* and *atma*, builds the first step towards visualising how the limiting concepts find their way to foster an actual perception and consciousness on one hand, and to the limitless oneness on the other. *Om* is almost *Brohmo*. In *Brohmo* ends all logic. Therefore, every individual concept has to generalise, narrow down its differences and create common grounds with allied disciplines as it proceeds in its journey towards a logical end of its existence. Many of the concepts may not survive a very long journey, and before long, twos of them may but merge, for the twos may prove, on scrutiny, to be the separate versions of the same idea when the frills and the affectations are removed. That end of two ideas into an one, creates an intermediate oneness and the final oneness of the *odvoito* of theology is the stage when the final twos

have become one. This is the end of *proponcho* of theology. In this scheme, although *atma* may throw projections on *Om*, *Om* has no means to project anything on *Brohmo* except oneness, which cannot have any known or envisioned dimension. Therefore any flow can be only from *Brohmo* to *Om*, and the flow is not envisioned. Therefore, the flow can rather be called "rule", because this earthly term possibly describes adequately, and well, a "flow" that is ordinarily anticipated, inevitable, irreversible, definite and not envisioned.

Time, space and Shonkoro

In the chapter called "truthlessness" in MU, Shonkoro points towards the truthlessness in conceptualising that a mountain may be contained inside the body of a man,¹¹ or that the space may be constricted. Interestingly, and very conveniently for a theory of time, Shonkoro accepts the constriction of time^{ww} not only in *sopno* but also accedes to the idea that time constricts in thoughts under ordinary circumstances. The state of physicality encountered while time has constricted, is but a state of truth-lessness; like the "chariot (seen in *sopno*) is not there".¹² Shonkoro generalises and states that time and space may constrict in *sopno*, and that *sopno* differs from other times, but the truthlessness of physicality seen in *sopno* may also prevail in other times. The physicality seen in other times^{xx} is also truthless because mere "seeing"^{yy} and the truthlessness^{zz} are the same.¹³ It seems that Shonkoro had made a statement on the Special Theory of Relativity! But, possibly, he was apparently a step ahead of Einstein, because he says that the space can not constrict but it may be "seen" to have constricted or that space may appear constricted under the subjectivity of observer to "seeing", while it is not so in reality - or it is truthless that space constricts.

Multiplicity of conscious time

For a theory of time, it establishes that the time is a concept. It also says that the space is a physicality. Any presumption regarding the reality of the constriction of space as conceived in *sopno* or its variations, is "truthless" or a depiction of unreality. A portrayal of "truthless" unreality of a physicality is possible only if the associated time, or to be more specific, the consort of

conscious time generated along with the unreality of treating physicality as a concept or an abstraction or an impression, becomes "different" from each other. In other words, when the physicality has only one real form and the other forms of it are "truthless", then the time has to adopt many forms to be associated with one "truthful" form of the real physicality and more than one "untruthful" styles of the unreal physicality. These multiple forms of time are the constructed "time-frames" of applied time or conscious time. The conscious time have a multiplicity to portray the "truthful" physicality in one factual countenance and to imitate the "untruthful" physicality of *sopno* in transient, but seemingly real visage while the *sopno* or *sushupti* lasts. The theory of time establishes that there is a multiplicity of conscious time for everything connected with event and its observation, *sopno* or no *sopno*; and every sequence of conscious time will constitute a 'time-frame'. But Shonkoro remains, as is always the case, unbeaten. When *sopno* ends, then he brings in the concept of *maya*¹⁴, then comes *mônónigrôhō*¹⁵. However, all these lead to a multiplicity of situations the time has to tackle; and since these stay within the limits of human perception, they are associated with the conscious time. Shonkoro's *maya* is well known to the students of Indian and contemporary philosophy as is also that the truthlessness of *sopno* and of *maya* leave the oneness or *odvoito* as the residual truth.

"Odvoito operator"

The theory of time uses an "odvoito operator"^{aaa} to resolve the *proponcho* that a duration of time always must have at least one open end. One may start with the Shonkoro's technique of "refutal".¹⁶ He uses the term *pôrômärthô*^{bbb}. To use "refutals", *pôrômärthô* is not secession, not creation, not bound, not resultant, not desired, not free. Thus defined, *pôrômärthô* is the total convergence to the single concept of *odvoito*. Shonkoro refuses to accept that *odvoito* is the absence of *dvoitô* or duality. He establishes that *odvoito* arises as the residual and the final truth when the truthlessness is removed. Shonkoro quotes Modbhägôvôdgeetä (GTA:12:18 and GTA:13:27) to say that *odvoito* is a bliss, because it is same, when understood.^{ccc}

Shonkoro establishes the characteristics of *odvoito* from the reverse direction of deductive argumentation. In the chapter of *ôdvôitôprôkôrôn*, he

calls them "poor"¹⁷ who pray¹⁸ and hope to become a part of *Brohmo* on the ground of the "constructed memory"¹⁹ that "before birth I was a part of *Brohmo*, so after death I shall become a part of *Brohmo* again through prayer". The hope is not based on systematic logic. He quotes KU:1:4 that clearly states that whom you worship can not be the *Brohmo*²⁰; because *Brohmo* is not a worshipable identity. A simile is drawn from the invariability of the statement that "*Brohmo* causes the words to form; the words can not form the *Brohmo*"²¹. So, worship can not affect *Brohmo*. The starting point of the refutation is that the belief of the "poor" that "I am produced; so I am produced from *Brohmo*"²². Such a belief originates from "lack of study"²³; because the *shrutis* say variously that *Brohmo* has "no physicality, no shape, no body"²⁴; therefore, how can one²⁵ come out of it²⁶?

There was no reason or occasion for Shonkoro to bring in a geometrical clarity of the post-creation status of *Om* and *Brohmo*. It may go like this: A "poor" is one who is created. So, at best the "poor" may expect a to and fro movement from and to the Creator. The "creation" part has been more liberally described in *shruti* notwithstanding the fact that Shonkoro rejects "creation" itself and provides, as will be discussed a little later, alternative explanation as to why *shruti* speaks about creation. However, for the present purpose, an assemblance²⁷ of matter and ideas²⁸ to create the "poor", precedes the act of the Creator²⁹ to create³⁰ a "poor"³¹. and the dissipation of the matter and ideas when the "poor" of the "miser"^{ddd} is no more.

The significance of the exercise is that the "miser" merges in the odvoito process long before other more substantial *Om* based ideas "merge" to complete the odvoito process to reach *Brohmo*. Shonkoro elaborates the process further.

Shonkoro cites the example of the composition of an earthen pot being earth prior to saying that the composition of life is *atma*.³² When life comes to end, it merges with *atma*.³³ If that be so, and there is just one *atma*, then, will not there be much confusion and sometimes disassociation^{eee} of effect from the cause of it? Shonkoro tackles this possibility variously.³⁴ Firstly he deals with the *sāṅkhyô* path that says that the *atma* remains with the same feeling^{fff} everywhere. He uses four words: *sômôvâyô* to depict the relationship quality has with that which possesses or is assigned with the quality; *prôdhânô* to depict

that part of *atma* which is holding the discourse; *bôndhō* to depict the state of earthboundness or the absence of deliverance; and *môkshō* describes the deliverance "of the soul", the endness, the unfetterment. He says that feeling has *sômôvâyō* with the intellectualism (of the *Prôdhânō* - *this is added by this author*). So, feeling provides no evidence that there is a difference between feeling and *atma*. The cause created by *Prôdhânō* has nothing to do with *atma*. Therefore, the effects of *bôndhō* or *môkshō* have to assemble on *prôdhânō* and not on *atma*. But this contradicts the *sāṅkhyō* philosophic base that *bôndhō* or *môkshō* can not be assigned with any entity other than the *atma* itself. Therefore, the argument does not contradict the fact that the exteriority of *prôdhânō* is not really a duality. About the *vôishéshikō* path that holds that desire, quality, dynamism, general and special connotation remain in *sômôvâyō*, Shonkoro takes the view that *atma* can not be identical with desire because the desire can not reach the identity³⁵ of *atma*. The desire can begin or end; its *sômôvâyō* with *atma* will create the fundamental question regarding the external presence of *atma*.^{ggg} Shonkoro demolishes the myth of the cyclical or *kolpo* bound Creation by saying that there is no necessity of such a legend because without such an illusion the purposes of the *shrutis* are served. A dissention, or creation or an end to creation cannot be the aim of *shruti*.³⁶

If a *maya* difference is taken to be a real disagreement in comprehension^{hhh} then, like fire may beget the terminal coolness, what is unperishableⁱⁱⁱ, unborn^{jjj}, the only one^{kkk} and by nature is existent^{lll}, will become perishable^{mmm} ³⁷. This can not be, or desired to be, the aim of even *maya* oriented perception. Therefore, disagreementⁿⁿⁿ to *odvoito* can only be on account of *maya*. It can not be the result of real comprehension. Therefore, an opposition to *odvoito* by Buddhism or by the lesser known differing Hindu School of *Kôpilô* or of *Kônädô*, can not base on truthful containment of the meaning^{ppp}. When a conception is made for the perpetual existence, then the opposite of it also can not originate. Therefore, any differing view that causes the "death" of the original premise, cannot be accepted. The rule of the nature is that what is "deathless" can not be made to die; and what is perishable can not perpetuate.³⁸ The opposition to *odvoito* causes the natural perpetuity to come to an end. Then, how can what is opposite to *odvoito* (*Kôpilô*, *Kônädô*, Buddha, *ôrhôt*, etc.) be sustained ? These are also transient phenomena and have to pass away by themselves.³⁹

There is another question⁴⁰ : Does not *shruti* itself talk about creation? The question arises, because, if everything ends in *odvoito* then a myth of creation is unnecessary; but *shruti*, comprising of *Vedos*, *Védāngôs* and *Védāntôs*, all being infallible, does speak about creation. If *odvoito* opposes *shruti*, then it is *odvoito* that fails, not *shruti*. Shonkoro answers saying "Yes". But adds that the reason for the *shruti* saying something about the creation is not for the reason as it appears at the surface. The strength of what *Shonkoro* says lies in the fact that creation is contained in *Vedo* while *Védāngô* and *Védāntô*, have brought in the concept of *Brohmo* and finally *odvoito*. Every word of *Vedo* is synthetic; which permits multiple meanings of a text. On the other hand, *Védāngô* and *Védāntô*, are written in Sanskrit refined by a stricter grammar and carry more or less fixed meaning of what is written; and these support *odvoito*.

MU:G:SB: *ôdvôitôprôkôrôñô*, : 23 to 48 discard creation. Neither the begotten^{qqq} nor the prayer^{rrr} are creations. When the truth is a product of search, the terminal truth is just truth. It can have no other identity or function or purpose. To reach that truth, the path taken encounters part-truths, apparent-truths and transient-truths. *Shruti* is true to the truth, valid for all its pre-forms and legitimate for all of its applied forms. In this sense, *shruti* says about creation which is the apparent-truth for a logical construction. The root verbs of the commonly used words of creation and construction are the same. It is the logical construction that *shruti* speaks about^{sss}. The thought of creation is truthlessness. The logical framework that arrives at creation is also not invalid. The result of the process does not sustain scrutiny and one has to proceed further along the same creation path to a pre-creation state; and, like all other logical paths, the creation-path, inclusive of the pre-creation probe, also ends in *Brohmo*. The logic of the creation path is not invalid. So, *shruti* speaks about it. And *Shonkoro* speaks about it from an awe inspiring intellectual height in a precise, economic and appropriate language drawing substance from the depth of Indian *shruti*. One is left breathless and compelled to read again and again.

It is not possible for a time theorist, and it is not required of him, to carry the entire, burden *Shonkoro* had shouldered. If the creation was not there, then there was no "birth" of time either. The time is there. If creation is a

concept *ad infinitum* then time is also a concept *ad infinitum*. But the transient truths are many. So, the forms of conscious time that are associated with the events and the ideas that are identified with such transient truths, are also many. The safest course of action is to envelop all pre-creation identities inside a set named "Neti" from No! '___' because shruti describes *Brohmo* with "no"'s or with "not this", "not this", "not that", and so on. There can be a prudent flow out of this set to another conceivable set, named *sôt* for "existent", a term used by Shonkoro - may be for a different purpose. It is, then a compromise. *sôt* contains what is created, in the sense the "created" is commonly understood, and allows a "chaos to order" situation to work to let events happen and ideas emerge. This appearance of events and ideas generates the "time-frames" of conscious time.

BU:4:3:9 concedes that there are two parts of mind : One part is of "this world"; and the other part is of the "other world". Shonkoro considers in the first sentence of the commentary on BU:4:3:9, whether it is possible to have a third or fourth division of mind. He discards the idea as an impossible proposition for the human mind to comprehend more than two divisions of mind.

If Shonkoro could not do any better than this, then a time theorist should not try an arrangement which may be more complicated than "Sôt" and "Néti". And it is not necessary to do so.

And it is *odvoito* itself that solves the impasse of disjointment of the instants of conscious time; because it is time that has to be associated with the truth of convergence of events and ideas *ad infinitum*. Even though the events and ideas are not residents of PCLR, the creation, or the idea thereof, emerges out of PCLR however brief that residence of creation, or of the idea of creation, in PCLR may be. "Brief" itself is a "time-term". This "brief" combines the events and ideas with PCLR if the mystery of creation is approached from the reverse direction by what is created. In other words, "brief" is by nature combinatory and must generate a continuum of more "brief"s. If an instant of conscious time contains more than one "brief", then, the "brief"s will remain one after the other within the instant without any gap. But this can not happen with the extension of the ordinary logical process. Therefore, the concept of an "odvoito operator" has to be built mathematically to let the miracle happen. This is what has been used in the theory of time.

ENDNOTES1. FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE

- ĩ may be pronounced like i as in disk
 ü may be pronounced like u as in put
 ô may be pronounced like o as in yoke
 é may be pronounced like e as in get
 ä may be pronounced like u as in but
 ó may be pronounced like oa as in coat
 ñ may be pronounced like of Hindi script
 ee may be pronounced like ea as in treat

2. Barhakur, J.K.: A Theory of Time; *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XXII; No.4; October, 1995; University of Poona; Pune; India.

The problem of assumed discontinuity and non-definability of time are tackled with expression like

$$V(t_1, t_2) = A\{O(e_{11}, a_1), O(e_{12}, a_2)\}$$

so that $V(t_1, t_0) = O(e_{11}, a_1)$

and $V(t_0, t_2) = O(e_{12}, a_2)$

Where O is an operator that can empathise real or unreal time with observation or awareness; V is an operator that can function upon real or unreal time; 't' is the meta-concept of time; 'e' is event or idea; 'a' is observation or awareness; e_{12} happens after e_{11} and they are not simultaneous; a_2 comes after a_1 and they are not simultaneous; A is an $\hat{o}dv\hat{o}it\hat{o}^2$ operator that can make two O's become one within a duration (t_1, t_2) to cause the *vy\hat{o}v\hat{o}h\hat{a}rik\hat{a}* or conscious time $V(t_1, t_2)$ understood for the duration (t_1, t_2) .

It has been shown that this type of expression can be used not only for a theory of time, but also for a multitude of other purposes. The associative to this expression is the form of a condition like $A\{O(e_{11}, a_1) (D) O(e_{12}, a_2)\} =$ (nothing), where (D) is called the $\hat{o}dv\hat{o}it\hat{o}$ difference, which renders the duration (t_1, t_2) an "instant" that is required to observe the event or become aware of the idea for which $V(t_1, t_2)$ is true.

For more details, please look up the reference given above.

Some of the assumptions made in this theory of time are connected with *shruti* in this essay, to prove that they are not arbitrary or speculative.

3. It is possibly the sound of *Om* that finds a mention in the Gospel of John of New Testament that reads, as per a leading translation, as given below :

“1. In [the] beginning the Word was, and the Word was with God, and the Word was a god.

2. This one was in [the] beginning with God.

3. All things came into existence through him, and apart from him not even one thing came into existence.

4. What has come into existence by means of him was life, and the life was the light of men.

5. And the light is shining in the darkness, but the darkness has not overpowered it.

6.”

4. Included in *Kṛishṇōyōjūrvédō*

5. The fortieth chapter of the *shūklōyōjūhsōnghitā*. Also called *Vājōsōnéyeesōnghitā*

6. *ôpôrô Brôhmô* in PR:5:2.

7. *ôkār, ūkār, mōkār*.

8. There is a claim in *Mārkéndōyô Mōhāpurāṇō*'s MP:13:66 and 67 that *Yōgônīdrā* occupies a place in the *prōṇôbô* or in *ô, ū* and *mô* of *Om*, and also in the *ôrdhômātrā* or in the “consonent ending”. According to MP:13:68 to 71, *Yōgônīdrā* starts an alternative centre of creation. This contention of having an alternative centre of creation, is supported by the intrinsic meaning of AV:10:125:7 & 8.

9. This sound is perhaps attempted to be mimicked by the Tibetan and Mongolian Lamas who follow the *Mōhāyānô* Sect of Buddhism.

10. *Pādô* (silence) *syô vishvô bhūtānī trīpādōsyāmritōng divi* RV:10:90:3

.... all created is but one fourth of the supreme....

vishtôbhyāhôm idōng kṛitsnômékōngshénô sthitōng jōgôt ... GEETA : 10 : 42.

....(This universe) I (exhibit) is only a fraction of the whole that there is....

11. nô hyôntôh sôn vrité déhântôrnâreeshû pôrvôtôhstyâdeenân ... MU : G : SB : 32.
Vôipôthyôprôkôrôn : 1 : Commentary. 33.
12. ôbhâvôshvôivô rôthâdeenân ... MU:G:SB: Vôipôthyôprôkôrôn : 3 : Commentary. 34.
13. drishyôtvômäsôtyôtvôm châviskîstômübhôyôtrô MU : G : SB : 4 : 35.
Commentary.
14. MU : G : SB : 24, 28, 29; commentary to 25, 27; and use of the essence of it 36.
in a number of other môntrô and commentary that follows.
15. MU : G : SB : 40, 41, 42. 37.
16. prôtîshedh. 38.
17. Kripônô deenôôlpôkôh ... MU : G : SB : ôdvôitôprôkôrônô : 1 : Commentary 39.
18. üpôsônâshritô ... MU : G : SB : ôdvôitôprôkôrônô : 1 40.
19. Smritôh ... MU : G : SB : ôdvôitôprôkôrônô : 1
20. Tôdévô Brôhmô tvông viddhî nédông yôdidômüpäsôté ... MU : G : SB :
ôdvôitôprôkôrônô : 1 : Commentary
21. Yôdvâchânôbhyüditông yénô vâgôbhyüdyôté.
22. Jâtôhông jâté Brôhmônî ... MU : G : SB : ôdvôitôprôkôrônô : 2 : prelude a.
23. ôvîdyî ... MU : G : SB : ôdvôitôprôkôrônô : 1 : Commentary
24. Nîrôyôvô ... MU : G : SB : ôdvôitôprôkôrônô : 1 : Commentary b.
25. Sâvôyôvô ... MU : G : SB : ôdvôitôprôkôrônô : 1 : Commentary
26. ... MU : G : SB : ôdvôitôprôkôrônô : 2 : Commentary : second part
27. Rôhîti - in AV : 13 : 1 : 4
28. Rûrhô - in AV : 13 : 1 : 4 c.
29. The Creator is generally called the God, and He bears different names for d.
different communities and different religions. In Hindu Philosophy, there may e.
be more than one centre of Creation. Rôhîti of the thirteenth chapter of ôthôrvô f.
Védô is a Creator. Rôhîti creates not only the final beings, but also the matter g.
to create matter; matter-to-create-matter-to-create-... . No other religion says
much about matter-to-create-matter-to-... Like Rôhîti, Dévee of the tenth chapter
of Rîgvédô is also a Creator. On the other hand, in Budhism, there is no Creator h.
God; and the term God does not appear in that religion. i.
30. Rûrûrhô - in AV : 13 : 1 : 4.
31. Prôpûrhô - in AV : 13 : 1 : 9.

32. MU : G : SB : ôdvôitôprôkôrnô : 3
33. MU : G : SB : ôdvôitôprôkôrnô : 4
34. MU : G : SB : ôdvôitôprôkôrnô : 5
35. ôyûtôsiddhô - the identity of time, place and characteristics, and the incapacity to add or subtract and being added or being subtracted from a status.
36. Kôlôhôtôpôtôprôlôyânâṅ prôtipôtôtérônîshtôtvât. Last part of the commentary on MU : G : SB : ôdvôitôprôkôrnô : 15
37. Commentary on MU : G : SB : ôdvôitôprôkôrnô : 19
38. Commentary on MU : G : SB : ôdvôitôprôkôrnô : 21
39. Commentary on MU : G : SB : ôdvôitôprôkôrnô : 22
40. Commentary on MU : G : SB : ôdvôitôprôkôrnô : 22

ADDITIONAL NOTES

- a. Kolpo is pronounced Kôlpô. It is a large division of time. It is notionally of one thousand Môhâyüḡ or about 4.3×10^9 years according to popular belief.
- b. It means the end of creation on termination of a Kôlpô. According to Mârôkôṇḍéyô Môhâpûrânô (MP : 13 : 59-60), both creation at the beginning of a kôlpô and its annihilation in prôlôyô are due to mâyâ of Yôgônîdrâ; and thus supports the contention that the concept of Kôlpô-wise creation or destruction, is "unnecessary".
- c. Sopno is pronounced sôpnô. The term is explained later.
- d. Sushupti is pronounced sûshûptî. The term is explained later.
- e. Shruti is based on Vêdô. It is pronounced Shrûti.
- f. The term is explained a little later under its specific sub-head.
- g. Odvoito is pronounced as ôdvôitô. It will be explained in Part II of the essay while discussing MU : 2 and MU : 8; and expanded fuather in a later part of the essay.
- h. Pronounced môntrô.
- i. Pronounced üpônîshôd.

The *uponishods* are one hundred and twelve in number : The following have been used in the essay : Brîhôt ôrônyôk or BU, Chhândô or CH, Eeshô or EE, Eeshâvâsyô or EV, Eteriyô or ET, Kenô or KU, Kôthô or KO, Prôshnô or PR, Mündôkô or MO, Svêtâsvôtôrô or Sv, and Tôiteriô or TU.

- j. Also pronounced óⁿ where ⁿ is nasal or as óm.
- k. Pronounced Brôhmô.
- l. ôthôrvô Védô says in AV : 19 : 53 ; 10 "... Kâlô pôrjâ ôsrîjôt kâlôgrê prôjâpôtîm..." or partly "... time constructed prôjâpôtî, the concept of creation ..."; or time was there when prôjâpôtî, arrived ... This time is not the conscious time of our understanding. Védô is talking about a meta-concept called "time".
- m. On kârôvikârôshôbdâbhîdheyôshvô sôrvôh ... Om (ness) expressed traditionalised all.
- n. vâchârômbhônôm vikârô nâmôdhéyôm.
- o. tôdôsyédôm vâchâ tôntyâ nîmôbhîrdâmôbhîh sôvôsîtôm
- p. sôrvôheedôm nâmônî îtyâdishrûtîbhyôh.
- q. Pronounced îdeegthô and used as "one who is prayed to".
- r. AV : 19 : 53 : 3 says that a "fullness of time" remains "much above" (pôrômé byômôn) the conscious time (prôtyôpông Kâlô). "Much above" is, by implication, located very close to Brohmo. This is confirmed by AV:19:53:9 and later by AV : 19 : 54 : 5 in "... Brôhmônâ kâlô so îyôte pôrômé nû dévôh ...".
- s. Pronounced âtmâ.
- t. Pronounced prôpônchô. The word will be put to casual use.
- u. téjômôyôh - chînmâtrôprôkâshômôyôh.
- v. ômrîtômôyôh - ômôrôndhômä.
- w. âdhyâtmô - pûrîshôh.
- x. shôreerôh téjômôyôh ômrîtômôyôh
- y. môdhû.
- z. sôrvôbhûtôh.
- aa. sônskârô.
- bb. sôndhyô.
- cc. ôvôstômbhô.

Maṇḍukyo Upanishod for a Theory of Time

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- dd. *svôyôm jyôti.*
- ee. *Nô chô sôpnô nāmāpūrvôdôrshônôm pūrvôdrishtôsmrītīhī sôpnô prāyēnô.*
Not also *sôpnô* not+seen+before memory+of+that+remembered *sôpnô* begets.
- ff. *sthūlô prôjnā.*
- gg. *ôntôh prôjnô.*
- hh. *sūkshmô.*
- ii. *pôrômānôdô.*
- jj. The word *projno* means “very wise” or “very knowledgeable” in many parts of India.
- kk. *indhô.*
- ll. *Beejātmā.*
- mm. *Nirbeejô Bhôhmô.*
- nn. *prôtiśhûédhô.*
- oo. *ôprôtiśbôdhôrûpô*
- pp. *nidrā*
- qq. Pronounced *mâyā.*
- rr. Later, MU : 6 speaks about the “Knowledge not yet born”.
- ss. MU : 6.
- tt. *Vôhübreehī* : The complex may mean *atma.*
- uu. *Môdhyôpôdôlôpee.*
- vv. *Tôtpūrushô* : For time theory, if *atma* expands in content, then each *pādô* expands in content. (Place compare MU : 6.) So, the corresponding availability of accommodation in *mātrā* in *Om*, must be greater than *now* to be able to take care of the expansions.
- ww. *kālôsyô ôdeerghôtā.*
- xx. *jāgrôddrīshyô.*
- yy. *drīshôtvô.*
- zz. *ôśôtyôtvô.*
- aaa. Please see Endnote 2.
- bbb. The term is utilised in the theory of time with an altered meaning.

- ccc. Shonkoro quotes Geetā (GTA : 12 : 18 and GTA : 13 : 27) to say that *odvoito* is a bliss, because it is same, when understood, whether the one who has understood is a “dog, *Chandal* (caste that cremates human body) or learned.” Thus, an attempt to understand *odvoito* and using its limited geometrical form, is also a “path to bliss”, or at least, a “path to understand”. Shonkoro does not reject a statistician workman from following the “path”, with a box of geometrical tools in his hand, to repair the concept of time.
- ddd. The alternative and the more popular meaning of the Sanskrit word used for the “poor”, is “miser” - a person who does not exercise his mind liberally.
- eee. *sāṅkôryô*.
- fff. *sükhee dükhee*.
- ggg. Or, even if desire is a pre-creation concept, it merges with *one* meta-concept of desire which stays as a part of *atma*. In doing so, the desire allows its process of becoming *one* meta-concept be charted mathematically.
- hhh. *tôtvôth*.
- iii. *ômrîtô*
- jjj. *ôjô*.
- kkk. *ôdvôyô*.
- lll. *sôt*.
- mmm. *sônômôrttyôtāṅg brôjêt*.
- nnn. *bhédô*.
- ooo. Jainism.
- ppp. *pôrômârthînô*.
- qqq. *jeevô*.
- rrr. *üpäsônä*.
- sss. One may again recall MU : 6. When the “knowledge not yet born” comes up, and is added to consciousness, then the same may be viewed “from below”, or from the level in which the created abides, as “creation” the *shrüti* speaks about. - Author.

NIETZSCHE : THINKING AS LIBERATION¹

RUDOLF BRANDNER

1. The academic approach to philosophy

To talk *about* Nietzsche seems still difficult for several reasons. One of them consists in the usual academic objectivation of philosophical thinking by which philosophy becomes an externalized object fixed as a set of propositions qua true or false statements. Consequently the contemporary academic approach consists basically of a so called "rational" examination of the truth claim of these propositions. But by what means can we examine the truth or falsehood of such propositions? - As it is well known there does not exist a general method to establish the (material) truth or falsehood of any statement that would not presuppose the logical and ontological validity of its underlying concepts. The philosophical framework presupposed as the operational base of such an examination will necessarily remain out of question. It is itself withdrawn from any inquiry into its truth which is only dogmatically affirmed but not questioned. The academic reduction of thinking to a set of truth claiming propositions turns philosophy into a kind of supermarket of opinions where we can freely and according to our ability distinguish the truth value of the merchandise purchase -- our own minds. We reconfirm within the objectivated thoughts the presuppositions of our own thinking. But then we always remain the same and withdraw from the possibility to undergo a theoretical transformation mediated by objective insights : we dismiss philosophy. On the other hand the academic approach seems to be quite necessary in order to avoid any ideological subjectivation of philosophical theories. Philosophizing would then merely consist in a reproductive overidentification with a certain theory according to the emotional or ideological predispositions of the hermeneutical subject. But the theoretical intention of the academic approach turns out to be just the same abandonment of philosophical thinking. How to deal then with philosophy?

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Now this seems to be quite a general problem in dealing with the history of philosophy' without any specific relevance related to Nietzsche. That the problem becomes particularly evident in dealing with Nietzsche is due to the more specific way of his philosophical thinking. We can see this more clearly if we just try to scrutinize a little bit more what has been said about the academic approach' to philosophy. Why are we at all talking about an approach'? Because we are dealing with a way of thinking, a certain attitude of relating to and dealing with theoretical contents. We might call it a certain mentality' or spirituality' as a specific cognitive disposition to deal with, mental objects' that is generated by thinking itself. If thinking can not be reduced to the propositional contents of its thoughts, this is basically because it is what it is only by generating its own 'spirituality' as the basic 'behavioural pattern' of interacting with and relating to intentional objects. Talking about an 'academic approach' we are already quite aware of the fact that thinking is much more than the sum of its thoughts : that it exceeds its intentional truths by the basic constellation it is already inhabiting as its way of relating to any possible object at all. Thinking is not only producing propositional results but first of all generating itself as a certain relationship to things in general, a certain 'spirit' of thinking. Thinking takes us from one awareness to another, makes us experience what is in different ways and is producing by this the specific consciousness of our being-in-the-world that will guide us as the underlying pattern of our way of relating to what is. It is by thinking that we become what we are as human persons; and the truth of thinking will always show up from the being of the thinker himself. So both - the ideological subjectivation as well as the academic objectivation - miss the sense of thinking as being basically the foundation of our relationship to Being in general which has to be the primary concern of philosophy : if philosophy is the radical inquiry into the last principles of Being and Knowing, by which we are supposed to found our 'êthos' - the specific place of human being in the midst of what is.

The question of philosophical thinking is so less the question of the truth value of its thematic assertions than what kind of human being it produces - who we become in our relationship to things by thinking. And it is not only Nietzsche's central philosophical concern to thematize thinking as the foundation of the relationship of Man and World but also his specific way of thinking that by its opposition to any defined set of truth claiming propositions conveys the

unique spiritual attitude specifically 'Nietzschean'. The general insufficiency of the academic approach to philosophy becomes so particularly evident in the case of Nietzsche, his thinking being less a theory than a continuous exercise in questioning the relationship we assume to what there is by thinking. It is his anti-systematical and artistic way of thinking, unfolding itself into the complexity of an aphoristic fragmentation, full of contradictions, open to shifts and changements, playing with coquetishness and self-irony, exaggerations and caricatures borne by a serene maliciousness, which makes his art of writing an invincible challenge to every academic attempt to talk *about* Nietzsche as of a well defined thory. It is in this sense that Nietzsche admonished his readers, to read him "with all doors left open"². But then the question arises, how we can talk about Nietzsche at all. Perhaps, first of all we have to take into consideration our own spiritual attitude' to things, the presumed relationship to Being in general that we are used to apply within thinking. Thinking about Nietzsche becomes thinking about thinking, thinking about ourselves - our relationship to what is. And we might discover in the light of Nietzsche's problematization of thinking how helpless, superficial and even ridiculous our usual academic approach of dealing with 'philosophy' is.

And is not all academical philosophizing taking itself just too seriously? - And that means - not seriously at all? - Would it therefore not feel insulted and indignant by being called 'ridiculous'? - And would not a deeply serious thinking feel itself honoured by the laughter about its ridiculousity? - How is thinking relating to itself?

2. Nietzsche's artistic attitude of thinking

From the theoretical point of view Nietzsche's 'artistic' attitude of thinking appears as the refusal to take thinking in an ultimate sense seriously. Thinking is a way of playing, resolving itself into the serenity of laughter as a changed awareness of the factual reality of our being-in-the-world. It engages itself in liberating our relationship to world. But this would not make sense, if our being as relating to things were not bound by some essential gravity and heaviness. Thinking is - as Nietzsche points out - overloaded by the 'spirit of gravity'³ : oppressed by its own necessity to take our human being in an ultimate sense seriously. Why? - Because it is thinking by which we found our relationship

to things - and there is no reference outside thinking which would break down its loneliness into a cosmic complicity that could share with us the burden of thinking. Thinking has 'to take the measure' in order, weigh all things' and see what they are worth'⁴; but how can it measure the universe itself included? There is no other way, and yet without it man can not find his place in the midst of what is. The gravity and solitude of thinking bearing the burden of the whole universe constitutes its tragical essence and makes out of the philosopher a 'tragical donkey'. Nietzsche writes : "Can a donkey be tragical? - To have to perish by a burden, you can neither bear nor throw off? - The case of the philosopher"⁵. The donkey is the dionysical animal, tragical by the antagonism of his 'must' and his 'can' which is affirmed by his desperate cry (in german I-A, which makes 'Ja' = Yes) as the dionysical affirmation of the tragical essence of life⁶. The tragical animal is as 'Yes-sayer' - it says 'yes' to its unbearable burden - its being-in-the-world. It is basically this unconditioned affirmation of the tragical, unbearable and intolerable essence of human being that constitutes the 'great liberation' as the resolution of the 'spirit of gravity' into the serenity of a free and liberated relationship to the facticity of being, making thinking light and easy, laughing and dancing.

This anti-systematical and artistic attitude of thinking becomes the mark of a newly gained intellectual probity and sincerity overcoming the inherent tendency of self-betrayal in all human being. The world - the factual reality - is not a system. "Every system is", as Nietzsche writes, "a deficiency of intellectual probity and sincerity"⁷, hiding what is within the conceptual framework of thinking itself. Intellectual probity and sincerity as the first principle of thinking consists essentially in this, not *to want* to see things differently from what they are⁸. The want and the need, to see things *not* as they are, to alter the perception of reality, to distort and falsify the proper consciousness of what there is appears to be the very essence of thinking. May be that every relationship to the facticity of Being is deeply immersed in illusion. Thinking in its objective- theoretical sense might just be an ontological function of the appearance. Every pretension to know what is in itself might be void. Thinking becoming aware of itself as an illusionary function of Being dissolves into a new awareness of the factual reality. What is reality - is pure appearance, a mask - with nothing behind that could be explored and revealed by theoretical thinking. There is no 'true' structure of things beyond their physical way of

being encountered within their casual and fragmented bursting out as dispersed events. Thinking as the falsifying and distorting power transcends (meta) the physical way of being into a *metaphysical* system detached from the factual awareness of being and is true only within the realm of 'pure thinking'. 'Pure thinking' believes basically in its own products as physically detached entities - be they ontological or mathematical structures, that are supposed to be the 'real reality' behind the 'apparent reality'. Theoretical-metaphysical thinking produces a reality of its own: It never takes the appearances *as such* seriously; that is, as the truth of Being. What we are doing in theoretical cognition is always the same : we are constituting another structure of Being supposed to be the 'reason' - the rational foundation - of the appearances. Theoretical cognition is as such 'meta-physical': it relies on something behind the mask only to be explored, unconcealed and given within 'rational cognition'. In opposition to the metaphysical act of transcending onto another reality than the one phenomenally and physically experienced, the intellectual probity commits us to transcend and overcome thinking itself - its inherent want of self-betrayal and illusion by intentional truth claims about the world. Thinking is basically the effort and process to transcend itself, to overcome its own fixations as illusions; its innermost impulse is transcendence as liberation from every conceptual appropriation of Being that could be erected as the prevailing measure of human existence. It is -- as Ursula Schneider wrote -- the "taste of freedom and liberation, that increases" in dealing with Nietzsche⁹. It is this sense of liberation that includes the basic maliciousness and contempt that makes Nietzsche's thinking the 'high school of suspicion'. Thinking that suspects the untruth in every truth claim is bound to overcome its theoretical and ontological project to cognize reality; it tends to a way of 'an-ontological' thinking that is more concerned with our relation to what is than with a true knowledge about it. And as thinking is a 'school', it is basically as 'education' how to be, how to relate to and deal with things; it is Nietzsche as an 'educator' who claims, that we should always come out of his books profoundly changed and transformed - even if we don't share or even remember any of their, theoretical propositions'. His thinking works as the continuous formation of thinking aiming at a liberated relationship to reality as it is and it is this 'spirit' that all his writings intend to convey.

It is in this perspective that Nietzsche wrote his famous sentence, that

"truth is the kind of error a certain species of living beings can not live without"¹⁰. Taken in a theoretical sense this is of course - as Aristotle already showed - non-sense. If truth is a kind of error and the distinction of truth and error blurred, then everything is error, illusion. But without reference to truth we won't even be able to speak of error and illusion. So 'everything is error' equals 'nothing is error'; it's the same to say 'everything is error' and 'everything is truth'. So nothing is said at all. Nietzsche is well aware of this. If we abolish truth we abolish thereby appearance too¹¹. Nietzsche's point is a quite different one: according to him the distinction of truth and falsehood in the theoretical sense can not serve as an ultimate parameter to structure, organize and orientate thinking and human being-in-the-world. Thinking goes beyond the ontological framework of truth and falsehood where it is bound to establish the 'ethos' of human being. Why? - Because a certain - metaphysically predetermined - way of relating to what is already presupposed in order to establish our relation to the world within the theoretical-ontological parameter of truth and falsehood. Ontologically it presupposes the difference of appearance and reality. It is this difference, that is explored by rational (meta-physical) cognition. 'Truth' stands for a certain understanding of reality founded in a certain relationship to world. It is that - theoretical - relationship that Nietzsche puts in question. Neither Plato nor Aristotle founding the occidental tradition of philosophical thinking made any attempt to show why human being-in-the-world should be measured and determined by the concept of theoretical truth: it goes along with their definition of the essence (qua true being) of human being as a 'rational animal'. But what is human being? - And what is 'being rational'? - Don't we have to rethink the concept of human being prevailing in the occidental tradition to what is that can very well be questionable? - In this case thinking has to go *beyond* 'truth' and 'falsehood' as well as *beyond* 'good' and 'evil'; it has to re-think all the concepts that have become the prevalent references of the ontological self-understanding within the occidental tradition. It is this, 'going beyond' that constitutes the innermost sense of Nietzsche's thinking as liberation.

Thinking is liberation -- and not -- thinking as theoretical-ontological cognition of what is. This is the decisive point in understanding Nietzsche's artistic attitude of thinking. Nietzsche's is not just another theory about what is -- but another way of dealing with what is. If there is neither ontological truth within thinking nor any purpose to achieve such truth, the question might still

be how we are dealing with Being in general -- our own being and the being of everything else. And it might be the task of thinking not to pretend to know the ontological constitution of reality, but to explore and clarify, as Wolfgang Struve wrote, our relationship to world¹². This might give way to quite a different formation of thinking than the one known to our occidental tradition, which has been basically theoretical - ontological. I shall now try to outline some of the fundamental issues of such a transformation of thinking by pursuing one of the major topics in Nietzsches writing : the conflict of Art and Science.

3. Thinking within the opposition of Art and Science

Modern philosophy after Hegel can be understood to quite a large extent within the framework of the opposition of Art and Science. The question if philosophy is to be conceived as Science or if it is rather to be referred to art is one of the major issues in the foundation of modern philosophy. While within Analytical Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Logical Empirism and the like, Philosophy is conceived as Science that should adopt entirely the logical-mathematical paradigm of the positive sciences, the dialectical, phenomenological and hermeneutical schools of thought tend to view philosophical knowledge in a closer relationship to what Art might reveal about being and human existence. We can even and without any exaggeration say that modern philosophy is the antagonism of Science and Art taken as the foundational orientation patterns of philosophical thinking. But what is at stake here? - The question whether Science or Art should be the leading, prevailing and measure-giving paradigm of human being-in-the-world. Can 'truth' as it is generated within the positive sciences be the fundamental ontological paradigm for our philosophical knowledge of human being-in-the-world? - The positive sciences might be useful pragmatical instances for our technological needs without any ontological truth that could claim to be an ultimate pivot to organize human being-in-the-world. The opposition of Science and Art becomes theory, a constitutive part of the modern inquiry into the foundation of philosophical thinking. Science and Art do not count as different and equally ordered realms of human activity, but as paradigmatical instances organizing man's relationship to world. As such they are mutually exclusive while within the formation of philosophical thinking they might intermingle into a complex cognitive form of

relating to Being in general. To think philosophy as Art will never exclude and abandon the achievements of the scientific spirit grown up and cherished by the occidental tradition of philosophy. Nietzsche's thinking - orientation itself towards Art - remains not only deeply indebted to the scientific spirit of the occidental tradition but would also refuse any attempt to cancel thinking into the vanity of a pure so-called 'artistic' subjectivity. His principle of intellectual probity and sincerity stands for this obligation to the scientific spirit.

'Science' in the opposition to 'Art' means for Nietzsche not primarily the modern type of mathematical rationality but the scientific spirit generated by philosophy. It is this 'scientific spirit' that is at the root of occidental philosophy as founded by Socrates and elaborated within the platonic-aristotelean tradition, thus becoming the dominating factor within the formation of occidental philosophy up to Hegel. Consequently the question of the origin of Science/Philosophy as a specific way of relating to the world has to be seen against the background of the Greek religion whose principle is Art; Art being basically represented by Greek tragedy. The origin of scientific philosophy is as such the negation of the tragical experience of human being in the world. 'Science' is therefore in Nietzsche's language 'scientific optimism'; that is, the conviction that rational cognition can as such serve as the fundamental measure of our relating to what is - ourselves and everything else. The negation of the tragical experience of our being-in-the-world by 'scientific optimism' includes the negation of Art as its prevailing orientational pattern. Art becomes thereby confined to an esthetical experience without any truth. For all this stands Socrates, "the turning point and pivot of the so called history of the world", as Nietzsche names him¹³. Failing to understand the Greek tragedy Socrates becomes the origin of science. Nietzsche's central point is that the scientific-rational attitude towards things in general makes a complete turning point in man's attitude towards the terrific aspects of life, towards its terrible and tragical essence and finally towards the negativity of Being in general. 'Scientific optimism' stands for the abolition and repression of the ontological negativity of Being. What we consequently find in Nietzsche is a completely new evaluation and appreciation of the negative phenomena of life - death and illness, madness and error, falsehood and illusion, appearance and voidness, evil and maliciousness, finiteness, pain and suffering and so on. It is basically the Negative that generates the new awareness of reality claimed by intellectual

probity and sincerity. To talk about the relationship of Man and World means then to talk about how human being is relating to the negativity of Being.

In order to avoid misunderstandings we have to distinguish two terms of 'negativity' :

1. In the Phenomenological-ontological sense 'negativity' means all phenomena of Being that have a negating character or are constituted by the negation. The negation is a fundamental trait of Being itself inasfar as being is coming-into-being and passing-away, being-finite and transient, fugitive and exposed to all kinds of deficiencies and privations, contrarities and inhibitions.

2. In the axiological-metaphysical sense which is commonly used 'negativity' indicates a lot more than only the negational structure of phenomenal being : it denominates not only a negative phenomenon but a negative phenomenon as something which *as such should not be*; something that being negative *should* be excluded from Being, *should* be negated and abolished, overcome and transcended into the 'positivity' of being. It contains a negative 'evaluation' of the negativity of Being handing it over to all kinds of negational attitudes.

It is quite clear that in this second - axiological/metaphysical - sense, 'negativity' stands for a certain - 'negative' relationship to the negativity of Being. It is exactly this relationship that is at the root of the socratic shift from tragical Art to 'scientific optimism' constituting thereby the basic pattern of the occidental way of being-in-the-world. 'Science' stands basically for a certain - negative - way of relating to the negativity of being. It is this, negation of the 'negative' that constitutes the scientific-metaphysical spirit of occidental thinking which Nietzsche undertakes to re-think. The essential question is then : What - if not a presupposed theoretical truth - is this root out of which thinking grows in its different ways of relating to the world? - If we dare a highly condensed answer - the Negative itself.

It would go far beyond the present essay to unfold this answer into all its conceptual and speculative implications. Instead of this I will try to roughly outline its meaning in order to understand better what Nietzsche considers to be the foundational root of thinking.

Let me first of all try to give a rough account of the traditional - scientific-metaphysical - relationship to the negativity of Being. How is this relationship negating the negativity of Being? - By scientific-rational cognition. In what way? - Scientific-rational cognition relates to the phenomenal sphere of Being - the way things appear to us, show up and disappear. But never are the phenomena taken *as themselves* and for what they are *as phenomena*. They are the appearance of *something else*, which is *ontologically different* from them : their pure essence and their formal interrelations and consequences, or their mathematical structure - in any case something which *is not* in the way of the finite, fugitive and transient, evenemental and unseizable character of the physical phenomena and our basic relationship to them, but eternal, stable, imperishable and thereby 'a-physical'. Whatever is known as the true being of the physical phenomena - as that, what they *really are* - is as such not-physical, a-physical : It constitutes another world as that which is the basic realm of our physical-phenomenological experience. Theoretical cognition, transcending the evenemental realm of phenomena, constitutes necessarily and by itself another - ontological distinct - realm of propositional facts : a 'meta-physical world' or - in Nietzsche's paradoxical language - a 'world behind the world'; as, for example, the set of logical-mathematical theories that is supposed to be the explanatory pool of physical facts. This 'Meta-world' constituted by the theoretical cognition itself is ontologically different from the physical structure of Being and ontologically identical with reason itself, defining the physical structure of Being as mere appearance of something which as itself is not-physical but 'ideal' - 'ideality' denominating the way of being of rational entities as such. They *exist* only within rational thinking. Consequently the real reality as that which is known by rational cognition to be the 'truth' of the phenomenal world is free of all negativity : What really is - the truth of rationally cognized being - is a 'de-negativated', purely positive reality without any negativity, deficiency and privation, all negativity of Being belonging to the realm of the physical-phenomenal world of appearance. It is deprived of any ultimate ontological reality. 'Negativity' is as pure appearance un-real, un-true; it *is* real only for the physical, phenomenal and esthetical experience of Being that is not yet overcome the apparent world by rational cognition and insight in its true foundations. The negativity of Being - void of all true reality - will vanish before the theoretical insight of reason into the lost 'reasons' of Being; and reason itself will discover the last foundations of Being as being identical

with reason a physical, pure positivity. The scientific spirit is metaphysical by its constitutive distinction of appearance and reality, facts and explanation. The distinction emerges out of the specific way theoretical thinking is transcending the realm of the phenomenal world. Exactly this constitutes what is called the 'method's of cognition; that is, the operating way of mediating the phenomenal world of appearances into the rationally cognized structure of true Being. The concept of 'method' constitutive for all scientific cognition implies the mediation of the grounded into its ground overcoming the factual given world into an ontological different set of entities as their de-negativated truth. The facticity of physical-phenomenal being is reduced to a pure transient stage of thinking never taken ultimately serious in itself. The supersession and repression of factual being is the essence of the scientific transgression of the phenomenal world. This transgression constitutes the metaphysical realm of true Being as its ontological transcendence. The 'axiological' (metaphysical) term of 'negativity' is nothing but the concept of this negation of the facticity of Being. Its primary gesture is that the negative should not be; its insight, that it is ontologically inexistant and mere appearance. The scientific-metaphysical relationship to world is essentially constituted by the repression of the negative - the tragical and terrific essence of Being; and this - the tragical and terrific essence of Being - is basically what all Art is revealing as the truth of human being in the world.

The opposition of Science and Art now becomes clearer. Art never transcends the physical-phenomenal reality onto something ontologically different but stays within it; and this is the very condition of the possibility of Art as the inner transfiguration of the physical-phenomenal reality into beauty. Beauty reconciliates us with our finiteness and the negativity of Being in general - without constituting the metaphysical transcendence of an ontologically different world. Art constitutes a non-metaphysical way of a free and reconciliated relationship with what is : it liberates from the negativity of Being without repressing it. Art sticks to the world as appearance. But why should we stick to it at all? - Because, as it is the point of departure and arrival of all scientific - metaphysical thinkings, it is the comprehensive realm of all validity of its concepts and thereby the unsurpassable truth of our being. If the world - the facticity of Being - is not ontologically reducible to something other than itself, it is in its physical-phenomenal and evenemental way of being mere appearance - of nothing : the mask of the void. 'Mask' is Nietzsche's name for the

ontological reality of the world; the mask is the (apollonian) transfiguration of the terrible, terrific and tragic (dionysical) essence of life and Being in general into Appearance. World as the transfiguration of the terrible, the masking of the void is not a system, but a "self-being artwork"¹⁴, that is revealed as such by the tragical Art. Art reminds scientific-theoretical thinking of its true being-in-the-world, demasking its pretention to conceptually transgress the abysmal superficiality and superficial depth of World¹⁵. Art generates the pre-theoretical awareness of World as a play of masks, a skin and surface with nothing behind. Art reveals World in its profound enigmaticity by withdrawing from every attempt to ontologically seize and explain what is. But then the 'Negative' is not any more a superficial and apparent aspect of reality overcome by the rational cognition of the true 'positivity' behind, but the innermost nucleus of a permanent transfiguration into the masks of Being as a self-bearing artwork. This transfiguration - and not the theoretically constituted ontological transcendence behind the world - generate the possibility of a free and reconciliated relationship to what is.

4. The soteriological concept of thinking as liberation

We can now try to bring out what Nietzsche considers to be the foundational root of thinking. In what way is this root the 'Negative'? In basically two ways :

1. First of all, relating to the facticity of Being is relating to its finiteness and to everything that constitutes its fundamental 'negational' traits. The awareness of what is is basically the awareness of being-finite, being-to-death, being-exposed to every kind of negation. Human being has to deal with the Negative insofar as its own being is only possible in view of its own negation (death). We relate to Being only insofar as we found a relationship to the negativity of Being which enables us to deal with and to handle our own being as immersed into the negativity of factual being-in-the-world. The object and issue, the purpose and even the root of founding a relationship to what is by thinking - be it religious or artistic, scientific or metaphysical - is the negativity of Being; and only a being exposed to its own awareness of the negativity of Being can 'think' and has to 'think'. What makes us think is the Negative -

never what is or seems 'positive'. Thinking is born out of the experience of the negativity of Being and it is this what commits us into thinking as developing a relationship to what is.

2. Secondly 'negativity' is one - if now *the* - basic trait of thinking itself. Thinking is thinking only as the force of Negation. The negation itself is the force to distinguish and discern one thing from another in order to conceive it *as such*. But the negation is much more than this : The simple 'not' in all its manifold ways constitutes the negativity of human being itself, plunging us into all forms of human violence but also generating all kinds of possibilities to restrain ourselves, to free and liberate ourselves from our own violent - that is 'essentially negating' being. Without the negation we would not only be unable to conceive, understand and know anything of what is, but we would be completely unable to found a relation to what is. So the 'negativity' is at the root of our own being inasfar as it 'possibilizes' our relationship to the negativity of Being - the mark of our freedom and liberty to handle our relationship to what is¹⁶.

That means, that the relationship of Man and World is not basically founded in a theoretical, ontological conception of the world nor is this the heart of it. The relationship of Man and World is essentially 'soteriological', dealing with 'salvation' and 'liberation' (soteria) of human being-in-the-world.

In this perspective Nietzsche is trying to give a general account of the formation of the relationship of Man and World within its traditional patterns of religion and metaphysics, including science. Even if they are not only different but strictly antagonistic and contradictory with regards to their theoretical and propositional contents we can discover a common root in their soteriological way of dealing with the negativity of Being. The metaphysical (socratic-platonic) and in consequence scientific attitude towards Being is all well as the religious (christian) relationship to world born out of 'the spirit of revenge' - the resentment against the negativity of Being - leading thus to its ontological 'de-valuation' as mere appearance of the real, true realm of positive being. Thinking is taking revenge on what is by applying its force of negation to the constitution of a 'Meta- world' which is the rational truth of the phenomenal

facticity of Being. In a different way thinking might just renounce the world - its destructive essence which Nietzsche calls 'will to power' - as is the case in all kinds of quietisms, the doctrine of the Buddha and even Jesus Christ himself as distinct from Christianity. It is for Nietzsche certainly the distinctive mark of early Greek religion - and generally of all early, archaic religions commonly called 'Religions of Nature' - that they articulate their relationship to the world within the Art- principle, that is *within* the physical-phenomenal truth of the world. The turning point within history - which in occidental history is indicated by the name of Socrates - is therefore a profound chngement within the relationship to the physical world as the realm of the negativity of Being giving thus origin to Metaphysics. Science and the World-religions like Buddhism, Christianity and Islam.

In this perspective modern scientific-technological rationality itself proves to be nothing more than the ultimate fulfillment of Metaphysics as 'scientific-optimism' by the idea of the progress of humanity towards a final de-negativated state of things where all 'negativity' would be strictly - technologically - abolished. We are already witnessing today how human being becomes the object of de-negativating technologies not only in the field of their possible physical applications but also within social and political, psychotherapeutic and ideological technologies. Modernity is the project to eradicate the Negative - and it is this project that proves nowadays to be the indefinite propagation and inflation of human negativity itself. According to Nietzsche this soteriological project of modernity is bound to produce man as 'the last human being'; that is, the human being who "invented happiness" and "can not despise himself anymore"¹⁷. The modern invention of happiness technologically pursued and secured 'generates the human being who can not overcome and transcend himself anymore. Man loses his negative force to despise himself, to overcome and transcend himself, to create himself as a work of art - that is as the reconciliation with the negativity of Being. What Nietzsche calls the human being as 'superman' means basically human being as transcendence, self- overcoming into the affirmation of something that simply can not be affirmed otherwise than by this self-overcoming into the freedom of the tragical awareness of what is, the free and liberated play of the world as the laughter of the mask.

If thinking is rooted in the negative and therefore basically the soteriological pursuit of a free relationship to the world it has to overthink and revolutionize its traditional 'metaphysical' attitude towards Being. Only liberated from any resentment against what is, any 'spirit of revenge' or 'renunciation', will thinking constitute itself as the 'gaya scienza' of the 'free spirit', the serenity of the 'tragical donkey'. Nietzsche's 'school of thinking' is basically one of a self-overcoming and transcending liberation - not *from*, but *to* the world as perceived within the intellectual probity which makes thinking pass beyond its inherent need for conceptual self-betrayal. This includes the dismissal of the traditional attitude of theoretical- ontological thinking as it forms the dominating mainstream of occidental philosophy. There is in the traditional theoretical sense no ontology in Nietzsche, no attempt to conceptualize what is into a theoretical framework of true insights and cognitions. What looks like an ontology in Nietzsche - and Heidegger has given the most pertinent interpretation of it¹⁸ - does not have any theoretical status but is in Nietzsche's published works modalized into the completely different 'artistic' status of aphorisms or a poem such as the 'Zarathustra'. The awareness of what is, transfiguring itself into the language of Art, does not claim any theoretically 'true' sentences and propositions determining Being in itself but is the function of a liberated relationship to what is, a perception of the empirical-speculative enigmaticity of the world we can not avoid to relate to and speak about. Every ontological interpretation of Nietzsche - like the one of Heidegger - is based on the unpublished work of Nietzsche taken as a theoretical discourse. It neglects the artistic modalization of ontology into a non-theoretical status : the poetical saying of how world appear to a 'free spirit' born out of a liberated way of being-in-the-world. Thinking is the pure surplus of Being, nothing but the free and gratuitous moment of its intricate negativity overcoming itself into the freedom of Being. Nietzsche's education in thinking, in 'an-ontological' and 'soteriological' thinking, is surely a difficult one. Institutionalized into a new academical approach it could only revolutionize our contemporary philosophical institutions and their way of dealing with 'philosophy'. We would less engage in generating formal wits and cleverness and educate more spiritual attitudes of dealing with what makes us think - the Negative. And may be this is what we need most today - more attention to what makes us thinks.

NOTES

1. Presented at the Conference held at Gargi-College, New-Delhi (India) on the occasion of the Seminar on : Nietzsche's Superman : Divine or Demonic, to commemorate Nietzsche's 150 th Birthday (19th December 1994).
2. KSA 3, 17. In this sense J. P. Schobinger, *Miszellen zu Nietzsche* (Basel 1992), proposed as a different hermeneutical approach to Nietzsche the method of 'operational interpretation'. See for a very radical 'anti-academic' lecture of Nietzsche : Gilvan L. Fogel, *Nietzsches Gedanke der Überwindung der Metaphysik* (Diss. Heidelberg 1980).
3. KSA 4, 241.
4. KSA 4, 36.
5. KSA 6, 60.
6. KSA 4, 390.
7. KSA 6, 63.
8. KSA 3, 16; KSA 6, 267, 371.
9. In her excellent book : Nietzsche. *Grundzüge einer Philosophie des Glücks* (DeGruyter, Berlin 1983).
10. W III, 844.
11. KSA 6, 80.
12. *Welt und Wirklichkeit in : Scheidewege* 2 (1972), 97.
13. KSA 1, 100.
14. W III, 495.
15. In this sense Nietzsche wrote, that the Greeks were 'superficial' out of profoundness (KSA 3, 352).
16. See for further clarifications my monograph : Heidegger. *Sein und Wissen. Eine Einführung in sein Denken* (Wien 1993), 349 ff.
17. KSA 4, 19 f.
18. M. Heidegger, *Nietzsche I, II*. Pfullingen 1961.

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DUMMETT ON SEMANTIC ANTI-REALISM : A CRITIQUE

SATRUGHNA BEHERA

Michael Dummett propounds a theory of anti-realist semantics in the philosophy of Language¹. He argues against classical semantics which assumes a form of realism. This form of realism is based on two significant propositions, viz (i) to understand a statement (either partially or completely) is to grasp its truth-conditions and (ii) these truth-conditions are not instantiated in assertions themselves, but they somehow transcend the assertions. The first proposition entails the truth-functional applicability of assertions mappable with the facts available in the world. The second proposition suggests the objective existence of certain truth-elements that transcend verification. Semantic anti-realism is generally advocated in an exclusive refutation of one of the above mentioned propositions though some attempt to refute both the propositions². In other words, one may deny the first (realist) proposition without arguing the second (realist) proposition and, so also, one may deny the second proposition without arguing against the first proposition. An attempt is made in this paper to show that Dummett never succeeds to deny the first (realist) proposition and his anti-realist arguments are more concerned with the denial of the second (realist) proposition. Dummett in his several papers argues against the realist standpoint about a class of statements that understanding a statement in the class involves truth-conditions, at least in some cases, capable of being satisfied³. These truth-conditions are called "recognition-independent"⁴ and more significantly characterized as "evidence-transcendent"⁵ or "verification-transcendent"⁶. I attempt to show that Dummett's anti-realism appeals to truth conditions, though not in the very way the realists propound, because a grasp of truth-conditions is not sufficient for linguistic understanding and defining a general theory of meaning for the natural language.

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I

According to Dummett, the semantic anti-realist holds that "the meaning of a statement is intrinsically connected with that which we count as evidence for or against the statement"⁷. The conditions which determine the evidence for a statement can be asserted (or denied). These assertibility conditions are never verification-transcendent. If assertibility-conditions are satisfied, then it is possible in principle, to detect their satisfaction. Anything that is called 'evidence' is a condition in a linguistic situation. Semantic anti-realism, for Dummett, is then the view that the meaning of a statement is determined through its assertibility-conditions. That is, assertibility conditions, not truth-conditions, constitute the meaning. As Dummett puts it,

The fundamental difference between the anti-realist and the realist lies in this : that...the anti-realist interpretes 'capable of being known' to mean 'capable of being known by us', where as the realist interpretes it to mean 'capable of being known by some hypothetical being whose intellectual capacities and powers of observation may exceed our own'⁸.

The obvious consequence is that in order to understand a statement one must know its assertibility-conditions. This amounts to that we do not first come to understand, for example, what a statement means and then ask ourselves about the appropriate conditions which determine its meaning. If we have no idea what counts as the evidence for or against it, then, according to Dummett, we have no idea that what the statement means. Thus anti-realist semantics contends that if we do understand a statement, we arrive at a position that our understanding involves a grasp of assertibility conditions which determine the semantic evidence for or against it. This thought leads to two arguments such that (i) We cannot understand a statement if we have no grasp of its assertibility-conditions and (ii) that we understand a statement (and therefore grasp its truth conditions, if that is what understanding involves) by grasping its assertibility-conditions. Dummett presents the anti-realist arguments more explicitly in "The Reality of the past"⁹, and "The philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic"¹⁰. The main thrust of the arguments is that the meaning of a statement is 'exhaustively determined' by its use. Dummett means that there can be nothing in our understanding a statement "which is not manifest or capable of becoming manifest-in the use made of it". This anti-realist theory thus denies the fact that linguistic understanding always involves a grasp of truth-conditions. Because in certain

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cases the need of these conditions lies beyond our capability to recognize them. This suggests that in certain cases a grasp of truth-conditions is irrelevant and redundant to our linguistic uses, to our linguistic practices. When our linguistic practices are insensitive to the satisfaction of certain conditions, a grasp of these conditions can make no contribution to our understanding. However, it does not follow from this argument that linguistic understanding never involves a grasp of truth-conditions. Rather the argument establishes the fact that understanding always involves certain conditions which are not necessarily the assertibility conditions.

Dummett seems to be highly impressed by later Wittgenstein's slogan that 'meaning is use'. This leads him to express the idea that to determine the meaning of an expression is to know its contextual employment i.e. to know the circumstances in which it can be asserted or denied. These circumstances (conditions) are concerned with the linguistic acts of the person to whom the understanding is attributed¹¹. The use of assertions itself matters with the meaning. The doctrine 'meaning is use' accentuates the fact that semantic ascription is quite public and conventional. The meaning of expressions are constituted by linguistic convention resulted from our continuous use of language in socio-linguistic situations available. Dummett's semantic anti-realism greatly acknowledges these attributions.

Dummett's conception of a theory of meaning is framed by his criticism of the traditional belief that meaning determines extension. No one, as Dummett rightly says, "has ever supposed that meaning by itself determines extension"¹². Instead, he suggests "what people have supposed is that nothing conventional, save meaning, is relevant to fixing the extension of a word, since very relevant convention must be part of the meaning"¹³. This argument goes against Frege who accepts the belief that meaning determines extension from words to sentences or statements. Frege believes in the objective existence of senses where the truth is the central notion to determine the semantic values of the statements. Dummett, as it is argued above, opts for the doctrine that meaning along with whatever is non-conventional (the facts) determines the truth-values of our statements. That is to say, the semantic theory accommodates a theory of meaning in which truth is not the central notion. Truth is not primitive to the language use; it is involved in it. Meaning is conventional since linguistic conventions constitute it¹⁵.

By discussing the task of a theory of meaning what he urges in this connection applies to those for whom truth is not the basic notion as well as to those for whom it is. As Dummett puts it.

The conception of the semantic value of a predicate as a function from the domain of objects to the semantic values of sentences is of quite general validity for any possible semantic theory, and gives the only way in which we may arrive at the correct notion for a given theory¹⁶.

In his "What is a theory of Meaning? II"¹⁷ he also maintains this thought. He suggests that the 'first stage' of a theory (semantic) that it determines the meaning of an expression involves the principles governing the conditions under which we decide it to be true or false¹⁸. He asks "what but the meaning of a sentence can determine what we count as a ground for accepting as true?". For him, 'meaning alone' determines whether or not something is a ground for accepting the sentence. And, finally he comes to the conclusion :

To replace a realistic theory of meaning by a verificationist one is to take a first step towards meeting the requirement that we incorporate into our theory of sense on account of the basis on which we judge the truth-values of our sentences, since it does explain meaning in terms of actual human capacities for the recognition of truth¹⁹.

It is in this conception of a semantic theory that accounts for Dummett's hostility towards holism. Dummett views a molecular view of language. But according to holistic view 'meaning consists in the place which a statement occupies in the complicated network... of our linguistic practices. This holistic conception of a semantic theory becomes unimpressive²⁰. This is because holism calls into question the distinction between fact and convention on which Dummettian semantic theory is based. The basic purpose to construct a general theory of meaning, as Dummett understands it, is to explain our assignments of semantic value²¹. The protagonists of a realist theory of meaning, Dummett claims, share this understanding which embodies an explanatory aim. This explanatory aim of a theory of meaning is semantically unwarranted. For, a theory of meaning can be framed through our linguistic competence²². A theory of meaning is a theory of understanding. A theory of understanding consists in our linguistic competence which, in turn, is instantiated in our actual mastery of language.

II

Thus, according to semantic anti-realism what is significant in our understanding of a statement must make a difference to our performance (actual or potential). This contends that since a grasp of verification-transcendent truth-conditions can make no performative difference, it does say nothing about the linguistic understanding. Verification-transcendent truth conditions neither constitute our linguistic competence nor are they part of it. But anti-realist may agree that to understand a statement (at least in some cases) is to grasp its truth-conditions since truth-conditions cannot be completely excluded from the semantic considerations. That is, in minimal sense anti-realist accepts the realist's first proposition (i.e. to understand a statement is to grasp its truth conditions) without advocating a theoretical realism. To say explicitly that we grasp truth conditions (even verification-transcendent ones) by virtue of our grasp of assertibility-conditions. In other words, truth conditions are involved in the assertibility conditions. Semantic anti-realism, in this sense, appears as a form of friendly formidable semantic realism by bringing the notion of meaning into the centre of linguistic understanding.

We may now argue that if a grasp of truth conditions is nothing over and above an appropriate grasp of assertibility-conditions and where an appropriate grasp is one accompanied by the recognition that the fulfilment of such conditions is no guarantee of truth, then the realist propositions can be accepted by the anti-realist. What semantic anti-realism suggests us is; we should not take the model of grasping truth-conditions seriously. Understanding a statement is not as if one takes hold of something lying beyond the detectable (decidable) conditions that justify assertion. Knowing the assertibility conditions of a statement and to know them along with the assertibility-conditions of other statements is also to know truth-conditions (factual evidence). Grasping truth-conditions is not a queer separate act; it is inevitably related to our mastery in the recognition of evidential facts. The temptation of replacement of truth-conditions by assertibility conditions proves to be logically superfluous. This temptation ponders Wittgensteinians in the discussions of following a rule. We train to respond in following a particular rule in a certain way in limited cases and then we know who to go on. It is tempting to say that our going on is regulated by our grasp of a rule. And we can certainly do this as long as it is not conceived as an interpretation. Interpretations at last do not constitute the

meaning. Semantic anti-realist makes this argument for our grasp of truth-conditions²³.

Moreover, a careful examination of Dummett's semantic anti-realism reveals that he does not, in principle, advocate a verificationist theory of meaning. He writes:

I should now be inclined to say that under any theory of meaning whatever... we can represent the meaning (sense) of a statement as given by the condition for it to be true²⁴.

The problem here, as Dummett suggests, "is not whether meaning is to be explained in terms of truth-conditions but of what notion of truth is admissible"²⁵. This makes room for the realist's propositions. That is, truth-conditions are to be accepted on the refutation of verification-transcendence. Dummett excludes the doctrine of conclusive verification because "often such conclusive verification is not to be had"²⁶. Further more he says in "Realism", "there may indeed be some empirical statements whose truth can never be known with certainty, for which there cannot be any wholly conclusive evidence"²⁷. He adds to this by saying, "for such statements there will, for the anti-realist, be no question of their being anything in virtue of which they are definitively true but only of things in virtue of which they are probably true; the notion of absolute truth simply will not apply to such statements"²⁸. These arguments of Dummett puzzle other protagonists of semantic anti-realism²⁹. The problem is, if the sense of absolute does not apply and it is inadmissible in such cases, how can we have a conception of verification at all? Dummett's reluctance to accept verification-transcendence completely stems from his failure to distinguish between theoretical realism and the realist's propositions. Dummett was aware that if he acknowledges verification transcendence and at the same time would commit to the doctrine of representing meaning as a grasp of truth-conditions, then he will do nothing for the semantic anti-realism. Dummett's interpretation shows that he accepts truth conditions when these are disconnected from objectionable notion of truth. According to assertibility-condition the theoretical realist's notion of absolute truth is rejected and at the same time Dummett, in a minimal sense, accepts the realist's proposition. And since he rejects the theoretical realism, he fails to satisfy the sceptic need of rational justification in order to establish absolute certainty of a semantic theory.

III

Dummettian semantic anti-realism, therefore, seems to be compatible with scepticism. On the one hand it rules out theoretical realism and on the other hand it does not take truth-conditions or any constitutive matter of fact as the sole determinant of semantic values. But Dummett's argument shows that his anti-realism involves realist propositions which lead us to get hold in the sceptic's argument. The sceptic arrives at his doubts by means of two presumptions. The first presumption asserts the possibility of a statement being false in spite of the facts (evidences) available (or may be available) for its truth. These facts may be called as, the best evidence we now possess," 'the best evidence we will ever possess' or, so also, 'the best possible evidence available to us with our cognitive capacities'. The second presumption states that unless the facts we have rule out the possibility of a statement's falsehood, it is impossible to know that the statement is being true. It is obvious that anti-realism is conditioned with the second presumption and in its most extreme form its argument is consistent with the first one. Thus anti-realism endorses the sceptical uncertainty even with the most extreme form of Cartesian scepticism. In other words, Dummett's epistemic commitment leads this sceptical position. This distorts anti-realism by drawing attention away from the possibility as emphasised by Dummett himself that one can be anti-realist without being a reductionist. A reductionist anti-realist, Dummett suggests, commits to the view that a statement of the disputed class (for instance, a statement about the person's outer behaviour) is also true³¹. This reductionist commitment entails that the 'suitable statement of the reductive class' reduces (equates) the meaning to the associated statement of the disputed class. Dummett calls it as reductivism in semantics.

According to Dummett, a reductionist proposes the view that "no statement of the given (or disputed) class can be true unless some suitable statement or statements of the reductionist class are true, and ...the truth of those statements of the reductionist class guarantees the truth of the corresponding statement of the class"³². Semantic anti-realism in this sense "does not...need to take on a reductionist form"³³. On the contrary, it holds that the use of a statement (of the disputed class) expresses the views which establish conditions by which the statement becomes true or false. For there remain no use-independent facts to

determine the truth/falsity of a statement (of any class). This shows that reductionist's proposal is too limited as it permits us, in principle to express truth-conditions of any statement in the disputed class without using the semantic characteristic of that class. A reductionist, thus, fails to save meaning for the matter of truth. This amounts to that reductivism always directs arguments for the refutation of the scepticism. A reductionist significantly assumes the reality of the physical facts. The sceptic about other minds, on the reductionist account, can be refuted once we succeed in reducing statement about the mental content to statement about behaviour. A reductionist in this sense is called behaviourist or physicalist. Dummett accepts non-reductivism, not because that the evidence he provides fails to guarantee the truth, but because that it is open to doubt the meaning of the statement as it is meant to support. If we are satisfied with what we ordinarily conceive as facts that do not take care of the sceptic's (or reductivist's) account of facts. The problem of anti-realism lies in that it epistemically commits to the conditions for the truth in terms of a kind of non-reductionist evidence which does not impress the sceptic.

Dummett advocates the principle of bivalence and argues that the principle follows from the realist propositions. The principle of bivalence states that 'every statement is determinately either true or false'³⁴. Dummett supposes that "we have succeeded in ascribing to our statements a meaning of such a kind that their truth or falsity is, in general, independent of whether we know, or have any means of knowing, what truth-value theory have. Since, in understanding a statement, we know what it is for the statement to be true, we thereby also know what it is for it to be false, i.e. it is false precisely in all cases in which the condition for its truth does not obtain; since this condition is taken to me one which either does or does not obtain independently of our knowledge, it follows that every statement is either true or false, likewise independently of our knowledge"³⁵. That is, a statement is false in all cases in which it is not true where the bivalence holds.

Dummett denies the verification-transcendence of truth. This leads us to believe that on the assumption that there are undecidable statements, Dummett cannot accept the principle of bivalence. His "Realism" attempts to show this. Dummett tells us that anti-realist shows, for statements of a given class, that "we possess no legitimate objectivist notion of truth, no notion of truth transcending our capacity to recognize such statements as true, and a fortiori no

notion of truth subject to the principle of bivalence"³⁶. And he continues " if such a statement as " Jones was brave' is true, it must be true in virtue of the sort of fact we have been taught to regard as justifying us in asserting it. It cannot be true in virtue of a fact of some quite different sort of which we can have no direct knowledge, for otherwise the statement 'Jones was brave' would not have the meaning that we have given it"³⁷. The limitation of anti- realist's argument, as Dummett represents it, is that bivalence will separate the statement 'Jones was brave' from the meaning we have given it, which is the only meaning it has. However, if it is true that the anti-realist opts to accept the realist propositions, then he has no room to deny bivalence. This argument for the acceptance of the principle of bivalence shows the anti-realist's accomplishment with the realist. That is, the anti-realist argument does not threaten the realist's propositions and these propositions are all about the sceptic's need formulate his doubts.

Dummett can argue that anti-realism about linguistic understanding is a view about meaning that promises to advance our understanding. However, if he commits it to be the only view about meaning it will not stand against scepticism. Dummett's failure to meet the sceptic need does not lie in his arguments but in the assumption that the arguments seem to be relevant to the contemporary concerns of epistemology. This leads some contemporary thinkers, e.g. Richard Rorty³⁸ to suppose that anti-realism offers a round about but improved way of doing anti-sceptical epistemology. Richard Rorty thinks that "Dummett sees philosophy of language as fundamental because he sees epistemological issues, now at least, being formulated correctly as issues within the theory of meaning"³⁹. According to Rorty, Dummett "argues with Descartes about the importance of the issues which emerged out of the ways of ideas"⁴⁰. But he thinks that we have only recently been able to state them precisely.⁴¹ Dummett as it seems to Rorty, believes that once the old questions are expressed in the right way as the questions in the philosophy of language the linguistic philosophers will surpass the traditional epistemologists. Nevertheless, Dummett's anti-realist approach to understand language has a considerable direct effect on the work of linguistic epistemologists⁴². Admitted that, it, I suggest, leaves room to accept Dummett as an anti-realist semanticist at a first glance than to be a linguistic epistemologist.

NOTES

1. Dummett, M. *Truth and Other Enigmas* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass, 1978).
2. See Michale Devitt, "Dummett's Anti-Realism" *Journal of Philosophy*, 80 (1982), pp.197-225.
3. For detail discussion on this point see Dummett's "The Reality of the past", p.358, "The justification of Deduction" P.136, "Realism"(1963), p.146 and the preface to *Truth and Other Enigmas*. pp.XXI and XI.
4. See Dummett's Critical notice of L. E. J. Brouwer, *Collected Works, Mind*, 89 (1983), p.609.
5. See Devitt, "Dummett's Anti Realism", *Journal of Philosophy*, 80 (1983), p.74.
6. See Crispin Wright "Truth conditions and criteria (II)", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Suppl.* Vol. 50(1976) p.225.
7. See Dummett, "Realism" (1963) in *Truth and Other Enigmas* p.162.
8. Dummett, "Truth" in *Truth and Other Enigmas* p.24.
9. See Dummett, "The Reality of the past" in *Truth and Other Enigmas*. pp.358-374.
10. See Dummett, "The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic" in *Truth and Other Enigmas*, pp. 215-248.
11. *Ibid.* p.216.
12. Dummett "The Social Character of Meaning" in *Truth and Other Enigmas*. p.420.
13. *Ibid.* p.420.
14. See G. Frege, "Thoughts" in *Logical Investigations*, Ed. by P. T. Geach, (Blackwell, Oxford, 1977).
15. See Dummett, *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy*. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1982).
16. *Ibid.* p.168.
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IS SINGULAR PROPOSITION CATEGORICAL?

AMIT KUMAR SEN

There is a long tradition of taking the following argument as the most typical of syllogisms :

All men are mortal

Socrates is a man

∴ Socrates is mortal

Granted that this argument is intuitively valid, we can still ask whether it differs in any essential respect from Syllogisms formed by A.E.I. or O propositions. In other words, is a Singular proposition a special case of a universal or particular proposition. There may be four possible alternative answers to this question.

- (i) A singular proposition may be taken to be the same as a universal proposition.
- (ii) A singular proposition may be taken to be the same as a particular proposition.
- (iii) A singular proposition may be taken to be the conjunction of both universal and particular.
- (iv) A singular proposition is taken neither to be universal nor to be particular.

Let us examine the four alternatives. The first alternative i.e. a singular proposition may be taken to be the same as a universal proposition has got its support in traditional logic. In traditional logic propositions like "Socrates is a logician" or "This man is a logician" are treated as universal because a single individual like 'Socrates', 'This man' etc. can be looked upon as constituting a class by itself, what is called a unit class and this unit class formed by a single individual, here 'Socrates' or 'This man' in the subject position of the proposition is in inclusion relation with another class in the predicate position, say 'logician'.

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Kant remarked, "Logicians are justified in saying that, in the employment of judgments in Syllogisms, singular judgements can be treated like those that are universal" (*Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N. K. Smith, B. 96 A71).

I admit that in some ways a singular proposition resembles a universal proposition. It obviously subalternates : from 'Socrates (or this man) is a logician', it certainly follows that "Some men are logician". It also obeys the law of contrariety; at least if its negation is looked upon as a contrary, for example, if 'This man is a logician' is true, its negation 'This man is not a logician' cannot be true. Here, however, we begin to run into trouble. If 'This man is a logician' and 'This man is not a logician' are true contraries and related as A and E propositions, then their truth is incompatible with the particulars that are their contradictories. But this is by no means necessarily true for singular propositions. 'This man is a logician' is not at all incompatible with the truth 'Some men are not logicians'. But if the Singular proposition is the same as universal, it should be. Thus we see that if a singular proposition is taken to be the same as universal, it will violate the law of contradictory opposition.

In fact, with respect to the law of contradictory opposition a singular proposition acts more like a particular proposition. The truth of either its affirmative or negative form is sufficient to deny the opposite universal proposition : If 'This man is a logician' is true then 'No man is a logician' is obviously false. Considering this, some may be inclined to take singular proposition to be the same as particular. But in that case there would be a violation of the law of distribution of terms. In a singular proposition like 'This man is a logician' the subject term 'man' is distributed but if this proposition is taken as particular, that term should remain undistributed. So the second alternative that a singular proposition may be taken to be the same as particular is not acceptable.

According to some, a singular proposition contains more information than is contained in any one of the four categorical propositions of A, E, I, or O form and if a singular proposition is taken to be the conjunction of a universal and a particular proposition, all the informations contained in it can be retained. As I. M. Copi said that to retain the aspect of existential import of singular proposition it is to be taken as particular and to retain the universal aspect of singular proposition, which distributes its subject term, it is to be taken as universal.

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Moreover, taking a singular proposition as the conjunction of a universal and a particular proposition, one may think, may help us to avoid the difficulties due to violation of the law of contradictory opposition and the law of distribution of terms.

But I do not accept this view because to say that singular proposition is the conjunction of a universal and a particular propositions is to say that a singular proposition is equivalent to the conjunction of a universal and a particular propositions. This means : This man is a logician \equiv (All men are logician and some men are logician.). But this equivalence cannot be maintained. Let us symbolise the above equivalence :

$$Lt \equiv [(x) (Mx \supset Lx) \ \& \ (\exists x) (Mx \ \& \ Lx)].$$

By definition of equivalence :

$$(Lt \supset \{(x) (Mx \supset Lx) \ \& \ (\exists x) (Mx \ \& \ Lx)\}) \ \&$$

$$[\{(x) (Mx \supset Lx) \ \& \ (\exists x) (Mx \ \& \ Lx) \supset Lt].$$

In the first conjunct of the above conjunction Lt (This man is a logician) is true then $(\exists x) (Mx \ \& \ Lx)$ is true no doubt but $(x) (Mx \supset Lx)$ is false and consequently, $Lt \supset \{(x) (Mx \supset Lx) \ \& \ (\exists x) (Mx \ \& \ Lx)\}$ is false. Now, as the first conjunct is false, the whole conjunctive proposition is false and so the above equivalence cannot be maintained. In other words, truth of a singular proposition is not the necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of the conjunction of the universal and particular proposition.

In fact, the logical import of a singular proposition is quite different from the logical import of categorical proposition. In a singular proposition a relation between an object or individual placed in the subject position and a class placed in the predicate position is expressed and this relation is a membership relation. But in a categorical proposition a relation between two classes placed in the subject and the predicate position is expressed and this relation is an inclusion relation. The concept of membership relation is different from the concept of inclusion relation. So a singular proposition which involves the concept of membership relation cannot be equivalent to a categorical proposition which involves the concept of inclusion relation.

Let us consider the differences between membership relation and inclusion

relation to bring out the difference between a singular proposition and a categorical proposition more clearly. Membership relation is intransitive but inclusion relation is transitive. Any three termed syllogism illustrates the transitivity of inclusion e.g. $(A \supset B \ \& \ B \supset C) \supset (A \supset C)$. But this fails to hold for membership relation e.g. $(A \in B \ \& \ B \in C) \nvdash (A \in C)$. To make it clear let us take the following substitutions : A/ this American, B/ united States, C/ United Nations. It can be true of this American that he is a member of the United States and also that the United States is a member of the United Nations; Yet the consequent, that this American is a member of the United Nations, is false, since the United Nations take nations only and not individuals, as its members. Again the membership relation unlike inclusion relation is irreflexive. A relation is reflexive if a term is capable of having that same relation to itself. Thus, inclusion is reflexive, since $a \supset a =$ which by the definition of inclusion is equivalent to $a \ \& \ \bar{a} = 0$ - is obviously true. But membership relation cannot be reflexive, since its two terms are of different types. Furthermore, in case of membership relation, the relation can never be reverse. This American \in the United States, but the United States \notin this American. Thus membership relation is an assymetrical relation. But inclusion relation sometimes allows such a reversal : there are cases where both $a \subset b$ and $b \subset a$ are true. Thus inclusion relation is non-symmetrical i.e., neither assymetrical like membership nor symmetrical like equality.

From the above it is clear that the membership relation is different from the inclusion relation in many respects. Consequently, a singular proposition in which there is membership relation between the subject and the predicate is quite different from a categorical proposition in which there is inclusion relation between the subject and the predicate. So a singular proposition is neither Universal nor particular. In fact, a singular proposition because of its different logical import cannot be a categorical proposition in the true sense of the term.

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Notations used :

$\&$ = Conjunction.

\supset = Material Implication.

\equiv = Material Equivalence.

$\equiv 0$ = Emptiness.

\subset = Inclusion.

\in = Membership.

(x) = Universal Quantifier.

$(\exists x)$ = Existential Quantifier.

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FROM PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE

A. KANTHAMANI

1. Naturalism : bald and methodological :

From philosophy as a logical and conceptual analysis of language, we have traversed a long way to reach philosophy as cognitive science. If the former, in a sense, represents the lowest point of naturalism, the latter represents the highest point of naturalism. The history of analytical philosophy cannot be chronicled without a parallel development of the above¹. Within analytical philosophy itself, naturalistic projects trace their origin to Quine. For Quine, epistemology is a branch of cognitive psychology, and it was looked upon as part of naturalizing epistemology². Can philosophy also be naturalized? Various were the answers that emerged in recent years. Naturalism is understood as a fullfledged project for philosophy of language, semantics, and for philosophy. Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny first inaugurate this tradition in their introduction to philosophy of language³. Within the burgeoning field of cognitive science, an appeal to naturalism appears in a modest way, but it is allowed to sustain stronger programmes. The *differentia specifica* I have in mind is that the former radically rejects *in toto* folk elements in philosophy of language whereas the latter rejects the folk psychology of belief, but it is more open to discuss how philosophy of language can throw light on cognitive science. The distinction may also be termed as one that obtains between bald naturalism (strongly naturalistic), which believes that science alone matters and there is not much for philosophy to do, since it is continuous with science, and sophisticated naturalism (weakly naturalistic) which always tries to throw light on each others domain⁴. I classify Stephen Stich, as belonging to the latter category; he, for example, distinguishes three ways in which philosophy of language can interact with cognitive science⁵. They are roughly equivalent to :

- (1) Philosophy can become philosophy of cognitive science;

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- (2) Philosophy of Language can throw light on cognitive science; and
 (3) Cognitive science can throw light on philosophy.

(1) is a more remified version of philosophy of science. It remains only at the 'descriptive' level. It is descriptive because philosophers distance from cognitive science in the sense that they never assume that there is anything wrong with the cognitive science. 'While cognitive psychologists say a bit about intentionality and so on, their comments are not so systematic or philosophically illuminating. Many philosophers see cognitive psychology as a fertile ground for careful descriptive work'⁶.

(2) represents a very different way of doing cognitive psychology. Here philosophers tried to say what a cognitive psychologist should or should not do. In order words, they prescribe do's and dont's for them. This is mainly because one comes across problems within philosophy of language. The celebrated example of Twin Earth paradox (two mental states which are computationally the same, but differ in their realization) is used by Putnam to throw light on the nature of cognition. The problem of supervenience tries to answer whether mind supervenes on matter or the mental is supervenient on the physical. The question they were concerned to show is whether functionalism is true about philosophy of mind. Similar questions arise about physicalism as well. A strong undercurrent of criticism is evident in that many philosophers do not agree with the view that philosophical problems can show the lacunae in cognitive psychology.

(3) reverses (2) in some sense in that it claims that world with cognitive psychology can throw light on philosophical problems. A paradigm case here is the first cognitive revolution stemming from the writings of transformational grammarians. According to this, grammar is a theory of language, but its only drawback is that it is only a tacit theory which posits the psychological reality of grammar. It is called folk theory in linguistics. Following this, philosophers made it a trend to appeal to tacit theory in psychological explanation⁷. Though much empirical work is evidenced in folk psychological explanation, this was challenged by simulation theories. An important work in this genere is found in Simon and his coworkers⁸.

The major work of Simon and his coworkers falls within scientific rationality. The question that lies at the centrestage for the domain of query

is : can scientific rationality be simulated? For Stich, this is only a precursor of a more human epistemology. But the challenge to folk theory comes in their denial of any internally represented psychological theory. Two important consequences of this theory are : (1) psychological explanations cannot appeal to tacit theory, and (2) folk psychology is radically false. This is presented as an alternative naturalized epistemology. Stich thinks that a pragmatist epistemology could be a more humanized (Human Epistemology) one than a naturalized version of reliabilism (reliabilists are those who think that truth is still a basic cognitive virtue and justified true beliefs are produced by a reliable belief-forming strategy) or a naturalized (android epistemology) in the computational sense. To cognitivise is to humanize epistemology⁹.

Two important authors who show strong likings for strongly naturalistic tendencies are Michael Devitt and Kim Sterenly. Their book was originally published in as far back as 1987 and was reprinted in 1994. In what follows, I comb through their textbook in an effort to capture the contents with a view to appraise the current scene. I shall begin with some reflections on the way one can conceptualize about language.

2. Conceptualizations About Language :

I shall begin to distinguish four different ways in which language is conceptualised within contemporary philosophy, covering thus much of the whole spectrum of analytical philosophy. In other words, there are four different models of philosophy of language. One can appraise them apart from the history of analytical philosophy itself. It is conventional to divide analytical philosophy into major streams : the earlier analytical philosophy of language (analysis, which is psychological, with a recipe for axiomatization of logic and mathematics, or the early Wittgenstein's resolution of the above case for decidability in the *satzsystem* (natural language analogue of axiomatic system) verificationism; soon this was superceded by *satzsystem* verificationism which admits of alternative *satzsystem*) and the later cognitive philosophy of language (which starts with Quine and running through Davidson, it culminates in the proto-cognitivism of Dummett)¹⁰. The above two broad divisions can be narrowed down to the following three subdivisions, namely, the protoanalytical (Frege, Russell), the analytical (Wittgenstein, Carnap) and the post-analytical (Quine, Davidson,

Dummett). Surely, a better picture should include the way it interacts with the upcoming trends in cognitive science. Accordingly, the following four models are suggested :

- (a) Language as Communication : Language is understood as consisting of a class of spoken utterances (tokens). This is called the 'code' conception of language;
- (b) Language as Logic : Language is understood as a class of propositions which enter into logical relations with each other (logical conception of language); if this is to be called logic as language, its corollary is called logic as calculus;
- (c) Language as Linguistics : Language is understood as the class of sentences which are spoken or written which follow certain rules of grammar (language as grammar); and,
- (d) Language as Reality : Language as part of physical reality, that is as part of physical nature.

Of these, (a) is widely used by communication scientists, and is usually represented in the form of language as encoding-decoding device. Language is understood as a set of tokens issued by speakers of a community. A parallel account within philosophy of language is given as speech act philosophy of language. A speech act is defined to be the act which is performed while one speaks. Such acts are called utterances. A sophisticated variety of speech act philosophy of language deals with the logic behind illocutionary speech acts¹¹. An act is illocutionary when it contains a force apart from its logical structure, which consists of a subject and predicate. The glamour surrounding this ordinary concept has been under cloud. While Dummett dismisses the code conception of language with a shrug, thinkers like Burge, Dennett, and Devitt make use of Gricean conversational implication for one reason or other in the serious development of their outlooks¹².

(b) talks about language as a computation which involves inferential process of thought, and *a fortiori*, cognitive. But since logic cannot afford to be cognitive, it is apsychological and its corresponding epistemology is also apsychological¹³. This conception of language as logic provides the necessary recipe for axiomatization of logic. Axiomatic systems are many-splendoured

thing. Its major drawback comes in two forms, namely semidecidability of first order predicate logic, and non-semidecidability of second order logic. Given a sentence *S*, semidecidability yields either an answer 'No' or no answer at all for a question regarding whether it is found in the system whereas, nonsemidecidability conveys that such a sentence is computationally intractable¹⁴. Since neural network (as suggested by connectionist paradigm of cognitive science) are represented by second order functions (its activating function can be formulated only by means of quantifying over properties of neurons), they are not algorithmically calculable. This is consonant with Turing's interpretation of Church's thesis, according to which human mind is an unorganized machine. There is not much difference between the classical AI programme and modern connectionist models in cognitive science. But what I call strongly naturalization programmes toe the classical line as it is represented by the received view. The received view stands for the equivalence of mental states with computational states. It is strongly functionalistic in its appeal, and is sometimes identified with the Good Old Form of AI (GOFAI). Axiomatization projects ranges from many axioms, single axiom, or even zero axiom like natural deduction system. The primary relation it brings about is between language and reality (language-ontology interface). Language is a custodian of reality. The relation is between the world and the words. When logic is regarded as foundational (metaphysics is reduced to logic), in a non-foundational sense (science is not resting upon metaphysics), it forms the 'canonical idiom' of science (Quine) or it constitutes the 'primary conceptual system' (Putnam).

(c) reduces languages as a class of sentences to a set of rules. These rules are set by grammar. That is once the rules are given as an input, its output is a torrent of sentences. Such a conception of language is identified with language as a algorithm. An algorithm is an input-output device. What blocks this move is that rule-following is simply enigmatic¹⁵. Added to this is the computational device of inferential processes, it becomes a stronger version of cognitive modelling. Even so, a stronger version of cognitivism is different from strong AI (Artificial Intelligence) because it includes both hardware (intentional stance) and software (design stance)¹⁶. The stronger version is quite contemporary and strongly naturalistic. By superimposing the computational mode of thought (inferential process), it is argued, that it adds truth-functionality to linguistics. A certain cohesiveness of language (logic) with linguistics is imminent. In other

words, it begins to offer a corrective to the claim which holds that linguistics is a branch of cognitive psychology, by affirming that psycholinguistics is a cognitive discipline. An immediate fallout is that it takes both philosophy of linguistics (a version holds that grammar is platonistic) as well as philosophy of language as folksy. Thus there emerges a new stance according to which linguistics is about sentence tokens. Such is the nature of bald naturalism pursued by Devitt and Sternly. Its origin lies in the above assumption. Once philosophy of language is cognitivized, then semantics is only the way to become naturalized, and with this philosophy too is likely to become naturalized.

3. The Naturalization Project :

In fact all the above set can be derided as folksy, a term that is used to refer to the immature status of its science. This is what is understood to gear up to the level given as (d) above which therefore represents a more sophisticated way of understanding language as a form of physical reality. Enter the naturalization programme which assumes that language is also a part of physical nature. This is basically revisionary in its intent. Just as there is a close relation between scientific theory which speaks about the world, language is also a naturalized representation of the world. The motions such a bald naturalization goes through are :

1. Philosophy of linguistics must become philosophy of psychology;
2. Psycholinguistics is the science of cognition; and
3. Philosophy is cognitive discipline.

It is only in this category that one can locate the project Devitt and Sternly pursue in their introduction to philosophy of language. They claim that it has a place in 'the exciting, somewhat chaotic interdisciplinary field that has become known as cognitive science'¹⁷ and so we are well advised to dish out this stuff to our graduate students. To what extent can we justify this requirement? It is in this context that I want to suggest the following alternatives; we can agree that

4. Philosophy is a cognitive science in the sense that it yields a representationist theory of language and mind;

if and only if

5. Philosophy of language is itself to be regarded as a cognitive discipline in the sense that it has within it a *verstehen*-imbued meaning theory.

The stumbling block here is that (4) is an attractive proposal in the exact sense in which it wants to have a *verstehen*-free theory of meaning, thus making a bald naturalism into a full circle. If so, its defect, according to my reading, lies in explaining understanding *via* a speech act philosophy of language. There is reason to suspect this project as we have already dismissed the code conception of language earlier. In sharp contrast, *verstehen*-imbued theorists believe that a theory of meaning is a theory of understanding. More poignantly drawn, the contrast comes to : whereas *verstehen*-imbued theorists reduce metaphysics to semantics, the *verstehen*-free theorists reduce semantics to metaphysics. While the former is entailed by the view according to which semantics is the first philosophy of language, the latter take semantics as first epistemology, and in their zeal to pursue a strongly reductionistic programme refuse to understand what is 'philosophy of' in philosophy of language¹⁸. They even go the extent of detaching philosophy from philosophy of language and graft it on their epistemology. The underlying strategy runs parallel to eliminativists who pursue eliminativism of folk psychology. So, on Devitt-Stereny's proposal, (4) must be shown to be demonstrably a counterthrust to antirealistic proposals about language, meaning, and understanding. Thus the opposition between (4) and (5) is one between a realistically oriented philosophy of language and an anti-realistic philosophy of language represented by (5)¹⁹. There is no objection in holding that (5) cannot legitimize a philosophy of language and mind, however incomplete it might be, and consequently, sanction a theory of meaning and understanding. The opponent must show that such a project is totally at odds with the one they are interested in. This they cannot show unless.

(6) *bald naturalism is the only correct way;*

(7) The cognitivism we associate with (4) is totally at fault.

(7) cannot be so easily disproved as any disproof requires us to show that (8) which asserts that

(8) philosophy of language is first philosophy

must be proved illegitimate. In spite of all the hue and cry, it continues to remain on the agenda. There is a precise reason why this should be so. (8) inherits a legacy from the conceptual analysis of the past and hence it is also as much naturalistic as any other. For Devitt and Sterenly, however, the following assertion, namely.

(9) semantics is first philosophy

is incompatible with (8) above, since it favours *a priori* semantics of natural language, whereas (9) recommends an *a posteriori* way of doing semantics; semantics must be on par with epistemology. Philosophy of language must be abandoned. I argue for a contrary view that philosophy of language itself is cognitive science, and hence the sharp contrast drawn between folk/cognitive, explanatory/understanding, realistic/anti- realistic does not stand for scrutiny. This is exactly where the shoe pinches. Let us elaborate this in the sequel.

4. Realism Vs Anti-realism :

The history of analytical philosophy of language (Karl-Otto Apel's expression), is punctuated, first by a rudimentary cognitive philosophy of language (philosophy of language and mind) and, then, a sophisticated cognitive variety. The earlier is often identified with the view according to which all philosophy is conceptual analysis, and much of the later philosophy of the language is regarded as proto-(folk) science. According to a revisionary view, recommended by Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny, the former view, must be decisively rejected, whether folksy or not²⁰. On the otherhand, folk, (rudimentary) philosophy of language is full of thorny pathways like verificationism, innatism, holism, scientific Whorfianism, Neo- Kantianism, Structuralism, Verstehenism and Anomalous Monism. It is a 'veritable smorgasbord' (Micheal Devitt and Kim Sterenly's expression). Since the conceptual analysis view of philosophy is wrong, the linguistic turn, especially the later, does not establish first philosophy (this view holds that philosophy of language is first philosophy)²¹. This goes directly contrary to the widespread understanding of the origins of analytical philosophy. The authors go further :

moreover, some of the folk theories of the past (descriptive theories of reference and sense) are spectacularly wrong²² and hence it is an open question how correct the folk theory is²³. Targeting verificationism and verstehenism in particular, the authors recommend that they must make moves undreamt of by folk. Philosophy of language is exactly the wrong place to start metaphysics²⁴. They all commit a deep mistake. The mistake is that of inferring what the world is like from a theory of language²⁵. Eschewing their *a priori* methods, we should only speculate about language from a firm realist (sophisticated) base²⁶. The right procedure is to start with a world view and attempt to derive a theory of language. And the most plausible world view to start with is realism²⁷. Much of the above is highly controversial to say the least.

So realism will contrapositively imply anti-verificationism (this is the contrapositive of : verificationism implies anti-realism). I shall call this as a method of contrapositive paradigms. I assume that it is false. May be this is what I call 'truth-functionally' true. This means that they cannot exclude each other. If this much is agreed, at least one key methodological nuance in their argument evaporates. It is roughly at the time when philosophy of language looked to cognitive science, it took on the mantle of rudimentary cognitivism (psychology) for its modelling. This is the second cognitive turn, the first, the first occurred with the advent of transformational grammar in linguistics. The authors critique : the fact that linguistics has become part of cognitive psychology is not enough; it should become a cognitive science in its naturalized setting, overcoming its folksy theory of linguistic competence. It is folksy because it conflates a theory of mental competence and a theory of propositions. This is roughly the thematic of the recent introduction of the above book and its merit as well. It finds a unique expression in their naturalization of semantics. Semantics should become an empirical science like any other²⁸. Just as philosophy of language can be completed in semantics, the introduction of truth-conditionality into linguistics can move the cognitive completion of semantic. Such an acumenical view of philosophy of language, as the authors realise, must of necessity include a critical account of contemporary transformational grammar, which falls under the rubric of philosophy of language, however incomplete their relationship might be understood.

Devitt-Stereny start with the following assumption that linguistics without the logic of truth functions remains only at the folk level, and this is what is

attested to by the view they present about the history of transformational grammar. According to their reading, the coherence of natural language and natural logic is what is seen in the many appearances of TG grammar, in its standard (classical) and extended theory, and more so, in the development of generative semantics, and in the more recent versions of Chomsky's linguistics as reflected in the principles and parameters (Government and Binding) theory as well as trace theory. Of the four major components namely the phonological, base (tree building plus lexicon), transformational (rules commenting deep and surface structures) itself and the semantic components, the controversy is only about how third connects to the fourth. Various answers are given : the standard theory holds that the deep structure links meaning (transformations preserve meaning), while the extended theory includes both deep structure and surface structure, and the trace theory leaves traces in the surface. The point about the principles and parameters theory and trace theory is that they approximate towards natural logic, however defective it might look²⁹. Devitt clinches the tale by holding that :

'Deep structure seems to provide the structure of natural language sentences we seek. Subject it to logical analysis, add a theory of reference, and we might hope to have the core of a theory of a meaning'.³⁰

An immediate objection arises if we look into Chomsky's theoretical interest in semantics. That is, if Chomsky is shown to have not as much theoretical interest in semantics as he has either in syntax, or even so, in pragmatics, then what will happen to the above project. Assuming that this is what is warranted by the historical development of the above as well as the last mentioned stage of the theory (it incorporates principles and parameters which act as constraints on the principles of syntax), we have a paradigm which is nowhere near to Devitt-Stereny's proposals. There is something amiss in their conclusion which says that the problems of linguistics are *au fond* problems of logic pertaining to negations, quantifications, and movement rules from surface to deep structure, even though they were all attested to by later Chomsky according to one interpretation. At least this makes one thing clear that there is no hard and fast interpretation of Chomsky's grammar which will fit either into naturalism or physicalism. More recently, Chomsky has recourse to what he calls methodoloical naturalism which does not seriously believe in any one of the current ways of doing cognitive science³¹. No one has any idea how Chomsky's

grammar must be fitted into the chronicle of analytical philosophy, or how to take seriously his naturalistic concerns so as to see its relevance to cognitive science. Ironically, both Dummett and Chomsky share a scepticism towards the present status of cognitive science. I am in favour of maintaining a Dummettian picture of the entire history of analytical philosophy, a history that still waits to be written, and that would portray how the two major paradigms of realism and anti-realism run through the analytical, the postanalytical, the hermeneutical (von Wright believes that this is non-naturalistic; I disagree), and even so, the cognitive turn³². Thus I stand for philosophy of language as cognitive science rather than philosophy of cognitive science; hence the passage in the title.

5. The Problem of Reference :

How the authors propose to tackle the problem of adding up the referential component to the above machinery? The authors base their reasoning on a Kripkean premise of description theory of proper names (this is obviously neither Russell's nor Frege's theory) for drawing a Kripkean conclusion based on the notion of rigid designator. On their view, this is what is entailed by the modern cluster-descriptive theory of proper names. A cognitive completion of the above adds two key steps to it. The first may be called the description theory of sense, and the second is the description theory of reference. In the final showdown, it conforms to a Millian theory of proper names but when pruned from his connotation and given by Devitt's designating-claims, which is given in terms of descriptive causal theory instead of a pure causal one, it yields Devitt's idea of designation. 'The causal theory promises an explanation of the ultimate link between language and the world'³³. If any, Devitt's idea of designation is supposed to bring out this relationship. Devitt very well knows that this does not say the final word on the problem of reference : many a realist is on the dock in this primal problem, and realism is pronounced to be false.

From the cognitive point of view, however, the most important question that requires an answer is about the relation between language and mind. The authors critique the theory of innate competence (Chomsky) before they begin to explore the innateness of representation which brings out the linkage between structures of language and structures of thought, and thereby the linkage between the structure of language and the structure of the world. The former is a sort of

telementational isomorphism³⁴ and the latter is an exteriorized isomorphism. I think they are somehow opposed to each other. Is the project, therefore, merely a Boolean telementational isomorphism with truth functions added to it? Computational or not, realistic or not within the intertional domain (Cf. Fodor), the authors have to take into consideration many other paradigms of cognitive science, of which the connectionism (cognitive architecture) is the most important³⁵. The point is that such a realistic cognitive assumption is opposed to by the anti-realistic cognitive view, according to which language is an external clothing of the thought. This stance, taken by Dummett while making philosophy of language as first philosophy, is continued to be heavyweathered by critics. As it is obvious, it represents one half of the above in that it attempts to bring out the relation between structures of thought and structures of language, the realistic project takes over the other half, namely the relation between structures of language and the structures of reality without openly committing themselves to the former. Quite unmindful of all this, the authors tell us how truth relevant structures of language are to be understood, in total disregard of the verification conditions. Should we lay down to rest folk anti-realism along with others? This is the dilemma.

The critique of folk philosophy of language is defective at least in one respect in that it rejects the folksy character of anti-realism *in toto*. Sterenly, for example, may not be in full agreement with this, since he maintains a 'compatibilist' outlook in his own book, which takes into consideration both of the above halves, namely the intentional and the physical system. As he takes it, both the scientific and folk picture converge on the idea of representation. Having asserted that that his approach is not physicalist, but naturalist, he goes on to tell us that naturalism is a vague term and it is in danger of becoming merely honorific term too. So, he wants to naturalizes folk as well as naturalize representation. In fact folk theory is included and incorporated into cognitive psychology (modest naturalism) precisely because we cannot do away language of thought, however folksy it might be³⁶. We miss here the revisionary outlook that marks the earlier book. At the methodological level, Devitt and Sterenly distinguish themselves by adopting the following dicta. While Devitt claims that by naturalizing philosophy of language, we can naturalize philosophy itself (philosophy becomes a natural kind word), Sterenly avows that by naturalizing folk psychology (of belief and desire), *pace* Fodor and his *mentalese* (cognition

involves an inner mental code or language of thought), we can naturalize a modest version of the representation theory of mind. If all this is agreed upon, then Devitt's exclusive derision of antirealism is mistaken. Somewhere realism and anti-realism complement each other and *a fortiori*, they are all compatibilist in certain respects. The counterfactual view which Devitt-Sterelny advocate is therefore a miasma. Methodologically, it is defective. It is the most correct assessment since eliminativists do not eliminate, and so the chances of the compatibilist position, in comparison to that of revisionists, are better off. The authors round off the above criticisms with a brief discussion between rational psychology and philosophy along the lines indicated above. The compatibilists are not as 'ironic' bald naturalists as they look to be at first sight³⁷. Two thinkers namely Davidson and Dennett are favoured for discussion in an introductory course like this. Both according to the authors, they engaged in rationalizing psychology in their own ways and thereby they pose a real challenge to naturalization programmes. They are verstehenists who cannot reconcile folk psychology with cognitive science.

Dennett adheres both a no-replacement thesis as well as a non-integration thesis, while Davidson follows a no-reform thesis. Davidson does not believe that folk psychology could be reduced to physics. Dennett thinks that folk theory is a different tool for a different job and thereby makes their separation a reality. He even goes to the extent of rejecting folk psychology. He makes a basic distinction between intentional stance and design stance. The former is the domain of folk psychology and the latter is that of cognitive psychology. For Dennett, the identity conditions are such that people can be computationally very different, yet still they have the same beliefs. Even this is too simplistic a picture of Dennett's physicalistic approach to cognition, on the basis of the computational model of parallel processing.

Dennett has also been variously described as an instrumentalist or even an anti-realist. He is also well known for his heterophenomenological (third-person descriptive) method which has certain meeting points with the externalist interpretation of belief ascriptions. Similarly, Davidson's anomalous monism accepts that there are physical equivalents of the mental but we do not know the laws that operate in the region, Devitt-Sterelny's way of overcoming these stand-points is to assume that there could possibly be psychological laws. More importantly, if there are no laws, then folk psychology cannot be a

protoscience. Or contrapositively, there is protoscience, and hence there must be some laws, as far as narrow psychology is concerned. This is Grandma's way of naturalizing psychology³⁸. Contrapositive once again. Unless they are truthfunctional, they should have counterexamples, anti-realism is not to be laid to rest but it remains as ghostly as it is folksy. I have discussed thus far one important methodological nuance, namely that realism and anti-realism are *toto caelo* different and found to be false^{39,40}

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The view which holds that the very origin of analytic philosophy is naturalistic is aired in the recent estimate of articles on the *Rise of Analytical Philosophy*, see *Ratio*, IX (3) 1996, see esp. Dagfinn Follesdal's counter to G. H. von Wright's understanding of hermeneutics as non-naturalistic and hence it is incompatible with analytic philosophy can be fully endorsed. See his article, 'Analytic Philosophy : What is it and Why should one engage in it?' pp. 193-208. G. H. von Wright's survey titled 'Analytic Philosophy : a Historico-Critical Survey' is reprinted in his *The Tree of Knowledge and Other Essays* (Leiden Brill, 1993); see also f. n. 32 and 37 below.
2. Quine's 'Epistemology Naturalized' which is anthologized in his *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays* (New York, 1969), provides the grist for naturalistic projects, occasioning both a critique as well as an improvement. The critique demands more than Quine can offer. A microlevel application is attempted in cognitive science. If epistemology is a branch of psychology, and psychology is a branch of biology (or physiology), then philosophy, in its naturalistic form, should be a branch of physiology. I borrow this intriguing argument from Professor Ruth G. Millikan.
3. Michael Devitt and Kim Sterenly's combined proposal has a strong contrast between folk and mature science, generally favoured by cognitively-oriented philosophers like Stephen Stich. See their book on *Language and Reality : An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language* (LR hereafter) (Bradford, MIT : Cambridge, 1987/1993 (4th Printing). This stands in contrast to Sterenly's later book on the *The Representational Theory of Mind : an introduction* (Basil Blackwell, 1990) The title of my article mimics Stich's *From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science* (Cambridge : MA, 1993). The contrast lies between a strong naturalism and a modest one. I am always indebted to Professor Michael Devitt

for his encouraging tip to the best way of doing philosophy : be critical of others, and also for the numerous reprints and books that gave me the necessary input. I owe a word of thanks to ICPR Reprographic Services for the materials on Sterenly's book.

4. I own the characterization of bald naturalism to R. Bernstein's Patrick Romanell Lecture on '*Whatever Happened to Naturalism?*' published in the *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* (November, 1995), pp. 57-76; for the definition of bald naturalism see f. n. 37 below.
5. I am indebted to Stephen Stich's review of the three types of naturalism as found in his 'Naturalizing Epistemology : Quine, Simon, and the Prospects for Pragmatism' in *Philosophy* (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 34 (1995) pp. 1-17; See esp. p.9.
6. Again, I owe much to the classification made by Stephen Stich in his contributory article under the entry '*Psychology and Philosophy*', especially to his remarks and comments, in the *Companion to the Philosophy of Mind*, ed. by Samuel Guttenplan (Blackwell, 1994) pp. 500-507.
7. A major work in psychological explanation is Jerry Fodor's *Language of Thought* (New York, 1975). Kim Sterenly's book defends a modest version of intentional realism advanced by Fodor : 'Fodor's proposal is at least coherent, theoretically motivated, and experimentally productive' (p. 79). The book is conservative (and perhaps 'chauvinist', p. 146) in the light of the present controversy with regard to the very idea of representation. Stich stands for pluralism in representation, whereas Terence Horgan decries this as an important paradigmatic idea.
8. The standard work is due to Simon and coworkers who have studied scientific discovery by means of computational stimulation of creative processes; see the reference under Stich (1995) mentioned in f. n. 5 above.
9. The terminology is due to Stich.
10. The term *satzsystem* and its plural *satzsysteme* are introduced by Stuart Shanker. Following him, we can understand the Tractarian verificationism as *satzsystem* verificationism. For an account of this, see S. Shankar's *Wittgenstein and the Turning Point in the Philosophy of Mathematics* (Croom Helm, 1987).
11. Searle's exploration into the logic of illocutionary act is a case in point.
12. Such a conception is critiqued by Michael Dummett in his article on '*Language and Communication*' anthologized in *Reflections on Chomsky* ed. by Alexander George (Blackwell, 1989) pp. 192-212.

13. I owe this to Tyler Burge's survey on 'Philosophy of Language and Mind : 1950-1990' in the *Philosophical Review* (1992) pp. 3-52.
14. I am very much indebted to the remarks made by B. Jack Copeland in his contributory article on 'Artificial Intelligence' in the *Companion to the Philosophy of Mind* (Blackwell, 1994) pp. 122- 131; see especially pp. 127-128.
15. The significance of Kripke's interpretation of *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (Basil Blackwell, 1982) for cognitive science has never been assessed so far.
16. Daniel Dennett's distinction between intentional stance and design stance roughly correspond to that of hardware and software. The remarks about Dennett may not be the same if his recent contributions were taken into consideration. Devitt's list ranges only from his 1978 book *Brainstorms* to his 1985 title *Elbow Room*.
17. Devitt and Sterenly note this in the Preface (p.x.)
18. The significance of 'Philosophy of in *Philosophy of Language* inaugurates an innovative way of branching philosophy which is radically different from the traditional classification of its branches. Once this is understood, its foundational interest becomes obvious; see f.n. 32 below.
19. The opposition between realism and anti-realism is totally misconceived; this is different from the way it is conceived later by Sterenly.
20. Dummett's views are discussed from 234 ff.
21. See *LR*, p. 235.
22. *Ibid.*,
23. See *LR*, p. 209.
24. *Ibid.*,
25. See *LR.*, p. 197.
26. See *LR.*, p. 220.
27. Devitt's exclusive adherence to eliminativism of philosophy of language, in favour of semantics as epistemology is not sustainable in my view.
28. See, for example, Devitt's recent contribution to the 'Methodology of Naturalized Semantics' in *Journal of Philosophy* (1994) pp. 545 - 572.
29. See J. Hintikka's Essay on the 'Logical Form and Linguistic Theory' in *Reflections on Chomsky*, see f.n. 12 above.
30. See *LR*, p. 103.

31. Noam Chomsky's article on '*Language and Nature in Mind*' (1995), pp. 1 - 61; see also his '*Naturalism and Dualism in the Study of Language and Mind* in *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* (1993), pp 181-209. I thank Professor Chomsky for the reprints.
32. My project on the '*Major Analytical Traditions* was executed with this intention in mind dividing the traditions into the analytic, post-analytic, the hermeneutic, and the cognitive turns with the above Dummettian imprint; See f.n. 1 and 18 above.
33. See *LR*, p. 60.
34. See P. M. S. Hacker and G. P. Baker's *Language, Sense, and Nonsense* (Blackwell, 1984).
35. Sterenly considers connectionist paradigms (Chapeter 8) and find it difficult to come to terms with its 'deflationary' position in his later book.
36. Sterenly's position, which accepts the language of thought hypothesis and hence does not eliminate folk psychology, is summarized here; see esp. p. 6, 19, 22, 23, 28, and 79.
37. Bemstein's definition of bald naturalism is that which aims to domesticate conceptual capacities within nature conceived as the realm of law, Rorty is an 'ironic' type since he does not deify natural scientific discourse; see f.n. 7 of the lature quoted in f.n. 4 above.
38. Grandma's view as defended in his recent work is neither as theory of representation nor is it an exactly narrow theory of meaning, as it is claimed, but its credentials are not very apparent. See for example, Devitt's '*A Narrow Representational Theory of Mind*' in *Mind and Congnition* ed. by William Lycan (Blackwell, 1989).
39. I have avoided critical arguments about other leading issues. I have borrowed from my companion article on '*Philosophy of Language: Folksy or Revisionary?*' which was to be presented in the 69th Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress (1994) where I make more methodological remarks (abstract published).
40. I am indebted to Professor Dr. S. V. Bokil, Editor of the Journal, for the advice to recast the article which was originally written as a review.

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FREEDOM AS ACT OF TOTALIZATION : A CRITIQUE ON SARTRE

BHAGAT OINAM

This paper consists of five parts : one, lay out of the plan, two, ontological structure of action, three, nature of practico-inert, four, act of totalization as act of freedom and five, conclusion.

I

It is one of the most problematic issues among the scholars of Sartre as to whether Sartre believed in the individual freedom (in the existential sense) in his later works. This refers to his works like *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, *The Problem of Method*, *Existentialism and Humanism* etc. The question primarily arises out of the debate on whether there should be a dichotomy between 'early Sartre' and 'later Sartre'. I shall not go into the debate, but take up his books *Critique of Dialectical Reason* and *The Problem of Method* to understand as to how he places human action amidst the collectives and groups. Though I shall try to explore more into the contents of these books, I may, at some instances, take account of his *Being and Nothingness*. However, my exposition, in any case, should not be seen as a comparative study between the *Being and Nothingness* and the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. If one tries to do so, the whole perspective upon which I have attempted to deal with human freedom may look misrepresented or gets misinterpreted.

The debate on early and later Sartre, however, is not completely invalid. The distinction primarily takes into account the question on human action. And when we make a discussion on action, we exclusively take it as voluntary and intentional. This makes our action a free act. Subsequently, it leads us towards the concept of freedom. So, the debate is on the issue that Sartre could not

continue with his earlier found freedom of the *Being and Nothingness* after coming to terms with Marxism.

The debate to my mind, seems superfluous and misdirected. Instead, what we should look out for, is the analysis of a particular concept or a line of thought which Sartre has developed and nourished throughout the span of his philosophical life. Seemingly, what I propose to do in this paper is to take up the concept 'totalization' and other related concepts and show that Sartrean conception of freedom is clearly presented through the act of totalization.

Act of totalization is seen by Sartre in the light of framing the ground for human action. In the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, he was more interested in dealing with action within a larger assemblage, in groups, series, institutions etc. Further, he also sees man as an embodied consciousness¹. Human beings are not merely inert bodies like stone, table or chair, nor are free floating consciousness like Plato's soul², who could determine his birth. They are both body and consciousness. It is by virtue of their being body that an act of body upon body is possible. And it is in light of this bodily act mediated by the act of consciousness that we understand Sartre's conception of human action. Since action is performed out of constant act of mediation between body/matter³ and consciousness, we shall first discuss the ontological structure of human action. Later, we shall see how Sartre developed the concept of action within the social nexus, in the act of totalization through third-party-mediation.

II

As mentioned earlier, Sartre's philosophy of action does not include any form of causal explanation. He finds the debate between intentional and causal explanation of human action as an outcome of our ignorance of the very nature of the human action. He writes:

"It is strange that philosophers have been able to argue endlessly about determinism and free will, to cite example in favour of one or the other thesis without ever attempting first to make explicit the structure contained in the very idea of action. The concept of act contains, in fact, numerous subordinate notions which we shall have to organize and arrange in hierarchy we should observe first that an action is on principle intentional. The careless smoker who has through negligence

caused the explosion of a powder magazine has not acted. On the other hand, the worker who is charged with dynamiting a quarry and who obeys the given orders has acted when he has produced the expected explosion, he knew what he was doing on, if you prefer, he intentionally realized a conscious project''⁴.

Since, action is always intentional and intentionality implies freedom, then human action is inconceivable without freedom. Since the smoker has not acted intentionally he cannot be said to have acted. Perhaps, this concept of action would solve the age old debate on free will versus determinism. If we proceed with this line of argument, we may derive the proposition that actions are intentional and cannot be otherwise. And, intentionality since involves act of consciousness, the subject (person) is solely responsible for the action. To be responsible means to be responsible for the consequences of the actions which the subject, himself/herself has performed. It is this capacity to choose ones own actions and also face responsibilities for one's own actions that one can be called a free human being. So, freedom implies the capacity to choose and to face responsibility for the choice one has made. Since 'choice' is 'choice for action', we ought to understand the ontological structure of action. Action is understood in terms of concrete physical act, i.e. a bodily act. A body cannot act on a non-body. So, body acts on body only.

Let me first clarify as to what is meant by 'body' here. So far, the word 'body' has been used to mean that which will consist of animate body (human body) and inanimate body (stone, table, plant etc.). The term has so far been loosely used to accommodate both animate and inanimate bodies/matters. But from here, onwards, we shall make a distinction between the terms 'body' and 'matter'.

- (i) Body will refer to animate body (human body excluding the consciousness), and
- (ii) matter will refer to inanimate objects (both physical and a construct).

An action can be bodily, only in the sense that a body can act on another body or matter.

But one may raise a question whether a body (excluding the consciousness) can ever act on other bodies or matters. An act has to be understood in terms of subject-object relationship. A body-subject cannot act on a body-object in

exclusion of other factors. For bodies are unconscious and an 'unconscious' cannot act on another 'unconscious'. So, the mediation⁵ is made with the help of the conscious, i.e. 'consciousness'. The reason is that an (bodily) act has to be intentional and as discussed above, intentionality is possible only with the help of consciousness.

Now, we have arrived at a paradoxical situation where body is talked of in terms of minus consciousness (i.e. body to body relationship), yet action has to take place with the act of consciousness. This paradoxical tension is bridged by the concept, 'Being-for-itself'. Sartre defines For-itself as follows:

"The nihilation of Being-in-itself; consciousness conceived as a lack of Being, a desire for Being, a relation to Being. By bringing Nothingness into the world the For-itself can stand out from Being and judge other beings by knowing what it is not. Each For-itself is the nihilation of a particular being"⁶.

Being is. It includes both In-itself and For-itself, latter nihilating the former. Further, Sartre writes:

Being-for-itself must be wholly body and it must be wholly consciousness; it cannot be united with a body. Similarly being-for-others, is wholly body; there are no 'psychic phenomena' there to be united with the body. There is nothing behind the body. But the body is wholly psychic"⁷.

The need for studying For-itself is felt because it is the For-itself as a body and also as a consciousness who acts as the subject. We cannot visualise an action, so to say, the 'freedom' without the For-itself. It is by virtue of its being 'no-thing' (nothingness) that it strives for Being (completeness, inertness).

Coming back to the discussion on action, it is the For-itself, both as a consciousness and as a body, acts as a subject on other bodies, matters or For-itselfes⁸. Ontological structure of action, thus, is that body (For-itself) acts on body/matter with the mediation of consciousness (For-itself).

Keeping this structure as the foundation, Sartre develops his theory of action by the act of totalization of reciprocity, mediated through the practico-inert. He formulates it by coining certain concepts like totalization, mediated reciprocity, practico-inert, third party etc. The interesting aspect of the

discussion, here, is that Sartre sees totalization as the constantly developing process of understanding and making history⁹. And history is made through mediated reciprocity of binary and ternary relationships and also through the act on the practico-inert. So, before studying the totalization of reciprocity, we shall make a study of the practico-inert.

III

Sartre defines practico-inert as 'matter in which past praxis is embodied'¹⁰. It is the embodiment of the past praxis because it is a product of human praxis. So, it neither exclusively means all forms of physical matters nor 'product of human labour' in the strict marxian sense. It is a kind of material embodiment comprising of both the concrete material reality as well as abstract construct. In other words, it will encompass both means of production (machines etc.) as well as human constructs (society, association, values etc.).

It seems that Sartre has a wide spread conception of the practico-inert. Any part of nature on which human interference is made, can be considered as practico-inert. Practico-inert is an outcome of dialectic because the very concept of practico-inert is dialectical in nature. Dialectic is 'not a truth, not even a conjecture, but is the type of thought which is necessary, prospectively in order to elucidate a self-developing investigation'¹¹. Before man started humanizing nature with the help of technology (from ploughing and fishing to the use of atomic energy), there was no practico-inert. With the advancement of knowledge (magic, science, and technology), man creates a new alternative world to satisfy his needs and creates his own history. What he creates to satisfy his needs is the practico-inert. He then confronts the practico-inert. And it is through the process of confrontation and interaction that human history is made, making history an outcome of the dialectics (a self developing process with man in the centre).

Interestingly, Sartre sees an autonomy in the practico-inert that at one point of history, it starts dictating its terms to man by becoming an 'exis'¹². This can be seen in Sartre's example of Chinese peasants who ruthlessly cut down forests to meet more land for cultivation. The deforestation resulted in the imbalance in the ecological system leading to untimely and severe damage of life by floods. Man's constant effort to humanise nature sometimes leads to

disastrous catastrophes. The most obvious example of practico-inert turning 'exis' is the present state of fast advancing industrialisation.

From the above mentioned descriptions on practico-inert, we may draw relevant points which will serve the purpose of our discussion on 'action' and more specifically on 'totalization'. One, practico-inert is any part of nature (matter) on which human interference is made; two, it is the outcome of human need; three, it gradually becomes an exis, thus confronting man; and four, it is through constant action and interaction between man and practico-inert that human history (if not a genuine one) is made.

Let us, now, draw a continuity in Satre's thought on the nature of action. As discussed in the Part II of the paper, human action is possible when For-itself (as body) acts on body/matter, mediated by the For-itself (as consciousness). This statement may now be seen in the light of our understanding of the practico-inert: Man (For-itself) acts on practico-inert (matter) to make history through the act of totalization. And totalization is possible only through mediated reciprocity. Interesting feature of the practico-inert is that it does not remain passive. It bounces back on human beings. It enslaves man by becoming exis. In fact, human history is the history of constant struggle between man and his objects of creation. His object of creation may be in the form of art work, civilization, culture, value, technology etc. Man creates them, yet he, too, is bounded by the dictates of these matters.

IV

For-itself does not act on matter alone, it also acts on bodies (other For-itself), i.e. 'For-others'. What we have understood so far, as body-object is the 'For-others' so far as they are seen as others in the eyes of the subject. I (For-itself) may, in turn, become 'body-object' in the eyes of other 'For-others'. So, man does not act on practico-inert alone, but also on other men (For-others). The relationship is more vividly visible in the case of the latter kind, i.e. between man to man. It is through man's act both on other man as well as on practico-inert that praxis¹³ is performed, leading to the making of history.

Totalization and praxis are closely related. While praxis is a group or individual activity with some goals ahead, totalization is the constantly developing process of understanding and making history. Making of history is

what Sartre calls 'totalization'. Since totalization is an activity with certain goals (totality), it is understood only in terms of human praxis. Perhaps, Sartre meant by totalization an act of unification of experience on the part of human consciousness whereas praxis is the external act of doing on the basis of this unification. It is the constant act of goal making. This act is the visualisation. And it is upon this visualisation that praxis is performed.

If we proceed with this distinction between totalization and praxis that while totalization is act of unification of experience on the part of human consciousness, praxis is the external act of doing on the basis of the unification; it necessarily follows that praxis is not possible without the act of totalization. Sartre writes:

".....Praxis, in the first instant, is nothing but the relation of the organism, as exterior and future end, to the present organism as a totality under threat; it is function exteriorised",¹⁴

So, praxis is an external act to realise certain goals or ends. Totalization, on the other hand, can be described as an act of project making. Since praxis is an activity to achieve some ends, it already presupposes a prior act of totalization, for human activity is not possible without some project before the performance. Sartre further writes:

".....praxis, born of need, is a totalization whose movement towards its own end practically makes the environment into a totality",¹⁵

Thus, praxis is also an act of totalization as well as an activity to realise the totality (which has been totalized).

Interestingly, Sartre sees totalization, not as a single act, but a constantly developing process. Totalization is always encompassing in character. It visualises a process of action to be performed. And this process is directed towards a goal, which Sartre calls as 'totality'. He writes:

"A totality is done completed The critical experience is within a totalization; it is itself both totalizing act and its own totalization, the multiplicity is in process of synthesizing into a unified object. The act of totalization can be autonomous from, or external to, that which it totalizes. It is a real moment in ongoing totalization, in so far as this is incarnated in all its parts and is realized as synthetic knowledge of itself",¹⁶

For Sartre, one's past or future goal or object of imagination will be a totality. My future goal or past (as totality) is inert, passive and complete in itself. I may set a goal of achieving first class in graduation, in which I may succeed. After my success I may further set new goals, say to become a teacher. Yet my becoming a graduate remains a totality since it is a goal complete in itself and the effort or activity in which I constantly engage myself to achieve the goal is the totalization. Interestingly, each time one totalizes he sets a totality encompassing all other earlier totalities. Similarly, each act of totalization encompasses earlier totalizations. And totalization is momentary for every moment new totalization takes place encompassing the earlier totalizations and totalities.

Totalization gets more complicated when we talk of interaction within larger assemblage in collectives and groups (For-itself with For-others). It gets marked by binary and ternary relationships. In a binary relationship, one to one correspondence between, (i) man to man, or (ii) man to practico- inert can be found; whereas in the ternary relationship, a person (A) will mediate the interaction or relation of two other persons, say (B) & (C) Here, we find the inclusion of a third party. Interestingly, this relationship is not one sided, but has mutual reciprocity. R.D. Laing writes:

"In reciprocity, each may make himself a vehicle of the other's project, so that the other will make himself a vehicle of one's own. Then there will be two separate transcendent ends and the reciprocity will have the character of an exchange. Or, each makes himself the means of the other for one joint end, which will be unique and transcendent. I recognize the other both as the means toward a transcendent end of my own, and as a generator of the project for which I am a means. That is, I see him as an agent of a totalization in his movement towards his ends in the same movement as that whereby I project myself towards my own; and I discover myself to be object and instrument for his ends by the same act whereby I constitute him as object and instrument for my ends"¹⁷.

In reciprocity, thus, each respect the others' praxis. Though each individual includes other in his act of totalization and *vice versa*, yet each one of them realises that other is equally an agent as much as he is. That is what Sartre calls as reciprocity which is possible between two free individuals. Had it been an

act between man to man in alterity, it would not be considered a genuine form of human relationship. Further, in group movements where each individual gives up some of his personal interests and works with others for a common interest and goal, members of the group constantly totalize one another. I totalize others in my totalization and others totalize my totalization in their individual totalizations and so on. Each individual totalizes the other remaining inside the group¹⁸. Each is a third party to the others. Each totalizes as a third party. We may take note of Sartre's example of a road mender working on the road side and a gardener planting the seedlings¹⁹. These acts are, however, isolated acts. But Sartre as a third party totalizes, by mediating both of them.

We may, now, note an interesting aspect of the mediation. We have already discussed earlier with regards to binary relationships, the double aspects of it viz., (a) man to man relationship and (b) man to practico-inert relationship. In fact, binary/ternary relationships are possible through mediation by both the confronting sides. But the way the mediation will take place between man vs. man will be different from that of man vs. practico-inert. While the former will be largely marked by reciprocity (except for bad faith)²⁰, latter is marked by alterity²¹. In the latter, genuine praxis is lost and is marked by materialized praxis²². The practico-inert constantly robs us of our genuine action. Man's action (self-for-self) in a factory no more remains his own. It is bought in lieu of his wages. It becomes for others (other-for-other). So, the mediation between man and practico-inert is devoid of reciprocity.

In the relationship between man to man, it is not completely devoid of alterity. Series²³, as described by Sartre is marked by alterity. The example of queue in a bus stand as given in the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* can be referred here. Some people are smoking, while others are reading newspaper and so on. They are plurality of solitude. It is the provisional negation by each of their possible reciprocal relations, marked by a negation. I have nothing to do with you. All are in their own world negatively, by taking no notice of each other except as a member in a quantitative series²⁴. The notion of negation as inherent in the very nature of seriality can be seen as parallel to internal negation²⁵, as Sartre visualised in the *Being and Nothingness*. Sartre sees that there can be no relationship at all if two bodies are completely exterior to one other. My seeing of others' bodies as separate and exterior to mine is due to cognizance of the fact that others are not me. This capacity to negate myself

from others is what Sartre terms as 'internal negation'. Existence of the other as a subject is apprehended prior to the involvement of the body as a mode of mediation. Sartre writes:

"The appearance of the Other's body is therefore, the primary encounter; on the contrary, it is only one episode in my relations with the Others and in particular in what we have described as making an object of the other. Or, if you prefer, the other exists for me first and I apprehend him in his body subsequently. The Other's body is for me a secondary structure²⁶.

Similarly, individuals involved in the series are basically bodies. And an absence of relationship between two bodies in exteriority can be applied in the case of the series. The numerical relationships among the passengers in the bus are self made. Prior to the negation of the bodies, they too know that they are all human beings, able for reciprocity. It is their internal negation, the capacity to negate oneself from others that made the passengers remain in exteriority from one another. So, we may note that idea of negation in seriality is nothing new, but an application of the ontological structure of negation as studied in the *Being and Nothingness*.

Similar is the case with institution. People are not recognized by their personal individuality, but by their power and status. The person as an individual freedom becomes inessential. This inessentiality is due to structures of power and status. In the process, individual somehow loses his freedom. We may, therefore, see the institution as a perverted form of a group. But an institution is necessary for a group to exist longer. This inessentiality of persons is the outcome of each person's impotence born of the belief in the inalterable character of institution. Sartre writes:

"But this inessentiality does not come either from the institution to the individual or from the individual to the institution: it is actually practice isolating itself in so far as it is produced in a common milieu defined by new human relationships. These relationships are based quite simply on serial impotence: if I regard the institution as basically unalterable, this is because my praxis in the institutionalised group determines itself as incapable of changing the institution; and this impotence originates in my relation of circular alterity to the other members of the group"²⁷.

As we can see from this passage, it is my freedom to let my praxis in the institutionalised group be reduced to impotence. I have equally the freedom to come out of it. My becoming impotence is a choice. So, Sartre does not lose sight of his basic thrust that 'man is freedom'.

V

Two lines of arguments may be drawn from Sartre's philosophy : (i) Human praxis and totalization is the outcome of scarcity and philosophy of freedom will dawn when the problem of scarcity is overcome²⁸. (ii) History is human history and it is collectively constructed²⁹. These two propositions can, now, be seen in the light of the arguments so far formulated in this paper.

Sartre sees 'scarcity' as the foundation for any form of human action and praxis. This foundation, however, is derived from Marxian concept of scarcity. However, problem of scarcity can be better understood in terms of need-lack relationships. Sartre writes :

".....need is the first totalising relation between the material being, man, and material ensemble of which he is part. This relation is universal, and, of interiority. Indeed, it is through need that the first negation of the negation and first totalization appear in the matter. Need is a negation of the negation in so far as it expresses itself as a lack within the organism; the need is a positivity in so far as the organic totality tends to preserve itself as such through it"³⁰.

Need is a positive quality and need is always need of something (matter). Sartre further correlates need with lack as need emerging out of lack, on the other hand, is a negation, my lack of food etc. Lack is seen as the basis upon which idea of need emerges. As R. D. Laing puts it:

"Whether the relation is man to man, or man to matter, the fundamental relation in our history is reciprocal of need-scarcity. It is the contingent determination of our univocal relation of materiality. Scarcity in the material world is constituted by need. This dialectic can also be viewed starting from scarcity, not from need"³¹.

Thus, scarcity is seen as the theoretical basis for both totalization and praxis. Interestingly, what Sartre formulates as lack is the new version of the old Marxist

term 'scarcity'. A particular lack can be overcome when a need (for a lack) is fulfilled. My lack of wealth makes me feel the need for wealth. My lack of wealth is an emptiness, conveying a negative meaning; whereas my need for wealth implies a satisfaction with the possession of the wealth. Latter carries a positive attitude. Need is opposed to lack. Since lack is a negation, need becomes negation of the negation. Sartre sees material scarcity as the basis of human praxis. Had man been complete in itself (Being), the question of human praxis could not have arisen. What one should see in this context is that it should not be only material scarcity that determines human praxis but also the nature of human finitude itself. Man being finite has the constant desire to be complete to realise the being. And it is man's constant thrust to be complete that also makes him visualise totalities through constant totalization. So, it is not only the material scarcity, but also the ontological structure of finitude that enables man to perform the act of praxis.

It is Sartre's over emphasis on the structure of lack-cum-scarcity that makes him blend existentialism with Marxism. His statement that marxism is the only philosophy of our time is mainly due to the fact that he sees marxism as the philosophy of scarcity. And as discussed above, praxis is the outcome of scarcity. So, we may conclude that Sartre's over emphasis on scarcity leads him to see 'philosophy as the philosophy of scarcity alone'.

However, Sartre has a vision of an end to this problem of scarcity. He writes:

"As soon as there will exist 'for everyone' a margin of 'real' freedom beyond the production of life, Marxism will have lived out the span; a philosophy of freedom will take its place. But we have no means, the intellectual instrument, no concrete experience which allows us to conceive of this freedom or of this philosophy",³²

In spite of the doubts about the philosophy of freedom being realised in actual life, we can be hopeful that the vision for a philosophy of freedom will dawn in actuality. Rest can be left to history.

Let us now see the second proposition that history is a collective construction. It is not an individual alone who makes history. Others too, make it. So, at times, history looks like an alien force dictating terms to individuals. This statement only shows the 'appearance', the way history is shown to us

History is not a practico-inert. It is the outcome of human praxis. But this praxis is not an isolated individual praxis, but a constitutive praxis, a product of mediated reciprocity of binary and ternary relationships. If history escapes me, it is not because I am the only one, others also make history.³³ Examples to cite the case are that of Tibet in our times and Sepoy Mutiny/Great Uprising in Indian history during 1857. British army suppressed the rebels and stole away their praxis. Well, of course, under definite historical conditions - division of different small and weak kingdoms and each rebel group fighting for their own interest, without any unified effort. Further, Indian middle class did not support them. And thus, praxis of the rebel groups were suppressed. And it is unfortunate for the human race that history has always been made by the victorious group of any class (group) struggle. Nevertheless, each group and within that, each individual makes an effort (if not all the time) to perform a praxis, even if his/her praxis is stolen away. Our point of discussion is the effort on the part of the individuals/groups to constantly totalize and thus perform the praxis. Success or failure for a praxis is beyond the realm of freedom. It takes note of several other historical factors.

To conclude, we shall make two observations in the light of the two lines of argument stated in the beginning of this section. First, it is true that human history is the outcome of scarcity. But Sartre's formulation of the 'philosophy of freedom' after the 'philosophy of scarcity' is a redundant one. There cannot be a state of freedom away from that of the scarcity. That would be a Godly world. What is important is the constant struggle of man to get away from scarcity by fulfilling the 'lack'. It is true that the vision is of a Godly world where there is no more 'need'. But freedom as we understand in the light of human action and subsequently through totalization and praxis, can be visualized and meaningfully talked about only under the world of scarcity. It is in the effort to solve scarcity that human freedom is realised. The moment scarcity is solved, there will be no freedom either. Human existence cannot rule out the ontological presupposition of finitude and lack. It is by the very nature of facticity that man is a lack. And freedom is possible only in the act of solving the lack. So, freedom cannot be visualized in a world outside that of scarcity. It is to be realised within.

Secondly, nature of history as both (a) collectively determined and (b) as outcome of man-practico inert confrontation, should not lead us to think that

history is the alienated product of human praxis. Though it is true that one does not exercise genuine freedom during the formation of series and institutions, yet fused groups show exercise of genuine freedom. Since fused group is marked by mediated reciprocity of totalization, praxis of the group becomes praxis of the individual. Constitutive praxis merges with constituted praxis. Interestingly the span of any fused group is short, often giving way to series or institutions. But the moment of formation of fused groups and exercise of praxis within it are genuine moments of freedom. Since fused group has short duration, freedom is also short lived. But the interesting part of the nature of human freedom is that most of the time freedom is eluded by alienation through bad faith and passivity. What we should note is that fluctuation and momentariness of totalization and praxis marks the very nature of freedom. Therefore, human freedom is realised in momentary act of totalization of mediated reciprocity within the boundary of scarcity and finitude.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. By embodied consciousness, the implication is on the dual character of man both as a conscious being as well as a body. This duality is for the sake of conceptual understanding only and should not be seen in the light of Cartesian dualism. In fact, consciousness is merely an act and it is rooted in the ontological presence of the body.
2. Jean-Paul Sartre, (1956, reprint 1966) *Being and Nothingness*, trans. by H.E. Barnes. New York : Washington Square Press. Pp. 131-132.
3. So far the distinction between 'body' and 'matter' has not been made. As we proceed, the distinction will more visibly be made. Body means human body (living one) and matter means inert objects. It may be a natural object or a human construct.
4. *Being and Nothingness*, op. cit., p.559.
5. Mediation refers to bridging of a gap or making a dialogue possible.
6. *Being and Nothingness*, op. cit., p.800.

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7. *Ibid.*, p. 453.
8. For-itself is not an aggregation of body and consciousness. It is wholly body and wholly consciousness. Further, For-itself also acts on other For-itself/For-itselfs. It need not act on bodies and matters alone.
9. Jean-Paul Sartre, (1960, reprint 1982) *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, tr. by. Alan Sheridan-Smith, Edited by Jonathan Ree. London: Verso. p. 830.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 829.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
12. Sartre uses the term 'exis' to mean the autonomous character of the practico-inert, the stage where it exerts its authority over man.
13. Praxis is defined as 'activity of an individual or group in organising conditions in the light of some end'.
14. *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, *op. cit.*, p. 83.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
16. Laing and Cooper, (1971) *Reason and Violence*. London : Tavistock Publication. p.103.
17. *ibid.*, p. 109-110.
18. Mark Poster, (1975) *Existential Marxism in Post War France*, Princeton University Press, Pp. 291-291.
19. *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, *op. cit.*, Pp. 101 & 110.
20. *Being and Nothingness*, *op. cit.*, p. 559.
21. Sartre defines 'alterity' as relation of separation, opposed to reciprocity. *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, *op. cit.*, p. 827.
- R.D. Laing further puts that 'the structural aspect of the transition to and from self-for-self to other-for-other Sartre calls alterity, and the movement he calls alteration'. *Reason and Violence*, *op. cit.*, p. 118.
22. *Reason and Violence*, *op. cit.*, p. 118.
23. It is an ensemble each of whose members is determined in alterity by others (in contrast to group). *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, *op. cit.*, p. 829.
24. *Reason and Violence*, *op. cit.*, Pp. 121-122.
25. *Being and Nothingness*, *op. cit.*, Pp. 445 & 803.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 446.

27. *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, op. cit., p. 79.
28. Jean-Paul Sartre, (1963) *The Problem of Method*, Trans. H.E. Barnes, Methuen and Co. Ltd., p. 34.
29. *Ibid.*, Pp. 88 & 90.
30. *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, op. cit., p. 80.
31. *Reason and Violence*, op. cit., p. 113.
32. *The Problem of Method*, op. cit., p. 34.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 88.

THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM IN SARTRE AND ŚAṆKARA

G. C. NAYAK

In his Introduction to Sartre's *Existentialism and Humanism*, Philip Mairet points out, "To him (Sartre) freedom is the value of all values. It is as a philosopher of freedom that Sartre's contribution to existentialism is most brilliant and does most honour to the enlightened tradition of his country"¹. The concept of freedom is thus essential to the philosophy of Sartre. The reality of freedom is emphasised by him over and over again to such an extent that it may without exaggeration be regarded as the central theme of his philosophy. Freedom, for Sartre, is the ground all value and meaning. Values are the fruits of free choice; they have no objectivity or independent status. Values are not out there to be discovered as the given. "My freedom", says Sartre, "is the unique foundation of values and that nothing, absolutely nothing justifies me in adopting this or that particular value, this or that particular scale of values". Moreover, "What we called freedom is", according to Sartre, "impossible to distinguish from the being of 'human reality'". Man does not exist first in order to be free subsequently; there is no difference between the being of man and his being free". Anguish is "the reflective apprehension of freedom by itself". Orestes' defiance in *The Flies* makes the human situation remarkably transparent, when he says "Alien to myself, I know it. Outside of nature, against nature, without excuse, without recourse save myself. But I shall not return under your law; I am condemned to have no other law but my own. Nor shall I return to nature, where a thousand paths are marked out, all leading upto you. I can only follow my own path. For I'm a man, Jupiter, and each man must find his own way"². "In anguish", says Sartre, "I apprehend myself at once as totally free and as not being able to derive the meaning of the world except as coming from myself"³. Here when he says "myself", as appropriately pointed out by Croshy, he could just as well have said "from my freedom", for that is what he intends⁴. The meaning of my life is whatever I decide it to be in my

unrestricted freedom. There is nothing like human nature, an essence of the self, constraining us to behave in a predictable way. New dimensions of the present and the future can undo the essence which we have fashioned for ourselves as the outcome of our past free choice. "The meaning of the past is strictly dependent on my present project. I alone in fact can decide at each moment the bearing of the past By projecting myself toward my ends, I preserve the past with me, and by action I *decide* its meaning"⁵. Men can transcend their characters or the "essences" which they have given to themselves in the past. The whole course of our lives including the values by which we live our lives are however left "without justification and without excuse", according to Sartre, because "as a being by whom values exist, I am unjustifiable. My freedom is anguished at being the foundation of values while itself without foundation"⁶. This speaks of the radicality of Sartre's conception of freedom. "Values are either sheerly invented or freedom is completely unreal. There can be no middle ground"⁷. Sam Keen seems to have an admirable insight into Sartre's view of freedom when he says "If there are any 'oughts', any given standards of good or evil, or any invasions of human life by powers beyond its control, there is no freedom"⁸. In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre seems to have developed a theory which points to the ultimate subjectivism and arbitrariness of freedom, and therefore "a doctrine of absolute freedom such as Sartre's is also a doctrine of *absurd* freedom"⁹. But it is important to note that "the social and cultural constructions in the midst of which individuals find themselves, including the roles to which they are relegated and by which they are objectified by others (e.g. Black, Caucasian, Aryan, Jew, crippled, ugly, beautiful, criminal, saint, shopkeeper, civil servant; see Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*) are givens to be transcended, as all givens are necessarily transcended, by the nihilations of the for-itself"¹⁰.

What makes this freedom a source of misery, rather than joy, is that by my freedom "I am condemned to be wholly responsible for myself" and to "carry the weight of the world by myself alone without anything or any person being able to lighten it". To discover the full meaning of radical freedom is to experience "abandonment", in the sense of finding "myself suddenly alone and without help"¹¹. Sartre writes as follows in his *Existentialism and Humanism* which deserves to be quoted here at length in order to understand his exact position regarding freedom. "There can no longer be any good *apriori*, since

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there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it. It is nowhere written that "the good" exists, that one must be honest or must not lie, since we are now upon the plane where there are only men. Dostoevsky once wrote "If god did not exist, everything would be permitted", and that, for existentialism, is the starting point. Everything is indeed permitted if God does not exist, and man is in consequence forlorn, for he cannot find anything to depend upon either within or outside himself. He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism—man is free, man *is* freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimise our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet is nevertheless at liberty, and from the moment that he is thrown into this world he is responsible for everything he does"¹². Referring to Ponce, Sartre points out, "Man is the future of man"¹³. Stavrogin who commits suicide in Dostoevsky's novel *The Possessed* has been rightly depicted by Crosby as "an embodiment of the Sartrean ideal of absolute freedom and even of perfect "good faith"¹⁴. Stavrogin's life is miserable in spite of his freedom. "Freedom is not enough, it alone cannot confer meaning on life"¹⁵, this is Dostoevsky's point. A life based only on freedom is "vertiginous"¹⁶. As Roquentin says in *Nausea*, a freedom like this "is rather like death"¹⁷.

Crosby rightly remarks that "Sartre's doctrine of radical freedom calls the possibility of genuine human community into question, not only with respect to its negative implications for shared truths, meanings, and moral values, but in other important respects" like "the acute sense of separation and loneliness implicit in Sartre's insistence that each of us is condemned to be wholly responsible for herself"¹⁸.

Moreover, it is also to be noted that according to Sartre "the freedom of others is a constant threat, enigma, and embarrassment to me, just as my freedom is to them. I cannot avoid converting them into objects for the utilization of my freedom and they cannot avoid doing the same in relation to me. Conflict between or among individuals is thus insurmountable; each atomic centre of

freedom works relentlessly to absorb all other centres of freedom into the orbit of its projects and concerns"¹⁹. Sartre clearly states that "it is useless for human-reality to seek to get out of this dilemma: one must either transcend the other or allow oneself to be transcended by him. The essence of the relations between consciousnesses is not the *Mitsein* (of Heidegger): it is conflict". Sartre also points out, "While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me ---- conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others". Freedom thus in Sartre ends in "despair of the possibility of community, at least in *Being and Nothingness*", as appropriately pointed out by Crosby²⁰.

The exaggerations in the claims in respect of freedom and responsibility in the writings of Sartre are too obvious to escape our notice, but the truths conveyed to us through those very exaggerations are no less significant. "The rock will not be an obstacle if I wish at any cost to arrive at the top of the mountain", says Sartre. This picture of man is no doubt an encouraging one, but it is an exaggerated picture nevertheless. Antony Flew seems to be right in his remarks that "the most press-on regardless assault may simply, and perhaps fatally, be defeated; while if it succeeds, its success will have been precisely in overcoming (what were by the very attempt chosen) obstacles"²¹. Sartre may be making "quite reckless claims about the massive scope"²² of human agency when he says that "man being condemned to be free carries the weight of the whole world on his shoulders", but the insight gained through this cannot be set aside as trivial by any stretch of imagination. It seems somewhat unfair, and mostly unwarranted, therefore when philosophers like Sartre are taken to task for entering into "successive orgies of pretentious verbosity and elaborate mystification"²³ at the hands of linguistic philosophers like Antony Flew. One is reminded here of the reaction of those philosophers who, as Edie points out, "see in Sartre 'major', if rather too morbid and personally objectionable, novelist and playwright but *not a philosopher*, at least in the commonsensical British sense of the term"²⁴. The point, however, is that, as Edie has rightly observed, "very few personages in the history of philosophy have been both major playwrights and technical philosophers as well. Sartre's very versatility is a cause of suspicion to contemporary academic philosophers"²⁵. Ācārya Śāṅkara here in India was not only a great philosopher, he was also a man of great poetic

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genius, as is evident from his inimitable work *Saunderya Laharī*. Sartre similarly was not only an authentic philosopher, he was a great literary figure too of the present century. Exaggeration apart, it is the philosophical insight which is of utmost importance in Sartre. "It is of crucial importance", says Crosby that "we do not make Sartre's mistake of overestimating the extent of our individual freedom"²⁶. And this criticism of Sartre is alright so far as it goes. Bernard Loomer is quoted by Crosby to make the point that "we are not only free. We are also driven by irrational impulses and destructive compulsions. We are sometimes held fast in the vice of emotional and intellectual fixations ----- In our felt entrapment we may have the depressing feeling that our civilized attitudes are a veneer that comouflage the hidden demons that mock at our pretensions". It is further pointed out that "the demons who swell within each of us may not be solely of our own creation. They may also have a communal origin. There are socialized demons or communal shadows"²⁷. And yet Crosby in all fairness also admits that "while we do not have the limitless freedom that Stirner and Sartre often seem to think we have, the bold overstatements of their philosophies can help to jolt us into realizing that we have much more freedom than we usually credit ourselves with and hence, our common future is significantly open, not fixed or foreordained"²⁸. Rightly emphasising the importance of human freedom, Sartre has pushed this theme to a "ridiculous extreme"²⁹, one might say, but what is significant is that Sartre has highlighted the capacity in man "for self-transcendence, meaning that we do not have to settle for what we already have become, give up because of past disappointments or failures ---- or acquiesce in the psychological or sociological theories that would deny the considerable scope of personal freedom"³⁰. Sartre's picture of "man being condemned to be free", with its typical insight, is however only a partial one, even if we conveniently ignore "the reckless claims" and over-estimations" of Sartre. The picture needs to be modified, and supplemented by other pictures of man like that of Brahman, as *nitya śuddha buddha mukta svabhāva*, as one who is intrinsically pure, intelligent and free. Let us now examine what the Vedānta of Śaṅkara has to say about man and his freedom.

What is of utmost importance for Śaṅkara is the knowledge or *jñāna* of man, not the embodied being of course but in his essence, as the *Brahman* or the ultimate non-dual Reality, the Vedānta passages like *Ahaṁ Brahmāsmi*, *Tattvamasi* etc. being the source of this unique knowledge or realisation. This

knowledge is unique and is the most important because it brings about freedom or *mokṣa* as it is called in Advaita Vedānta, which is otherwise denied to man on his empirical plane fraught as it is with misery and distress on account of varieties of limitations and constraints like duality (*dvaita*) and multiplicity (*nānātva*). *Dvitiyādvai bhayam bhavati*; there is fear when there is duality, says the *Upaniṣad*, and this duality is due to our ignorance. Once the oneness of the self with the *Brahman* or the non-dual ultimate Reality is realised i.e., once *Ātmajñāna* or *Brahma jñāna* which is the same of course dawns on man, there is no limitation or constraint left for him who has attained absolute freedom (*mukti*) through this *jñāna* or knowledge. He becomes a *jīvanmukta* or a free man during his lifetime itself. All others who are deprived of this knowledge are not free of course, and they are bound by so many constraints of body, mind, intellect, considerations of station and its duties, birth, death, old age, internal and external laws and what not. This in a nutshell is the theory of freedom (*mokṣa*) or liberation, as it is popularly called, in Śaṅkara Vedānta. Man of course is intrinsically free; he has only to know or realise this in order to be free. He needs to be reminded of his true nature, that is all, and once the realisation of the identity of man in his essence with *Brahman* or the ultimate non dual reality dawns on him, he becomes *jīvanmukta* or free in his life time itself. It should be noted here that *jñāna* instead of being merely a means of freedom is itself considered in Advaita Vedānta to be the goal for which every one should aspire only for its own sake in as much as illumination of *jñāna* itself is considered here to be freedom. This becomes evident if we deal with the Vedāntic conception of freedom at great length.

It has often been misunderstood that according to Śaṅkara, illumination or knowledge (*jñāna*) is a mere means of freedom. But it is more appropriate to say that freedom, according to Śaṅkara, is nothing but illumination (*jñāna*). ‘*Śrutayo Brahnavidyānantaram mokṣam darśayantyo madhye kāryāntaram vārayanti*’, as Śaṅkara would tell in his commentary on *Brahma Sūtras*, 1.1.4. It is true that at places Śaṅkara speaks of *jñāna* as a means to liberation e.g. when he says ‘*Niḥśreyasaphalam tu brahmavijñānam*, in his commentary on *Brahma Sūtra* 1.11. or when he says “*mokṣa-sādhanaṃ jñānam*” in *Upadeśa Sahasrī*. But in all such cases it is a mere concession to the popular way of expressing the idea and moreover the context in which such statements are made should never be lost sight of. In the *Upadeśa Sahasrī*, for example, *jñāna* as an

instrument of freedom can only mean the bookish knowledge of Brahman or *vākyaḍ vākyaṛtha jñāna* obtained through *śravaṇa* only which is to be firmly entrenched in the mind of the listener through *manana* and *nididhyāsana* finally culminating in *Brahmajñāna* in the sense of *Brahmāvagati* or the full comprehension of Brahman. And in the commentary on the first Sūtra, “*Athāto Brahma-Jiñāsa*” Śaṅkara being primarily interested in showing the difference in the fruits of *dharmajijñāsa* and Brahman *jijñāsā* naturally talks of *mokṣa* or *niḥsreyasa* as the fruit of *Brahmajñāna* just to contrast it with worldly prosperity (*abhyudaya*) which is the fruit of *dharmajñāna*. As a matter of fact, however, there is nothing more to be aspired for beyond the comprehension of Brahman (*Brahmajñāna*) in Advaita Vedānta, be it a *Vaikuntha*, a state of *Kaivalya*, *ānanda* (bliss) or *nirvāna* (extinction). Illumination or *jñāna* is freedom and it itself is a bliss or *ānanda*. Where *jñāna* is used in Śaṅkara Vedānta as a mere means (*pramāṇa*) for the comprehension of Brahman (*Brahmāvagati*), as for example when Śaṅkara says *jñānena hi pramāṇena avagantumīṣṭam Brahma*, there *jñāna* to my mind should be taken to mean a mere word to word, bookish, understanding of Brahman from the Śāstra i.e. *vākyaḍvākyaṛtha jñāna*. In that sense alone *Brahmajñāna* and *Brahmāvagati* can be distinguished from each other, for otherwise *jñāna* in the sense of *aparokṣa jñāna* is certainly indistinguishable from *avagati*, and *Brahmāvagati* or *jñāna* in this context should mean an immediate and full comprehension of the nature of the Real which constitutes the *puruṣārtha* or the aim of man and is identical with freedom (*mokṣa*).

Some of the misconceptions associated with the idea of freedom (*mukti*) in Śaṅkara Vedānta are subjected to trenchant criticism by Vidyāranya in *Pancadaśī*. Enlightenment does not make one unfit for worldly transactions, otherwise it would be a kind of illness which of course it is not. The knowledge of truth is not something like the disease of consumption which makes one incapable of normal dealings. The idea is that illumination does not affect our normal life in any way. There is absolutely no difference between the ignorant and the enlightened as regards their activity or abstention from activity from the point of view of the body, mind and intellect. *Pancadaśī* is quite clear on the point that freedom does not consist in being like sticks and stones abstaining from food etc.

That the enlightened is not forgetful about the world, that illumination

does not destroy duality, that it only make one realise the self as real and the unreality of the world only in a specific sense is clear from the following passage of *Pancadaśī*. “*Ātmadhīreva vidyati vācyaṃ ne dvaitavismṛtiḥ*”. Vidyāranya caricatures the idea that illumination consists in forgetfulness of the world of duality by pointing out that inanimate objects like pots should in that case be half-enlightened in as much as they do not have any knowledge of duality. *Pancadaśī* is rather very clear on the point that the knower of truth fulfils his worldly duties well, as they do not conflict with his knowledge. In order to perform the worldly activities, according to *Pancadaśī*, it is not essential that the world should be taken as ultimately real.

What are required for doing normal activities in the world are the means such a mind, speech, body and external objects. They are not made to vanish by enlightenment. So why can the enlightened not engage himself in worldly affairs? Therefore, as knowledge of truth does not affect the means such as the mind etc. the enlightened person is able to do wordly activities such as ruling a country, study of logic or engaging in agriculture. The enlightaned one, like an expert who knows and understands two languages, is conversant with both the bliss of Brahman and the worldly joys and does not see any conflict between the two. The idea of freedom (*mukti*) as something mystical and other-worldly is thus entirely ruled out by *Pancadaśī*. It is as if some one has mastery over two different languages; as there is no incongruity here similar is the case with one having illumination continuing to be conversant with the worldly affairs. What is important to note in this connection is that the enlightened person is not affected or distrubed by the pleasure or pain caused by *prārabdha*; thus and only in this sense he is a free man. The only difference between the enlightened who is free and unenlightened who is in bondage is that the former remain undisturbed and patient through all his afflictions due to *prārabdha* whereas the latter is impatient and sufferes on account of this. This is how and this is the sense in which the metaphysical concept of freedom in Indian thought, instead of remaining confined to the conceptual level alone, is seen to have a definite bearing in our practical day to day life. Attainment of freedom (*mukti*) by no means makes one other worldly or merely contemplative in character transcending, and thereby becoming totally unfit for, the day to day affairs of the world. Though undergoing similar experience or engaged in similar activities it is freedom from misery that characterises the enlightened whereas the

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unenlightened continues to be subject of misery. The above discussion should dispel once and for all several misconceptions about the nature of freedom (*mukti*) in Indian thought.

As far as the ethical aspect of freedom is concerned, it is to be noted that the enlightened one is in a definitely advantageous position to do good to the society without any attachment whatsoever and the life of a *jīvanmukta*, though in itself beyond good and evil, can thus be conducive to the social welfare. In any case, there cannot be any question here of his life being one of unbridled licentiousness like that of a debauch. His life is a life of detachment alright, but at the same time the world can benefit immensely by his teachings. As an *Ācārya* he can be a source of unfailing inspiration to the entire erring humanity. That is why such an enlightened person is described by Śaṅkārācārya as both '*Vimukta saṅga*' and '*Sadāpāradayāmbudhāma*'³¹. *Ācārya* Śaṅkara is very clear about the life and conduct of such men of wisdom, the enlightened ones. There are great souls, says Śaṅkara; calm and magnanimous, who do good to others as does the spring (*Vasantavallokahitam carantah*)³², and who having themselves crossed this dreadful ocean of birth and death, help others also to cross the same, without any motive whatsoever. Here the words '*Vasantavallokahitam carantah*' doing good to the world like spring, refer to the spontaneous goodness of the enlightenad. It is indeed a pity that this spontaneous goodness of the freeman, in the context of Indian thought has not been sufficiently highlighted while the freedom's (*jīvanmukta*'s) life has been depicted as one of sheer moral indifference and callousness by those who are alienated from the Indian culture in some form or the other.

True, there is a sort of "supermoralism, the state of being beyond good and bad"³³ set up as a model here where the life and conduct of the enlightened person are supposed not to be subject to normal ethical considerations, but from this it does not follow that the enlightened person could be immoral. Wherever it is stated that evil actions do not affect him, i.e. the enlightened person, it is to be construed as a praise of the state of enlightenment, *Brahmaṇo jñāna mahātmyam*, as Śaṅkara would call it³⁴. This does not and cannot mean that the enlightened person as matter of fact could indulge in evil actions, because there would be an obvious anomaly to speak of an immoral *jīvanmukta*. As a matter of fact, *jīvanmukta* is beyond the polarities and is at the same time, and precisely because of his transcendence, immensely helpful as a guide. He is a man of

unparalleled benevolence doing good to mankind with a rare spontaneity. A unique status is assigned to *jīvanmukta* in the Indian cultural milieu; here is a model of spontaneous goodness flowing from the intrinsic nature of one who is not entangled in polarities.

But what is this spontaneous goodness supposed to be? If it is spontaneous, can it be good in any ordinary sense? In the ordinary parlance we speak of goodness only when there is a moral choice and when the choice is genuine. If there is no genuine choice left for the *jīvanmukta*, can he be regarded as good in any sense whatsoever? Rather it would seem as if *jīvanmukta*'s activities could be only mechanical and automatic, and therefore, not good in any sense when there is no possibility of his becoming evil under any circumstances. The vital question at issue here is whether the situation envisaged in this context where the *jīvanmukta* chooses the good over evil because of his natural inclination for the good reduce the *jīvanmukta* to the status of an automation. I do not think so. Goodness is spontaneous in the *jīvanmukta* only in the sense that it becomes his second nature³⁵, so to say, to do good, to choose good over evil. Although, the theoretical possibility of a *jīvanmukta* choosing evil over good cannot be ruled out altogether, such a possibility is never actualised in his case simply because the choice of good over evil becomes natural to him or in other words, it becomes his *svabhāva*. I do not think that there should be any inconsistency in visualising some such situation in the case of a *jīvanmukta* and his spontaneous goodness.

Actual choice of good as a matter of practice is what is meant by spontaneous goodness in this context and it is, therefore, neither an impossibility nor is it a sort of automatic or mechanical conduct where the words like 'good' and 'evil' would be inapplicable. The *jīvanmukta* is himself not touched or affected by the consideration of 'good' or 'bad' but his choice is always in favour of the good over evil and his activities are always conducive to the good of the mankind.

There is no question, therefore, in Śāṅkara of anyone being condemned to be free or the freedom of one coming into conflict with that of the other. Moral values, or any value for that matter, though not ultimate, are not arbitrary

in Śaṅkara Vedānta. They are to be honoured both by one who desires freedom and even after freedom has been gained in knowledge. In the former case it is a part of the *sādhana* itself, a part of the process by which *citta śuddhi* or purity of mind is obtained which in its turn is essential for the knowledge of Brahman while in the case of the latter it becomes spontaneous, a second nature, so to say, on the part of the Freeman not to transgress the moral values. God is not redundant for Śaṅkara either. Everything has its due place, its due value being kept in tact in Śaṅkara Vedānta. They are all important on the empirical plane of course; whether it is a case of secular activity or religious devotion, nothing is arbitrary, purportless or meaningless. Only they do not have any ultimate significance, that is all. What's of utmost significance is the realisation of Advaita which alone can make as free. What is significant from Śaṅkara's point of view again is that the *jīvanmukta* or the free man, as we have noted earlier, does not live a self-centered life, but is a great asset to his environment and the society. His very conduct, his guidance as Ācārya, is beneficial for the humanity at large (*Vasantavallokaḥitam carantab*); he is spontaneously altruistic in his conduct. This aspect of freedom is missing in the picture of a man who is condemned to be free in Sartre. There is, however, one significant point where Sartre and Śaṅkara would agree, and that concerns the capacity in man for self-transcendence. Man with all his misery and distress is not bound by the circumstances, which appear to be so very inexorable, so very intransigent after all. He has the capacity to break the chains which he himself seems to have imposed on himself and his conduct. In Sartre, the choice is an absolutely free choice, not determined by any conditions of the past, not by any condition whatsoever. As Sartre puts it, "either man is wholly determined (which is inadmissible, especially because a determined consciousness i.e. a consciousness externally motivated becomes itself pure exteriority and ceases to be (consciousness) or else man is wholly free"³⁶. Man, being consciousness as such in Advaita Vedānta, is by his very nature absolutely free. For Sartre, consciousness is "a project of being. In "bad faith" consciousness takes itself for a thing, for a role, for an ego etc"³⁷. In Śaṅkara Vedānta also consciousness in the empirical plane becomes bound by the limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*) on account of wrong knowledge (*mithyājñāna*). The realisation of the true nature of man as pure consciousness makes him free. Unlike Sartre, however, the

realisation in Vedānta is associated with pure bliss, bliss being the very nature of man. "*Cidānanda rūpaḥ Śivōhaṁ, śivohaṁ*". Man is essentially and intrinsically of the nature of bliss, consciousness and purity, and freedom consists in a realisation of this nature of man. The picture of freedom given here by Śaṅkara is a sublime one, and though belonging to a tall order perhaps, it cannot be regarded as something unachievable either, for it has been seen to have been realised in the lives of *jīvanmuktas* like Kānci Paramācārya, Rāmākrishṇa Paramahansa and Rāmana Maharshi, to name only a few belonging to this cultural heritage.

NOTES

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1. Cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism* (Translation and Introduction by Philip Mairet) (London, 1966-Reprinted.), pp. 18-19.
2. *The Flies*, as quoted in Footnote 20, J. M. Edie "Sartre as Phenomenologist and as Existential Psychologist," E. N. Lee and M. Mandelbaum (eds.) *Phenomenology and Existentialism* (The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1966), p. 151.
3. Jean Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*. Hazel K. Barnes (Trans) (New York 1966), p. 48.
4. Donald A. Crosby, *The Spectre of the Absurd* (State University of New York Press, 1988), p.89.
5. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (New York 1966) p. 610.
6. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (London, 1957) p. 38.
7. Crosby, *Op. Cit.*, p.92
8. Sam Keen, *Apology for Wonder* (New York, 1969)
9. Crosby, *Op. Cit.*, p.95

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10. *Ibid.*
11. Cf. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*. (London, 1957) p. 555-556
12. J. P. Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism*, pp. 33-34
13. *Ibid.*, p. 34
14. Crosby, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 98-99
15. *Ibid.*, p.99
16. Philip R. Fandozzi, *Nihilism end Technology; A Heideggerian Investigation* (Washington D.C., 1982).
17. J. P. Sartre, *Nausea*, Lloyd Alexander (trans), New York, 1964
18. Crosby, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 108-109.
19. *Ibid.*, p.109
20. *Ibid.*, p.110
21. Antony Flew, 'Is There a Problem of Freedom?' EDO PIVCEVIC (Ed.), *Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding* (Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 209.
22. *Ibid.*, p.208
23. *Ibid.*, p.202
24. Cf. James M. Edie, "Sartre as Phenomenologist and as Existential Psychoanalysis", "E. N. Lee and M. Mandelbaum (eds.), *Op. cit.*, p. 140
25. *Ibid.*, p.141
26. Crosby, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 414-415 n. 10
27. *Ibid.*, p.415. Reference is made here to Bernard Loomer in Sibley and Gunter (eds.) *Process Philosophy; Basic Writings* (Washington D. C. University Press of America, 1978).
28. Crosby, *Op. Cit.*, p. 369
29. *Ibid.*, p.268
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 369-70
31. *Viveka Cūḍāmani*, 486
32. *Ibid.*, p.37
33. R. D. Ranade, *A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣhadic Philosophy* (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1968), p.224

34. Cf. *Chândogya Upaniṣad*, IV 14.3, "Yathā puskarapalāśa āpo na śliṣyante evamevaṃ vidi pāpam karma na śliṣyate iti". Cf. Śaṅkara's commentary on the above, "Śrunu tasya mayocyamānasya Brahmano jñāna mātṛmyam yathā puskarapalāśe padmapatra āpo na śliṣyante evam yathā vakṣyām. Brahmaivaṃ vidipāpam karma na śliṣyate na sambādhyate iti".
35. Cf. Sureśvara, *Naiṣkarmya Siddhi*, IV. 69, "Utapannātma prabodhaḥ tvadveṣṭvādāya guṇāḥ, Ayatnato bhavantyasya na tu sādhanārūpinaha".
36. Jean Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (Trans) Professor Hazel Barnes (London, Methuen & Co, 1957) p. 442.
37. Edie, "Sartre as Phenomenologist and as Existential Psychoanalyst", Lee and Mendelbaum (eds.), *op. cit.*, p.169.

ACTUAL AND POSSIBLE WORLDS : AN INTUITIONISTIC APPROACH

KANTILAL DAS

The concept of possible world is an intuitionistic concept, since the problems relating to this concept can be apprehended through intuition. This concept, however, is not a new one, it is indeed an ancient concept and has had a long history. Philosophers over the years, have been using this concept in order to explain various philosophical issues. Contemporary philosophers have thought that the concept of a possible world provides a powerful framework for illuminating and resolving a great many philosophical problems - such as that of clarifying modal concepts - of ethical concepts, of probabilification, of counterfactual situation, of disambiguation of sentences, of propositional attitudes and so on. In the present context I propose to confine myself only to examining the relevance of possible world in modal logic. But prior to that, let us look at the historical and theoretical development of the concept.

Historical Background of the Concept of Possible World :

It was Aristotle who had introduced the concept of 'possibility' variously. Anscombe in her celebrated article "Aristotle and the Sea Battle"¹ has promulgated this concept in an illuminating way. Insightful explanations have also been found in Hintikka's article on "Aristotle's Different Possibilities."²

In modern times, it was Leibnitz, who has made an epoch-making attempt in understanding our world in terms of 'possible worlds'. Leibnitz's idiom has come to be called the *possible world's idiom*. The problems which he intended to solve are : "Is this the best of all possible worlds?" Why God did create this particular world rather than some other possible worlds? He says, "There are the eternal truths. They did not obtain only while the world existed, but they

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would also obtain if God had created a world with a different plan''³ For Leibnitz, possible worlds are compositional in the sense that all possible worlds of any substance is the totality of all substances compossible with it. Every possible world, says Leibnitz is made up of a family of possible substances and there we apprehend a compossibility or conglomeration with every substance. It brings a mutual adjustment of substances of possible worlds. In course of an apt metaphor. Leibnitz comments that "the substance of a possible world "mirror" one another in their mutual accommodation''⁴. Like the Kantian cleavage of analytic and synthetic and Hume's wedge between relations of ideas and matters of fact, Leibnitz distinguishes between truths of reason and truths of fact. He holds that a statement concomitant with truths of reason can be shown to be true in all possible worlds. It appears that the force of this claim is similar to the one made by Quine, when he said that an analytic proposition comes out true in every possible situation. To have Quine's own worlds : "A statement is then explained as analytic when it comes out true under every state description. This account is an adaptation of Leibnitz's "true in all possible-worlds''⁵. Following Leibnitz we can define the concept of possible world in saying that things might have been different from the way they actually are and each of the alternative ways is a possible world. A statement is analytic if it comes out true in every possible world or every possible situation.

In recent times the concept of possible world' has been promulgated by many a thinker in ethics, in counterfactual situations and above all, in modal predicative logic, differently of course not in the same tune as Leibnitz did but in a new direction. We can cite the name of C.B.Daniels who at the outset of his book *The Evaluation of Ethical Theories* justifies the relevance of the idiom of possible world in the ethical field. He compares a possible world with an ideal world - a world whose belonging is ideally true. He says, "... and ethical theory is simply a determination of a unique set of ideal worlds. an ideal world relative to a theory that determines it as ideal, is a possible-world, a fairy world perhaps, in which everything the theory says ideally true is in fact true. An ideal world relative to an ethical theory is a world in which everything the theory says ought to be the case is the case."''⁶ Other philosophers have thought that the concept of possible world assumes importance, since it works favourably in counterfactual situations. For them counterfactual supposition is not a redundant speculation nor is it a pointless one. Counterfactual supposition is very much

effective as well as useful in logic and other sciences. David Lewis is a thinker of significance, who says, " 'If Kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over' seems to me to mean something like this : in any possible state of affairs in which Kangaroos have no tails, and which resembles our actual state of affairs as much as Kangaroos having no tails permits to it the Kangaroos topple over. I shall give a general analysis of conuterefactual conditions along these lines.'"⁷

The logical structure of the world presupposed by Wittgenstein in *Tractatus* is based on the concept of possible world. Although Wittgenstein does not mention the concept of possible world in the *Tractatus*, nevertheless, there is an underpinning of the concept in terms of the concepts of actual and possible states of affairs. When Wittgenstein says that 'the facts in logical space are the world'⁸ he understands the logical space as a space of 'possible worlds'. Wittgenstein characterizes the logical space as a space of 'possible states of affairs'. These states of affairs refer to the world as a whole, as a space of possible worlds.

According to Wittgenstein the world is the totality of facts in logical space. He understands an independent existence of an atomic state of affairs in logical space in terms of possible worlds. He goes on to say that the world as a fact is fitted into a 'logical space' of possible worlds. The dimension of this logical space is determined by the mutually independent components of a world description. A combination of atomic states of affairs consists of one atomic state of affairs of each dimension determines a 'possible world' : i.e. a possible state of affairs the world as a whole. Every atomic state of affairs, says Wittgenstein is independent and they belong to the logical structure of the world. Suppose, p and q are two existing states of affairs in our world. Then it is the case that p and q exist. Now, if we are to say that p and q are independent of each other, then we not only state a fact about the world as it is : but rather something about the world as it might possible be. Since both p and q are existent independently, each of them might have been existent or non-existent independently of what is true of the other. The 'independence' does not refer in particular to the actual world; it refers likewise to all possible worlds. So whether a state of affairs, says Wittgenstein, is independent of another state of affairs involves the question of that kind of world are to be considered 'possible worlds'.

It was Kripke who argued for the relevance of possible world in order to establish the reference of proper name. Following Frege, he seeks to clarify the reference of a name in terms of rigidity.⁹ Frege holds that proper names are rigid designators and he defines rigid designator as one that designates the same thing in all possible worlds in which it designates. Like Frege, Kripke says a name is a rigid designator, if in every possible world it designates the same object. Let us presuppose that 'a' and 'b' are two rigid designators (proper names) and further suppose that 'a = b'. Now 'a' is identical with 'b' by virtue of the fact that each designates the same thing in one possible world, viz. the actual world. So, since they are rigid, they each designate the same thing in all possible worlds in which they both designate. Kripke holds that 'a = b' is true in all possible worlds in which 'a' and 'b' both designate and hence that 'a exists and b exists \rightarrow a = b' is true in all possible worlds whatever, and is therefore a necessary truth. This is all he really means when he claims that 'a = b' is a necessary truth.

Kripke then goes on to say what he means by a possible world. To use his own example, when we say, "If Nixon had bribed such and such a Senator, Nixon would have got Carswell through", we are speaking of Nixon and Carswell, the inhabitants of the actual world. But what would have happened in the actual world if a certain 'counterfactual situation' of the world had been actual. To say that a designator designates, this or that in a certain possible world is to say that it has that designation in a certain counterfactual situation. This means to say that the designator has that designation when it occurs in the sentence which we use to specify the situation. The point on which Kripke mainly insists upon is that when we say "If Nixon had bribed such and such", it is Nixon we are talking of and not, e.g. some possible counterpart of Nixon. This means that the word 'Nixon' is used to designate Nixon even in counterfactual sentences and this is Kripke's main way of illustrating what he means by the claim that, 'Nixon' is a rigid designator. So an expression is a rigid designator iff it is used to designate the same thing both in actual and possible assertions. Or in other words, an expression is a rigid designator if it has to designate the same thing when it occurs in any counterfactual situations.

But it is also important to notice that Kripke is sceptical about the relevance of possible world in a counterfactual supposition. For him counterfactual supposition is not rigid like the reference of a proper name, since

the propensity for having qualitative descriptions of counterfactual suppositions have many sources. He raises a question : How can we identify an *a priori* proposition in all possible worlds if aprioricity is not identified with necessity? Even if it does, it may not hold good, remarks Kripke. His point is that since things are stipulated, they are not found in counterfactual suppositions. Moreover, possible world need not be given purely qualitatively as if we were looking at them through a telescope. He says, "..... that the properties an object has in every counterfactual world have nothing to do with properties used to identify it in the actual world" ¹⁰

So far as logic is concerned the concept of possible world has widely been developed in intuitionistic logic. Jaakko Hintikka in his "On the Logic of Perception" has substantiated different possible worlds in terms of compatibility. He asks, "when does a know (believe, wish, perceive) more than b?" and answers that, "The only reasonable general answer seems to me to be that a knows more than b if and only if the class of possible - worlds compatible with what he knows is smaller than the class of possible - worlds compatible with what b knows" ¹¹ Hintikka's view is analogous to the view of Leibnitz. The former admits the principle of compatibility among possible worlds while the latter admits the principle of compossibility among possible worlds. We have noticed above that the concept of possible world has been employed both in order to illuminate the philosophical basis of logic, specifically intuitionistic logic and also many other novel areas of philosophical thinking.

After having examined the historical background of the concept of possible world, let us now proceed to examine the theoretical and logical implication of the concept.

Theoretical Implication of the Concept of Possible World :

Before we look into the theoretical implication of the concept of possible world, it would be worthwhile to clarify the way how we come to have the concept. How is a possible world conceptually apprehended? In a non-philosophical parlance the concept of a possible world does not amount much. The world of our every-day experience is the one and only one that we intend to realise. But philosophical survey always overlaps with the limitations

of the ordinary way of investigation. Logic presupposes the concept of possible world in various ways. In one sense a world may be thought of as possible and also as impossible. A world is called 'possible' if it be conceivable and a world would be termed 'impossible' if it is not conceivable. But this manner of thinking begs the question. Since conceivability does not imply the distinction between possible and impossible worlds. Failure in conceiving a fact does not imply that the fact is impossible; and ability to see a fact does guarantee the possibility of the fact. There is no formal contradiction in saying that an unconceivable fact is possible or that a conceivable fact is impossible. There was a time when it was conceived that the earth is round : but this does not mean that the fact that the earth is round is impossible. Similarly, there was a time when mathematicians had sought squaring a circle. They thought, so as they believed that there could be a procedure of proving the case. But subsequently, it has turned out to be impossible. At one time people believed or even conceived that the sum goes round the earth, but the helio-centric theory showed that it was impossible. It should be clear then that so far as conceivability is concerned, the distinction between possible and impossible worlds is held at a bay.

What then should be the suitable conditions for something to be possible? How do we distinguish the possible from the impossible world? What makes the distinction explicit? It is claimed that in lieu of the word 'conceivability' alone, the concept of possible world can be apprehended in terms of coherent conceivability or conceivability without inconsistency. One may fail to conceive that the earth is round; but the concept of earth being round in itself is perfectly coherent, and it may be conceived without inconsistency. Contrarily, it may be the case that one might have thought of the possibility of squaring a circle but such a thought would land one into inconsistency.


But the notion of coherent conceivability is a bit psychological and it turns the system of logic into a function of human psychology so as to claim that the laws of logic are the laws of thought. It may have some theoretical relevance for explicating the concept of possible world; but from a logical point of view it lacks validity of significance. If we are trying to understand the concept of the possible world in terms of logical concepts, such as consistency and/or inconsistency; we find ourselves in a predicament and we have all the chance of getting involved into a circularity. Since, then, we have to explain consistency in terms of inconsistency and vice-versa. It is coherently conceivable that what

is consistent cannot be inconsistent and what is inconsistent cannot be consistent. There is no formal contradiction owing to understanding consistency in terms of inconsistency. These concepts are taken as polar concepts in the sense that there cannot be any term that lies in between them. But this type of coherent conceivability leads us into a circularity and it does not enable one to find out a clear-cut distinction between possible and impossible worlds. The trap of circularity may be circumvented only by citing paradigm examples of possible world and also citing clear-cut example of impossible world. Intuitively by a possible world we mean a world in which there are more or less objects than the actual world or there may be some objects having different properties. On the contrary by an impossible world we mean a world in which a circle could be a square : a world in which there is an even square root of nine : and so on and so forth. Thus any attempt to outline the distinction between possible and impossible worlds is a matter of dispute, the distinction may perhaps be apprehended, of course by theoretical apprehension, only by adducing paradigm examples.

Actual and Possible Worlds :

It is important to note that the concept of possible world may be grasped in respect of actual world. The distinction, however, is very subtle, since the domain of possible worlds is contained in the domain of actual worlds. We cannot think of a possible world unless and until contained in the domain of actual worlds. We cannot think of a possible world unless and until we do not have the concept of an actual world beforehand. It is also important to observe that we have only one actual world among many possible worlds. By an actual world we do not mean just the planet on which we live : rather by an actual world we mean the universe as a whole which contains everything that really exists. The concept of actual world is made clear by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* when he goes on to say that the world (actual) is the totality of facts or in other words, facts in *Logical Space* are the world. A fact, says Wittgenstein, is something which makes a proposition as either true or false. A thing is claimed to be either true or false if it *exists in Logical Space*. Of course, the word 'exist' is used here in a timeless sense. It means that what existed in the past will also exist in the future. So an actual world includes all that was, is or will be. In this

sense an actual world is to be a possible world. It is presupposed that every world is the possible world of itself. The reason is simple, because if something actually exists then it may possibly have existed. In modal logic, it is claimed that if p is true (i.e. if p exists actually) then p is possibly true. This means that it is necessary that if p then Mp : i.e. in symbol $L(p \supset Mp)$. 'Something actually exists' is stronger assertion than 'something possibly exists;'. That is why the proposition ' $p \supset Mp$ ' is claimed to be logically sound. But its converse does not hold; i.e. if something is possibly true; then it can not be the case that it would be actually true. That is, the proposition ' $Mp \supset p$ ' is not logically sound. This makes it clear that we do not have any possible world independent of any actual world. So the concept of a possible world can be explained only in terms of an actual world. Equally and fundamentally, it is presupposed that we do have only one actual world among many possible worlds. This thesis is confirmed by the definition of possible world like this : Things might have been different from the way they actually are, and each of these alternative ways is a possible world. Realistically, we can say that an actual world is the paradigm of a possible world (every world is the possible world of itself). The concept of possible world lies in conceptual space or in Wittgensteinian sense it lies in *Logical Space*. The actual world is only one of an infinite number of possible worlds. The class of non-actual worlds contains all possible as well as all impossible worlds other than the actual world. The following table makes the distinction more perspicuous.




Logical Implication of the Concept of Possible World :

After having examined the theoretical aspect of the concept of possible world we shall now enter into the logical, of course modal logical, implication of possible world. In this sequel we shall demonstrate some possible world diagram through which the basic concepts of modal logic as well as some testing

of modalities will be examined. Here we discuss the basic modal concepts such as the concept of possibility and the concept of necessity¹² The modal concept of possibility is denoted by 'M' and the modal concept of necessity is denoted by 'L'.

We have already stated that in order to understand a possible world, we have to presuppose beforehand an actual world. This means that the concept of possible world can best be apprehended in context of an actual world. We had stated also that one may assume an infinite number of possible worlds of an actual world. Keeping this option in mind, we decide to confine ourselves for brevity's sake only to a limited number of possible worlds. We do this as we think this confinement does not render the system incomplete. In the present paper, we shall propose and consider only two models of possible worlds diagrams. In one model there obtains at most two possible worlds of an actual world. In another model there occurs at most three possible worlds of an actual world. But we do not of course rule out the possibility of an infinite number of possible worlds of an actual world. On the other hand, since every world (actual) is the possible world of itself, every world must have at least one possible world. And we claim, in the sequence that the following two models would be sufficient for testing the modalities in T-system in general.

Model I



In the above model, we have three worlds such as W1, W2 and W3. It is admitted in our system that every world is the possible world of itself. It will be seen that the concept of an actual world preserves the principle of reflexivity. The implication sign (i.e. \rightarrow) in the above model is used to identify the possible world/worlds of an actual world. However, the force of the implication sign is not reciprocal. It is used to mean that if W2 is the possible world of W1, then W1 can not be the possible world of W2. And if W3 is the possible world of W2 then W2 cannot be the possible world of W3. When we consider W1, W1 is an actual world and W2 is the possible world of W1. Now if W2 is the

possible world of W1, then W1 cannot be the possible world of W2 since W2 itself is a possible world of W1. If we admit a reciprocity between two worlds then we have to admit the two assertions, Viz; (i) If p is actually true then p is possibly true (i.e., in symbol ' $p \supset Mp$ '); and (ii) If p is possibly true then p is actually true i.e in symbol ' $Mp \supset p$ '). But assertion (ii) is not logically sound. We can understand, as we have already stated, a possible world in context of an actual world, but we can not apprehend an actual world in terms of a possible world. Again W3 cannot be the possible world of W1 since the implication sign of W1 does not point to W3. It may be noticed from M-I that no actual world has more than two possible worlds. We may now determine the possible worlds of M-I in the following way :


Worlds possible to W1 = W1 and W2.

Worlds possible to W2 = W2 and W3.

World possible to W3 = W3 itself.

When we examine W1, W1 is the actual world and W1 and W2 are its possible worlds. Since every world is the possible world of itself and hence W1 is the possible world of W1. W2 is the possible world of W1, since the implication sign of W1 points to W2. When we examine W2, W2 is the actual world and likewise W1, W2 and W3 are the possible worlds of W2. But when we examine W3, we find that W3 itself is the actual as well as the possible world of W3 (Principle of reflexivity). Let us pass on to Model II.

Model II



Modelwise M-II is different from M-I. But as far as rules and principles are concerned M-II remains the same like M-I. Unlike M-I W1 of M-II possesses three possible worlds. since the implication sign of W1 does point to W2 and W3. (likewise the numbers of possible worlds of W1 may be increased numerically by pointing '→' from W1). The reason is simple since W1 is the possible world of W1 and there we find two implication signs of which one points to W2 and the other points to W3. Consequently, W2 and W3 are also considered to be the possible worlds of W1. We may now determine the possible worlds of M-II in the following way :

Worlds possible to W1 = W1 and W2 and W3.

World possible to W2 = W2 itself.


World possible to W3 = W3 itself.

So this then is the device by which the concept of actual and possible worlds in modal logic can be marked off. Let us examine the implication of basic modal concepts in respect of possible world. The concept of possibility (M) and the concept of necessity (L) are taken as the basic modal concepts. By the term 'possibility' we mean logical possibility and by the term 'necessity' we mean logical necessity¹³. In modal logic the concept of truth and falsity can be understood in two senses - something merely happens to be true/false; and something which is bound to be true/false. A proposition is necessarily true if it is bound to be true in every possible world. On the other hand a proposition is necessarily false if it is bound to be false in every possible world. The proposition 'P is necessarily true' is denoted by 'LP' and the proposition 'P is necessarily false' is denoted by 'L-P'. Similarly, the proposition 'P is possibly true' is denoted by 'MP' and the proposition 'P is possibly false' is denoted by 'M-P'. Now LP is true, if P is true in every possible world of an actual world; LP is false, if P is false at least in one possible world of an actual world. Similarly, MP is true if P is true in at least in one possible world of an actual world and MP is false if P is false in every possible world of an actual world. So far as true values are concerned the concept of L and M may be compared with the truth-functional conjunction and disjunction respectively. A conjunctive proposition is truth functionally true if all the components of the conjunction are true; otherwise false. Similarly, LP is true in an actual world if P is true in every possible world of the actual world; otherwise false. A disjunctive proposition is truth - functionally true if at least one component of the disjunction is true :

otherwise false. Likewise, MP is true in an actual world if P is true in at least one possible world of the actual world : otherwise false.

Keeping the above proviso in mind, let us determine the value of L_p and M_p in respect of the following model.

Model III



M-III has three worlds, viz, W1 W2 and W3. Every world contains two propositional variables such as p and q. But no two worlds remain same, since they possess different senses of the propositions p and q. The above model, however, is drawn arbitrarily, it could have been drawn otherwise as well. In our system, however, every world must be differentiated from other world in respect of the sense of the proposition the worlds possessed. This is exactly what happens in the above diagram. All the worlds possess two propositional variables, namely p and q : but the senses of the propositions they have are different. W1 says that both p and q are true : W2 asserts that p is false but q is true : W3 says that p is true and q is false.

Now L_p is false in W1, since the possible worlds of W1 are W1 and W2 and p is false in W2. So L_p is false in W1. L_p is also false in W2 on the same ground. But L_p is true in W3, since the possible world of W3 is W3 and p is true in W3. M_p is true in W1 since W1 and W2 are its possible worlds and p is true at least in one of the possible worlds of W1. So M_p is true in W1. M_p is also true in W2 on the same ground. M_p is true in W3, since W3 is the possible world of W3 and p is true in W3. It seems clear from the above that if p is necessarily true in an actual world then p must be possible true i.e. as we have seen in the case of W3. But it may be the case that if L_p is false in

an actual world. Mp may be true in that particular world. (here in the case of $W1$ where Lp is false, but Np is true). This means that the falsity of Lp sometimes implies the truth of Mp .


Let us now determine the value of $L(p.q)$ and $M(p.q)$ in respect of the above model. As both p and q are true in $W1$, $[p.q]$ is true in $W1$. Likewise, ' $p.q$ ' is false in $W2$, since p is false in $W2$; and ' $q.p$ ' is false in $W3$, for q is false in $W3$. Now, the possible worlds of $W1$ are $W1$ and $W2$ and ' $p.q$ ' is false in $W2$, so $L(p.q)$ is false in $W1$. $L(p.q)$ is false in $W2$ and $W3$ respectively on the same ground. But $M(p.q)$ is true in $W1$, since at least one of the possible worlds of $W1$, namely $W1$ itself, in which ' $p.q$ ' is true, $M(p.q)$ is false both in $W2$ and $W3$, since $(p.q)$ is false in every possible world of these two actual worlds.

The upshot of the above consideration makes it clear that the value of the actual world is determined in terms of the values of the possible world/worlds. Our aim is to determine the value of the actual world : but we take the aid of the possible worlds in order to determine whether something is bound to be true or bound to be false; necessarily true or necessarily false.

Testing of Modalities in T-System

Case - I : If p is actually true then p is possibly true i.e., the proposition ' $p \supset Mp$ ' is logically sound.

Possible worlds diagram



Determination of possible worlds


Worlds possible to $W1 = W1$ and $W2$.

World possible to $W2 = W3$ itself.

Justification

1. $p = T$ in $W1$
2. $p = F$ in $W2$
3. $Mp = T$ in $W1$ for (1) and (2). So
4. $p \supset Mp = T$ in $W1$ for (1) and (3).

Case - 2 : 'If p is necessarily true then p is possibly true' - The proposition is logically sound (i.e. in symbol, $Lp \supset Mp$ is logically valid); but its converse does not hold good (i.e.; in symbol $Mp \supset Lp$ is not logically sound).

Possible worlds diagram**Determination of possible worlds**


Worlds possible to $W1 = W1$ and $W2$.

World possible to $W2 = W2$ itself.

Justification

1. $p = T$ in $W1$
2. $p = F$ in $W2$
3. $Lp = F$ in $W1$ for (1) and (2).
4. $Mp = T$ in $W1$ for (1) and (2).
5. $Lp \supset Mp = T$ in $W1$ for (3) and (4).
6. $Mp \supset Lp = F$ in $W1$ for (4) and (3).

Case 3 : $L(L \supset Lq) \vee L(L \supset Lq)$

Possible worlds diagram

Determination of possible worlds

Worlds possible to $W_1 = W_1$ and W_2 .

Worlds possible to $W_2 = W_2$ and W_3 .

World possible to $W_3 = W_3$ itself.

Justification


1. $p = F$ in W_1
2. $p = T$ in W_2
3. $p = T$ in W_3
4. $q = T$ in W_1
5. $q = T$ in W_2
6. $q = F$ in W_3
7. $Lp = F$ in W_1 for (1) and (2).
8. $Lp = T$ in W_2 for (2) and (3).
9. $Lq = T$ in W_1 for (4) and (5).
10. $Lq = F$ in W_2 for (5) and (6).
11. $Lp \supset Lq = T$ in W_1 for (7) and (9).
12. $Lp \supset Lq = F$ in W_2 for (8) and (10).
13. $L(Lp \supset Lq) = F$ in W_1 for (11) and (12).
14. $Lq \supset Lp = F$ in W_1 for (9) and (7).
15. $Lq \supset Lp = T$ in W_1 for (10) and (8).
16. $L(Lq \supset Lp) = F$ in W_1 for (14) and (15). So
17. $L(Lp \supset Lq) \vee L(Lq \supset Lp) = F$ in W_1 for (13) and (16).

So the given formula is proved invalid in the above T-setting.

Case - 4

$$MLp \supset LMp$$

Possible worlds diagram



Determination of possible worlds

Worlds possible to W1 = W1, W2 and W3.

World possible to W2 = W2 itself.

World possible to W3 = W3 itself.

Justification

1. $p = T$ in W1
2. $p = F$ in W2
3. $p = T$ in W3
4. $q = T$ in W1
5. $q = F$ in W2
6. $q = F$ in W3
7. $Lp = F$ in W1 for (1), (2) and (3).
8. $Lp = F$ in W2 for (2).
9. $Lp = T$ in W3 for (3).
10. $MLp = T$ in W1 for (7), (8) and (9).
11. $Mp = T$ in W1 for (1), (2) and (3).
12. $Mp = F$ in W2 for (2).

13. $Mp = F$ in $W3$ for (3).
14. $LMP = F$ in $W1$ for (11), (12) and (13). So
15. $MLp \supset LMP = F$ in $W1$ for (10) and (14).

So the given formula under consideration is proved invalid in this particular T-setting.

We have tested a few modalites of T-setting by possible world diagrams. But we claim that this technique is adequate for testing any modality in T-system. Thus it is shown that the concept of possible world has gained a lot of significance in solving problems in modal logic, apropos the intuitionistic School.

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BOOK REVIEW

Chakraborty, Alpana : *MIND-BODY DUALISM : A Philosophical Investigation*, D. K. Printworld (P) Ltd., Now Delhi, 1997, pp. 270. Rs. 300.

Philosophically speaking, mind-body dualism is a matter of truism and a mystery. The truism is that it mainly speaks about the dual nature of two substances, i.e. mind and matter. And their features are distinctively unique from each other. On the other hand, the mystery lies in their interrelationship. The interaction that takes place between the two independent substances. In short, it is mysterious because the solutions are inadequate and thereby the problem persists without resolving the so-called dichotomy. The efforts are mostly taken up in order to resolve the problem, by either advocating the causal autonomy of the mental or by reducing mind causally to the physical states and processes.

In 1989, Colin McGinn, in his paper, "Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?" states that, "..... time has come to admit candidly that we cannot resolve the mystery", referring to the reason for "insolubility", and this "insolubility-as reason for it - removes the philosophical problem". (*Mind*, Vol. 98, p. 352). Further he continues by saying that the very attempt of unfolding the mysterious nexus or "psychological nexus" has become an objective mystery. We can resolve it by "appreciating" it. (McGinn : 352-53) The similar thoughts appear in Dr. Alpana Chakraborty's *Mind-Body Dualism : A Philosophical Investigation*. The author "appreciates" the problem of dualism instead of countering it and arguing for a monistic world view. (p. vii) She tries to represent her views systematically in bringing out the "real significance" of the dualism. (p. 32) Moreover, both McGinn and Chakraborty oppose the scientism as an official trend of looking at the problem and solving it. For McGinn, we are yet to have the "explanatory properties --- we need to cultivate the vision of reality (a metaphysics) that is truly independent of our given

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cognitive process" (McGinn : p. 365). Thus it is a metaphysical problem. The metaphysics, that is embedded in 'culture'. Alpina Chakraborty focuses on this central point. That the reality of dual philosophy has been cultivated in the history of human culture. (Introduction, pp. 9-27) As a result, Chakraborty systematically unfolds the problem of dualism considering "[a]ll moral, religious, and metaphysical questions revolve around them." (p.1).

The book is divided into five chapters and each chapter has its own conclusion. It also has a separate glossary, bibliography and index. The introduction not only cites the origin of dualism but also gives a long description exclusively on the origin of Sāṃkhya philosophy in India. Sāṃkhya is being regarded as one of the systems in Indian philosophy. The author states how its philosophy is preserved in culture of North-Eastern people of India. other than that, the five chapters are, Dualism-I, Dualism-II, Disembodied Existence, Concept of person, and Dualism of Sāṃkhya.

In the first chapter, Chakraborty discusses the nature of dualism that has been sustained in philosophy since Plato. The author talks about various theories of mind, such as, Monism, Pluralism, Mentalism, and Materialism in detail in order to highlight that they don't really resolve dual conception about the nature of reality. The chapter also elaborates Descartes' conception of dualism. According to Chakraborty, Descartes leaves most of the "questions unanswered." (p. 69). The causal interactionism between the two incompatible substances is very much questionable. For Chakraborty, "the core of mental substance considered by substance theory can be regarded as an abstract concept and not a reality at all." (p. 70). Answering to the problem of interactionism, she says that human beings possess "neutral entities" constituted by both physical and psychological properties - *fibain*. (p. 40). And it can further very well eschew the problem of Category-Mistake. This chapter also cites the arguments of C. d. Broad and C. J. Ducasse in order to defend dualism. The arguments are based on (i) the principle of Conservation of Energy, and (ii) Psychological facts and natural processes and human behaviour. It also analyses different other theories, Occasionalism, Parallelism and Pre-established harmony of the modern thinkers, Malebranche, Spinoza and Leibniz respectively. The commonality among all these theories is centred around the notion of God for maintaining the regulatives between mind and body. The author also rejects the notion of Epiphenomenalism by citing the view of famous epiphenomenalist

Thomas Huxley, precisely, because the juxtaposition of epiphenomenalism with interactionism results in severe drawbacks of epiphenomenalism. Though it follows that interactionism is more reasonable one than the other, still it proposes "most possible dualism." (p. 65). Finally, the chapter deals with Hobbes' Materialism. According to author it is reductive and thus it is "self-contradictory". (p. 66) Chakraborty also brings out a comparison of Hobbes' Materialism with Chārvakā, the Indian materialistic thought. Consequently, the materialism does not entertain many important aspects of human existence, according to the author. As a result their views are mostly unsatisfactory. In the concluding remarks, the author states that the conception of interaction between mind and body has to be replaced by the notion of "bodily entities;" and "mental entities". They are unitary concepts that exist in "human being". (pp. 67-68).

In the Chapter II, Dualism II, the author mainly focuses on the Identity theory and Metalinguistic dualism. The identity theory basically includes the contention of behaviourism and mind-brain identity theory. Insofar as the behaviourism is concerned, Chakraborty stresses its relationship with the analytic behaviourism, referring to the methodology of Logical Positivism and Hempel's verificationistic method. However, J. C. C. Smart's and D. M. Armstrong's conception of mind-body identity is well taken up. The non-spatial feature of the mental results in a logical objection. The conceptual or logical analysis draws a limitation to the scientific explanation of the identity theory. Computationalism is incompatible for explaining many other features of human mind, such as, thinking, composing, feeling, etc. (p. 88) The author asserts a sort of autonomy of the mind. (p. 122). The chapter, further discusses Neil Bohr's theory of 'complementarity'. It explains the "nearness" between the two phenomena. Seeing the incompatibility between the mind and the body, the author points out that our concern must be based not on the two divergent features, neither they belong to two different categories. Rather, mind and body belong to the person. The person as an unitary concept possesses both bodily activities as well as mental activities. However, the Metalinguistic dualism emphasizes the linguistic aspect of the mental states. The characterization of the mental can be done through the linguistic expressions. As a result the knowability of the mental is corrigible. Rorty, who advocates incorrigibility as "partial mark" for distinguishing mental from the non-mental, according to author, gives a one sided

view without explaining the nature of the physical properly. It is because the physical body possesses certain other characteristics, viz. spatio-temporal continuity, extension, etc (p. 118). The author, further talks about Levison's notion of corrigibility with reference to the distinction that Levison makes between "paradigm mental events" and "non-paradigm mental events". According to Chakraborty, both Rorty and Levison provide an "inconclusive" theses. (p. 123).

The third chapter raises an age old important question "Is mind independent of the body?" And, "does mind or soul exist after body perishes?" In order to answer this question the author takes up the textual view points of reincarnation and resurrection of Hinduism and Christianity respectively. In both the cases the immortality of soul has been strongly advocated. This "embodied survival" of the mind or soul is looked at from the stand point of both theoretical and empirical possibility. The author strongly argues by undertaking the arguments of Terence Penelhum and Anthony Flew, who reject the logical possibility of disembodied survival. On the other hand, Chakraborty also gives a juxtaposition while relating the contention of Penelhum with G.C. Nayak's concept of karma for establishing personal identity. Penelhum rejects the notion of 'memory' as the criteria for personal identity advocated by Nayak. He says that "memory is essentially a parasitic concept" depends necessarily on perception. (p.145) Citing various conflicting views regarding the relationship of the soul with body as unsatisfactory. According to Chakraborty, it is unsatisfactory because it results in contradiction. Since we do not know about the nature of the soul, it is difficult to associate soul with personal identity. Moreover, there is continuity occurring in the case of bodily transformation. She further says that "disembodied existence implies dualism but dualism does not imply disembodied existence. Even if dualism is true, disembodied existence may not be true". (p.149)

In the Chapter "The Concept of Person" Chakraborty gives more importance to the concept of person. So far as the nature of person is concerned there are two conflicting views. According to Buddha and Descartes, the notion of person is identified with soul, whereas, for Strawson, the concept of person refers to both bodily and mental states and processes. The chapter also includes the Lockean conception of person. However, the chapter exclusively brings about the rejection of Strawsonian notion of person by Mrinal Miri. According to

Strawson, the concept of person is logically prior to the concept of 'pure-ego'. The pure-ego has a secondary existence. For Strawson, "A person is not an embodied ego, but an ego must be a disembodied person" (p.188). Precisely, the person can be defined with relation to the two types of predicates that a person possesses. They are, M-predicates (relationship of person that is ascribed through the material objects) and P-predicates (Psychological predicates that are ascribed to the person). Miri thoroughly rejects Strawson's view of person, saying that identification of person through memory is a misunderstanding. Miri remarks, "it is possible to think that a person is a material body. As a material body a person possesses certain characteristics, functions and capacities, e.g. self-awareness, memory, language, etc.,... To think that there is something like 'I' which is essentially distinct from body may arise from linguistic illusion." (p.193). Chakraborty does not fully agree with Miri's view, pointing out that, Strawson's concept of person is not a serious failure nor does it involve mistake in principle. (p. 205). On the other hand, she defines person as "composite unity." (p.206). Thus, the author brings about an expository version of person.

In the concluding chapter, "Dualism of Sāṃkhya" the author gives an exclusive version of Sāṃkhya philosophy. The general understanding of Sāṃkhya philosophy is that the reality is dual, i.e., Puruṣa and Prakṛti. However, the author refutes the views of monistic dualism, which advocates, Prakṛti as the single substance from which the world is evolved, including the puruṣa which is essentially defined as conscious entity. Chakraborty brings about a comprehensive study of the philosophy of Sāṃkhya by both comparing and juxtaposing with Cartesian dualism. From this, one can very well conclude that, dualism, according to Chakraborty persists without facing any hurdles. Simultaneously, she also justifies her position stating that dualism follows in philosophical investigation because of the inadequacy of "predicability." McGinn too agrees with this point. The lack of predicability here means we are still not equipped enough with the properties to explain the mental structure. Chakraborty remarks, "about the mental phenomena predication is not possible because physical cause is not applicable to mental cause." (p.88). However, that does not imply that the realm of mental is something hidden and the mind is unexplainable. There are recent theories, like Biological Naturalism which explain the mind without advocating the primacy of causal theory. (Searle: 1992). In other words, the causation itself is intentionalised. That is, intentionality which

defines causation as one of the essential features of consciousness. And, thus it is regarded as one of the properties in order to explicate structure of the mental states. As a result, the problem of inadequacy of "predicability" does not occur at all. However, Chakraborty's theses show that enrootment of dualism in general is conventionalized in the Indian context, whereas, particularly, in philosophy it is logically true.

The arguments in the book are well structured in order to project the authenticity of dualism. Insofar as the identity of person is concerned the author attempts to provide a healthy solution by incorporating both mind and body as referents. Arguing from both Indian and Western philosophical perspectives, Chakraborty provides sound picture of dualism. The ironical position of the author is reflected in various parts of the book. Consequently, the author provides that Dualism in Indian system is practised from the time immemorial. On the other hand, the author's delving into contemporary philosophers of India like Nayak and Miri is significant. The discussion of their philosophical contributions to the problem of law of karma and the concept of person respectively is admirable. Above all, how far the Dualism will be conducive to the epistemology is to be thought seriously. Nevertheless, the book provides a better understanding of the nature of dualism. And, the author's effort in this regard must be appreciated.

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THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE HUMANISTIC ETHICS OF KANT AND SARTRE

AKINYEMI ONIGBINDE

In the logical progression of modern Western ethical thought, it is not difficult for one to discover that the early modern rationalist ethics of Kant and the modern existentialist ethics of Sartre are like two juxtaposed peaks, each with its own characteristics, in the history of the founding of humanistic philosophy-ethics; and like an on-going tradition, they echo one another, even if from afar. The two moralists constructed their theories of a humanistic ethics on the cornerstone of the free subject (man), yet demonstrated different theoretical styles and qualities. The former raised high the banner of rationalism, establishing a set of universal principles of "practical reason" in order to enlighten and liberate humanity's moral spirit; the latter, contemplating the significance of mankind's actual existence, sought an interpretation of the historical conditions necessary to set up a "universal morality" for mankind. Yet when we take a bird's-eye view of this peculiar theoretical phenomenon from the perspective of the overall course of the whole of (at least modern) western ethics, we also cannot but notice that the background of this phenomenon conceals a series of questions both profound and urgently needing solution: Why did these two thinkers in the course of similarly seeking to establish humanistic ethics wind up with such radically dissimilar characteristic? Why did they choose such different course of theoretical exploration? Contrariwise, why did these two masters each take different routes and lead humanistic ethics off into different directions?

In my opinion, these two great masters part company basically because of the features of the different times in which they lived, in part revealing the different features and basic tendencies of the development of Western ethical thought from early modern to modern times. At the same time, this also expressed an increasingly strong tendency in the development of human ethical thought, i.e. subjective

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speculation about self-existence and reality. Hence, the goal of this essay is to take the first steps towards finding answers to these important but difficult questions through a comparative study of Kant's and Sartre's ideas on humanistic ethics in order to provide theoretical background and guidance for establishment of a scientific humanistic ethics.

I

Broadly speaking, so-called humanistic ethics can be said to be opposed to naturalistic morals and theological ethics which search outside man for mankind's own existence, meaning, norms of behaviour and ideal values. It means any understanding of human morality must be based on human subjectivity and it does not seek the origin of human morality in such extra-human objects as gods or nature. In this sense it may be said that the earliest intimation of humanistic ethical thought appeared with Sophists and Socrates in Greece and Confucius in China and its true birth was marked by the onset of early modern humanist ethics in the Renaissance.

Yet humanistic ethics in the strict sense is not only the denial of all religious ethics, but also, quite distinct from naturalist ethical perspectives which reduce human moral phenomena to man's instinctual desires (Aristippus and the Cyrenaic School) or pleasurable satisfaction (Epicurus and Hedonism) and from sensualist ethics whose explanations resort to notions of man's natural genius (Helvetius and rational self-interest) or sympathetic intuitive knowledge (Adam Smith and Rousseau). It bases itself upon the free will of the subject itself (which is the unity of the human individual and collectivity) and its moral relationships to explain the unique phenomenon of human moral life.¹ Thus the period from Socrates up to the early modern humanists is merely a prelude to the true birth of humanistic ethics. Until Kant humanistic ethics were still deterministically structured, and in modern times Sartre's ethics may be seen as another attempt by Western Philosophy to construct a humanistic ethics. Even if these two thinkers did not achieve the heights of a thorough-going scientific ethics, a brief comparison of their ideas on humanistic ethics may still be regarded a very worthwhile effort for perfecting and developing our science of human morality.

As seen above, the first step in the construction of an ethical system for

the human subject is to determine a theoretical point of departure with effective tententiality, otherwise it will be impossible to reveal the transparency of human moral life. In other words, for the determination for this point of departure one must be able to satisfactorily demonstrate the transcendence (ideals) of moral conscience of humanity as a subject, the self-consciousness (independence) of moral behaviour and the purity (non-utilitarian nature) of moral sentiments, and the point of convergence for all these characteristics is the moral subject's freedom of will (autonomy), which is where the quint essential characteristics of Humanistic ethics are to be found.

Surveying the ethics of Kant and Sartre, we discover that their starting points were in fact the same, i.e. they both defined the freedom of the subject (man) as the foundation for the establishment of ethic², proceeding from which they investigated the innermost recesses of human moral phenomenon, and in the course of justifying this foundation they also expressed their own styles which were not completely identical.

The pre-eminent moralist in the modern West, Kant relied on the tool of reason to clear away the fog which had long enveloped the everyday world of human morality, revealing a new treasure house in the field of human morality. He neither assented to the English materialists, his contemporaries, who took human sensory experience as the starting point of ethics nor agreed with theology that *a priori* divine principles should be seen as the premise of ethics. In his view, ethics had never in the course of its history met the demand for "universal necessity". The empiricists had stopped at the empirical observation and synthesis of human moral realities, and ultimately were only able to achieve a level of *a posteriori* synthesis of human experience and contingent fact but could not present humanity with any universally practical principles. As he said,

"...necessary law which varies according to the subject (as does natural law) once it reaches the object becomes a completely contingent practical principle and can and must substantively vary with differences in the subject, hence can never provide a norm"³.

Meanwhile, religious ethics, although it achieves a veneer of universality anterior to experience in seeking the basis of morality in divine will, exceeds the limits of human practical reason. Consequently, Kant advocated the establishment

of "a pure normal philosophy completely cleansed of everything that can only be empirical and appropriate to anthropopoloty".⁴ In fact, Kant here has stipulated for us the two fundamental demands of pure moral philosophy ; one is the principle of transempirical theory and the other is the principle of the primacy of man. On the basis of this critique Kant went on to point out that so-called moral philosophy "gives him (man) laws *a priori* as a rational being." These laws then are the norms of the human moral will. Just as man's everyday world has dual empirical and ontological attributes, he himself is also a dual being. As a sensory being, man belongs to the empirical world and is subject to the empirical and natural laws of cause and effect. As a rational being, man belongs to the ontological world. Reason makes him go beyond the domination of the necessity of natural cause and effect and the contingency of experience, submitting him merely to the rational norms which he himself sets up, detaching him from all relative beings (things which only know submission) and from the objectifying dominance of the non-human (gods which know only lawmaking), and making him into a real subject with genuinely free self-legislation, self-rule and self-control. Consequently, freedom is the basic premise of man's lawmaking for himself and also the true source of humanistic ethics, Kant in the end realized "the will of a rational being can be a will of his own only under the idea of freedom."⁶ The supreme ends and sense of duty can exist and man's value as a free subject can be realized only with moral behaviour and relations which arise on the premise of autonomy of the will.

Quite like Kant, Sartre also defined freedom as the starting point for his ethics, and made all principles of human morality without exception emanate from the beacon of freedom. Where they differed was that Sartre adopted a more direct and absolute style. He not only limited his discussion of freedom to the perspective of the purely subjective will but also elevated freedom to the supreme ontological level⁷ thus setting humanistic ethics at an ontologized peak. To begin with, as Sartre saw it, human freedom and human existence are ontological matters identical to one another. "Existence is prior to essence" refers to the centrality of the existences of the human subject, which shows that the freedom of the human subject is absolute. Sartre was opposed to all forms of metaphysics and believed that from Plato onwards essence had been given priority over existence.⁸ This tradition of metaphysics in philosophy had inverted the

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relationship between existence and essence, causing subject man to be equated with natural objects and subjected to determinism while human free subjectivity as a result was lowered into a chain of cause and effect relationships. In fact, man's difference from things does not lie in his qualities of possessing reason, emotion, etc., nor in something produced a priori by divine will, but simply in that he is his own creation. "Man is nothing more than his own creation, this is the first principle of existentialism. This principle is also called subjectivity".⁹

Sartre continued :

....if existence really is prior to essence, then human action cannot be explained using a fixed prefabricated human nature, in other words, determinism is ruled out. On the other hand, if God does not exist, we cannot find any value or norm to explain our actions as correct. Therefore, within the field of luminescent values, before us there is no guarantee and no excuse.¹⁰

It is from that stance that Sartre with the aid of the ontological proof of freedom moved from the autological philosophy of being to the ethics of subjective values.

Freedom is the reality of man; as soon as man is thrown into this world he is condemned to freedom.

"I am condemned to exist forever beyond my essence, beyond the causes and motives of my act. I am condemned to be free. This means that no limit to my freedom can be found except freedom itself or, if you prefer, that we are not free to cease being free."

That is to say, man's freedom being man's destiny is the "facticity" of all subject beings. Hence,

We said that freedom is not free not to be free and that it is not free not to exist. This is because the fact of not being able not to be free is the facticity of freedom and the fact of not being able not to exist is its contingency.¹²

He continued, man's freedom lies in the fact that he can only ever be a being "who is what he is not" and "is not what he is" and in the capacity which he always has for conscious negation and nothingness. This is the proof of the freedom of the subject and the basic premise of our investigation of the

subject's moral behaviour. Only absolute freedom bestows upon man the dignity of the subject of moral values and the sublime ontological significance of existence.

The heart of this "human freedom" is freedom of choice and action. Freedom is the first condition of action; choice is the unique source of life. The significance of human existence lies in the incessant choices, projects and actions which man carries out for himself and in the establishment and realization of standards of value renewed and unceasingly pursued. Therefore, "freedom is simply the fact that this choice is a project for itself of being and value. Hence, Sartre tells us,

"....my freedom is the unique foundation of values and....nothing, absolutely nothing, justifies me in adopting this or that particular value, this or that particular scale of values. As a being by whom values exist, I am unjustifiable."¹⁴

At this point, we can see that Sartre had drawn the boundaries of the freedom of the moral subject to include the following elements (1) man is an absolutely free being ; (2) Human freedom includes free choice, free projects and free action (choice being also a form of action)' (3) Human choice is the basis of all values. In sum, for Sartre here, man's being, freedom, choices and values are all ontological categories on the same level.

The freedom of the subject as defined by Sartre does not emerge from the universal significance of the moral subject. He stressed that the free subject is the solitary human individual, as point which was poles apart from Kant's view of freedom. Sartre sharply criticized the ethics of Kant and his followers:

In fact, they, preoccupied with establishing the universal laws of subjectivity which are the same for all, never dealt with the question of person.¹⁵

Only the existentialists (Kierkegaard and himself) were truly concerned with individuals existing in reality, the individual I then being the "being upon whose being values depend". This is the cornerstone of Sartre's humanistic ethics. What should be pointed out is that Sartre's position on human freedom did undergo certain changes.¹⁶ If *Being and Nothingness* and *The Critique of Dialectical Reason* may be said to mark two major stages in the development of Sartre's thought, the "ethico-philosophical" and the politico-philosophical", then Sartre's

idea of freedom in the former stage may be said to have been primarily philosophical, theoretical, ontological, individual; and in the latter stage, political, practical, situational, relational. Specifically, Sartre's later concern was mainly to investigate the practical conditions of the possibility of freedom.¹⁷ In response to the criticisms of others, he more or less attenuated the extremely individualistic notion of freedom which he had earlier proclaimed. He said,

"What we want is freedom with freedom as its end, where there is freedom in every particular situation. When we want freedom, we discover it always depends upon the freedom of the other. And the other's freedom always depends upon our own."¹⁸

Of course, in terms of Sartre's overall stand, this defence did not alter the basic thrust of his idea of freedom.

It can be seen from the above that, in the basic standpoints of Kant's and Sartre's ideas on humanistic ethics, the similarities and difference were intermingled and were expressed primarily as follows : (1) Freedom is the common foundation of humanistic ethics for both. This explains the very crucial nature of the question of freedom in establishing a system of humanistic ethics. However, the concrete standards and proofs for freedom which the two offered were not at all alike. Freedom for Kant was a pure autonomy of the will in a strictly ethical sense, while for Sartre it carried the sense of the ultimate ontological meaning of being, which was not merely autonomy of will for the subject but also the basis for the existence and all the activity of the subject itself. For this follows : (2) Though freedom occupied a position of pre-eminent priority in the ethics of both masters, Kant's freedom originated in man's rational essence. Since man is a rational being, man is then made to go beyond the subjective contingency of empirical facts and achieve universal freedom. But with Sartre, the basis of freedom lay in the negative nature and nihilating capacity of man's self-consciousness, which was unrelated to everything essential such as reason, and freedom itself is the subject's being. (3) Kant's freedom was an *a priori* universal condition of the appearance and existence of morality, dealt with in terms of the universal subjectivity of the whole of mankind, and thus holistic, universal and necessary; whereas in Sartre's view, freedom could only be individualistic self-determination with each person having the contingency of free action and choice but not any *a priori* universalized

standard, for otherwise it would not be freedom. (4) Kant's freedom only touched upon the internal world of the human moral spirit, which is also to say that he restricted the free will of the subject to the good will of "duty for duty's sake" and completely disregarded the results of this will's actions. Consequently, it was only well-meaning, abstract and ideal. Sartre's freedom, contrariwise, was itself the sign of activity and the subject's freedom lay in his self determined activity processes. Hence, Sartre's philosophy of freedom was frequently called a "philosophy of action" and his freedom was active, concrete and actually perceptible. (5) Even though Kant and Sartre both took freedom as the absolute starting point of humanistic ethics, for Kant freedom was the precondition of the subject's actions achieving moral worth, and the form of the moral imperative became universal law as well as the guarantee that duty and good will could be realized the absolutely *a priori* nature of freedom made it no different from an idealistic universal postulate. Yet Sartre argued that freedom's absoluteness lay precisely in its real facticity and individual contingency and it lacked any universal properties.

To be sure, freedom is the source of every individual subject's sense of morality but its consequences are not to be found in the purity and transcendence of responsibility (duty); quite contrary, for it is the brimming vessel of the individual's vexations and worries. For freedom is my destiny, I cannot not choose, and cannot but assume full responsibility for my choices, everything being unreliable and completely absurd.

In essence, Kant's freedom was merely an abstract and idealistic *a priori* moral postulate, while Sartre's freedom was the concrete, active moral facticity of the individual ontologized. The significance of the latter is far more extensive. Lukacs has rationally appraised this. As he said:

In order to give his concept of freedom universal value, Sartre cannot but vigorously leap from a starting point well beyond that of Kant. It is because he wants to leap so far that he all the more needs to do so. In fact, the demand of all men for freedom is a leap far beyond Kant's simply not allowing man to be seen as a means....

Hence Sartre summons up his courage and with his mouth intoning the name of Kierkegaard he vigorously leaps. He leaps from a fully formulated

concept of freedom towards another concept of freedom which is totally opposed to it. ¹⁹

And so, the perspectives on freedom which act as the starting points of Kant's and Sartre's ethics, though ageless, due to their individual biases lacked a concern with the social basis and practical conditions of the subject's freedom and slipped into an abstract *a historical* morass, with tragic consequences for the construction of a compact scientific-humanist ethics.

While it may be said that Kant and Sartre formally shared a certain point of departure in their humanistic ethics, extrapolation from this common starting point reveals the obvious oppositions and diversions between the two.

II

The characteristics of Kant's ethical thought are best reflected in his exposition of the system of the three moral imperatives. For simplicity's sake, we will focus on those aspects relevant to revealing the innermost recesses of his humanistic ethics.

Kant's first moral imperative is the so-called principle of universal moral law. As he says, "The basic law of pure practical reason is the principle that you should act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." ²⁰ In *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, he called this principle a "law (which) has to determine the will"; That is to say, I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law." ²¹ The real significance of Kant's proposal of this imperative is that as he profoundly perceived, a universal practical law for man as a rational being must have absolutely universal necessity to give "the fundamental law of pure practical reason" objective authority. This necessarily demands that the practical law of the subject possess transempirical objective universality, because only then can "pure reverence for the norms of behaviour", ²² even the realm of duty, thereby make the will of the subject and the behaviour derived from it possess all its outstanding values and dignity and also thereby reveal the transcendent status of the moral subject.

Kant's second moral imperative may be called the rule of universal ends. "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end".²³ In the light of analysis of Kant's overall thought, we should believe that his idea of ends primarily has two aspects, first of which is the subjects' shared teleology. Ends are the meaning of the universal being of the universal subject and not the subjective values of the individual subject; to use Kant's own words, man's existence is an objective end, not a subjective one, for "the subject of all ends is to be found in every rational being as an end in himself"²⁴ He stated further ;

Man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will : he must in all his actions, whether they are directed to himself or to other rational always be viewed at the same time as an end.²⁵

In fact, as Kant saw it, man has a dual existence, natural and ontological, and in terms of his natural being he has no superiority over the values and ends of animal : it is only his rational being that makes him go beyond all other beings and possess absolute ends and values. In *The Critique of Judgement*, Kant pointed out through an analysis of the relationship between man and nature that man is in fact one species within the overall system of being, or, one say, the supreme end within the overall system of ends. In the absolute sense, man is the end, nature is the means. In terms then of the system of ends which man himself constructs, between individuals there should be relationships "which alternate as means and ends" because in any organism "all of the parts within alternate as means and ends".²⁶ It can be seen from this that Kant's theory of ends is not only an elevation of the subject status of man but also a moral delimitation of interrelationships between subjects, which is the second aspect : the subjects' alternating teleologies. There is only a monovalent significance to the purposiveness of each rational subject, yet the principle of humanistic ethics demands the subjects shared end, which required that individuals treat one another as ends and not as a means. Seen abstractly, Kant's idea of "man as the end" contains an accurate revelation of the relationships of moral subjects, a point which can be seen in four examples he gave. These were (1) necessary duty to oneself, (2) necessary duty to others, (3) non-necessary (special) duty to oneself

and (4) non-necessary (special) duty to others.²⁷ These examples can be divided into two larger categories of self-interest and altruism. As Kant saw it, the end of self-interest (including direct, necessary self-interest and indirect, special self-interest) is morally negative and subjective, for although this type of end subjectively exists (Kant did not deny the subjective reality of human sensual desires and self-interest), in the end it lacks absolute moral value. But the end of altruism (including direct, necessary altruism and indirect, special altruism) is positive and objective, possessing universal moral value. Kant's example represented a reconciliation and summation of self-interest and altruism which had existed for a long time in modern Western ethical thought,²⁸ they also reflected the anti-egotistic stance of Kant's humanistic ethics.

The two moral imperatives above provide the premise and conditions necessary for the self-legislation of the moral subject, while the third moral imperative, based on the synthesis of the previous two, is the core proposition which ultimately justifies the humanistic ethics of "man as self-legislating".²⁹ "From this there now follows our third practical principle for the will as the supreme condition of the will's conformity with universal practical reason - namely, the idea of the will of every rational being as a will which makes universal law".³⁰ This is the so-called autonomy of the will, i.e. man's self-legislation. This imperative is the classic expression of Kant's humanistic moral ideas. The moral form of universal law (imperative one) is the theoretical premise ensuring the principle of practical reason; the rule of universal ends (imperative two) is the internal foundation of the human subject as a rational being provides the authority for the subject's self-legislation, which is where the true meaning of the freedom of the human will is to be found. For this reason Kant called the autonomy of the will the "supreme principle of morality" and labelled all other principles of behaviour "heteronomy".³¹ It is through proof of the autonomy of the will that the objective form of moral law was internalized from an external constraint into the positive content of the subject's own norms and became testimony to the exalted autonomy and superior teleology of the moral subject. Because of this, wrote Kant immediately thereafter, the result of the establishment of the autonomy of the will leads to the moral concept of the "kingdom of ends".³² The human subject's moral idea had finally found commitment to conceptual form.

In short, Kant's three moral imperatives actually constituted the basic

framework of his humanistic moral ideas, with freedom as the pivotal and strong point of this framework; the three imperatives focused on, and develop from, this core and from different angles revealed the supreme theme of Kant's humanistic ethics : free human subjectivity.

Although he likewise started out from freedom, Sartre's thinking on moral ends and relationships headed off in the opposite direction. For Sartre there existed no universal moral principles. The subject's moral behaviour had absolute freedom but not objectivity; the subject's ends enjoyed the highest status but the mutuality of ends was lacking; the moral subject (man) had absolute transcendence but common subjectivity was completely lost; all that was left was the subjectiveness of the individual subject, mutual negativity between subjects and the blindness of subjective activity.

Initially, Sartre, like Kant, argued that being-for-itself as consciousness goes beyond natural rules of cause and effect.³³ Yet he categorically denied that the transempirical nature of the subject's freedom must lead to any moral principles of universal validity, and also maintained that the social development of mankind so far had failed to provide us with the possibility of creating any "universal morality". According to Sartre, what is important is not the theoretical search for abstract moral principles but the creation of social conditions which make a universal morality a real possibility, since "ontologically, moral commands depend on the social structures in which we live."³⁴ A genuine ethics of human freedom can only be established if social conditions are changed. Said Sartre: "To begin with, everyone must become human by an improvement in their living conditions, only in this way can a universal morality be created."³⁵ Constrained by this consideration, Sartre's promise made in his early work *Being and Nothingness* to write a special work on ethics was never realized.³⁶

As described previously, Sartre's moral subject always exists as an individual; he acknowledged in his final years that :

"In my early investigations, I was like the majority of moralists in that I looked for morality in a knowledge without interrelationships or without other people (I would rather say other people than interrelationship)."³⁷

In fact Sartre, in his later works still firmly maintained that,

The subject of existentialism - which is lacking Marxism - is the individual person in the field of society, the individual in classes within a situation vis-a-vis many other individuals and collect objects, man alienated, materialised, mystified by the division of labour and exploration but also struggling against alienation by various means and measures - even if progressing slowly.³⁸

Obviously what Sartre stressed was not the universalized human subjectivity which concerned Kant but the subjectivity of the human individual for itself. He criticized Kant's failure to deal with "the question of person".³⁹ he also bitterly ridiculed Hegel for "establishing a conceptual palace while living himself in a mud hut". "But if Hegel has forgotten himself, we cannot forget Hegel".⁴⁰ As Sartre saw it, Hegel was given to abstract universal conceptions to the point that he had forgotten the everyday individual, so much so that from him through to Husserl the true significance and relationships of being had not been truly grasped. Hegel equated being with knowledge (the concept), while Husserl reduced the relationships between beings to relationship between knowledge. Although Kant and Heidegger attempt to understand the being of man in ontological terms, both were so intoxicated with man in general that they were content to describe human relationships as those of human "mitsein" (being-together). Only Kierkegaard saw through to the true significant of individual reality. All this led to a reconsideration of the cogito, the start of absolute knowledge, in order to find the actually existing object. As Sartre said,

"I must establish myself in my being and posit the problem of the other in terms of my being. In a word the sole point of departure is the interiority of the cogito. We must understand by this that each one must be able, by starting out from his own interiority, to rediscover the other's being as a transcendence which conditions the very being of that interiority."⁴¹

Taking the self of the individual being as the point of departure and positing the being of the other in terms of my being was the basic standpoint of Sartre's humanistic ethics, and also his first inversion of Kant's humanist moral principle.

Since Sartre reduced Kant's moral subject from a universal to an individual, this led to another inversion, this time in Kant's theory of humanistic moral relationships, that is, Kant's shared and alternating teleologies were inverted

into individual teleology and mutual instrumentalization (objectification), with the final end being transcendence, struggle and conflict between subjects and intersubjectivity becoming a hopeless pipe dream. According to Sartre, within the realm of being-for-itself, any being which is for-itself and only has the sense of absolute subjectivity but also has a relativistic side. In terms of the free existences of the self, its subjectivity is absolute for this is its freedom and its creation but, on the other hand, the existence of any subject necessarily places it into a particular situation, encountering the existence of other subjects, and this produces the dual structure of the for-itself and for-others for the subject being, thereby giving rise to non-subjective relationships between subjects. These relationships are as a contingency of our being and are objective facticity; this determines the necessity of the objectification of my subject being (as with "the look"). But as Sartre pointed out, being-for-others cannot be "as ontological structure" for being-for-itself, because I cannot imagine either "deriving being-for-others" but can only reveal through reflective consciousness this one fact : "that our being along with its being-for-itself is also for-others".⁴² This is to say,

the existence of others is not a consequence which can derive from the ontological structure of being-for-itself. It is a primary event, to be sure, but of a metaphysical order; that is, it results from the contingency of being.⁴³

Yet the existence of the other leads to two objective consequences : the first being that I am forced to accept objectivity, i.e. transcendence by the other, while at the same time my being-for-others also causes the other to achieve his own subjectivity; the second being my anti-objectification behaviour, i.e. transcending the transcendence of the other, thereby also constituting the others objectivity. Thus are formed the asymmetrical "subject === object" relationships between human beings. The result of the exclusion of being-for-others from within the ontological structure of being-for-itself is that relationships between subjects become relation of unequal subject-object exchange, which led Sartre to a negative conclusive : "The constitutive negation of being-for-others is therefore as internal negation is nihilation which the for-itself has to be, just the reflective nihilation".⁴⁴ In other words, my being-for-others formally can only constitute a relation of negation with the others : I either act a presence and subject which objectifies the others, or am objectified by the other and make him into the subject. This was Sartre's conclusion.

Subjectivity in common between me and the other is simply an impossibility, expressed concretely as two attitudes in relationships between me and the other. The first attitude is love, language and masochism. "Love" is in fact just an expropriation and possession of the other's freedom. A footnote in the conflict of the relationship between me and other. As he puts it :

Thus the lover does not desire to possess the beloved as one possesses a thing; he demands a special type of appropriation. He wants to possess a freedom as freedom.⁴⁵

Language is but "the fact that a subjectivity experiences itself as an object for the others".⁴⁶ And Masochism is then,

An attempt not to fascinate the other by means of my objectivity but to cause myself to be fascinated by my objectivity-for others; it is characterized as a species of vertigo, vertigo not before a precipice of rock and earth but before the abyss of the other's subjectivity.⁴⁷

The second attitude is indifference, desire, hate and sadism. Indifference is the attitude of destroying the other to establish myself ; "I can choose myself as looking at the Other's look and can build my subjectivity upon the collapse of the subjectivity of the Others"⁴⁸. Desire (sexual desire) is an "attempt to get hold of the Other's subjectivity through his objectivity-for-me".⁴⁹ Hate, simply put, is freely to "determine with full knowledge of the futility of its former attempts, to pursue the death of Others"; it is "the hate of all Others in one Other".⁵⁰ It is the complete negation of being other than me. And sadism "is an effort to incarnate the Other through violence"⁵¹ Both attitudes, Sartre warned people, will lead to "failure" and ultimately be unable to realise the full goal of my relationship with the Other.⁵² This failure originates in the eternal inapprehensibility of the Other.

There is no any to know the Other as subject; every subject can spontaneously prove the subjectivity of the self but cannot enter the territory of the subjectivity of the Others. As Sartre pointed out,

The Other is on principle inapprehensible; he feels me when I seek him and possesses me when I flee him. Even if I should want to act according to the precepts of Kantian Morality and take the Other's freedom as an

unconditioned and, still this freedom would become a transcended by the mere fact that I make it my goal. On the other hand, I could act for his benefit only by utilizing the Other as object as an instrument in order to realize this freedom....Thus respect for the other's freedom is an empty word; even if we could assume the project of respecting this freedom, each attitude which we adopted with respect to the other would be a violation of that freedom which we claimed to respect".⁵³

Thus, on the basis of denying Kant's ethics, Sartre tells us that negative interpersonal subject-object relationship are a contingent fact which is insurmountable; I cannot realize inter-subjective relationships with the Other;

for the assimilation of the for-itself and the Other in a single transcendence would necessarily involve the disappearance of the characteristics of otherness in the Other. Thus the condition on which I project the identification of myself with the Other is that I persist in denying that I am Other. Finally this project of unification is the source of conflict since while I experience myself as an object for the Other and while I project assimilating him in and by means of this experience, the Other apprehends me as an object in the midst of the world and does not project identifying me with himself.⁵⁴

That is to say, intersubjective assimilation is not only impossible but can only lead to conflict; I and the Other lack the necessary agreement, reciprocal apprehension of subjectivity does not exist between people. Hence, according to Sartre, there is no way that the existing structure of the "We-subject" in the human world can become a fact, it can only have a relative reality in the sense of man's relationship with nature. In a word in Sartre's eyes intersubjective relationships can only be mutual objectification.

It is worth noting that in later works Sartre added the concepts of "reciprocity" to attenuate his earlier views. But he also wrote this :

We must not suppose that we have entered the kingdom of the ends and that in reciprocity, everyone recognizes and treats the Other as an absolute end. This would formally be possible only in so far as everyone treated himself, or treated the human person in himself, as an unconditioned end.⁵⁵

Even this only formally possible reciprocity needs four preconditions :

Reciprocity implies, first, that the Other is a means to the extent that I myself am a means, that is to say that the Other is the means of a transcendent end and not my means ; second, that I recognize the Other as paxis, that is to say, as a developing totalization, at the same time as integrating him as an object into my totalizing project; third, that I recognize his movement toward his own ends in the same movement by which I project myself toward mine; and fourth, that I discover myself as an object and instrument of his ends through the same act which constitutes him as an objective instrument of my ends. ⁵⁶

It is difficult to see that these four conditions of reciprocity have certain similarities to Kant's four examples. The first two can be categorized as other-oriented, expressing the mode of dealing with the other to gauge the self, while the latter two are self-oriented, expressing the mode of dealing with the self to gauge the Other. A temporary mutuality is formally achieved through the juxtaposed orientation of the self and the Other. Sartre further noted that within these four preconditions mutuality can also give rise to two situations, the first being the affirmation of mutuality. In this situation, I and the Other become means for one another's transcendent ends, but these ends retain their separateness and the ends of the self can only be realized if people can rely on collective effort. The second situation is the negation of mutuality. In this situation, the four preconditions are mutually exclusive and each person refuses to act as the means for the Other's ends; this is struggle. Each person impersonates the Other's object through such means as subterfuge, schemes and lies, actually seeking the negation of the Other's ends. This understanding made it difficult for Sartre's humanistic ethics to ever lose its pessimistic aura, and even led him to insist, for a long time, on the impossibility of a universal human morality. What is puzzling though is that Sartre in his later years also optimistically discussed love relationships between people and even argued that "mine is your, yours is mine...this is the morality of the future".⁵⁷ Clearly Sartre's thought was no match for Kant in terms of maintaining theoretical consistency and rigour ; though Kant too was no match for Sartre in terms of the realism and concreteness of his thought.

Having gone through the two master's exposition of the ends and relationships of moral subjects, we have discovered at least the following distinctions:

(1) Different standards for the moral subject. Kant's moral subject is whole, abstract and universal, while Sartre's is individual, concrete and isolated. (2) Different proofs for the moral subject. The common goal of the two is to confirm the moral subject's superiority and dignity but the results of their efforts are widely divergent. For Kant, the teleology of the subject lay in its nature as a rational being, "man is the end" refers to the shared and alternating teleologies between subjects. Though Sartre also stressed the supreme teleology of the subject, his division of the subject into individuals rejecting one another led to negative conclusions about intersubjective moral relations which held that the reality of inter-personal relations is mutual objectivication, and even to the conclusion that "hell is Others"⁵⁸ (3) Different conclusions about the moral relationships of subjects. In Kant's theory, moral relationships between subjects are positive, mutual, unified and idealized. But with Sartre these relationships can only be antagonistically termed unequal relationships of "subject==object" and are negative, incommensurable, exclusive and inapprehensible.

Although Kant's and Sartre's theories about the ends and relationships of moral subjects aimed at elevating the status of the moral subject, they led to different theoretical tendencies because of the difference in their standards and proofs of the subject. Kant's humanistic ethics tended towards holism and what was elevated was a civilized stage of reason, while Sartre's tended toward an individualistic ethical view so that was what the empirical individual set in modern Western society. Consequently, Kant appears to have come close the the truth of human ethical relationships in general theoretical terms, while Sartre appears to have been the more honest of the two about the contemporary social backgrounds into which he was placed.

III

The preliminary comparative analysis of the humanistic ethical ideas of Kant and Sartre has provided the necessary suggestions of their different features and endpoints which we shall now summarise briefly from the vantage point of methodology, and then scan the changing course of modern Western ethical thought to discover the path of establishing and perfecting a scientific humanistic ethics.

1. *Rationalism and Irrationalism*

Rationalism and Irrationalism are one set of features which fundamentally distinguish the humanistic ethics of Kant and Sartre, but also methodological reasons which led the two head off in different directions in the course of constructing humanistic ethics. As a pioneer of German Enlightenment Philosophy Kant hoisted high the philosophical banner of rationalism. To be sure, Kant was more indebted to the inspiration of Rousseau's liberal ideas in creating his ethics, but Kant's perspective on freedom was not based on naturalism or individual freedom; rather, he used reason to supplant Rousseau's category "Nature". Reason, by making the subject a being whose essence went beyond the realm of nature, freed it from the restraints of natural physical desires so that it enjoyed the superior moral dignity of an autonomous will and obtained its own teleology, and also set up moral relationships of shared ends and alternating subjectivity. This innovative rationalist feature in fact took the modern Western rationalist ethical tradition which began with Descartes to a new height and undoubtedly represented more thoroughgoing rationalist leap beyond those earlier moralists who were content with simply elevating reason to the detriment of sensation, as well as being one of the important reasons why Kant was capable of completing the construction of his humanistic ethics. It should also be recognised that the ethical characteristics of such rationalism were a complex theoretical reflection of Kant's time and social background. The stress on rationalism in particular was a theoretical reflex of the intellectual enlightenment and moral ideals of the weak late eighteenth century German petty bourgeoisie which was subject to the rule of the stronger feudal monarchy of Prussia.

In contrast to Kant, Sartre opted for a typical irrationalist course, which as the ontological basis of his ethics of the free subject led him into ethical opposition to Kant. On the one hand, Sartre reduced human existence and action to the level of unreasoning psychological behaviour, eliminating the introspective guiding role of human reason in moral conduct. Although Sartre took this position to eradicate "determinism", he simultaneously also removed the positive meaning of reason vis-a-vis human morality and completely reduced ethics to the empirical observation and psychological description of man's being and activity. In fact Sartre explicitly equated the science of human ethics to "existential psychoanalysis".⁵⁹ On the other hand, Sartre firmly denied the use of reason

(knowledge) to explain the interrelationships between subjects. Having sharply criticised those such as Hegel and Husserl who use rational concepts or knowledge to explain relationships between things (men), he argued :

My relation to the other is first and fundamentally a relation of being to being, not of knowledge to knowledge. We have seen Husserl's failure when on this particular level he measures being by knowledge, and Hegel's when he identifies knowledge and being.⁶⁰

To reduce my relationship with others to a relationship between being is in fact to eliminate the factor or reason in human relationships. And this "Relation of being to being" becomes the naked collision and convergency of interpersonal psychological feelings and actions, exposing interpersonal relations and exchange to a psychic realm of being. This approach which unilaterally rejected reason led Sartre to a constricted understanding between peoples. To be sure, such a view for Sartre living in the capitalist epoch of the twentieth century was really a courageous exposure of the life and society before him, and to a certain degree, it authentically portrayed contemporary Western society, especially the general psychology of French Civil Society which has experienced the depredations of two World Wars. If Kant's ethics can be seen as the embodiment of the moral ideals of the eighteenth century German bourgeoisie, then it is probably not unreasonable to concur with the formulation of the Western commentators who suggested that Sartre's existentialist ethics is "psychologically understandable in terms of the social and political upheavals of the twentieth century"⁶¹

However, it must be pointed out that Sartre stopped at the direct experience of the real life of Modern Western Society and the psychological description of the phenomena of interpersonal relations. Thus he was perplexed by the malignant development of human relations under capitalism and people's (abnormal) psychological expressions. Still, he would not be said to have transcended his time and class in order to get a scientific understanding of the phenomenon of moral life, except that he was able to theorize and universalize some psychological states of human society. And this, perhaps, was the most stumbling block to what commentators have referred to as his own "monograph on ethics".

As can be seen from the comparative analysis above, the common intent but differing results of the ethical thought from Kant to Sartre has brought into

prominence a fundamental tendency and law of the evolution of Western ethics from early modern to modern times, viz. the turn from rationalism toward irrationalism. If we extend the field of vision just a trifle, we soon discover two major turning points in the history of modern Western ethics: (1) The change from the rationalist ethics which went from Descartes to Kant and Hegel to irrationalist ethics which began with Schopenhauer and Nietzsche and affected Bergson, Sartre, Freud and others; and (2) The change from the Western traditional normative ethics toward modern metaethics, which began early this century when the Anglo-American trend of analytic ethics (pioneered by G.E. Moore) transformed ethics into a type of purely linguistic logical analysis, the so-called metaethics. The two changes constitute two fundamental threads in the development of modern Western ethics. And the correspondences of Kant's and Sartre's ideas on humanistic ethics typically reflect the former tendency of change.

2. *Idealism and Realism*

While rationalism and irrationalism represent one way to grasp the fundamental approaches and characteristics of the humanistic ethical ideas of Kant and Sartre, idealism and realism offer another difference in style which one finds for assessing their humanistic ethical ideas in terms of (the history of) ethics.

We are persuaded by the position that rationalism need not lead to idealistic characteristics for ethics; but it also cannot be denied that the rationalist tradition in Western ethical thought has usually led ethical thinkers to incline toward idealistic portrayals of human morality, imbuing their ethics with idealism. Such was the case from Plato to Kant. Conversely, empirical (perceptual or psychological) principles caused these thinkers' moral theories to display more of realistic quality, as has been the case, apparently without exception from the early modern British empiricists to the modern day existentialists.

Kant's humanistic ethics was without doubt redolent with the spirit of idealism. He made freedom the starting point of his entire thinking on humanistic ethics, yet the idealisation of this starting point grounded the moral subject simplified into a rational being in this *a priori* postulate. Contrariwise, Kant's free subject was the embodiment of a moral ideal which had lost all the elements of perceptual

experience through *a priori* philosophical shifting; this subject transcended natural desires and calculation of interest, understood and supported universal moral principles, had a conscious knowledge of the subject's shared goals and alternating subjectivity, grasped the principle of the autonomy of the will - in a word, Kant's moral person was a rationalized, idealized pure subject.

Consequent on this Kant stressed the autonomy of the subject's will, yet the results of actions were excluded from moral values, "autonomy" being understood solely as an internal motivation; the subject's freedom was no more than a purely intellectual freedom and spiritual independence. This truly gave a hint of the politically idealistic ethics of eighteenth century Germany.⁶² Kant's kingdom of ends" which followed from this could not but reflect this quality of idealistic ethics. In general, it reflected to some degree a moral prospect and model for the self-development mankind, as well as the ideal and transcendent nature which morality alone possessed. However, Kant seriously disregarded the objective empirical factors in the moral life of mankind and denied the objectively necessary connections between human moral phenomena and the material life (economic interests) of society, transforming this idealized humanistic ethics into an abstract postulate beyond reality, time and class.

In contrast to Kant, Sartre always stood on the ground of real life, seeking an understanding of the subject's morality in the concrete individual's "design" and actions, and brought out ethics' realistic qualities. However, what concerned him was simply the psychoanalysis of the harsh reality for the individual in the terrible circumstances of Western society. As a Scholar has cogently pointed out,

.....a deeply prejudiced moralist, Sartre rejected the transtructural status of conscious formations interlinked with prefabricated 'moral systems'... his was an ethics interlinked with individual praxis.⁶³

That is to say, Sartre's humanistic ethics was not a Kantian style assumption about "ought" but was direct reflection on the individual's real existences and actions.

And yet the sense of realism in Sartre's ethical ideas was extremely narrow, representing as it did an experience and iteration of people's lives in the postwar West rather than expressing strong qualities of realism. What should give one

food for thought is that these different qualities of Kant and Sartre seem to similarly represent the two polar tendencies of idealism and realism in the development of Western ethical thought. Considered more broadly, these divergent tendencies' biases reflect the epochal qualities and social demands of the two different historical stages of the bourgeoisie's initial and current development. Nevertheless, both Kant and Sartre were unable to avoid the divergences of the polar movements' specifically, they like all bourgeois moralists, were unable to understand, or show in a more explicit term, the contradiction between the ideal and the real. While Kant's ethics may be said to have resembled a patch of blue sky which people could see but not touch, Sartre's ethical ideas were like a turbid stream from which people recoiled and did not dare enter; neither was able to offer us a real path to the ideal.

3. *Holism and Individualism*

Holism and individualism are yet another set of qualities which mark the dividing line between the humanistic ethical ideas of Kant and Sartre. Since Kant set out to construct his humanistic ethics starting from universal human freedom he cast his eyes even more on the whole rational being. Superficially, the underlying reality of Kant's ethics was nothing but a moral enlightenment for individual liberation; actually, what Kant focused on was a holistic, classiest and socially civilized freedom for the moral subject. His kingdom of reason and system of alternating ends were, in fact, german *Burgertum* in the initial stage of capitalist civilization. Therefore, when he spoke of the different starting points for his own and Rousseau's ethics, he said that Rousseau began with "natural man" while he started out from "civilized man".⁶⁴ On this matter the founders of Marxism incisively pointed out that Kant's ethics remained an abstract, universalized good will, which expressed the common aspirations of the German bourgeoisie of his time.

Although the "composition of an alternating subjectivity" was also a professed goal of Sartre's humanistic ethics.⁶⁵ Sartre never recognized the real possibilities of alternating human subjectivity. He had an excessive faith in the individual's absolute freedom and denied that there existed any common essence between individuals or intersubjective links. Each person was a sacred world of potentialities, mutually incomprehensible and impenetrable. Even in his later

years when discussing the relationship between the self and other, Sartre firmly maintained : "I would rather say others than interrelationships".⁶⁶ To be sure, Sartre also frequently proclaimed that he conceived the individual as a "totality" and even said :

our goal is to form a genuine whole, within which each component will be an individual person and collectives will be collectives of people. ⁶⁷

However, Sartre's totalistic conception was no more than an existentialist interpretation of the "transiency" of individual existence (by yardstick of past, present and future) and of the structures of multiple existences (the in-itself, for-itself and for-others), whose basic point was still the individual; "the other", the "collective" and "society" were all satellites orbiting around the sun and the self.

IV

It can be seen from the foregoing that these two outstanding ethical thinkers, though living in different times, shared the common goal of wanting to construct a humanistic ethics and actually did contribute a number of valid insights. But basically, their work fell short of the boundaries of science. We say this because their different positions lack a scientific methodological foundation; hence they were unable to resolve such basic theoretical questions in ethics as freedom and necessity, ends and means, and the self and the other, nor were they able to overcome correctly the antinomies which have persisted for so long in Western ethical-philosophical investigation. This shortcoming confirms that in the establishment of a scientifically-derived humanistic ethics neither abstract freedom (Kant) nor concrete individual freedom (Sartre) can resolve the dialectical relationship between the subject's own teleology and instrumentality or subjectivity and objectivity. So while the foundation of authentic humanistic ethics really should be the freedom of the subject, the rules of this subject must have recourse to the concrete historical unity of the human individual and society (the collective), and freedom must be founded on and awareness of the objectively necessary nature of human society and human society and human moral relationship. Only in this way can humanity's subjective goals, behaviour and their moral relationships be finally understood and all of humanity's moral phenomena be fully explained and understood.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The reason for the uniqueness of moral phenomena (including) those that are Psychological, emotional, conscious, relational, behaviour, and theoretical is that they possess peculiar properties differentiating them from other everyday phenomena, and theoretical study of vantage point of human subjectivity. With reference to this point it should be noted that even today it appears that insufficient attention has been paid to the many important insights offered by Kant, Sartre and others who have labouriously studied the matter, with the result that our intellectual vision has been restricted to the palace of narrow empiricism or even common sense, with no way out.
2. See Jean-Paul Sartre, "Existentialism Is a Humanism" in *Existentialist Philosophy*, (Beijing, Shangwun Yinshuguan, 1963). p. 356
3. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, (Beijing : Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1960), p. 24
4. Immanuel Kant : *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, (tr. by H. J. Paton). (London : Hutchinson's University Library, 1948, p. 57.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 57
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A NOTE ON LOGIC WITH TRUTH VALUE GAPS

AMIT KUMAR SEN

Being dissatisfied with the accounts of the truth conditions of a conditional proposition of truth functional two-valued logic, some logicians have tried to develop non-truth functional two-valued logic which may be classified under two heads namely, Quasi Truth Functional Logic advocated by Reichenbach and others and Logic with Truth Value Gaps advocated by Quine, Strawson and others. The purpose of this paper is to throw some light on logic with Truth Value Gaps and the obvious off shoot of it.

In truth functional two-valued logic the truth conditions of a conditional proposition are expressed by means of truth table in the following way :

P	q	$p \supset q$
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	T
F	F	T

The table shows that a conditional proposition like 'if sugar is put in water, it dissolves' - would be false if we actually put sugar in water but it does not dissolve. Even a lay man would agree with this view that a conditional proposition is false if the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. But with regard to the other truth conditions of a conditional proposition he suspects and raises the famous problem of the paradox of material implication which can be stated as : A false proposition implies any proposition, true or false, and a true proposition is

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implied by any proposition, true or false. This paradoxical situation can be expressed in a proposition like 'If the sea-water is sweet, then the earth is round'. In truth functional two-valued logic since the antecedent is false, the conditional statement 'If the sea-water is sweet then the earth is round' becomes true, no matter what the truth value of the consequent is (vide, third and fourth row of the truth table) and again since the consequent is true, the conditional statement is once again true, no matter what the truth value of the antecedent is (vide, first and third row of the truth table.) Thus both the propositions 'If $2+2=5$ then Russell is a philosopher' and 'If $2+2=5$ then Russell is not a philosopher' are true because the antecedents of them are false. Again 'If $2+2=4$ then Russell is a philosopher' and 'If $2+2=5$ then Russell is a Philosopher' - both these two propositions are true because the consequents of them are true. But one's common sense would revolt here on the ground of the question of relevance between the antecedents and the consequents of the above propositions. One cannot take the above propositions as true from the point of view of ordinary language. In truth functional logic notion of relevance is irrelevant but in the logic of ordinary language the notion of relevance is very much relevant. So from the point of view of logic of ordinary language a conditional proposition cannot be taken as true in the first, third and fourth row of the above truth table. Can a conditional proposition be false in those cases in the logic of ordinary language? No, because not to speak of truth functional logic, even in ordinary language logic a conditional proposition is false if and only if the antecedent of it is true and the consequent is false. As this condition of falsity is not satisfied in the first, third and fourth row of the truth table, a conditional statement cannot be false in those cases. Thus from the point of view of ordinary language logic, the first, third and fourth row of the above truth table should be kept BLANK, as in those rows neither T nor F can be inserted.

From this ordinary language point of view some philosophers have developed non-truth functional logic with truth value gaps. The names W.V. Quine, P.F. Strawson, Van Fraassen and K. Lambert are associated with this system of logic. But perhaps all of them have got the clue to this logical system from the philosophy of Gottlob Frege. Here we shall confine our discussion to Frege, Quine and Strawson.

In his 'On Sense and Reference' Frege expresses the view that (i) the reference of a sentence is its truth value and (ii) the reference of a compound sentence depends upon the references of its parts. So, if any part of a compound sentence lacks reference then the compound sentence as a whole lacks reference. Frege, however, ruled out the possibility of denotationless singular terms from the province of logically perfect language and consequently from his logical system. But as he could not claim that definite description be well-formed only if it has a denotation (because such a claim would require a logic to dictate ontology), he adopted an alternative strategy of providing a denotation for any well-formed expression some parts of which lack denotation. Frege thought that an expression must always be assured of reference by providing a purely ad hoc or conventional denotation e.g. by the convention that zero (null class) shall count as its reference, when the concept applies to no object at all.

According to W.V. Quine one conspicuous way in which ordinary language diverges from the language as reflected in logical forms is in the existence of what he calls truth value gaps. One illustration in his *Methods of Logic* is the conditional under ordinary usage in the indicative mood. Ordinarily, Quine thinks, the conditional is not thought of as true or false at all, but rather the consequent is thought of as conditionally true or false given the antecedent. Another example, Quine offers in his *Methods of Logic* is provided by the singular description. If the object which it purports to describe does not exist, then commonly the contexts of description are accorded no truth values under ordinary usage.

When Strawson maintained that 'The king of France (in a republican age) is bald' cannot have any truth value because the question of its truth or falsity does not arise at all due to the failure or the non-satisfaction of the presupposition requirement, he was also propagating truth value gaps logic. Now what is presupposition requirement? Strawson in his *Introduction to Logical Theory* has offered two solutions to the problem of existential import of categorical proposition raised by Leibnitz and others, one is the *ad hoc* formalistic solution and the other is the realistic solution. In realistic solution an interpretation of the doctrine of existential import is given in a way different from the orthodox interpretation. According to the orthodox interpretation a categorical proposition has existential import with respect to the subject term in the sense that it entails

existence of the object denoted by the subject term. But Strawson's interpretation is that a categorical proposition has existential import with respect to the subject term in the sense that it presupposes existence of the object denoted by the subject term. Strawson explains the difference between entailment and presupposition of existence by saying that in the case of entailment, existence of the object denoted by the subject term is a necessary condition of the truth only of the proposition in question, but in the case of presupposition, existence of the object denoted by the subject term is a necessary condition of both the truth and the falsity of the proposition in question.

One of the consequences of this difference is that under the first interpretation if the existence condition is not fulfilled, a categorical proposition would be false, but under the second interpretation if the existence condition is not fulfilled, a categorical proposition would be neither true nor false. Now if a proposition is neither true nor false, it may be called 'indeterminate'. Indeterminate is not a truth value, it is only a failure of truth value. So Strawson's logic is a non-truth value gap logic.

A substantial off-shoot of Strawson's reflexious on truth value gaps is a theory expounded by him in the article "On Referring" (Mind, 1950) in which a distinction is made between the referential role and the predicative role of singular terms. Normally, if the role of a singular term in a given statement is referential, the question of truth value of the statement does not arise at all in case the purported object of the term is found not to exist. Since formal logic closes all such truth value gaps, there is nothing in it to correspond to the referential role of singular term in Strawsonian sense. Strawson points out that proper names, so called by the formal logicians, are far from corresponding to the singular terms of ordinary language. And on this point Strawson finds the formal logic in a difficulty. To quote Strawson: "Now the whole structure of quantificational logic, with its apparatus of individual variables, seems, or has seemed to most of its exponents, to require, for its application to ordinary speech to be possible at all, that there should exist individual referring expressions that could appear as values of the individual variables". (*Introduction to Logical Theory*, Page - 216).

Logic with Truth value Gaps

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REFLECTIONS ON AHIMSĀ : A PRACTICAL APPROACH

PRABHAT MISRA

I

The term *ahimsā* or non-violence clearly expresses its negative character. Indian ethical thinkers - the Hindus, the Jains and the Buddhists accept its negative character also. Even the ethics of the Mohammedans, which is not originally Indian, share with this character. All of these thinkers also emphasise its positive character (love). But in my opinion, love as its positive character is an ideal concept. In our practical world, the negative aspect of *ahimsā* is more real and really a matter of evaluation. Of course, ultimately this aspect may materialise love or a tradition of love-force.

In its negative aspect, *ahimsā* is the negation of *himsā* or violence. *Himsā* or violence may be of two types : physical and mental. Generally killing of man and animal is physical type of *himsā*. Anger and hatred are its mental type. In my paper I shall try to reflect my thoughts on the negative aspect of *ahimsā*. I shall not however consider the Jain view, because, in my opinion it is too much impractical and it will not be consistent with the intention expressed in this paper.

Mā himsāt sarvabhūtāni

“Don’t kill the creatures of the world” is a famous vedic dictum. It has also been stated that *himsā* or killing gives rise to sin, for the remedy of which some expiratory rites (*prāyascitta*) are to be performed. Of course, so far as the Dharma-śāstras are concerned, the Hindus are not so rigid as the Buddhists are. They permit physical type of *himsā* in some cases.

In the Vedic sacrificial rites, some non-human beings - beasts like goats and even the cows - were permitted to be killed. In almost all the somayajña, goat-killing for the fat-offering was a rule-abiding practice. To quote the words

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of Saral Jhingham, "Gradually the violence in these sacrifices increased. Scores and probably hundreds of animal were sacrificed in the major sacrifices. Cow, the most sacred animal of the present day Hinduism, was one of the important victims in several Vedic sacrifices. Even man was included among the list of victims of some sacrifices, such as *Sarvamedha* (sacrifice of all). An important, Vedic ritual - *agnicayana* (erection of the fire altar) included man as one of the fire victims whose heads were to be walled up in the construction of the altar. Thus, the human sacrifice was not beyond the thinking of the Aryans, though in all probability it was usually not carried out."¹ Secondly, According to the *Varṇadharma*, the Kṣatriya-kings were permitted to kill their enemies in war. Thirdly, they were also permitted to award physical tortures particularly to the śūdras and women as punishment, according to the regulations of the Dharma-śāstras. Fourthly, the Dharma-śāstras permitted the people to take some animal flesh, which was first dedicated to the Gods and the Goddesses. In all other cases, however, killing was treated as condemnable violence and disvalue.

In the Purāṇas, *ahimsā* did not duly mean non-killing of man or animal. The Agnipurāṇa had furnished ten types of physical violence.² These include several types of physical injury. Other than physical injuries, back-biting obstructing another's good and betrayal of trust were also included in the list of cases of physical violence. The Padmapurāṇa nicely stated the ground against the violent actions : "Don't do unto others, what you do not desire for yourself".³ This ground may be compared with some statements of the Dhammapāda.

The Buddhist ethics is world-famous for its utmost emphasis on the principle of *ahimsā*. Out of the five principles of panchaśīla (the five precepts), the first is the principle of non-violence or *ahimsā*. To the Buddhists, violence is either killing, or causing killing, or even sanctioning the killing of the living beings - from insect to man. The Buddhists think that there is a close relationship among all the living beings in the world; any harm inflicted on any one will certainly harm him who does inflict harm. The Dandabhāgga of Dhammapāda upholds: "All fear death, comparing others with oneself one should neither kill nor cause to kill".⁴ Again, "Life is dear to all, comparing others with oneself one should neither kill, nor cause to kill".⁵ Unlike the Hindus, the Buddhists strongly disbelieved in the Vedic sacrificial rites in which animal killing was a regular practice. Instead an orthodox Buddhist used to sacrifice his own selfish

motives. The Suttapīṭaka states, "Don't kill a living being. You shouldn't kill nor condone killing by others. Having abandoned the use of violence you should not use the force either against the strong or the feeble."⁶ The Buddhists are, indeed, in favour of a figid type of non-violence in its negative aspect. In the fourth part of Vinayapīṭaka, there are many statements made by the Buddha, in which the Buddhist monks have been advised not to dig the ground, not to cut the trees and not to misuse the water of pond, because there are breathing things - living beings in these places.⁷ Such statements certainly remind us of the Jaina view in this connection. But the Jaina view seems to be too much impractical, when it maintains that one should cover his nose with a piece of cloth, because his breathing process may kill some insect.

However, to-day any study of Indian ethics must take into account particularly the teaching of the Quran in this regard. The Mohammedans have been living side by side of the Hindus, the Buddhists, the Sikhs and others for a longer period in India. Even history has informed that a section of Mohammedans living in India were originally Hindus. That is to say, they or their ancestors were original inhabitants of India. Changing their religion they have been trying to abide by the rules of the Mohammedan ethics. Here I shall mention some points on the Mohammedan view of non-violence on the basis of the ethical teachings of the Quran as furnished in *A History of Muslim Philosophy* Vol.I, edited by M. M. Sharif.⁸ Sharif has made use of the English translation of the Quran, by Abdullah Yusuf Ali. The quotations from the Quran here are from this translation as found in *A History of Muslim Philosophy*. Emphasizing the value of life, the Quran regards violence as a disvalue. It states, "Opposed to the value of life is weakness of man to make mischief on the earth and shed blood."⁹ "All life is sacred. It is forbidden to commit suicide or to kill anybody without a just cause."¹⁰ The Quran discards the killing of a person as it is tantamount to slaying the human race. "Fight for the cause of righteousness is permitted only because tumult and oppression, which necessitate resort to armed resistance, are worse than killing"¹¹ This sanction may encourage an active Marxist, who believes in violent social revolution. The Quran also approves physical tortures, which even may lead to death in awarding punishment to the criminals. To punish some performer of misdeed, the Quran advises, "The thief, male or female, cut off his or her hands."¹² Again "Those who devour the property of orphans unjustly, devour fire in their bellies, and

will soon endure a blazing fire.”¹³ Furthermore, in some rituals, the Mohammedan ethics permits massive cow-killing and camel-killing for the grand feast of the devotees. Thus beside just war for the protection of number of good and valuable lives, for the punishment of evil doers and for eating purposes only violence or killing is permitted. In no other cases violence is sanctioned in the Mohammedan ethics.

II

One may think that the principle of non-violence envisaged in the ethics of the Hindus and the Mohammedans is inconsistent. Both the ethical systems, though accept this principle as an important virtue or value for human being, in some cases, they permit man to violate this principle. In the Vedic sacrificial rites and just war cases like the case of Kurukshetra battle violence is permitted. Again severe physical torturing has been permitted by the Hindus to those who violate the socio-ethical rules and regulations prescribed by the Dharmaśāstras. It is the duty of the king as Kṣatriya to award such punishments to the evil doers, particularly the *Śūdras*. Thus it was prescribed that, if a *Śūdra* used offensive words to a Brahman, his tongue was to be cut off or pierced with a red-hot iron nail or his mouth or ears were to be filled with burning oil.¹⁴ The Mohammedan ethics, as found in the Quran, also is in favour of violence in just war. The rulers of the Mohammedan society were also permitted to do physical tortures to the evil doers. Ancient Hindus, the so-called Aryans were ruthlessly meat-eaters. In the fifth chapter of his *samhitā*, Manu has prescribed many regulations for the eating of meat. He approves, “If anybody eats an animal, which may be eaten, there is no sin. As God has created some animals as eatable and some as eater.”¹⁵ Perhaps to justify their habit of meat-eating, they used to offer first the killed animal in some sacrificial rites. Then they took the same. And that meat was granted as just meat (*Vaidha Māṃsa*). “It seems”, says Dr. Saral Jhingram, “to be fairly certain that the value of non-violence was introduced into Hinduism as a result of the direct influence of the heterodox sects of Buddhism and Jainism. At first the value of non-violence was only conditionally accepted as a virtue which characterises a certain class of persons, viz. the renunciants. Gradually, non-violence came to be accepted as a guiding principle of life or the supreme universal virtue - (*ahimsā paramo dharma*). The acceptance of non-violence resulted in the rejection of vedic sacrifices involving

violence".¹⁶

III

The case of violence in just war, however, deserves special discussion. In this connection, one may find out a kind of affinity of the principle of non-violence with the so-called pacifism.

Prof. Richard Norman asserts, "I define 'pacifism' as the view that it is always wrong to go to war. As such it is addressed to Governments, and to political movements, specially those which aspire to be Governments, since there are the bodies which, by definition, are capable of waging wars and therefore have to decide whether or not to do so. Violence or killing engaged in by individuals solely as individuals would not be war, whatever else it might be. However, as individually we can, to a greater or lesser extent, influence governments, and we can either support or oppose the decisions of Governments and political movements to resort to war. Pacifism, therefore, would require us as individuals to oppose any resort to war."¹⁷

According to Prof. Richard Norman, killing of human life in just or unjust war destroys respect for human life and autonomy which is no less valuable in civilization. Secondly, even in a just war of defence the loser nation or community does not lose its intellectual, moral, religious, political and artistic movements. Thirdly, if a community is destroyed in the face of violent aggression, individuals retain the ability to speak the language and engage in their traditional practices. In fact, in war the irreplaceable individual life is lost and the loss is total. Tragic though the destruction of a community may be, the destruction of individual lives is of a different order again. Fourthly consequentialist's consideration about killing in any war may not also be justified. A consequentialist may say that killing in some war is justified if some greater good is achieved after the war. Taking the case of the second world war, Prof. Norman thinks that this war was surely a justified war against the terror of Nazism. This war achieves its result at an immense cost, involving million of deaths and appalling suffering. By such means it brought about the overthrow of Nazism. But Nazism has not been really destroyed. It as a political system or as an ideology is still there in the world in some other form.¹⁸ Prof. Norman states, "It is very difficult to tell whether fighting a war will achieve anything positive, and what its long term consequences will be. We do not know however,

with very much greater certainty, that it will involve immense suffering and great loss of life. Therefore, weighing the certainty of suffering and death against the mere possibility of long term good term consequences, we may well conclude that war is never worth to risk.

Now Scepticism about the positive achievements of war does not by itself entail pacifism. Nor does scepticism about 'just war' theory. Nor does respect for human life. What I have been claiming is that that respect for human life sets up a very strong presumption against the justifiability of killing in war. Doubts about 'Just war' theory and doubts about the positive achievements of war, make it very difficult to see how that presumption could be overridden. That is the case for pacifism, and it is a very strong case."¹⁹ Prof. Norman finally advises that "by building up a tradition of non-violent resistance to aggression and oppression, we can bring it about that people do have a choice and are not faced with an impossible ethical dilemma. It might then be possible to be unhesitatingly a pacifist."²⁰

Pacifism, which is ultimately the principle of passive resistance is not same as the principle of *ahimsā*, particularly advocated by our Mahatma Gandhi, the last and most significant figure of India in this regard. In his autobiography Gandhi says that passive resistance may be a weapon of the weak, it may admit of inner hatred. This inner hatred may ultimately lead to violence.²¹ So passive resistance is not all for the principle of *ahimsā*.

Whatever may be the case -- be it pacifism or the principle of non-violence, it is very difficult to say whether a war is just or unjust. War for attack or aggression is generally designated as unjust. The defensive war against aggression is just war. But attack or aggression for the greater good of a nation or community has been regarded sometimes as just war. The civil war in the Bolshevic revolution led by Lenin, or the long march in the Chinese revolution led by Mao - Tse - Tung may practically be regarded as just war. The aggression of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha in India may be granted by some as just war. So we are to come to a definite position in regard to the question what is a just war?

In my opinion, the ethics of the Hindus and the Mohammedans and even that of the Buddhists may enlighten us to find out the real distinction between just war and unjust war. Anger, pride, hatred, selfish consideration and bad

intention have been definitely described by these ethicists as the disvalues of man. Any war based upon these disvalues is unjust. Whereas any war not influenced by these disvalues, but initiated by love to greater humanity and good intention of establishing justice and peace in human society - in a nation or in a community is just war. Unless the tradition of non-violence is nationally and emotionally established in human society, violence in such just war would not be overcome. Mahatma Gandhi, the practical pioneer of the principle on non-violence in India had shown that even the principle of *ahimsā*, led the oppressed to Satyāgraha movement. Of the different actions of this movement in different parts of our country, he was particularly in favour of disobedience, non-co-operation, direct action and fasting. But the last two actions, though essentially non-violent cannot be regarded as purely so. Direct action gave rise to violent activities in different places. And fasting which may lead to kill oneself by himself is also violence in a sense. The call of 'Quit India' given by Gandhi in 1942 was a kind of direct action of the Satyāgraha movement. It was not purely non-violent in different corners of our country. And fasting, which was to Gandhi, the last resort to conquer the enemy by awakening rationality and love in his heart, is certainly, a going towards suicide. Suicide is a type of killing - self-killing. So each and every killing or violence cannot be discarded in our practical world. Limited violence may necessarily be permitted in the case of just war. In reality, we have seen violence has been predominating over non-violence. Gandhi's violent death may be symbol of the victory of violence over non-violence. The same may be said in some restricted sense, about the murders of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi.

From these considerations, I am unanimous with Prof. Norman's view that unless a tradition of non-violence grows in the rationality of mankind, violence cannot be wiped out. Also in any just war -- war for the establishment of justice and righteousness in society, I disagree with him, violence may not be avoided.

IV

There is another case of violence permitted by the Hindu and Mohammadan ethicists - the case of physical tortures to award punishment to the evildoers. Although the inhuman punishment prescribed in the Hindu

Dharmaśāstras and in the Quran are not in vogue to-day, yet we find torture and killing of human beings who are identified as witches out of superstition in tribal Hindu societies. Above all, till now the legal authorities award the death penalty as a type of cruel killing is, no doubt, an act of violence. The question is : How can the principle of non-violence appear before us as consistent with the death penalty? Or, in other words, is this type of violent penalty morally justifiable particularly in the light of the principle of non-violence? The controversy between the retentionists and abolitionists in connection with the death penalty has not yet come to a compromise. Both groups have sound arguments. Killing somebody for awarding punishment may in some cases be permissible. But it is a very serious matter. It should not be permitted in the absence of weighing overriding reasons. That is to say, in the case, where the question of death penalty comes, the principle of non-violence may not keep itself rigid. "Most heinous offences", as Prof. Leiser contends, "against the state and against individual (such as crimes against the peace, security and integrity of the state) seem to deserve the death penalty. Because of the fact that if the claim that life is sacred has any meaning at all, it must be that no man may deliberately cause another to lose his life without some compelling justification."²² But if it is possible any day, I repeat, to establish a tradition of non-violence in the world then no such major crimes like unjustified terrorism and murder will take place and consequently the question of death penalty will not arise at all.

V

The Buddhist principle of non-violence is different from the Hindu-Mohammedan principle. Killing of man or animal for any purpose (for sacrificial rules, just or unjust wars, eating or awarding punishment) is strictly prohibited in Buddhist ethics. Rather the Buddhists in their religious practices revolted against the Hindu view of animal killing in sacrificial rites. Killing in war and awarding physical tortures or the death penalty as punishment is also out of question in non-violence principle of the Buddhist ethics. In the Dandabhāgga of Dhammapada, I repeat, it has been stated : "All tremble at punishment. All fear death, comparing others with oneself, one should neither kill nor cause to kill."²³ In regard to the method of non-violence which may be adopted by a king one may go through the Dighanīthaya (I. 134-42). I would like to quote the relevant text in the words of Hammalawa Saddhatissa. "In the

Kutadanta sutta ... we have the story of a king of a distant date by name Mahavijita, who finding himself possessed of great wealth, his treasure-houses and store-houses full, felt that he should perform a great sacrifice to show his gratitude. He consulted with his religious adviser who said, "Sir, it is remarked that the king's territory is oppressed with murderous attacks, seeking of villages, market towns and cities with ambush and robbery," ... It may be that the esteemed king feels : "I should put an end to that robbery - trouble by punishment, imprisonment, fire, fine or by making an example of somebody, or by exile," but it is not by that means that violence is slightly exterminated. Those who survive cause fresh difficulties. But by adopting this method (method of non-violence), the robbery trouble is rightly exterminated. In this case, to those in the king's territory, who work on the land, cultivating and farming, let him distribute food and seeds; those who are traders, let him make a grant; to those who are in service let him consider food and wages. These men, attached to their own work, will not make trouble; they will help in the raising of revenue and the country will be free from oppression ... "24 In fact, historically speaking, the kingdoms ruled by the Buddhist Kings accepting the principle of rigid non-violence were peaceful for a long long time. Fahsien writes, "Of all the countries of Central India this (i.e. Magadha in the Buddhist period) has the largest cities and towns. Its people are rich and emulate one another in practising charity of heart and to one's neighbour."25 The Kingdom of the Buddhist Ashoka was a golden Kingdom in all respects, so far the historians certify.

VI

Now the Question is : What type of non-violence is acceptable to-day - the Buddhist type or the Hindu - Mahammedan type? At this stage of human civilization, the answer may be very simple. The Buddhist type may be ideal; but may seem to be impractical; but the Hindu -Mohammedan type is realistic and acceptable. Although a group of thinkers, nowadays, are in favour of Vegetarianism, one cannot even imagine now that animal killing for eating purpose will be stopped any day. Secondly, many inventions in medical science require of the torture and killing of animals, killing of man particularly in just war cases, though debatable, cannot be avoided even on human ground. The death penalty, particularly in some justified cases, may be required for the sake

of greater good of human society. Besides these cases of violence, which may roughly be called just, violence may be avoided, if we may rationalise the situation giving rise to violence.

But inspite of this, it may be emphasised that the principle of non-violence advocated by the Buddhists must be the highest end of humanity as a whole.

If reason be the guiding force of human civilization, then why shall we aim at violence? Reason may justify violence also. As Kant, the celebrated rationalist philosopher is found to be an advocate of violent retributive theory of punishment. But the reason, which is needed to establish a non-violent tradition in human society is the reason blended with human emotion viz. love or loving kindness. Love is the positive and more fruitful counterpart of non-violence. This love or loving kindness may be acquired by extensive efforts of educated people of the society. In different Buddhist Texts, the methods of the acquisition of love have been furnished. This love-centric non-violence theory is greater than western pacifism which implies inaction.

However, while emphasising the Buddhist position we cannot underestimate the Hindu-Mohammadan contribution. "The Hindu Thinkers", says Saral Jhingram, "could not always succeed in deriving a morality of love and kindness to all from their grand vision of the identity of all selves with the universal self; but they were always conscious that this vision becomes meaningful only when one habitually sees all in the images of one's self and acts accordingly. This vision and its related moral virtues (daya sarvabhūteṣu, anasūyā, Kṣamā, akrodha, dāna etc.) have very well compensated for certain soul-centric tendencies of Hindu moral philosophy. Any future reconstruction of a Hindu philosophy of morals must first of all try to develop the Vedantic vision at a philosophical level, and thus make it the basis of a positive morality of universal love and compassion."²⁶ In the ethical teachings of Quran also it is upheld that love as a human ideal demands that man should love God as the complete embodiment of all moral selves above everything else. It is the love-force, with the help of which the human beings are compassionate and loving to one another, they walk on the earth in humility and hold to forgiveness. They are friends to others, and forgive and overlook their faults even though they are in anger"²⁷

It may be added that Gandhiji, while expressing the positive counter-part

of *ahimsā* has established that it is nothing but Love -- a kind of feeling of oneness. Due to this love or loving kindness, one can be non-violent. But such realisation of non-violence is not something passive. It is a dynamic process of mind that involves continuous and persistent deliberations, efforts, strains and actions. By these active efforts one can make one's mind free from the disvalues recognised by the moral philosophy of the Buddhists, the Hindus and the Mohammedans. Anger, malice, hatred, will to take revenge, jealousy etc. are such disvalues, which ultimately give rise to violence in society.

Though the principles of non-violence and loving - kindness have been preached by almost all the ancient ethicists of the world, violence and hatred have not disappeared. Communal riots, cast-conflicts, regional and racial conflicts, terrorism, aggression and violent attacks are usual events of different parts of the world and India. Particularly as Indians we are sometimes proud of carrying a long tradition of spiritualistic moral philosophy. But violence is still ruler of different parts of India. A Marxist would opine that the tradition of spiritualist moral philosophy is not sufficient for the abolition of violence. When historically proved class-struggle will come to an end, only then a non-violent and peaceful world-community will emerge. But to achieve this end he would necessarily grant violence to uproot the class-division of human society. This is a time-taking process. The fall of the socialism of U.S.S.R. and the countries of East Europe is not failure of Marxist philosophy. We may also accept the Marxist position, if it is realised that violence in the form of blood-shed revolution to build up a classless society is morally justified, if it is really a just war. Violence in just war, we have seen, has been permitted in Hindu-Mohammadan ethics. We have also defined just war. Briefly speaking a just war is that type of violence which arises out of sincerest love to the major portion of the people and for the sake of preservation and upliftment of humanity and human values. Without loving kindness to the most of the people violence will never cease and it will act only for the benefit of a few power-loving pseudo patriots. "The history of all hitherto is the history of class-struggles". This proposition of the Manifesto of the Communist Party is true. But Marx and Engels aimed at the ultimate end of the class-war originated from this class-struggle -- ultimate end of the underlying violence in human society. In reality, a non-violent tradition may be

manifested only in a classless society. But unless we make us prepared to build up this tradition, unless we heartily believe in the morality of non-violence and realise the distinction between just and unjust violence, the world will never be a kingdom of classless human society. Let us try to arrange a meeting between Gandhi and Marx and hope for a better future of human civilization.

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LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY OF NYĀYA SCHOOL

R. PATHIARAJ

In Indian thought, the Philosophy of language did not attain the status of a fully developed independent inquiry. But that does not mean that problems concerning language were not treated. Philosophy of language formed a part of epistemology, more precisely, the *pramāṇaśāstra*. Nyāya school of philosophy accepted four *pramāṇas* : *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *śabda*. Philosophy of language finds its due place under *śabda*.

The basic question of philosophy of language is: How does a linguistic utterance, through communication of its meaning, impart knowledge to the hearer? In this exposition, however, I would like to give a comprehensive view of Nyāya philosophy of language and concern myself with following topics : Linguistic units, the relationship between word and its meaning, comprehension of word, comprehension of sentence meaning, emergence of a unified sentence meaning, and the form of the resultant knowledge.

1. Linguistic units

Not going into the evolution of the Naiyāyika understanding of sentences and words, let us limit ourselves to the definition of the two linguistic units. The Naiyāyikas defined sentence as a cluster of words with a syntax which possessing the three properties of semmantic competency, syntactic expectancy and contiguity in space and time, expresses a complete thought, a combined meaning.¹ And what are words then? Jagadīśa (c. 1600 A. D.) defined word (*pada*) as a cluster of letters and a meaning-bearing element of a sentence.²

2. Word and its meaning

There exists a relation between the word 'cow' and the object cow that

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as soon as the word is grasped the other is presented to the mind. The relation between the word and the object (word and its meaning) is called *vyakti* or designatory function which is formed by (divine or human) convention. There are two types of designatory powers : *śakti* (denotative function or primary meaning) and *lakṣaṇā* (indicative function or secondary meaning). According to some, there is also a third power of words called the suggestive power.

a) Denotative function : It is the lexical meaning of the word. It is the primary meaning of the word, that sense in which it is normally used. And words could be classified into four groups according to their denotative function. (1) *Yaugika* : A word which retains the signification which belongs to it by its etymology. Eg. *pāthaka* (one who reads). (2) *Rūḍha* : A word which does not derive its signification from its roots but from convention. It does not mean that it cannot have etymological meaning but that the etymological meaning does not hold here. Eg. *Ghatah* (jar). (3) *Yogarūḍha* : These words are partly derivative and partly conventional. Eg. *pankaja*. By meaning of the component parts, this word would have referred to anything born in mud, but conventionally its meaning is so fixed that it expresses only the lotus which happens to be born in mud. (4) *Yaugikarūḍha* is either derivative or conventional. These words have two meanings one by derivation and the other by convention. *Udbhid* means a 'tree' by etymology and the name of a sacrifice by convention.

Regarding the relation between word and its meaning there is a problem that has plagued philosophers: where is the denotative function of a word? A proper name say, 'Rama', has its denotative function in the individual called Rama. The problem arises mainly in connection with those terms that we call class names (*jātiśabda*). Take for example the word 'cow'. It is used to refer to many cows, black, brown, white, a cow of the past, a cow of the present, a cow of the future and stone image of a cow. Hence there arises a question, where is its denotative function? Is it in the individual cows or in the universal 'cowness'? Buddhists (individualists) say that it is in the individual while the *mīmāṃsikas* claim that it is in the universal. *Naiyāyikas* try to strike a balance by saying that the denotative function is in the individual (*vyākṛti*), universal (*jāti*) and in the form (*ākṛti*). According to this definition denotative function of 'cow' is in the cow-individual, cow-universal and also in the form or image of a cow, for example, 'the golden cow'. The word '*ākṛti*' stands for the visible mark of the universal (particular configuration like appearance, shape, colour, action, etc.).

In a given context one factor may be predominant and the other factors not so evident. It does not mean that the other factors are absent, they are not useful in the context.³ The same thing is held by the navya-naiyayikas though they word it differently: denotative function is in the individual as characterized by the universal (the form being included in the universal).⁴

b) Indicative function (lakṣaṇā): It is the meaning assumed by the word because of the unsuitability of its primary meaning to the context. It is intentionally used by the speaker in that way. It is explained by the example of '*gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*'. It means, 'the village is on the *gaṅgā*'. *Gaṅgā* by its denotative function would mean the river, literally the 'flow of water'. The speaker would be speaking about an impossible state of affairs if it is taken in its primary meaning, for the village cannot be situated on the river! Therefore the circumstances demand that the meaning of the word *gaṅgā* be taken differently as, 'the banks of the river *gaṅgā*', due to its excessive proximity to the river. Given this meaning the sentence makes sense. Or the bus conductor calls out to his passengers, "Railway station get down". Obviously the 'railway station' is not travelling in the bus and the conductor is not asking the 'railway station' to alight from the bus! He is rather asking the 'passengers who are bound for the railway station' to get down at their destination.

c) Suggestive power: In addition to primary and secondary meaning, rhetoricians and literary critics claim that there is a third power of words called the suggestive power. For example from the sentence, '*gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*', we may comprehend the natural beauty of the village by its excessive proximity to the river. This is due to the suggestive power of words, they claim. But the Naiyāyikas reject the existence of such a separate power of words on two accounts:⁵ (1) The suggestive power is resorted to only after the primary and the secondary meanings are grasped unlike the secondary meaning which is resorted to due to the unsuitability of the primary meaning in the context. (2) The suggestive power is hearer-relative and it is comprehended only by a sensitive reader. The sentence, 'The sun has set', may mean different things to different people. The thief may understand that the time has come to go out and steal. A priest on the other hand may comprehend that it is time to say his prayers and retire to rest. A lover may take it to mean that it is time to meet his beloved. For these two reasons Naiyāyikas refrain from accepting suggestive power of words.

3. Comprehension of the word

We have stated that the word has a special relation to its meaning so that whenever the word is perceived the meaning is brought to the mind of the hearer. So it becomes essential that the whole word be grasped to be able to perceive the meaning. If you can perceive the meaning without the word being fully pronounced then there will arise a problem as to the necessity of all the syllables of the word!

The word '*gauḥ*' is composed of three syllables g, au and ḥ. This word should be comprehended as a whole in order to convey its meaning. But the word '*gauḥ*' cannot exist as a whole since the syllables are pronounced in a sequence, one after the other. At no point of time does '*gauḥ*' exist as a whole. Each sound unit is destroyed soon after they are produced. When the speech is in the first sound 'g', it cannot be in 'au' and 'ḥ'. When the speech is in 'au' the sound 'g' is destroyed and 'ḥ' is not yet produced. When the speech is in 'ḥ', the preceding syllables 'g' and 'au' are no more. How then is the word '*gauḥ*' grasped as a whole, so as to convey meaning? And yet it is our linguistic experience that we grasp the meaning. How?

Naiyāyikas say that, at the utterance of the last sound the memory impressions of the preceding sounds are brought to mind and both together give rise to the cognition of the word as a whole which then gives the meaning.⁶ Grammarians say that the letters convey the *sphoṭa* (indivisible meaning-bearing symbol which manifests the meaning) and the *sphoṭa* reveals the meaning.⁷ Naiyāyikas criticized the *sphoṭa* doctrine as an unjustified postulation.⁸ Grammarians held *sphoṭa* to be something altogether different from the letters that reveal them. Naiyāyikas say that a word is composed of letters and therefore a composite fact. A composite fact (*sphoṭa*) cannot be entirely different from its constituent parts. And also it is our linguistic experience that we do not grasp anything other than the letters (as distinct from the letters).

4. Comprehension of sentence meaning

Verbal knowledge (*śābdabodha*) is the knowledge derived from the linguistic utterance. It is not same as perceptual and inferential knowledge in as much as the structure of knowledge gained from the utterance of the speaker

has a specific structure unlike the others. Moreover even the way we get the knowledge demands that it be treated separately.

There are some factors which are essential for verbal knowledge. The hearer, to have knowledge from the utterance of the speaker, should be linguistically competent member of the same linguistic community as the speaker. Then speaker's linguistic utterance will trigger off a process in the hearer which can be given by I+V--R, where 'I' is the instrumental cause, which in this case is the knowledge of the words (auditory perception), 'V' is the *vyāpāra* (the intermediate cause) or the operation to which the instrument (*karaṇa*) is subjected by the agent, which in this case is the recollection of the meaning of the words and 'R' is the resultant verbal knowledge from the utterance.⁸ Secondly, the hearer should have knowledge of the meaning of the words which the speaker utters. Only then the resultant verbal knowledge will occur.

Hearing from a man who speaks a language which I do not know (eg. French) can I have verbal knowledge? Obviously not, because I do not know the French words and their significance. Even in one's own tongue, if a pundit uses technical terms, he will not comprehend the meaning, because he does not know the meanings of those words. So if the hearer is not familiar with the words and their denotations he cannot have verbal knowledge from the utterance. *Vṛtti* is the connection between the word and its meaning. An awareness of it is called *vṛttijñāna*. The general nomological rule says that wherever such a cognition of the connection between the two items is present, a cognition of one, will generate the remembrance of the other. Hence, if words are cognized, the meanings are presented to the mind of the hearer.⁹ *Vṛttijñāna* is therefore noted as an auxiliary factor.

There are other auxiliary factors which an expression should possess, of which the hearer should be aware, which play an important role in the production of verbal knowledge. They are *āsatti*, *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and perhaps also *tātparya*.

Āsatti or physical proximity" It refers to the spatio-temporally uninterrupted sequence of words in an expression. 'John is dead' written on three different pages or uttered at an interval of an hour each, or interrupted by irrelevant words (Eg. John French a is minister dead) would not generate verbal knowledge.

Ākāṅkṣā or syntactic expectancy: It refers to the desire on the part of the hearer to know the other words or their meaning to complete the sentence meaning. The utterance, 'please bring' will leave the hearer wondering as to what is to be brought, because the very 'bring' expects an object to complete its sense.

Naiyāyikas distinguish between psychological *ākāṅkṣā* and syntactical *ākāṅkṣā*. They define (syntactical) *ākāṅkṣā* as the "interdependence of the lexical items (nominal and verbal stems) and the grammatic elements (nominal and verbal suffixes) as well as the interdependence of certain grammatical categories (verbs, agents, instruments, etc.) among themselves."¹⁰ Eg. In the sentence, *ghaṭam ānaya*, nominal stem *ghaṭa* needs to be associated with the accusative ending - *am* (*karmatvam*) to express the meaning of the accusative. This is syntactic expectancy with a word, between the word base and the suffix. *Gaṅgeśa* defined syntactic expectancy as "the accompaniment of one string X with another string Y in such a way that X would not generate cognition of the meaning, unless accompanied by Y".¹¹ There is syntactic expectancy between word A and Word B, if the utterance of A cannot contribute to the knowledge of the sentence meaning without being in combination with the word B. Psychological *ākāṅkṣā*, can be illustrated with an example: 'Please give me a paper'. This sentence is complete. The hearer might still ask 'what paper do you want? What colour and what size?' This is over and above the complete meaning of the complete sentence. And for this reason, naiyayikas restrict themselves to the syntactical *ākāṅkṣā*.

We do meet a lot of grammatically incorrect expressions, not possessing *ākāṅkṣā* (eg. a language learner's first exercise in composition) of which we seem to understand the meaning. In this case, do we have *śābdabodha*? If we answer in the affirmative, then, *ākāṅkṣā* does not seem necessary for verbal knowledge. Naiyāyikas say that we do not have *śābdabodha* directly from that sort of an utterance. The incorrect expressions remind us (due to similarity and dissimilarity and of the hearer's familiarity with the language) of the correct expressions, which then generate the required knowledge. This knowledge should be distinguished from *śābdabodha* as it did not arise directly from the words of the utterance.

Yogyatā or semantic competence: It is the mutual agreement of the meanings of the component parts of the sentence.¹² 'Drink bananas' and 'pigs fly' do not have *yogyatā* because the meanings of 'drink & bananas' and 'pigs & fly' do not fit although grammatically both the expressions are correct. In short this is the fitness condition. 'He sprinkles with fire' shows a sort of ontological impossibility because by its definition 'fire' is not as object that we sprinkle with. 'This mother is a barren woman' on the other hand shows a logical impossibility: motherhood and barrenness. Nyāya school filters these two impossibilities under *yogyatā*. But one can contend that 'he sprinkles with fire' and 'green ideas sleep furiously' are used in riddles and poems as metaphors. We understand their meanings too. Does it mean that they generate *śābdabodha*? Fitness condition or *yogyatā*, *naiyayikas* hold, is applicable only to the actual world. In the realm of fiction and fantasy such a test will not be needed.¹³

Where does the domain of *ākāṅkṣā* end and that of *yogyatā* begin? Why is the requirement of a liquid for sprinkling a matter of *yogyatā* and not of *ākāṅkṣā*? Navya-naiyayikas resolved the issue by saying that the concept *yogyatā* be restricted to the lack of verbal contradiction (contradiction of words) or logical impossibility as expressed in 'what is without fire has fire'. Water as an instrument of sprinkling would be included in this view in the domain of *ākāṅkṣā*. B. K. Matilal is of the same opinion that the *ākāṅkṣā* is to be connected with syntax and grammaticality and *yogyatā* with semantics.¹⁴

Tātparya or intention of the speaker: One cannot possibly make an entry into the mind of the speaker to know his intention. If it was possible the communication would have become superfluous! The intention of the speaker is not a causal factor for verbal knowledge for it is possible to have *śābdabodha* even from the utterance of parrots and water marks made on a stone by the waves. But in an utterance involving homonyms (words having more than one meaning) or homophones (a word having the same sound as another but of different meaning), the intention of the speaker acquired through an intelligent guess from the context is a necessity to solve the ambiguity.¹⁵ The word *saindhava* has two meanings 'salt' and 'horse'. '*Saindhavam ānaya*', if uttered while the man is at meals, in all probability he wants some salt and not a horse.

5. Unified sentence meaning

The meaning that emerges from '*nīloghatah*' is 'the jar is blue' or 'the jar is identical with that which is blue' or 'the jar is qualified by that which is blue'. How does this meaning emerge? In other words, from the meaning of the individual words of the sentence, how do we come to know the sentence meaning as a whole?

There are two views concerning this. Bhartṛhari's view is called sentence-holism. He held that the sentence as well as their meanings are unanalysable units, indivisible *sphoṭa* (*vākyasphoṭa*). The whole sentence reveals a *sphoṭa* which in turn communicate to the hearer its meaning in a flash of understanding (*pratibhā*). The other view is called atomism, held by Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya schools. Atomism is a theory which holds that the sentence is a composite entity composed of words, particles, etc. These elements are meaningful units of expression. According to Naiyāyikas, the sentence-meaning is conveyed by *saṃsarga*. It is translated as 'mutual linkage of word meanings', 'association of word meanings'¹⁶ and 'syntactical connection'.¹⁷ Their position is called *saṃsargamaryāda*. In '*Harir vihaḡam paśyati*' each word conveys its designatory meaning. Further more, 'bird' is related to the chief qualificand, 'Hari' by the accusative ending used in the word base '*vihaḡa-*' (*vihaḡam*). 'Hari' is related to 'seeing' by his mental effort which is represented by the verbal suffix '-ti' added to the verbal base '*paś-*' (*paśyati*). By these relations of the words the connected sentence meaning is made possible.

6. Form of the resultant knowledge

Naiyayikas classify *śābdabodha* under *savikalpajñāna* which is translated by Matilal as qualificative cognition.¹⁸ The qualificative cognitions are always expressible in the qualificand-qualifier model. Eg. *rakṡam puṡpam* (the red flower). Here the qualificand is the flower and the qualifier is the red colour. Using the expression Q (xy) for 'x is qualified by y', where x is the qualificand and y is the qualifier, the *śābdabodha* derived from the above sentence can be represented by Q (ce) (1) Where c and e are the flower and red colour respectively. It can be read as a flower is qualified by red colour'. The Indian logicians further analysed the concept 'flower' as 'a flower individual qualified

by flower-universal'. Hence (1) will become $Q(Q(cd)Q(ef))$ (2) Where d and f are flower universal and red universal respectively. It will be read as, 'a flower- individual is qualified by flower-universal and red colour which is qualified by red-universal'. Similarly the sentence, *rakṣa puṣpavati latā* will give a *śābdabodha* expressible as, 'a creeper individual is qualified by creeper-universal and flower-individual which is qualified by flower-universal and red colour which is qualified by red-universal'. It can be represented by $Q(Q(ab)Q(Q(cd)A(ef)))$ (3) where a and b are the creeper- individual and creeper-universal respectively. It will be noted that creeper individual holds a special place. It is simply a qualificand and never a qualifier. The other elements are either qualifiers or both qualifier and qualificand. Nyāya calls it the chief qualificand of the sentence.

Thus we find that the knowledge gained from an utterance has a specific form. It is one of the reasons that prevented the Naiyāyikas from placing *śabda* under inference or perception, in spite of criticism from other schools.¹⁹ The form of the perceptual knowledge arising from seeing a cat on the mat can be either 'The cat is on the mat' or 'The mat is under the cat'. It has no determinate structure. Similarly inferential knowledge from seeing smoke on the mountain can be of the form, 'The hill has fire' or 'There is fire on the hill'. But *śābdabodha* has a determinate structure. The sentence 'Cat is on the mat' has a specific form of knowledge which is expressible as 'The cat is qualified by its presence on the mat'. Thus knowledge from testimony cannot be assimilated into perception or inference.

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2. B.K. Matilal, *Logic, Language and Reality* (New Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1985), p. 401.
3. Kunjunni Raja, p. 70.
4. B. K. Matilal, *The Word and the World* (New Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 36.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.
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8. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
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10. *Ibid.*, pp. 420-422.
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14. *Ibid.*, p. 427.
15. Matilal, *The Word and the World*, pp. 53-54.
16. Kunjunni Raja, p. 208.
17. Matilal, *Logic, Language and Reality*, p. 413.
18. The points under this title are taken from *Ibid.*, pp. 408- 416.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 391.

HUSSERL'S NOTION OF OBJECTIVITY : A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS *

KOSHY THARAKAN

The various issues around which the fundamental controversies in philosophy of social sciences revolve concern the questions whether the method of social sciences is fundamentally similar to or different from that of natural sciences (Monism or Dualism), whether the terms of social scientific understanding pertain to individual agents or trans-individual phenomena (Intentionalism v/s Consequentialism), whether social sciences must commit to a realist ontology (Realism or Anti-realism) and whether the end of social sciences is description / explanation or critique etc. Underlying some of these seminal issues is the question whether social sciences can be objective, if so, how ? And if not, why not ? My paper deals with some aspects of this basic question from the point of view of the philosophical movement called phenomenology.

Phenomenology, as formulated by Husserl, is an attempt to ground all knowledge in unshakable foundation. The unrelenting search for certitude is the principal theme that underlies his works. Thus, Husserl proceeds from an attack on psychologism to phenomenology so as to describe the necessary structures of the world. Such a project leads him to transcendental subjectivity. Transcendental subjectivity constitutes the necessary structures of the world as correlates of its own intentional acts.

1. *The Structure of Intentionality*

The doctrine of intentionality of consciousness is the key to understand the notion of objectivity in phenomenological philosophy. According to Husserl,

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consciousness as always directed to some object-consciousness is consciousness of something. Intentionality consists in this directedness of consciousness. Thus, if all conscious acts refer to some objects, Husserl maintains that, object is constituted by the conscious act. The phenomenological analysis of consciousness reveals the noesis-noema structure of experience. Noesis is the objectifying act and noema is the intended object. In other words, noesis and noema correspond to the subject and object poles of experience respectively. Every noesis has its corresponding noema. However, the same object can be apprehended differently. That is to say that the many intended objects may refer to the same object grasped in various intending acts. This implies that there is an underlying unity or identity of different 'noemata' of varying acts. Without this unity we cannot support any claim to objectivity. Now, we may ask how does this unity emerge? An answer to this question points to the phenomenological concept of 'horizon'.

In perception an object is given in a perceptual field or horizon. Any object is perceived from various standpoints. These changes in view point are not accidental with respect to an initial perceptual act. These various perspectives are rather intrinsic to the object. Every actual perception implies an horizon of possible perceptions that are expected to occur. Husserl calls this anticipated set of possible perceptions 'internal horizon' (inner horizon). Apart from this there is 'external horizon' (outer horizon). An object perceived does not appear in isolation. There is no such thing in experience as an isolated object. It always stands in relation to other objects. An object appears amidst other objects simultaneously perceived. This is known as external horizon. To quote Husserl:

In seeing I always 'mean' it with all the sides which are in no way given to me, not even in the form of intuitive, anticipatory presentifications. Thus every perception has 'for consciousness' a horizon belonging to its object For consciousness the individual thing is not alone: the perception of a thing is perception of it within a perceptual field. And just as the individual thing in perception has meaning only through an open horizon of 'possible perceptions', insofar as what is actually perceived 'points' to a systematic multiplicity of all possible perceptual exhibitings to it harmoniously, so the thing has yet another horizon: besides this 'internal horizon' it has an external horizon precisely as a thing within a field of things; and this points finally to the whole world as a perceptual world.¹

Thus, we have seen that 'noema' has horizon both inner and outer, apart from a 'nucleus'- the central core of meaning or objective sense that invariantly presents in

different acts. But in transcendental perception as against immanent perception the object is not given completely and absolutely. The object of transcendental perception is capable only of a series of perspectives or profiles that is not fully determinable. An element of indeterminacy always hangs on. However, this indeterminacy does not lend to what Quine calls 'indeterminacy of meaning'. For Quine undetermination by experience necessarily leads to indeterminacy of meaning. Contrary to this, Husserl says:

Indeed, the indeterminateness necessarily signifies a determinableness which has a rigorously prescribed style. It points ahead to possible perceptual multiplicities which, merging continuously into one another, join together to make up the unit of one perception in which the continuously enduring physical thing is always showing some new "sides" ... in a new series of adumbrations. Accordingly, those moments of the physical thing which are also seized upon gradually become actually presented, the indeterminacies become more precisely determined and are themselves eventually converted into clearly given determination...³

That is, the unity of sense is accomplished by reason prescribing an idea of complete givenness as an *a priori* determination.⁴ In the course of perceptual process, if the anticipations implied in previous perception are fulfilled later, unification takes place. That is to say, if the possible perceptions are actualized, then identification of object is made possible thereby increasing the determinateness of the object.

In the noesis-noema structure of intentionality, we have so far analyzed the noema-the intended object, into nucleus and horizon. Similarly, if we analyse the noetic act, we can see that 'intending falls into direct visualizing of the object as well as aiming at its horizon'. Now, this 'aiming at' is always done with reference to a scheme of anticipations known as 'situations'.⁵ Situations arise out of the emotive and valuational modes of intending acts. We cannot ignore the situation as merely one of subjective traits, since as an attitude in regard to the object it has an important role in the constitution of the object.

It is clear now, that both the noetic act and noematic aspect of intentionality are vital in grounding experience. If we neglect the situatedness of intentional act and concentrate only on the noema, we fall prey to naturalism. On the other hand, ignoring the noema and attending only to the act loads us to unmitigated relativism. However, phenomenological analysis shows that both noesis and noema are the

two poles of the same pointer called intentionality of consciousness. Nevertheless the relation between noesis and noema is not one of equality. As Helmut Kuhn points out, noesis has primacy over noema. According to him, "The very objectivity of object is to be defined in terms of objectivating activity".⁶ Moreover, Husserl speaks of the object as constituted by the subjective sources. Then the question is: will it not end up in relativism? The answer lies in the notion of 'Lebenswelt' or 'Life-world'.

2. *Life World*

Life-world is the world of common experience. It is the world prior to the theoretical attitude. The theoretical attitude which idealizes entities paves the way to objective science. In other words, science is an ideal construct or theoreticological superstructure which has its basis in the life-world. Life-world, then is a pre-given world that exists for all in common. It is always taken for granted in all human life, in all human activities. The life-world is a realm of original self-evidences (self-giveness). Every mediate cognition confined to this domain has the sense of possibly perceivable as the thing itself, as self-given. Hence all verifications go back to these modes of self-giveness. The thing itself in this given mode of self-evidence is intersubjectively experienceable and verifiable. It is not a substruction of thought. Thus, we have life-world and objective-scientific world which is obtained by idealization. However, the knowledge of the objective-scientific world is grounded in the life-world. The meaning of science becomes intelligible only when one explores the relatedness of the scientific world to the life-world.

Life-world thus understood, comprises multiplicity and relativity. It is a subjective-relative world. To each one of us the objects in the world at large appear under the varying perspectives, according to one's point of view. Hence the life-world implies a community of individuals who interact with each other. It is a historical community. Thus, a life-world is relative to a certain society at a given moment of its history. However, there may be invariant structure of the life-world. As Husserl says:

No one ever thinks about the predications and truths which precede science, about the 'logic' which provides norms within the sphere of relativity, or about the possibility, even in the case of these logical structures conforming purely descriptively to the life-world, of inquiring into the system of principles that give them their norms *a priori*.⁷

So as to grasp the essential features of the life-world, Husserl subjects it to a series of epoche. The first epoche concerns the objective sciences, thereby precluding us to find any common objects of the life-world such as spatial shape, motion, sense quality etc. (these are all concerned with objective sciences). But our bracketing reveals that these are the same structures the life-world has despite its relative features. This general structure itself is not relative.

As life-world the world has, even prior to science, the 'same' structures that the objective sciences presuppose in their substitution of a world which exists 'in itself' and is determined through 'truths in themselves'... These are the same structures that they presuppose as a priori structures and systematically unfold in *a priori* sciences, sciences of the logos, the universal methodical norms by which any knowledge of the world existing 'in itself objectively' must be bound.⁸

Nevertheless, the spatio-temporal world that is prior to the theoretical attitude (the scientific attitude) is not one of ideal mathematical points or the straight lines or planes. The bodies in the life-world are actual bodies. Yet not in the sense of the physicist's actual bodies. In other words, these general features of the life-world, though they share the same names, are not concerned with theoretical idealizations and hypothetical substructions.

Now we have to make a separation in principle of the *a priori* of the life world from the objective *a priori*. This is achieved by the first epoche of all objective sciences along with all objective *a priori* sciences. It provides us the insight that the universal *a priori* of the objective sciences itself is grounded in a universal *a priori* of life-world. In the search of the general structure of the life-world, we come across the world as the universe of things, distributed within the world-form of space and time. It is the universal field of all actual and possible praxis as horizon. 'To live is always to live in certainty of the world'. It is to be conscious of the world and of oneself as living in the world. The *pregivenness* of the world effects a *givenness* of the individual things. Though things (objects) and world are inseparably united, there is a difference between the way we are conscious of both. We are conscious of things as objects within world-horizon. Each object is an object of the world horizon. We are conscious of this world horizon only as a horizon for existing objects. Thus relativity and multiplicity presuppose the world-horizon. Over and against the seeming relativity of the life-world, it exhibits an invariant structural framework or a conceptual scheme that incorporates the relative and changeable.

Nevertheless, such an attempt to overcome relativism looks trivial. What Husserl achieved is only a formal essence. Hence, Mohanty is right when he says that "What was threatened at the level of contents is thereby gained only at the level of form".⁹ Husserl himself realizes this. Hence he says: "...the first step which seemed to help at the beginning, that epoche through which we freed ourselves from all objective sciences as grounds of validity by no means suffices".¹⁰ So Husserl turns to a pre-given world itself. He carries out a universal epoche in which a total transformation of our attitude in the life-world is carried out. Through the universal epoche or transcendental reduction we discover the correlation between the world and world-consciousness. Transcendental reduction liberates one from the internal bond of the pre-giveness of the world to a realm of absolutely enclosed and absolutely self-sufficient correlation between the world itself and world-consciousness. By world consciousness Husserl means the conscious life of the subjectivity which validates the world. This transcendental subjectivity bestows meaning and ontic validity on the life-world. In other words, transcendental epoche effects absolute correlation between the life-world and transcendental subjectivity. However, Husserl cautions us that transcendental subjectivity is not a point of view or interpretation about the world. Every point or view or interpretation about the world is grounded in the pre-given world. By transcendental epoche the world becomes a phenomenon. Hence, transcendental subjectivity constitutes the world. This universal subjectivity / intersubjectivity is nothing but the mankind. However, the human beings are a component part of the world. This leads to a paradox: humanity as world-constituting subjectivity and yet as incorporated in the world itself. To resolve this paradox we have to look into the constitution of intersubjectivity itself. 'I' as the one who practises the epoche put all other human beings in the epoche including my empirical ego. Then 'I' as transcendental ego, first constitutes a primordial sphere of objects and constitutes in itself the alter-ego. Then in me another 'I' achieves ontic validity as copresent with his own ways of being self-evidently verified. The ego by its transcendental functions, exhibits transcendental intersubjectivity in its transcendental communalization and constitutes, in the functioning system of ego poles, 'the world for all'. Each subject in its transcendental mode, constitutes the world as world for all. Husserl says that

.....each human being 'bears within himself a transcendental I' - not as a real part or stream of his soul... but rather in so far as he is the self-objectification as exhibited through phenomenological self-reflection, of the corresponding transcendental I.¹⁴

Here, the paradox gets resolved: we human beings in the natural objective sense do belong to the world as real entities. But at the same time, these real entities themselves are phenomena and as such themselves object poles and subject matter for inquiring back into the correlating intentionalities. By the function of this intentionality alone the human beings have their ontic meaning.

Hence, Husserl, by virtue of transcendental epoche, transforms everything objective into transcendental subjectivity. In other words, objectivity in phenomenological philosophy resolves into transcendental subjectivity.

In his arguments against relativism in the *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, Husserl accuses the relativist of contradicting himself. The relativist makes claims that are supposedly objective truths which are later used to show that those very claims are not possible. In other words, the relativist assumes the nonrelative validity of his own concepts in order to show how any such theory or concept is relative. Do these arguments make Husserl an anti-relativist? David Carr answers in the negative. Carr draws some elements from Husserl's phenomenology which make a relativistic interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology tenable. As he points out, Husserl's search for 'The Given' - the unmediated objects in intuition - does not supply an irrefutable cognitive link to the external world. Since the perceptual objects in space and time are the most primitive objects, Husserl denies the availability of any sense-data beneath the directly given. Reflection on the sensation does not give any evidence for the existence of the objects but only makes claim about those experiences themselves.

Husserl makes a distinction between the object which is intended and the object as it is intended. This distinction is crucial as there are various ways in which an intention relates to its object. In other words, an object which is intended can be intended differently. From this, it follows that though Husserl holds the unmediated nature of objects, it is only with regard to the mediation by some other object. Husserl allows the mediation by concepts - thus the 'object as it is intended'. This distinction between object which is intended and object as it is intended is further developed into the analysis of 'profiles'. It speaks of the object as always seen from some angle or another. As has been mentioned earlier, the object of transcendental perception is never given fully. From this it follows that our perception of objects or cognitive experience of them is always

perspectival. With regard to the cognitive experience of an object, some other perspective is possible as other possible 'intending-as' is allowed. This leaves the object undetermined by our reference to it as other 'intending-as' make other possible references which has obvious implications of relativism. Moreover, the temporal character of consciousness as conceived by Husserl is prone to a relativistic interpretation. Consciousness is conceived as consisting of distinct phases. Thus the present has past and future with it through 'retention' and 'protention'. The passing experiences are held within the present as a background awareness as the future is anticipated in the present. The same of the present is derived from the past as well as the future anticipation. Now Carr argues that if we assume that each individual has a different experiential part and different concerns from each other, then each one confronts the world of his experience in a way that is unique to him or his community.

However, we cannot brand Husserl a relativist as he holds a teleological concept of history and consciousness. Husserl may well accept these relativistic implications but he overcomes relativism with his notion of intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity is the coincidence or consensus of simultaneous but different intendings of the same object or state of affairs. Though perceptual evidence does not guarantee intersubjective agreement it nevertheless appeals to it. Further, experience makes it forth coming. The role of communication of what one has perceived is emphasized by Husserl. Such a possibility of being able to communicate and consequently to understand what is being communicated is never ruled out. The very fact that the life-world is constituted by the transcendental intersubjectivity as its intentional correlate gives credence to the possibility of intersubjective agreement.

3. *Phenomenological Philosophy of Social Science*

For Husserl, science, like any other cultural fact is a product of human praxis. It takes shape form the interaction of the members of that professional community. It is an open community in so far as the works achived by the predecessors are taken up and continued by the successors. Criticisms, confirmations and corrections find their place in the activities of the community. This praxis aims at a justifiable agreement among its practitioners. Here Husserl anticipates the post-positivist philosophies of science.

Husserl criticizes the Galilean style of mathematizing the nature. It misunderstands the objective nature as something hidden from the life-world - a reality that is to be explored beneath the appearances of the life-world. For Husserl, objective nature is a regulative principle - an idea with respect to which members of the scientific community orient their work. The idea gets approximated in theories which are the products of the scientific praxis. By such a regulative principle, the subjectivity and relativity of common experience can be overcome in so far as these ideals guide and direct the specific human activity. For Husserl, to be objective means nothing but to have results attained by mutual criticism that withstand further criticisms.¹³ In other words, objectivity is consensus or coincidence of judgements shared by the members of a community. Now, we have to clarify the nature of this consensus. This consensus or coincidence is explained by the concept of truth. For Husserl, truth is not predicated of judgements but of affairs. It is an assertion of what is the case. This assertion is made possible by the phenomenological concept of 'evidence'. Evidence is a mode of consciousness, a manner in which an object is given to consciousness. The establishment of evidence has nothing to do with mysterious vision, rather it is an achievement of consciousness. It is established in the complex act of synthesis. The synthesis of evidence is a coincidence of empty intention and fulfillment. An intention is empty if we merely intend something as truly existing. In order to have evidence we have to identify it with intuitive fulfillment. Evidence thus becomes the experience of self-givenness of something. Then, truth is an idea of the correspondence between meaning intention and meaning fulfillment.¹⁴ Nevertheless, Husserl talks about truth as idealized rational acceptability.

In the logical sphere, in the sphere of statement, 'being truly' or 'actually' and 'being' something which can be shown rationally' are necessarily correlated. This holds, moreover, for all modalities of being all doxic positional modalities. Obviously, the possibility of the rational showing referred to here should be understood, not as empirical, but as 'ideal', as an essential possibility.¹⁵

Both natural sciences and social sciences grow out of the pre-scientific life-world as cultural accomplishments. Social sciences, or Humanistic sciences, as Husserl calls them, are the 'sciences of the human subjectivity in its conscious relation to the world as appearing to it and motivating it in the world as appearing it in action and passions and conversely it is the science of the world as the surrounding world

of persons."¹⁶ Social sciences thus deal with the mundane intersubjectivity. There is a difference in attitude between natural sciences and social sciences. Natural sciences have the theoretic attitude towards the objective world while social sciences are directed towards universal subjectivity, - towards the personal attitude as against the natural scientist's theoretical attitude. Thus, the attitude of the social scientist makes the pre-given life-world as his starting point. (S)he finds himself or herself in a world which surrounds him or her. (S)he is practically determined in different ways by this world and his/her praxis makes the world a new. Hence social sciences cannot be reduced to or entirely modeled on natural sciences.

Nevertheless, as R.J. Bernstein reminds us, we have to distinguish the various dimensions of the activity of the social scientists.¹⁷

1. A social scientist, like any other man, is a participant in the everyday life-world. (S)he interprets his/her own actions as well as of others.
2. As a social scientist, like any other scientist, (s)he interacts with his/her professional community.
3. As social scientist *per se*, (s)he is concerned with a representation and explanation of the structures of the everyday life-world. (S)he then takes a theoretical stance against the practical stance.

To sum up, we may say that the theories / hypotheses / explanations etc. are objective in the sense that they are subjected to intersubjective norms of the scientific community.

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REALISM, HOLISM AND SELF-JUSTIFICATION

TADEUSZ SZUBKA

In modern debate about realism - carried on in different areas and in various terminological frameworks - it is sometimes suggested that there is a way of resolving it that does not amount to a form of realism or anti-realism, but significantly goes beyond this opposition, or rather shows why one should refuse to take part in the debate. This view is attributed by some philosophers to the later Wittgenstein who - according to them - has convincingly pointed out what is wrong with the whole debate. The most interesting construals along these lines were put forward in recent years. They pay less attention to Wittgensteinian deflationary metaphilosophy, where philosophy is conceived as an unsystematic therapy avoiding any theory, and stress more his positive views on the nature of concepts and language. One such construal has been developed by Jane Heal.¹ Her views on this matter are worth discussing not only in the context of Wittgenstein exegetical scholarship, but also in the more substantive philosophical context. For she wants, after all, to say not what Wittgenstein might think about the issue of realism but that the *right* approach to the issue consists in and how it is to be supported.

In what follows I shall present Heal's approach to the realism debate and subsequently discuss the problems that her apparently intermediate and noncommittal view causes. It seems to me that the final outcome of this discussion contributes to the plausibility of the general claim that it is rather impossible to show why one should refuse to take part in the realism/anti-realism debate, or go significantly beyond it without committing oneself to a full-fledged realism or anti-realism. In other words; there is no third option in this debate.

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Heal starts from an account of what are the most basic elements in our realist practices'. Or what are largely uncontroversial necessary conditions of being a realist about any subject matter. She notices first that in most regions or uses of language not all language moves are permissible. That is to say, there are incompatible pairs of sentences, and when we sincerely assert one of them. e.g. 'This is a melon', we cannot, without self-stultification, assert another, 'This is not a melon', or 'This is an apple'. And she calls this idea that the two incompatible statements are not acceptable 'the principle of contradiction'. However it is worth noticing that although Heal makes here use of a term that is familiar to those having at least slight acquaintance with formal logic, this principle is not strictly the same as the relevant formal principle, since incompatibility, according to her, holds not only between statements where one is formed from another by addition of negation. Incompatibility is determined in most cases on the basis of content of the involved expressions, and not only on the basis of their form. Obeying a principle of contradiction so understood is the first necessary condition of being a realist, thus if any region of discourse is not subject to this principle (e.g. moral discourse), it cannot be interpreted realistically.

The second necessary condition of being a realist about any subject matter is taking for granted that the subject matter is independent of our thoughts. In other words, "the mere existence and nature of my thought does not constitute the existence of what it is thought about, i.e., does not make the thought correct".² Heal notices that this statement of what is called by her 'epistemological independence' is sometimes connected with other controversial claims, for instance, that there is a reasonable possibility that each of my beliefs is false, or even if we agree on some ideally well established theory, it can turn out to be false. But these are additional claims which need not form part of a realist standpoint.

The third necessary condition of realism is connected with the attitude towards disagreements concerning which one of the incompatible moves should be made. According to realists the disagreements are to be continued until we reach either agreement on the question involved, or we recognize that it is impossible to make the final verdict on the issue and to remove the disagreement. Heal puts this point in the following way :

So the realist thinks that there is a defensible hope of convergence - in the somewhat limited sense that if a verdict on the matter is reached at all it will, with enough open mindedness and in favourable conditions of investigation be the same verdict. But this does not commit him to thinking that every question which is realistically construed, and rightly so construed, is in fact resolvable even in principle.³

These three conditions constitute what is the most basic in our realist practices. They form what Heal describes as minimal realism. But the natural question arises why we accept this minimal realism, and whether we can give such an explanation of it which at the same time justifies it. In other words : is it possible to produce a *Justificatory explanation* of our realist practices, and what form can this explanation take ? According to Heal there are three possible kinds of such an explanation, namely, mirroring realism, pragmatism and quietism, but only the last is defensible.

Mirroring realism dwells heavily on and elaborates the second condition of minimal realism. It claims that our realist practices are to be explained by the fact that we are confronted with an independent world with a determinate character or nature, and our concepts correspond closely to the natural kinds existing in the world. Moreover, at least some of our thinking grasps accurately the world as it is in itself.

We may say, then, that this mirroring perspective on our realist practices adds to the *epistemological* independence emphasized in minimal realism the extremely important extra element of *conceptual* independence. It is not only our individual judgements which are answerable to something other than themselves for their truth or falsity; the very concepts in terms of which they are couched must also (if the judgements are to be of the real) answer to something 'out there' and independent of us.⁵

Heal criticizes two kinds of mirroring realism : sense datum empiricism which can be discerned as an important factor in Quine's work and B. Williams' idea of an absolute conception of the world. Let us take for granted, for the sake of argument, that these criticisms are correct and can be easily generalized to all varieties of mirroring realism. So we can now consider the second way of explanation and justification of minimal realism, namely pragmatism.

According to pragmatism the only way to explain and justify our realist practices is to point out that these practices are useful for us, help us to cope with the world, etc. The minimal realism is then adopted as the result of a *decision*:

For the thorough going pragmatist then, everything, including the very idea of there being incompatible judgements obeying the law of non-contradiction, is up for grabs. There is no feature of current practice which he is not prepared to contemplate abandoning; and his taking seriously what he does now take seriously is, he says, the outcome of choice.⁶

For many, stresses Heal, such an explanation will be unsatisfactory, since according to them this explanation should proceed on the level of opinion, and not decision. But even if this case against pragmatism could be dismissed as simply question begging, there is a still deeper and more devastating challenge the impossibility of explaining within the pragmatist framework the pressure of that what seems to be somewhat given, what impinges on us and with what we must actively cope. Thus pragmatism not only is unable to explain and justify minimal realism, but rather requires it for its own justification.

The only promising way of explanation and justification of minimal realism seems to be then quietist realism. Heal gives the following description of this standpoint:

Quietist realism finds both pragmatist and mirroring realist attempts at justification of linguistic practice misguided. It denies that we can make any sense of the choice that the pragmatist supposes us to make and denies also that the idea of a, so to speak, pre-sliced world makes sense. It invites us instead to become aware of the interlocking complexities of our thought and action and to become aware also of how little sense or use we can make of the idea of (certain sorts of) things being otherwise.⁷

This general description receives more determinate shape when Heal discusses the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein, which she treats as the most vivid and characteristic expression of quietist realism. 'The interlocking complexities of our thought and action' are expounded by way of a closelink between our interests and projects, on the one side, and our concepts and judgements, on the other side. 'Close' in this context means the following; this link is not external and

contingent, and therefore it is not that we have fully determined sets of concepts or judgements and decide, on the basis of our interests and projects, which of them will actually be used by us. It is rather that our interests and projects are constitutive of our concepts and judgements. They all together form a part of the way we live our lives and cope with the world. However, although - contrary to mirroring realism - we are makers of our concepts and judgements, it does not mean that we also make them correct ones. There is an important role which the world has to play here. As Heal neatly puts it :

Our situation then is this. We are not in a position to determine the success of our enterprises. We propose things to the world, but the world disposes. ⁸

From these elucidations one can infer why there is 'little sense or use we can make of the idea of (certain sorts of) things being otherwise'. Since all our concepts, judgements, interests, and projects constitute an interlocked whole, any new concepts and any new connections established (e.g. by proof) change this whole and modify the range of possibilities. We can have no guarantee at any point that we have considered all possibilities, that we have taken into account all ways things could be different. They are merely possibilities from a particular point of our way of life, and other possibilities might emerge.

II

Quietism, as presented above, appears - at the first sight - to be a modest and reasonable view that is opposed to two positions deriving "from the ill-conceived notion that reflection may somehow capture an Olympian standpoint from which the claim to objectivity of a linguistic practice - a language game" - can be reviewed'.⁹ But, of course, if quietist realism is to be satisfactory, it must tell us why reflections cannot reach this 'Olympian standpoint'.

It seems that the first and important step towards justification of quietist stance on the realism debate should be the viability of holism, which is arguably the crucial doctrine of this stance. Roughly speaking this is a doctrine claiming 'that our concepts do not come isolated. To understand a concept is to see it at work in its setting'.¹⁰ One can conclude from this statement and the above presentation of Heal's position, that the holism that is involved here is a version of semantic

holism. It mainly affects an account of how meanings of our words are constituted and grasped. Heal does not claim that her holism ascribes meaning primarily to certain whole (entire theories, language games, etc.) and only derivatively to smaller units, as words or sentences. She argues that meanings are quite properly, and in no secondary sense, ascribed to such smaller units, but at the same time insists that a necessary condition of having these meanings is the presence and absence of other meaningful elements. Thus according to a semantic holism which she is prepared to defend :

The meaningfulness of the whole is not prior to that of the parts, in any significant way, conceptually, causally or metaphysically. We cannot make sense of the idea that the whole should have meanings it does without the individual parts bearing their appropriate meanings. So the slogan the fundamental unit of meaning is the whole' would be highly misleading as a summary of this sort of holism...The central idea now is rather that meaning necessarily involves complexity.¹¹

Heal believes that her 'moderate' semantic holism is significantly different from the semantic holism discussed and criticized by J. Fodor.¹² The latter is based on the idea that the identity of a propositional attitude is determined by the totality of its epistemic relationships, and leads to a preposterous consequence that two persons differing in their views about these relationships cannot share any propositional attitude and hence mean the same by any statements which they make. In other words, if we take any two individuals we can be faced only with two possibilities : they have exactly the same propositional attitudes (beliefs, etc.,) or totally different. Heal thinks that she is able to avoid the preposterous consequence, since her holism requires merely that in the constitution and expression of meaning the whole of a person's utterances plays a certain role. She writes:

But we have not said that there will be only one suitable setting in which a given meaning can occur, so we are not committed to the view that any difference between two whole must make every meaning expressed in the other. And to say...that every statement in a whole collection is relevant to (has a potential bearing on) the meaning of any other given statement is not to say that a change in the former must necessarily correlate with change in the meaning assigned to the latter.¹³

However such an assurance is hardly convincing without some explanation of what besides the wholes, individuate the meanings of individual words or concepts and sentences or beliefs, and is in fact, a prevailing factor in keeping their identities.

One possible explanation is suggested by a certain interpretation of the above mentioned slogan : 'We propose things to the world, but the world disposes'. Maybe it is so that our concepts and beliefs are individuated, for the most part, by their causal connections with the world. This would allow us to say that a given concept or belief can be a part of various wholes, being all the time the same concept of belief due to the fact that it was caused by the same state of affairs. Notwithstanding the current popularity of this line of thought, Heal is not ready to embark on it. The main reasons are not only the well-known troubles with singling out the relevant causes of a given concept or belief and excluding so-called 'deviant' causal chains, but first and foremost that according to quietist realism when states of affairs or facts 'impinge upon' a person, they encounter a subject already possessing a complex set of beliefs and living a specific life. This being so, the 'output', in the form of a concept or belief, depends on a given occasion not only upon current 'input' but also upon previous and innumerable inputs. If we take this seriously, it is rather unlikely that the causal factor will be able to keep the identities of concepts or beliefs across different meaningful wholes.

Another explanation of the preservation of these identities relies on the idea of the stable analytical or logical connections between the elements of our language of discourse. The existence of such a framework allows us to claim that in different wholes we have still the same concept or belief because it has the same inferential or deductive powers, etc. But the availability of this explanation depends on accepting the analytic-synthetic dichotomy and on an account of the stability of logical connections. But this explanation is scarcely available to Heal. She is not prepared to embrace the analytic-synthetic dichotomy. Indeed she seems sympathetic to the Wittgensteinian line in the philosophy of mathematics, the line hostile to Platonism and conventionalism but agreeing in the end that the logical or mathematical necessities are essentially conditional upon our linguistic practices that might be perhaps changed, although at present we do not see a reason for this change and even cannot imagine it.

Thus the foregoing considerations seem, to lead to the conclusion that Heal's 'moderate' semantic holism is not really different from the semantic holism criticized by Fodor, at least as far as its inability to avoid the preposterous consequence that any difference in the views of two individuals makes their concepts and beliefs totally different.

But at this point someone might contend that these criticisms appear successful because they are based on an oversimplified account of Heal's holism. The crucial component of that account is a conception of language as an integral part of a specific way of living, as constituted by a form of life.¹⁴ And it is this dimension of the holism in question that makes it really moderate, and hence it is able to block the preposterous consequence pointed out by Fodor.

However even granting that this is indeed so, one should notice that such holism 'imports' philosophical claims that are hard to justify given the perspective of quietist realism. To put it differently, it creates serious problems with the self-justification of quietism. To see these problems clearly consider the following passage from Heal's book :

But right across the board we need to be coaxed out of the impulse to metaphysical speculation, to be persuaded that we can and should be content with that understanding of our concepts which comes from seeing how judgements using them are placed in a context of actions, interest and other judgements, so that together they constitute the only sort of life that we have any idea how to live.¹⁵

It seems to follow from this that we are to be 'coaxed out of the impulse to metaphysical speculation' (i.e., from mirroring realism or pragmatism) by a particular understanding of ourselves and our activities. We may say then that to justify realism we need some kind of philosophical anthropology.

In fact, this anthropology is in this case quite determinate, and it is not, contrary to appearances, merely a set of philosophically innocent common places. Its central idea is the Wittgensteinian image of a human being who is bound by various kinds of not easily separable relationships with other human beings and the world. In particular, his or her knowledge is inextricably connected with action, and is the result not merely of grasping what is objectively out there, but

also his or her way of life. Knowledge changes our way of life, but also our way of life has a great impact on the content of our knowledge. We cannot even say what it would be like for us to live a different life. In general, it is a vision of a human being more as an agent than a spectator, whose life is not to be explained in terms of separate faculties (theoretical reason, practical reason, etc.)

But now the question arises how we have obtained such insights about ourselves. In the passage quoted above Heal speaks about *seeing* how judgements are placed in a context of actions, interests, and other judgements. We have been told earlier also that we should 'become aware of the interlocking complexities of our thought and action'. But what is the mechanism of this seeing and how are we *becoming aware* of all these facts about us, without presupposing mirroring realism? To put it more generally: is it possible to justify quietist realism without inconsistency, e.g. without making use of mirroring realism?

There are at least two possible answers to this question. The first is based on the idea of the naturalness of quietist realism. We can refer here to Wittgenstein's idea of assembling reminders and to the following passage from *Philosophical Investigations*:

What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings; we are not contributing curiosities, however, but observations which no one has doubted, but which have escaped regard only because they are always before our eyes. (I,415)

But if we assume the existence of such obvious, almost self-presenting facts, which are not noticed only owing to a radical distortion of our perspective, we must at the same time acknowledge that at least some parts of reality, namely we ourselves, are self-presenting that is given to us in the way postulated by mirroring realism. This is a consequence of the fact that, according to quietist realism, the idea of knowing subject(s) standing in a special cognitive relation to external reality is a myth. There are only human beings or persons who are complex objects in the world and whose knowledge processes are interwoven with and modified by other activities. So if we take this for granted, the obvious and self-presenting facts about us are in an unambiguous sense obvious and self-presenting facts about a part of the world.

Because this appeal to the idea of naturalness seems to lead inevitably to inconsistency or making a concession to the mirroring realist, one can attempt to give the idea of naturalness a historicist shift, and to argue in the following way: the general image presupposed by the quietist realist is a part of the general worldview hidden behind almost all contemporary philosophies.¹⁶ It is unlikely then that this worldview, at which we arrived after a very long course of history could be false. But to strengthen this conclusion we must add that it is impossible to imagine or even comprehend the possibility of more adequate world view. This additional claim is at odds with the quietist realist's view on possibilities, however. Concepts, categories and distinctions do not come isolated. They are only understandable in their proper setting. The same applies, says Heil - following Wittgenstein - to the notion of possibility :

And the fact is that we are not trained in, we have in our lives no role for, assessing the possibility of every kind of conceptual combination. We talk of possibility in a variety of contexts - some having to do with derivations in formal systems, some with whether men can swim rivers, pegs fit into holes or diamonds are to be found in boxes. In these contexts we know what to do with the notion of possibility - how to go about establishing whether or not something is possible and what accepting the judgement might lead to.¹⁷

Consequently, what possibilities are open in the area of the general views of the world depends on our present perspective and interests. Any changes in the latter will influence the range of possibilities.

If the remarks above are right, it seems that we are forced to the second answer to the question how to justify quietist realism without inconsistency. Any justification of quietist realism must satisfy quietist principles. In this case one can certainly be consistent and there is no need to impose any external limitations on quietism. One can even praise this a virtue of quietist realism by arguing in the following way : a comprehensive view is in trouble if its self-application cannot coherently be carried through. For instance, one of the trouble if its self-application cannot coherently be carried through. For instance, one of the important requirements for any general view about meaning and truth is the condition that such a view must be self-applicable, on pain of undermining itself.

The same goes for quietist realism which is obviously a general comprehensive view. But such an answer has its own difficulties.

On the first sight such a solution appears to beg the question: it simply presupposes what it has to justify. It is almost like saying: there is no question of justifying quietist realism, provided that we accept the quietist view on the nature of justification. But even if a convincing case can be made that this is not so, that transference of quietist realism from a substantial level to meta-level shows only how all-embracing and unavoidable is this perspective, one has still to deal with the problem how to support the philosophical anthropology embedded in quietist realism which is also transferred to the meta-level.

At this stage of the argument, in order to remove the threat of *regressus ad infinitum*, one can again refer to idle attempts to reach an Olympian standpoint on God's eye view. Wittgenstein's considerations about the limits of justification can also be invoked here. But due to these limitations and reservations quietist realism begins to lose its attractiveness. For many it is not a full-blooded philosophical theory that aims to explain and justify our realist practices, and cannot stand on a par with mirroring realism and pragmatism. It is just a not very well motivated resignation from taking part in the debate, resignation which has no explanatory force. One may even be tempted to say that it is simply an expression of philosophical despair.

These difficulties and the shaky status of that what can be called here the metaphilosophy of quietist realism, were felt by the later Wittgenstein who still oscillated in his philosophy between a transcendental and an anthropological stance.¹⁸ For someone, as Heal, who wants to build more systematic philosophical view on Wittgenstein's insights, there is an urgent question to be solved concerning which of these two stances should prevail on the metaphilosophical level.

However be that as it may, one can plausibly argue that all these troubles suggest that quietist realism is not actually a stable and satisfactory intermediate position between mirroring realism and pragmatism, or to put it more generally a view that transcends both realist and anti-realist standpoints, as well as their shortcomings. If one systematically unpacks the consequences that were always embedded in a particular form of life which forces us to use certain concepts in making judgements about the world, then it tends to slide into a form of anti-

realism. And its apparent attractiveness comes mostly from the fact that it is contrasted by Heal with very unattractive alternative, especially with mirroring realism which, as she holds, "goes naturally together with the idea of a given totality of metaphysical possibilities or ways that things might be."¹⁹ Contrary to that it seems plausible that the link of full-blooded realism with this idea is merely a casual one, and that there are viable forms of realism which do not accept it. But this is a separate issue and it requires a separate paper.²⁰

NOTES

1. Heal (1989). For another similar attempt see Diamond (1991)
2. Heal (1989), p. 16
3. *Ibid.*, p. 19
4. This term is, of course, an echo of the famous book of R. Rorty's (1979)
5. Heal (1989), p. 24. She seems to distinguish here sharply between sup-posed weak or uncontroversial independence (epistemological) which forms part of minimal realism, and controversial or strong independence (conceptual) which is distinctive to mirroring realism. But it is not at all clear how it is possible to secure epistemological independence without any form of conceptual independence, especially when the former is so conceived that it is really a form of ontological independence, in as much as it amounts, roughly, to the following claim: the fact that a person *S* thinks that *p* is one thing, and that *p* is the case is another. This, of course, by itself does not show that mirroring realism is true, i.e., that the world must come pre-sliced, or must bring with it the categories in which it is properly to be described, but at least it puts into doubt the possibility of non-committal construal of minimal realism, the construal that is not biased towards full-blooded realism or antirealism. It looks like epistemological, ontological and conceptual independence are more deeply connected than Heal is willing to admit.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 123
7. *Ibid.*, p. 24

8. *Ibid.*, 177
9. This is a description of quietism taken from C. Wright (1992), p. 202.
10. Heal (1989), p. 225
11. *Ibid.*, p.87.
12. Heal refers to Fodor's account of holism in his (1987). For a more recent and detailed critical discussion of holism see his book written with E. Lepore (1992). Heal (1993/ 4) is a response to the anti-holistic arguments of this book.
13. Heal (1989), p.91.
14. Such a view is dubbed by Fodor and Lepore (1992) an *anthropological* holism; they formulate its main thesis in the following way: "there is an internal connection between being a *symbol* and playing a role in a system of *nonlinguistic* conventions, practices, rituals, and performances - an internal connection, as one says, between symbols and Forms of Life" (p.6).
15. Heal (1989), p. 215
16. This worldview (of human beings as predominantly agents) is described and contrasted with the former medieval and modern worldview by E. Craig (1987).
17. Heal (1989), p. 225
18. As excellently shown by J. Lear (1986).
19. Heal (1989), p. 220
20. I am very grateful to Bill Brewer, Edward Craig and Hohn Heil for reading a draft of this paper and making useful comments. I have also profited from critical notes sent to me by Jane Heal, in spite of the fact that I have finally decided to stick to my guns.

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BERKELEY'S IDEALISM - INTERNAL REALISM AND THE INCOMMENSURABILITY - THESIS

TARITMOY GHOSH

Introduction

Some philosophers, the common people and scientists think that the world is constituted by objects - animate and inanimate. They really exist in the world whether we know them or not. Their existence and nature do not depend on us. This view is well known as realism. Celebrated kinds of realism are materialism, causalism, experimental realism etc. Though they are different kinds of realism, they all advocate mind-independent reality.

Some philosophers denying the realistic approach have tried to establish their views by saying that without mind the world is empty. The existence of the world depends on mind. This view is called anti-realism. Idealism, Positivism, Pragmatism etc. are well known types of anti-realism. At present, Internal realism of Putnam, Incommensurability theories of T.S. Kuhn and P. Feyerabend are also popular as forms of anti-realism.

In this paper, my aim is not to compare realism with anti-realism. What I want to do is to throw some light on Internal realism of Putnam and Incommensurability theories of T.S. Kuhn and P. Feyerabend in the context of Berkeley's idealism.

Berkeley's Idealism

Bishop Berkeley at first refutes the so called realistic approach that the world consists of a totality of mind-independent objects by saying that objects are mind-dependent for their existence. Only perceivable objects are real. Objects which cannot be perceived have no existence at all. Sometimes we imagine some objects but we can not perceive them. So they are not real. He argues that only the sensible objects or things or ideas are real.

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Idea is identical with object or thing or quality to Berkeley. He says, "Ideas actually (1) imprinted on the senses, or else such as are (2) perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind, or lastly, ideas (3) formed by help of memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways."¹ Berkeley is known as an empiricist on the question of knowledge while he is known as an idealist on the question of reality. He has tried to equate epistemology to metaphysics by saying that '*esse est percipi*'² means existence depends on perception. If a thing is perceived or known, it would be real. Human mind and super mind i.e., God are the subjects of perception or knowledge.

According to Berkeley what we can notice, touch, feel, drink, eat are real. We can never deny their existence. But what we can never touch, drink, notice, eat etc. are not real at all. For example, skyflower, unicorn, square circle etc are not real objects or ideas. Our mind, even super mind can never perceive them. Sensible ideas or things are the signs of God's purpose. He teaches us by using these signs or language.³

What is the way to communicate with each other if reality is mind-dependent? To answer this question Berkely argues that God feels us similar sense experience in similar contexts : so that we can communicate with one another. If you saw a tree where I saw an elephant and the next moment you saw in that place a sofa and I a bushal of apples, we would not be able to communicate. But by correlating the series of your experiences with mine God makes predication and communication possible.⁴

Natural sciences do not explain the physical world. They can only describe the world. Because we have no mind-independent physical world. In sciences scientists only can report what they observe but cannot say anything about unobserved events. Sense experiences are only correlated with each other in science. Berkely also thinks that there is no causal or necessary connection between two events. All causal statements are nothing but statements of correlations of experience. So, he argues that science is possible. But we can never say that science gives us true knowledge of mind-independent objects. The laws of nature are nothing but the manifestation of God's will. They are manifested in the orderly series of our sense experience. In this context he says that The great Mover and Author of Nature constantaly explaineth himself to the eyes of

Berkeleys's Idealism

men by the sensible intervention of arbitrary signs, which have no similitude or connexion with the things signified ⁵. He also argues that we cannot produce "unity" and "intelligibility" from God's mind.

So, in brief, Berkeley's argument is that God creates ideas or things to manifest Himself to our senses. All these ideas are real whether we perceive or not, for all the ideas are sensible to God. But the ideas that our mind creates are not sensible and so, they are not real. Science only can report on the objects or ideas which we can perceive. God also correlates the ideas in such a way for which we, though we have different mind, can perceive them equally. That is why we can communicate with each other and science can give us a description of our sense experience which is universally accepted.

If we eliminate the idea of God from Berkeley's view then it would be as follows :

Sensible objects or ideas are real because our minds perceive them. And there is uniformity in the occurrence of these ideas so that our different minds can perceive them equally. But this uniformity is not mind-independent. It is also sensible to us. If there is no mind, there is no idea and uniformity of ideas. Our minds are such things which can perceive the ideas equally for which we can communicate with each other though our minds are not the same. Science only reports or describes the sensible ideas and the uniformity of ideas. But it is only possible if our mind exists. Without mind, science is meaning less. In the presence of mind, science only can report the sensible ideas or the uniformity of ideas of mind.

Internal Realism of Putnam

Hilary Putnam does not clearly state about the reality of the so called external objects anywhere in his writings. He is well known as a linguistic philosopher. But from his philosophical discussion it seems to us that he is not a realist about external objects. To him the objects and the signs that we use to refer to the object are mental. Our mind carves up world into different objects and creates different signs to refer to the objects. There is no necessary connection between signs and objects. Within a conceptual scheme what sign is used for

what object is a matter of convention. Persons having a certain conceptual scheme can classify the world into different objects according to their own conceptual scheme and they can name them differently.

The classification of the world in different objects and signs may be different to the persons having different conceptual schemes but they would be same to the persons having one and the same conceptual scheme. For example, the sign H_2O is used for water. Only scientists and the students of science who have the same conceptual scheme know that H_2O is used for water but a layman who holds any other conceptual scheme may not use H_2O to refer to the object water; rather he may use some other sign to refer to the object called 'water' in English. Thus it follows that there is no necessary connection between sign and object. So, Putnam argues, ".....signs do not intrinsically correspond to objects, independently of how those signs are employed and by whom. But a sign that is actually employed in a particular community of users can correspond to particular objects within the conceptual scheme of those users."⁶

From the above argument it is clear to us what Putnam wants to say is that signs are used to refer to the objects conventionally. But it does not follow that the objects are mental. We can identify Putnam as an anti-realist when he says "objects do not exist independently of conceptual schemes, we cut up the world into objects when we introduce one or another scheme of description."⁷

We classify or divide the world in different parts according to our own conceptual schemes. Our conceptual schemes may differ from each other. In different conceptual schemes the classification may be different. that is why, we can never say that the objects have mind independent existence in the world.

Both signs and objects are mind-dependent for their existence. They are mental or internal to the conceptual scheme. Hence, Putnam accepts the internal reality of the world and he himself calls his realism as internal realism.

Someone may argue that Putnam's internal realism supports Locke's representative realism and Kant's empirical realism. According to our conceptual scheme we perceive our mental ideas which are the images of the real entities. but the real entities are unknown and unknowable. Like Kant, Putnam thinks that we cannot know the reality though our experience. But we can understand by reason that reality is transcendent to us. We can never know it. The reality is

unknown and unknowable to us.

But we cannot accept the above criticisms. Because Putnam himself says that like signs, the objects are internal. Like signs, we also discover objects. But Locke and Kant do not say anywhere that objects are discoverable. They argue that objects are unknown and unknowable while Putnam says, "objects do not exist independently of conceptual schemes. We cut up the world into objects when we introduce one or another scheme of description."⁸ Rather we may argue that Putnam's argument is similar to Berkeley's view about reality. Like Berkeley he argues that we perceive the world or we interpret the world according to our mental capacity having a certain conceptual scheme.

Putnam has tried to show that his realism is different from Berkeley's idealism by explaining Berkeley's idealism in the following way.

A Comparison Of Berkeley and Putnam

For Berkeley, nothing exists except mental entities. We observe the physical qualities according to our mental ideas. The physical qualities and the mental ideas or images are identical. This view is called subjective idealism. Against this view Putnam's argument is that physical qualities cannot be similar to mental ideas or images. Only one mental sensation or image can be same as another mental image or sensation. Putnam says, "Physical length and subjective length must be as different as physical redness and subjective redness."⁹

It seems to me that Putnam has misinterpreted Berkeley's idealism. In Berkeley's idealism it is not said that mental ideas are the images of physical objects and we perceive the physical objects according to our own mental ideas. What we find in his idealism is that ideas and the things or objects or qualities are identical. For example, we may take water as idea or thing. But all ideas or things which are sensible to us are created by super mind. On the other hand what ideas our mind creates are not sensible in anyway. We also do not claim that Berkeley is a subjective idealist. For he himself argues that we are totally bound to perceive and to take up the ideas or objects identically to communicate with each other. The super mind or God forces us to take up his created ideas or objects harmoniously for communication. From this argument, it follows that though Berkeley is an idealist, he is not a subjectivist. Rather we may argue

that Berkeley's idealism is similar to what Putnam wants to express through his internal realism.

Incommensurability Thesis Of T.S. Kuhn : A Berkeley Interpretation

T.S. Kuhn is well-known as a historian of science. But he has also tried to develop a philosophy of science. We consider his works as of historico-philosophical importance. From his writings "*The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*" and "*The Essential Tension*" what we come to know is that by rejecting the relativistic approach he has tried to establish the reality of the world which is unknown to us. We observe the real world from different angles because of our different paradigms or conceptual schemes. Different communities have different paradigms. Observation, experimentation and theory construction, are activities determined by mind which possess a certain conceptual scheme or a paradigm. When a man shifts from one paradigm to another paradigm then all his activities would undergo a change according to the new paradigm.

In his book "*The Essential Tension*", to show that theory totally depends on the minds of the members of a community he argues : "a new theory has been tested over time by the research of a number of men, some working within it, others within its traditional rivals. Such a mode of development, however, requires a decision process which permits rational men to disagree, and such disagreement would be barred by the shared algorithm which philosophers have generally sought."¹⁰

Theory, Kuhn says, does not present or reflect the real world' it represents our thinking which is dominated by a certain paradigm. So we cannot say that new theory is closer to truth than the old one.

Kuhn, is not a subjectivist though some of his critics identify him as a subjectivist by saying that he is the defender of the view that the world is like what the members of a community observe or think it to be. Kuhn rejects this criticism against him by saying that he does not advocate mind-dependent reality of the world. The view he advocates is that the world is in itself real but we perceive it and we represent it in different ways according to our different conceptual schemes. He says, "Scientific knowledge, like language, is intrinsic-

cally the common property of a group or else nothing at all. To understand it we shall need to know the special characteristics of the groups that create and use it".¹¹

Incommensurability Thesis Of P. Feyerabend : A Berkeleyan Interpretation

Feyerabend is also an incommensurabilist. He thinks like Kuhn that observation, experimentation and theory construction are mind-dependent. A scientific community constructs a theory to describe the world which the members of the community observe within a conceptual scheme. The theory constructed by them can give a true account of the world which they observe within a conceptual scheme or mental set up. Different communities have different conceptual schemes. Even a certain community may have different conceptual schemes at different times. But we cannot compare different conceptual schemes with each other. They are incommensurable. Theories and observations are also not commensurable, because different theories are constructed in different conceptual schemes and different observations are made in different conceptual schemes.

Feyerabend says that the world which the members of a community observe as real is not actually real. But they try to describe their observable world as real, by constructing theory. Theory can give a true account of the accepted world but not the actual world. That is why, he thinks that a theory is not a true description of the world, rather it may be accepted as real.

In his recently published article "Realism and the History of Knowledge, Feyerabend argues that man is the only sculptor of reality. We human beings, can tell many interesting stories about reality. Materialists argue that our world is constituted by the material objects which we observe. This observable material world is real. But the spiritualists have tried to deny this materialistic approach by saying that this observable world is not real. It is mere appearance. Only God is real. But, now the scientists want to say that our observable world is constituted by elementary particles which we cannot observe. They are not observable but intelligible. Hence he argues :

".....a look at history shows that this world is not a static world populated by thinking (and publishing) ants who, crawling all over its crevices, gradually discover its features without affecting them in any way. It

is a dynamical and multifaceted being which influences and reflects the activity of its explorers. It was once full of gods' it then became a drab material world; and it can be changed again, if its inhabitants have the determination, the intelligence and the heart to take the necessary steps."¹²

A Comparative Discussion And Evaluation

Now I want to compare all the views to show the impact of Berkeley's idealism on them. In internal realism what Putnam says is that the reality is mind-dependent. A man holding a certain conceptual scheme cuts up the world into different parts. If conceptual scheme is changed then the classification of the world would be changed. The classification of the world cannot be external. It is an internal event.

Putnam, I think, being influenced by Berkeley has tried to shed a new light in philosophy of science. But from his internal realism we do not get any new way for which we can say that his view is more appropriate than Berkeley's idealism to refute realism. What he has done is that he calls his view internal realism instead of idealism. Why he has hesitated to use the word "idealism" for his view is that he is not ready to accept God for the reality of the world. On the other hand, Berkeley accepts the reality of the sensible objects admitting the existence of God. While Berkeley thinks that the sensible objects are sent by God to us, Putnam says that we cut up the world into different parts having a certain conceptual scheme.

Berkeley says that God feeds us similar sense experience in similar contexts; so that we can communicate with each other. But Putnam, does not totally deny this view. He does not accept the existence of God and His influence on our sense experience. If we hold a certain conceptual scheme, then our sense experience would be the same. Here we notice that Putnam has highlighted the existence of man and his mental construction while Berkeley has strongly accepted the existence of God and His influence on our sense experience.

If we eliminate the idea of God from Berkeley's idealism then we can not discover any difference between Berkeley's idealism and Putnam's Internal realism. While Berkeley admits mind-dependent reality of the world, Putnam also

accepts this.

Like Putnam, Kuhn and Feyerabend also accept mind-dependent reality of the world. They have highlighted the existence of man and his mind construction denying the existence of God and His influence on our sense experience. In different paradigms we observe the world from different angles and it is observed different worlds. Our observation, experiment, theory construction etc. are totally influenced by our paradigm. That is why when we shift from one paradigm to another then our all activities are transformed in accordance with the change. Hence denying realism they have tried to establish such anti-realism where it is accepted that the reality of the world depends on man who holds a certain paradigm.

Here we do not notice any difference between Berkeley's idealism and incommensurability thesis of Kuhn and Feyerabend. Like Berkeley, Kuhn and Feyerabend accept mind-dependent reality of the world. They argue that we perceive the world according to our own paradigm while Berkeley says that perception depends on us. Like Berkeley, Kuhn and Feyerabend accept what we perceive are real, we cannot deny their reality. But when Berkeley says that our sense experience may vary from person to person, Kuhn and Feyerabend claim that our sense experience would change when we shift from one paradigm to another. Here they added an extra concept which is "paradigm" which is not used in Berkeley's idealism. Though Berkeley does not use the word "paradigm" yet indirectly he has tried to say so. When Berkeley says that God feeds us similar sense experience in similar contexts, so that we can communicate with each other, it seems that though he does not use the word "paradigm", he accepts the concept "paradigm" which is controlled by God. Kuhn and Feyerabend accept man as the ultimate cause while Berkeley accepts God as the ultimate cause. Beside this we do not notice any difference between Berkeley's idealism and incommensurability thesis of Kuhn and Feyerabend on the question of reality of the world.

Conclusion

So, we may conclude from the above comparative discussion that Putnam, Kuhn and Feyerabend have tried to modernize Berkeley's idealism to refute sci-

entific realism. Though they are quite able to modernize Berkeley's idealism, yet I think, their achievements are not much. If a realist can refute Berkeley's idealism, then internal realism of Putnam and incommensurability thesis of T.S.Kuhn are already refuted. The realist may not make further efforts to refute internal realism and incommensurability thesis separately.

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3. *Ibid.* p. 129
4. John Hospers, '*Philosophical Analysis*', tenth reprint, Allied Publishers, India, 1994, p. 521.
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HABERMAS AND CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY

P. SUDERSAN

Amidst the ruins of many a social theory, Jurgen Habermas stands alone in his endeavour to bridge the vast void between theory and practice, transcendentalism and functionalism, and moral-ethical and scientific-technical realms. His communicative competence, and ideal speech situation are all concepts which appear utopian but have historical and situational relevance. The aforementioned factors are not hierarchical postulates but simultaneous processes in any human communication aimed at reaching understanding.

Philosophy, hitherto mired in ontological puzzles and in establishing its fast slipping supremacy over other practical disciplines went farther and farther from the concrete historical situation by earmarking territories for knowledge. It abstracted certain transcendent entities like God and Soul and assigned them exalted and inaccessible status so as to prevent the prying eyes of the natural sciences from scrutinizing them. Thus, the role of being the foundational authority for all knowledge was coveted by philosophy. Habermas clearly holds that such farfetched claims are vacuous and in the present situation philosophy can only be an interpreter and a critique. It is for this reason that he criticizes Kant and Hegel for constructing false paradigms which show philosophy as an overbearing discipline.¹

Habermas was well aware that as philosophy was increasingly viewed as a discipline whistling in the dark about riddles which had no empirical or practical significance, it could be shoved aside with disdain and suspicion. As a believer in the Enlightenment ideals of freedom, justice, and happiness and in the power of reason to transform the society and cleanse the society of the evils plaguing it, Habermas felt that philosophy alone did not have the right to embark upon the redressal of the problems. All disciplines like the social sciences and natural sciences are to work in consort if any headway is to be made from the present impasse.

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Habermas wanted to approach the problems from various angles. He was in search of a paradigm which was not only particular to philosophy but also to any praxis oriented activity. A paradigm which would reduce all processes to the principle which it supports, to the neglect of other factors, was not acceptable to him. This was the reason why he decried the paradigm of 'consciousness' as overtly subjective. He plumped for 'language' as a paradigm because it was historically situated and the medium of communication for all strata of the society irrespective of the internal and external differences and class discriminations.² Thus Habermas supplanted Marx's paradigm of 'production' with 'language' which is the reservoir of the past, the prime vestige of the present, and a pointer to the future. It is mutable, discursive, redeemable, and interpersonal in nature which effectively preempts reification and hypostatization.

Critical Theory and its Historical Necessity

Critical theory arose as a result of the upheavals in the mid-twentieth century. Its avowed task was to interpret the scenario which unfolded as a result of the World Wars in which Germany was the key aggressor. Basically, the Frankfurt theorists were appalled by the failure of Marxism to usher in a new dawn in which the workers and the people who were suppressed were expected to participate in a big way. What shocked them beyond recovery was that what ensued after the failure of the workers movement was the alarming rise of Nazism and Fascism. They were worried over a spurt in authoritarian and totalitarian tendencies and the increasing dominance of science over other disciplines.

Ironically, the liberation of reason from the clutches of religion and other dogmatic ideologies held unlimited potential for political and social renaissance which failed to fructify. This made the critical theorists disheartened. Instead of reason serving as the tool for liberation from the self-imposed shackles of man over man it took a different hue in the form of scientific-technical rationality and began perpetrating domination over nature and fellow beings. Hence, the dreams of the Enlightenment period, of which Kant, Hegel, and Marx were the luminaries, proved as a crushing disappointment. The Frankfurt school which acquired its name because of it being founded as a movement attached to the Frankfurt University was at first known as the Institute for Social Research.³

The Frankfurt school viewed the social problems as affecting all strata of

the society and it enrolled as its members sociologists, philosophers, economists, psychoanalysts, and historians and it was expressly non-party. Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse were most important among the early critical theorists. They traced the chaos and turmoil in the aftermath of the two World Wars to systematic malady endemic to all closed systems of thought. They strove to break the strangle hold of misconceptions and misrepresentations which were befuddling the reason which was losing its emancipatory potential to the furtherance of domination and rigid systematization in the name of science and technology. In this, the domination of nature was confused with the freedom from the subjective and intersubjective factors blocking the progress towards a society in which freedom, justice, and happiness were expected to reign.⁴

Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse accepted many aspects of German idealism like the apportionment of domain of knowledge into science, morality, and art. Even though all of them accepted Kant's theoretical and practical reason, categorical imperative, critique of ideology, Copernican revolution and the essential nature of man as good, Habermas was critical of Kant for ingeniously separating the domains of operation of various disciplines so that philosophy could have a free run as the arbiter of knowledge. Habermas resented the unilateral allocation of spheres for other disciplines by philosophy.⁵

Hegel, on his part, historically situated the sublation of the consciousness which is epitomized by the brilliant "the owl of Minerva flies only at the dusk."⁶ Once again, his dialectical relationship ends in the "Absolute Idea." While Hegel wished for the conditions to change for the better for the betterment of the society Marx was impatient with the status quo and wanted a complete transformation. The prevalent social and political situation and the plight of the work force made Marx to press for a drastic change in the society in which the bourgeoisie ideals remained only in theory to be flouted repeatedly by them and to be cited only when dealing with the proletariat. Marx alleged that all the institutions like political state, economy, religion, and tradition were tilted heavily in favour of the upper class. So, false ideology, reification, exploitation, and alienation could be stemmed only if the labourers got their due and their surplus labour should not be converted as profit to do pocketed by the capitalists.⁷

The Frankfurt theorists were in agreement with Marx on his critique of political ideology which they felt very relevant for any social theory. But they

were not pleased by the scientific-technical rationality which had to be used in production assuming instrumental character increasingly. The critical theorists call the expansion of the state into more and more areas of life as "culture industry".⁸ The debacle of reason in the period of Enlightenment was that on the one hand it was a critical arbiter and espoused the ideal of impartial analysis of truth and on the other hand it became the instrument of perpetrating domination of nature and humans by technicalising administrative, political, and bureaucratic processes which thus become the part of *techné*.⁹ Thus, the role of imponderable was eliminated and success became the only goal. This, they feared, lead to a structured society. Thus, once again form assumed more importance over the content.

Difference between traditional and Critical Theory

Marx's critique of political economy was the precursor for a critical social science. It broke the shackles imposed on the social theorizing by advocating a different approach from the weather-beaten traditional approach. The Frankfurt theorists were insistent upon the renunciation of a closed approach to the social sciences and advocated an approach in which there was sufficient space for tensions and contradictions so characteristic of the society.¹⁰

Traditional Theory

- 1) Traditional theory is a closed system of statements constructed according to logical rules of deduction and induction.
- 2) It is supposedly value-neutral.
- 3) It is objective and modelled on the lines of natural sciences.
- 4) It is characterized by technical-instrumental rationality.

Critical Theory

- 1) Critical theory firmly says that there is no absolute subject of knowledge and that the coincidence of the subject and object lies in the future

not merely due to intellectual progress but also due to the social progress in which the relationship between the subject and the object is redefined.

- 2) The method of sciences is different because the ends determine the means in their case whereas in the case of critical theory the means also is equally important as the ends. The method of abduction is employed.
- 3) It is a critical reflection on ideology and it accepts that as a historically grounded method it is not itself free from the influences of the societal framework. It also claims independence vis-a-vis existing doctrines including Marxism.
- 4) It also realizes the importance of praxis and reposes faith in the cherished Enlightenment ideals of freedom, justice, and happiness.

Max Horkheimer and Critique of Enlightenment

As far as Marx's critique of political economy remained a critical social science it had a Kantian critical moment of unbiasedly analyzing the economy and laying threadbare the tall claims and bringing to light the lacunas. But when Marx went on to prescribe an economic theory himself, it definitely had an end in mind and lost its critical reflective moment.¹¹ Apart from this, there was no political and social revolution and any sign of capitalism crumbling because of inherent tensions in the capitalism itself. The proletariat uprising also was not forthcoming because they joined the stream of capitalism. The capitalists also saw to it that they were always kept in good humour with the promise of incentives for efficiency and also kept on the tenterhooks by the fear of not being indispensable, with a huge amount of unemployed labour waiting in the wings to replace if any vacancy arises.

Horkheimer and Adorno were particularly critical of the traditional theory for its obsession with classification of various phenomena and identifying them under well defined categories. Horkheimer's thoughts were permeated by the Marxist principle that philosophical, religious, and sociological ideas could be understood only in relation to the interests of the different social groups so that theory was a function of social life. He defended the autonomy of theory thus

acceding that there were truths which could not be validated with the help of analytical judgements or empirical hypotheses. He was careful in not describing the society in terms of individuals or vice versa. He was also wary of reducing the relations to base - superstructure ; subject - object; phenomenon - essence etc. He opined that there was need for constant mediation if one did not want to end in reduction.¹²

The Frankfurt theorists were apprehensive that overt emphasis on technology and science would lead to totalitarian regime by encouraging manipulation of human beings resulting in the destruction of culture and personality. Horkheimer in his essay on critical theory made it clear that the world of science was the world of readymade facts to be ordered as though the perception of these facts were divorced from the social framework. For critical theory, perception cannot be isolated from its social genesis. The society is an active player, even if unconsciously so, because the individual is passive in relation to the object. Critical theory accepts its social dependence and regards itself as a form of social behaviour. Hence, it is more a movement than a concrete philosophical and systematized theory. Eventhough it accepts the overarching spectre of the society whether in the foreground or in the background on any human activity it concedes the possibility of the critical activity vis-a-vis the society. It does not consider the society as a natural creation which can never be touched.¹³ Horkheimer feels that the conciliatory attitude towards the society had been the reason for the edification of the status quo and the people enmasse had been alienated. The sharp polarization of the society into subject and object and internal and external has led to the feeling that society is something alien to the individual. Without aspiring for complete unification or foundational explanation one can effectively address the tensions between the subjective and objective factors which are at loggerheads perpetually.

Critical theory does hold that theory and praxis can come together some time in the future if the 'external' character of the society undergoes a change. It is a critique of the existent society and does not claim any universality and eternity for itself. It is a critique of the capitalistic society which impedes the human growth. It is a critique in that it is a social act as well as an intellectual act. It dreams of a society in which human needs and powers are not externalized and

a life for the sake of human life and not for external necessities, i.e. freedom, justice, and happiness reign supreme.

Theodor Adorno and Negative Dialectics

Theodor Adorno, heartbroken by the disastrous failure of the Enlightenment launched a scathing attack on any type of systematization. He also vehemently criticized all types of categorization and allocation of names and forms. He was convinced that whether it be science or philosophy the attempt is to confine the world within a single principle to assign it an identity.¹⁴ For Adorno, philosophy is the express negation of any attempt to reify or identify human subject. Identification is the violation of the principle since the scope and facets of the object or the subject is limited to the desired level only. This is the reason why he steadfastly opposed Marx's all out emphasis on praxis to the neglect of the theory.

Adorno's allegation against philosophy is that even if its foundational claim to authority is found to be untenable it does not desist from using the contradictions to further its position and arrive at an ultimate identity of everything. Hence, dialectic was a method of repeated negation of any claim to universality. He averred that language was itself a violence to thought because it failed to capture the thought in its entirety.¹⁵ He alleged that by resorting to extreme systematization and identification philosophy and logic were guilty of homogenizing the society and reducing people to anonymity. This engendered only a form of interaction in which humans would be treated as commodities which have 'exchange-value'.

In a stinging attack on capitalism, Adorno accused it of using the facade of relativism to convince the people into accepting the status quo and remain subservient to the dominant class. Always guarded against giving any leeway to exploitation Adorno said that ontology and primacy were used adroitly to further totalitarianistic tendencies. "The principle of dominion, which antagonistically rends human society, is the same principle which, spiritualized, causes the difference between the concept and its subject matter." Therefore, for Adorno, any relationship is only dialectical.

He says :

In a sense, dialectical logic is more positivistic than the positivism that out-laws it. As thinking, dialectical logic respects that which is to be thought - the object - even where the object does not need the rules of thinking. The analysis of the object is tangential to the rules of thinking. Thought need not be content with own legality; without abandoning it, we can think against our own thought, and if it were possible to define dialectics, this would be a definition worth suggesting.¹⁶

Adorno holds that the critics cannot find fault with him either logically or factually because he has utter disregard for them. For him any genuine thought is a concerted opposition to any form of identity formation. He has outright contempt for the 'identity principle' because he feels that it reduces objects to what is expressed in words and what is given empirically. Adorno's view is that there are contradictions everywhere and they should not be absolutized so that the concepts are allowed to immobilize objects. In order that society does not become overtly functional or idealistic in which both of them are capable nurturing a structured society Adorno says that most advanced theory and a praxis which weeds out reificatory ideas is imperative.¹⁷

Herbert Marcuse and One-Dimensional Man

Herbert Marcuse was also concerned by the functional and reductionistic attitude of the society and a 'One Dimensionalistic' approach which ignored the normative and critical aspects of philosophy. The critical principle contrasted the day-to-day world from the true world characterized by freedom, justice, and happiness. Marcuse makes a return to the concept of universals. He saw in this a dialectic power of theory to negate the apparent reality and infuse the principle of higher reality. He indicted logic for restricting the sense of the world to 'is' stripping them of their essence. Dialectic maintains the tension between 'is' and 'ought', the former is the social reality and the latter is the ideal. Marcuse resembles Hegel in deriding direct experience as accidental and in holding that only dialectical reason can penetrate into the deeper reality. Marcuse's aim here is to restore the normative 'what ought to be' to the forefront of any social theorizing. The universals like beauty, justice, love etc., have been relegated to the realm of the subjective by the sciences. Marcuse avers :

Scientific-technical rationality and manipulation are welded together into new forms of social control... Outside this rationality, one lives in a world of values, and values separated out from the objective reality becomes-subjective.¹⁸

Thus, Marcuse opines, the ideas of goodness, beauty, and justice are deprived of universal validity and given only the parochial personal sphere. The attitude of science to quantify and systematize the concepts has led to a situation where there is no room for any form of social protest. The success-failure formula makes no one responsible and the failure is explained away as technical shortcoming. Even failure is not tolerated and the options are reduced to simply success. But success involves manipulation, domination, narrowing down the options, and particularizing the paradigm.

Marcuse lambasts the field of art as the standing testimony to the consumeristic culture in which the universal ideals are shoved aside for marketability. In the present scenario, instead of the talent of the performer the selling power of the individual is the key to success. The measuring yardstick is not the merit but the ability to ooze with glitz and glamour so that the person can be made into the darling of the masses. Thus, various arms of consumeristic apparatus link together in a wholesale deception of the common man. The common man is made to believe that what he is getting is the best which on the contrary is most untrue. Thus Marcuse laments how the structured society stifles the critical negative reason. In a vivid portrayal of the capitalistic - consumeristic society, he says :

Most of the prevailing needs to relax, to have fun, to behave and consume in accordance with the advertisements, to love and hate, belong to this category of false needs.¹⁹

The modern economic system is devised to multiply the artificial needs in the name of providing choice of selection. This sort of freedom vested in the individual is a clever mode of domination. Marcuse argues :

The range of choice open to the individual is not the decisive factor in determining the degree of human freedom, but what can be chosen and what is chosen by individual.²⁰

Jurgen Habermas and the Paradigm Shift

Jurgen Habermas accepted the basic position of his predecessors but he did not stop with the continued reflection and critique of ideology into which critical theory had petered out. Since he had no illusions regarding the role of philosophy he envisioned it to smoothly glide into the role of interpreter and critique. Since he had divided social action into the spheres of labour and interaction, he apportioned cognitive and practical interests respectively to them. As a staunch believer of the ideals of Enlightenment he brought in the emancipatory interest which he thought was immanent in all human beings. As a corollary he divided human approach towards knowledge as objective, subjective, and intersubjective corresponding to empirico-analytical sciences, historico-hermeneutical sciences and rational reconstructive sciences.²¹

In making such classifications Habermas followed Karl Proper's three-world theory which says that we exist simultaneously in : 1) an external world of states of affairs and objects; 2) an internal world of emotions, thoughts, and ideas; and 3) a normative world of intersubjectively determined norms and values. The human beings put forth validity claims regarding the truth of the statements about the objective world, the truthfulness of the subjective world, and the rightness or correctness of the intersubjective world.²² In the case of the objective world, the human attitude is one of the theoretical interest (episteme, knowledge, science, the reflected, critical, phenomenological standpoints). In a practical discourse, the normative validity claims are thematized. The imperative requirements are discursivity, universality, redeemability, and rational consensus. A discourse is more than mere communication because it demands the thematization of all problematic validity claims and unless and until the veracity of the claims are proved they are not accepted as valid. It assumes a commitment on the part of the participants to arrive at a rationally motivated agreement solely based on the evidence and the force of argument. The validity should be for all rational subjects not to only those involved in the discourse. The participants in a discourse are expected to be receptive and responsive to counter view points. The end in question is not the victory or defeat of any standpoint but the consensual and rational agreement which is the patented property of none. This

briefly is the ideal speech situation.²³

Since Habermas has situated his discourse theory on argumentation and dialogue it becomes necessary for him to provide a universal framework or, at least, general characteristics for speech. With this goal in mind, he set out to construct universal-pragmatics in association with Karl-Otto Apel. Pragmatics deals with utterance or speech. It studies the performative aspect of the language. While the communicative competence part of the language is assumed as universal with phonetics, morphology, and semantics to regulate the learning processes the pragmatic part, is left to the care of concrete circumstances. Habermas seeks to ground his universal-pragmatics on conditions which are common to performative utterances. It is for this reason that he inducts the conditions of comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness, and rightness for linguistic utterances to be validated.²⁴

Since Habermas was particular about the intersubjective realm he became interested in Austin's theory of speech acts. He was also concerned about the yawning gap between theory and practice. He wanted to choose a speech act that would have no tension between intention and declaration of intentions. The illocutionary speech act, which Austin defined as in saying, became the only candidate.²⁵ He went on to qualify his theory of communicative action with illocutionary speech acts. Thus, Habermas invokes both the universal and particular aspects of the utterances. Thus a communicative rationality which is intersubjective in nature starts from the universal pragmatics. This communicative rationality is the driving force behind the yearning for communicative action which aims at an understanding achieved through a rationally motivated consensus. Thus everyday language is armed with the ammunition to criticize history and distortions in communication while having a theoretical framework to fall back upon if called upon to justify its position.

Conclusion

Habermas has developed his theory on the assumption that human beings are driven by interests in acquiring knowledge. Later, he shifted his paradigm to language and focussed on interpersonal interaction as the bedrock of discurs-

sive formation of normative validity claims. Though he was not anti-scientific he opposed the positivistic reduction to empirical testing of facts and decisions. He welcomed scientific approach but he did not accept the universality of scientific method. Habermas' significance lies in rescuing critical theory from the shackles of self-critical negation, which his predecessors like Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse had made it into. Because of their disillusionment with the society and the evaporation of their faith in the ideals of Enlightenment they felt that their task was whittled down to the critique of the totalitarian tendencies.

Habermas gave critical theory a new turn with his new paradigm of 'language' which was free from the subjective bias of the 'consciousness'. The rational critique of the critical theory was assimilated as critical self-reflection and rational reconstruction. In order that the theory-practice problem be effectively addressed and both transcendental and immanent factors of the human life be taken into consideration, he introduced universal-pragmatics which served as the foundation for communicative action. Thus, Habermas successfully brought specialized information into the debates among common folk with the use of everyday language.

Habermas' ideal-speech situation is not utopian because a society torn by strifes longs for a dialogue to settle persistent problems. The relationship between the ideal speech situation and tranquility is circular. An ideal-speech situation is necessary for solving vexatious issues but a harmonious setting is required for an ideal-speech situation to materialize. the ideal-speech situation is therefore a consequence of peace and if it prevails nations could go a long way in cementing friendships and increasing co-operation so that people can benefit mutually. Habermas has been criticized for being too comprehensive in his approach. Unlike in natural sciences, no one expects any solution to be encapsulated in a formula or a method because the problems afflicting the social sphere knows no genesis and no end. There can be no solutions but only moderation of the ill-effects of the consequences because the problems are as natural as natural calamities.

NOTES

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2. John B. Thompson and David Held, eds. Habermas : *Critical Debates*, London : Macmillan, 1982, pp. 46-48.
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4. *Ibid.*, pp. 352-353.
5. Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, pp. 2-3
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17. *Ibid.*, pp. 146-147.
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NEO - SCHOLASTIC REFLECTION ON KANT

L. ANTHONY SAVARI RAJ

The Analytic of Concepts

Kantian studies have put the emphasis at various times on various works on Kant. Yet, I think that, for those interested in defending any form of metaphysics, it is the objections levelled against all forms of metaphysics in *The Critique of Pure Reason* which make Kant an ever challenging figure in the realm of philosophy. These objections rest on the standpoint taken by Kant in his transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Kant himself has stressed the importance of this part of his work. In the preface to the first edition he wrote: "I know of no enquiries which are more important for exploring the faculty which we entitle understanding, and for determining the rules and limits of its employment, than those which I have instituted in the Second chapter of the transcendental Analytic under the title "Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding."¹

We cannot attempt here to give even a summary of Kant's exposition. It is also too well known. We shall only recall its main elements and then pass on to the exploration of its context.

Kant considers that, besides what is given to our senses and the *a priori* forms of space and time, scientific knowledge involves us in the use of judgments. These, as principles of unity, unify concepts, but in their turn, they require a higher principle of unity. The "I think" is the highest principle of that unity.² The concepts unified by judgments may be many and of different kinds; but what Kant is anxious here to discover is the group of concepts which are inevitably involved in scientific thinking. These he calls the categories.

Actually one does not understand well how, according to Kant the categories determine the unity of apperception until one passes from the analytic of concepts to the analytic of principles. Here Kant explains how the imagination

connects the categories with the intuitions of sensibility through the various schemata of number, degree, permanence, succession, co-existence, agreement with the condition of time, and that simply, or for a time, or for all times.³ Further still, the chapter on "The System of all principles of pure Understanding"⁴ brings more light on the way in which Kant understood his categories and employed them. especially when he explains the "Analogies of Experience."⁵ Let us explore now the context of the Analysis of Concepts in order to judge better its vailidity.

The Context of the Analytic of concept

What are then the presuppositions which are at the basis of Kant's deduction. We may say, I think, that Kant started his *Critique* with a double conviction first, that Mathematics and Natural Sciences are sure and certain knowlege, are governed by necessity and obtain universal validity..⁶ Secondaly, Metaphysics, on the countary, remain always uncertain and this appears from the conflict of the various systems.⁷

Kant then thought that his task was to find out what gives that certainty to natural science and to explore whether it could even be extended to metaphysical knowledge. On the one hand, he accepted the empirism of Locke to the extent that he two would hold that nothing is sure which is not derived from experience. On the other, hand, he accepted the critical attitude of Hume which held that no universal knowledge could be derived from the given as such. From where then came the universal validity of natural science ? Kant then set about searching into the conditions of scientific knowledge, not by the means of hypotheses which he would try to verify by experience, beause it was the conditions of experience itself which he would be wanted to investigate, but by means of his trascedental method, which tries to find out directly what is involved in the very knowledge which we possess.

This method led him to the discovery of the priori in our knowledge, both at the level of sensibility and of understanding. The a priori of intellectual knowledge does not presuppose only a transcendental subject, but also some determinations of this subject. These determinations are precisely the categories.

The normal conclusion of such a procedure is that the categories are part and parcel of scientific knowledge and to use them independently of the given in sensible experience of metaphysical knowledge, is to use them out of context, and thus illegitimately. Here Kant presupposes that metaphysics moves "In a

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realm beyond the world of sense."⁸ distinct from "the field of appearances."⁹ One could question this presupposition, but when one discusses the conclusion of Kant, one must not forget that this is what metaphysics meant for him, viz. the study of what lies beyond the field of appearances, while in fact the world of appearances might also be the object of metaphysics. But let us not anticipate the criticism of Kant's view. Rather let me introduce the Neo-scholastic reaction to Kant.

Neo-Scholastic Reflection on Kant

Neo-Scholasticism could not, of course, remain indifferent to Kant's denial of the possibility of Metaphysics. Among the many Scholastic philosophers who examined Kant's objections and tried to answer them, I would single out two names only, on account of the thoroughness of their enquiry and the extensive presentation which they made of their own views. These two philosophers are Joseph Maréchal of Louvain and the Canadian, Bernard Lonergan, a professor of the Gregorian University in Rome. Joseph Marechal wrote the main part of his studies on Kant between the two world-wars. Bernard Lonergan published his book : *Insight, A Study of Human Understanding* (Longmans, 1957) after the 2nd world-war, and his 2nd edition has already known many reprints within the past few years. Both of them tried to see what is valid in Kant and go beyond him. I have studied them both and made an effort to assimilate their views. I shall present here, in my own way, some of their ideas on Kant, making only occasional references to their names.

With Kant

How far is Neo-scholasticism ready to go with Kant ? First of all, Kant's emphasis on certainty rather than on comprehensiveness of knowledge is to be praised very much. In this, he is surely a precursor of the modern analysts. Hume, before Kant, had taken a critical attitude, but he had failed to find the way out of skepticism. The solution of Kant still implies a partial skepticism, but his merit is to have tried to explain why and how what is certain is certain. His use of the distinction of the question of fact (*quid facti*) and the question of right (*quid juris*) in epistemology is important. We do have knowledge and even various types of knowledge. The point is to sort them out and discern the value of each type.

The discovery and use of the transcendental method is another merit of

Kant. For, once we discern that universality of knowledge is not to be sought on the side of the object, since it presents itself with particularity, it remains that the subject should be the source of such universality. Kant, then, began to investigate what is at work in our various forms of knowledge.

Since what is at work transcends the particular experiences in which its influence is felt, the method which discovers it, is called the transcendental method. One does not see why such form of investigation should not be valid and useful.

Kant thus discovered that there is some *a priori* in our modes of knowing. The objection which suggests itself against all form of *a priori* in knowledge, is that the *a priori* seems to cancel the objectivity of knowledge. The objection is not decisive; for nothing prevents the *a priori* to be precisely the tool or the means of attaining knowledge. It is not because our eyes belong to us and are *a priori* to our particular acts of seeing that they are not really leading us to the vision of things. Thus space and time are really, I think, the condition under which our external senses and our internal senses are working. There is also in us a subject which is the *a priori* centre of all our activities. Some of our activities too are so differentiated that they demand the presence within us of powers which account for their diversity. I am thinking for instance of the basic differences which exist between all our acts of knowing, on the one hand, and our acts of willing on the other. It is not simply the objects which command the diversity of the acts but some different powers or faculties within us. It would be too long to pursue this analysis, but I believe that Kant rightly discerned the *a priori* which govern these various forms of activity.

Beyond Kant

Not content to go a part of the way with Kant, is neoscholasticism ready to go beyond Kant? And, on the basis of what it accepts of Kant, how does Neo-scholasticism try to vindicate again the validity of Metaphysics? First of all, Neo-scholasticism would disagree with Kant when he limits the field of metaphysics to that which is beyond the world of appearances. Everything, it would say, even the appearances belong to metaphysics. The field of positive science must be determined, not by setting apart certain objects which metaphysics could not consider, but by taking certain objects which may also fall within the realm of metaphysics and considering them from a point of view which differs from the

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point of view of metaphysics. Positive science considers beings which appear as they appear, metaphysics considers all beings, and appearances too, in terms of being.

In spite of Kant's denial, is there then synthetic *a priori* propositions of a metaphysical character? Neo-scholasticism is ready to admit with Kant, as I said previously, that there is an *a priori* in our knowledge. Thus, it admits the validity of some synthetic *a priori* propositions which are expression of these *a priori* elements of our knowledge. Kant thought that these propositions could give objective knowledge only if they were connected with sensible intuition, which alone, according to him, links us with reality. But could there not be something else in us which keeps us in contact with reality?

Fredrick Copleston S.J. while explaining Kant's position, in his *History of Philosophy* writes: "It is possible to allow that there are synthetic *a priori* propositions and at the same time to hold there is an intellectual intuition which grounds such propositions. When I speak about synthetic *a priori* propositions I am thinking, not of propositions of pure mathematics, but of metaphysical principle such as the principle that everything which comes into being has a cause. And by intuition I do not mean a direct apprehension of spiritual realities, such as God, but an intuitive apprehension of being implied in the existential judgment concerning the concrete object of sense-perception. In other words, if the mind can discern, with dependence on sense-perception, the objective, intelligible structure of being, it can enunciate synthetic *a priori* propositions which have objective validity for things in themselves."¹⁰

While here Copleston merely hints at a possible solution. Maréchal had made the point the particular object of his inquiry in his book on *The starting Point of Metaphysics*.¹¹ He writes in his first volume of that work: "Our intention is not to examine the theory of knowledge in all its aspects, but to concentrate our efforts on the fundamental problem... We could formulate this problem provisionally thus, Metaphysics, if it is possible has necessarily its starting point in some absolute objective affirmation: do we meet such an affirmation in the content of our consciousness and do we find it surrounded by all the guarantees which the most exacting Critique requires?"¹² The *a priori*, insufficiently exploited by Kant, according to Marechal, is the very dynamism of the intellect exercising itself in all our judgements. This dynamism is the basis of our metaphysical knowledge of certain, and not only problematic, noumena.

Our intellect is dynamic. That is, knowledge does not just come to us from outside. We have a dynamic drive for it. Certainly none of us wants to be in total ignorance or be happy with only partial knowledge. We always want to know more. And we certainly strive towards fuller knowledge. Hence our knowledge is a dynamic movement.

Furthermore, the dynamic movement of our intellect experiences a limit. In our direct judgements, we experience the "is" element as actually limited by "this" element. That is, we experience the limitation of existence by essence. To be this means not to be that. This leads Maréchal to conclude that our intellect, in every judgment, is always ultimately tending towards the unlimited Being. Maréchal believes that the fact of our recognition of a limit implies a tendency to go beyond that limit. In other words, we are tending towards pure existence, absolute and unlimited existence, unrestrained by any essence.

In short, the very fact that we affirm the objects of our judgments as real and at the same time limited, points to the fact that the objects of our daily experience are only proximate ends. And these facts are intermediary in the reference of our mind to the ultimate end, in as much as they derive their meaning and force from the ultimate and final end.

Bernard Lonergan pursued the idea of Maréchal. He examined understanding especially as it works in scientific and metaphysical enquiries. As Maréchal, Lonergan finds the ground of synthetic a priori knowledge in the dynamism of the intellect. From this broader outlook a much more flexible conception of the categories becomes possible.¹³ "To know, for Lonergan, means to know being, and to know being includes knowing objects and subjects."¹⁴ This is far more than the Kantian category of reality which means "that which corresponds to a sensation in general."¹⁵ Or "that....the concept of which in itself points to being (in time)".¹⁶ It is also something more than the "position of a thing".¹⁷ Being is the object of the unrestricted desire to know. Being "refers to all that can be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation".¹⁸ And this may be much more than being simply posited as an effect is posited out of its causes.

The Resulting Position Concerning Metaphysics

If the efforts made by Maréchal and Lonergan and others are not vain but valid, it appears that there are other categories than those vindicated by Kant.

namely metaphysical categories which may be broader in their field of application than the Kantian categories. They show that Kant has not exploited his discovery of the *a priori* element in our knowledge well enough. According to them, the *a priori*, insufficiently exploited by Kant, is the very dynamism of the intellect exercising itself in all our judgments. This dynamism which in fact, goes beyond the Kantian categories, is the very basis of any metaphysical knowledge. Thus, metaphysics is possible.

NOTES

1. We quote from Norman Kemp Smith's translation, 2nd impression with correction, reprinted in 1961. With him too we use the letter A and B to refer to the first or second edition of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. The present quotation is from Axvi.
2. B 135.
3. B182-4.
4. B187ff.
5. B224ff.
6. Cf. Preface to the 2nd ed. Bxiv, xvi, etc.
7. Cf. Preface to the 1st ed. A vii ff.
8. B6.
9. B7.
10. Vol. VI Wolff to Kant, London, Burns and Oates, 1960, pp. 275 - 6
11. *Le point de depart de la metaphysique 5 volumes, Paris Brouwer 1923-1947.*
12. Vol. 1, 2nd ed., 1943, P.11.
13. *Insight*, Chapter 11, Sect. 10: "Contrast with Kantian Analysis". pp. 339-42.
14. *Ibid.* p.340
15. B 182.
16. *Ibid.*
17. B 626.
18. *Insight* p. 360.

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DISCUSSION

I

NEELMANI'S GRAMMAR OF LIAR PARADOX

The April, 1997 issue of this Journal carries an article which proposes to solve the liar paradox, and thereby to put an end to all such paradoxes¹. In what follows, I argue that Neelamani's Wittgensteinian resolution of the above paradox is neither Wittgensteinian nor is capable of resolving the liar paradox, as its only credential is that it does not want to accept the following identity sentence, namely

$$a = \sim Ta$$

as part of the effort to understand the 'grammar' of self-referential sentences. His aim to show that the paradox is no paradox boomerangs.

Consider the simpler version of the paradox

What I say is false.

The liar sentence is true, if false and false, if true. Neelamani's efforts for an 'operation rescue' lie in finding fault with the identity sentence such as

C is identical with 'C' is false'

which forms the major premise of a tightly-knit argument which proves the paradox (156). 'C' is different from 'C' is false'. The first reason is that the two occurrences of C can never be equivocated. Such an identity is, therefore, quite 'unwarranted' according to Neelamani (159). Granting that it is point against the self-referentiality of sentence such as

This sentence is false

for the simple reason that the grammar of 'this' is not auto-referential. From the point of view of later Wittgenstein's theory of language-use, this is grammatically innocent, not because it is auto-referential. It is auto-referential. The paradox is due to the fact that you are abstracting it from its use. Supposing I use this

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sentence as identical with the sentence. Thus 'I (as a pronoun) am ten centimeters long' is self-referential for the simple reason that I ('paradigmatically') use it in that way, and it serves as a measuring ruler, in the language-game of the tribe (f.n.4). Check truth-values, then you encounter a paradox. The true or false are part of the language-game (PI, 136)². My point is that there is no evidence to show that Neelamani's efforts are Wittgensteinian in any respect. His 'sticker example' does not convey anything, for whether it is there or not, the material inside will certainly explode, if ignited. Does it mean that if the sticker is lost, the grammar is lost, or it will fail to explode? The analogy is beside the point, because it is self-referential and contingent (Infra). Likewise, his Wittgensteinian type of distinction between a sentence and a sentence about a sentence goes counter to the above solution.

In arguing thus, Neelamani begs the main question because he accepts the Tarskian schema. Now, by denying that the *a* on both sides of the above identity statement, cannot be demonstrated to be the same, as *Ta* cannot be reduced to *a*. It is a strange argument to say that since such a reduction is not possible, they are not identical.

For what he argues is that since the RHS contains two elements *T* and *a*, we tend to fuse one into another to make us think of it as a complete sentence, and we think of *a* as an incomplete sentence, whereas *a* is a complete (matter-of-fact) sentence, to which it should be reduced. The sense of matter-of-fact sentence is counterintuitive, which he never succeeds to explain (f.n.3). Adding truth values (*T* or *F*) can hardly make it a more complete sentence (for it opens up the paradox), for the simple reason that it confuses a sentence and a sentence about a sentence. A rough-and-ready way to distinguish them is to introduce *p* and *p* is true or false. The latter are value sentences about matter of fact sentences; so, no doubt, they could be reduced to *p*. Neelamani wants to deny this. What is his explanation of truth values? He accepts that they are just properties of propositions, but says that they are not parts of propositions, or they can be distinguished as such. Just as we see there is a fit for *p*, we must also ask whether there is the similar fit for *p* is true or *p* is false. On finding that there is no difference between *p*, *p* is true and *p* is false, they all say the same thing. Because they are all reducible to (what) *p* says (something).

Discussion

$p \text{ says } p \text{ is true} \Rightarrow p \text{ is false}$

For Neelamani,

This is a sentence (p)

means

$p \text{ says (what)}$

That is,

$p \text{ says } p$

$p \text{ says } p$ is self-referential as well as contingent (as before). Can we succeed to make sense of the distinction

' $P \text{ says } P$ ' is true

and

$p \text{ says 'p is true'}$

My point is that the above sentence is as much a liar case as the latter. This looks silly as the latter. This looks silly as this will undoubtedly make

$TP = FP$

what about iteration? While

$TTP = P$

the same does not hold true for

FFp

because it changes the truth value. So on Neelamani's

$TTTp = p$

but,

$FFFp = Fp$

After all, we can accept Tarski's schema, then the paradox disappears. Then why try another awkward solution? Neelamani's distinction between matter of fact sen-

tence and value sentence cannot rescue us from the grip of paradox, as it is either a distinction which is already there (old wine in new bottles), or it is of no consequence whatever. His distinction, in other words, is not made to serve a rough-and-ready distinction as evidenced in

p is a sentence (true or false)

and

p is false (a sentence about a sentence).

The moment he does not accept the former, then he cannot determine whether

Pegasus files

is a sentence or not. For Neelamani, this is a matter-of-fact sentence. What does he mean by the fact of the matter of the matter of fact sentence ?

Now, depending on Neelamani's distinction between the logical and the empirical, we can put forward the following hypothesis: the paradox can be prevented by making the distinction between:

The statement (is) printed within the rectangle on this page (logical) and the the empirical, given within the rectangle

The statement printed within the rectangle in this page is false.

Consider the former sentence as p says \bar{p} and the latter as the second occurrence of p . If so, the p says p is true by virtue of this matter-of-fact. No confusion ever arises between the logical and the empirical. Surprisingly, the paradox does not disappear, because we are under some constraints to identify both of the above sentences. Can we think that this is an identity with a difference ? Neelamani wants us to think so. Let us proceed to investigate:

Accept Tarski's schema:

$$TP = P$$

$$\text{Then, } T(c) = c$$

$$(T)Fc = Fc$$

is possible only when F is lost sight of, so it yields

$$T(c(ii)) = F(c(i))$$

Discussion

Hence, no paradox. The question is: does it block the paradox? My answer is 'No'. Consider, as per his own reasoning,

$$p = \text{what } p \text{ says (Neela's identity axiom)}$$

Now, p is true or p is false is grammatically a nonsensical sentence; then he should only say

$$p \text{ is nonsensical} = p \text{ does not say.}$$

Neelamani has to equivocate both of the above lines to prove his point, since both have the same 'grammatical' status, according to him (see esp. p.161); or he must say

$$p \text{ says} = p \text{ does not say}$$

This is just equivalent to the line from which he proves that there is no paradox. In effect he equivocates

$$\text{nonsensical } p = p$$

In other words, we can take the LHS as neuter (neither true or nor false), then

$$\text{neuter } p = p$$

How else should one take Neelamani's 'nonsensical'? This blocks no paradox since this is very similar to

$$\sim Ta = a$$

So this sentence is false must either presuppose (what it presupposes it is false) or necessitate other sentences (since it is true), if the paradox is to be blocked, (he must consult Bas van Fraassen on this) and not 'does not anticipate' as he thinks. Neelamani's 'does not anticipate' is a *faute de mieux*. I suggest that Neelamani will be benefited by well-known advances made before to block the paradox (I am not accusing Neelamani for his ignorance, but his painstaking inquiry will be amply rewarded by taking such a course). At least one of the solutions (Fraassen's) take it to be neuter. The matter continues to be controversial and not as simple as he thinks.

Obviously, Neelamani thinks that early Wittgenstein's rejection of the distinction

between language and metalanguage supports his point. Wittgenstein's point is that sentence about a sentence attempts to say what cannot be said, and hence it is nonsensical. To what extent such a rejection is applicable to liar sentences is enigmatic, for it wants us to make the very distinction, which we otherwise avoid.

NOTES AND REFERENCES.

1. Neelamani Sahu, 'Wittgensteinean Approach to Paradoxes' in this Journal, (April, 1997), pp. 153 - 168 (pagination within brackets refer to this article).
2. I am indebted to Hilary Putnam here; see his *Dewey Lectures* (1994) on 'Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses : An Inquiry into the Powers of the Human Mind' in *Journal of Philosophy* XCI (1994) pp.445 - 517; see his last lecture, esp. p. 512.
3. Bas van Frassen, 'Presupposition, Implication and Self-Reference' in *Journal of Philosophy* 65 (1968) pp. 136 - 152, and a large corpus thereafter by him and other.

A. KANTHAMANI

II

THE SYNTHESIZING ROLE OF THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON

Strawson, it is sometimes alleged, has left the concept of person in an indeterminate¹ state. That is, they say, it is not possible for one from the definition he offers of a person as a being that admits of both the predicates P- and M- to determine in some situations whether a given being or thing is a person or not. More specifically, their objection is that Strawson has outlined only the "necessary" conditions, and not the "sufficient" conditions, of someone's being a person. That is, the question is whether a thing or being can count as a person simply by fulfilling the requirement of applicability of the two kinds of predicates. If so, is a dog (by virtue of being able to sleep, feel, run and much other P- or P- like capacities) or a computer (by virtue of being able to remember, calculate etc.) or

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a stream (by virtue of being able to "run down hill"²) a person? Questions of this type are not answered in *Individuals*; and the object of this small paper is to show that these questions neither arise from the standpoint of Strawson. Here he is not concerned with who or what is a person, but with constructing the concept as a pre-requisite of our simultaneous ascription of P- and M-predicates.

A reader of *Individuals* is well aware how Strawson has placed the concept of a person. Here he presents the concept as the "basic particular" in relation to 'private particulars' - "comprising the perhaps overlapping groups of sensations, mental events and in one common acceptance of this term, sense data."³ That is, the concept serves as the referring point of the private particulars and perceptions. We cannot speak of a perception in the abstract, it is to be referred to a person whose perception it is. In perception we become aware of two kinds of properties. We see that properties of a particular kind (material properties) apply to both material bodies and persons, but the properties of the other kind we do not find in material bodies; but it is peculiar to persons alone. We name it psychical properties. Both these properties can be ascribed to a person. But on this very point Strawson seems to be confused. Throughout the essay it is by no means the business of Strawson to define the concept of a person. Rather he is here to emphasize the logically basic nature (it is however not epistemologically basic, for Hume would rest content with perceptions alone) and the primitiveness of the concept. The primitiveness of the concept stands for the unanalysability of it. That it is not his purpose to define the concept can be seen from his way of presenting it. He goes to arrive at it through the refutations of the two theories viz. Cartesianism and no-ownershipism. These two theories deny that we ascribe both M- and P- characteristics to one and the same thing. The former theory feigns two subjects for the two characteristics, whereas for the latter there is no subject for the P-characteristics since P-characteristics themselves are illusory. Strawson takes these two theories to be two extremes, and considering the various difficulties they give rise to he goes to find a solution of the two opposing theses. The essay is to be seen not as an account of persons but as a reaction against both - dualism as well as physicalism.

They say that there is a mind and there is a body; or that there is no mind, it is only the body; but Strawson says a 'no' to both of them. There is neither a

body nor a mind in the sense that these two elements somehow came together and gave birth to a person. Neither a body nor a mind should be our starting point, rather it should be the concept of a person which is to begin with. And this person exhibits two kinds of properties, M- and P-. The person is not to be viewed as a body but as having physical or material properties; he is not to be viewed as a mind but as having psychic properties. These properties are identifiably dependent upon the concept of person. So if we try to break up the concept we are not to expect that we shall get thereby some abstract properties. Hence, it is said to be unanalysable or primitive or basic. But it is true only of the concept of person and not of the actual person X. The person X has a body, and at death he is reduced to a body we are here tempted to think that at death a person is analysed or broken up into a body - the perceptible left over of the person, and an invisible something - an ego (This phenomenon of death will probably go on inspiring people to think in the Cartesian way for ages to come). But the point of logic is that if it were an analysis of the person when he no longer remains a person, there should have been a corresponding synthesis also. In other words, if we can analyse a person to a lifeless body and an (or more?) invisible ego, then there should have been an instance of a construction or reconstruction of a person out of these two elements. Fortunately for Strawson, this has not yet been made possible. At death the person becomes a body, a non-person, it is the end of a person. But when alive he is not a body, although it is the body by virtue of which he is what he is. He thinks, feels, writes, talks, moves by virtue of his body. But why this possessive 'his'? Because the person is not the body alone. However this is not to say that he is a body plus..., for we cannot have the concept of a body (in case of a person) before we have that of a person. That is to say the concept of a personal body is secondary concept. It is a secondary existent too. So long as the person is alive we do not treat him as a body. We then deal with the person with all his peculiar characteristics and capabilities. He is a unified whole. From this point of view the concept of disembodied existence is irrelevant here. Because even if such a state is conceivable that would also be a secondary concept. A disembodied ego, for all possible reasons, is not a person, i.e. not a basic or primitive concept.

All this is to show that Strawson is not concerned with defining a person.

Discussion

By pointing out to the simultaneous applicability of P- and M- predicates Strawson has not defined a person but with the concept of person he has defined the P- and M- predicates, or mind and body. Seen from this angle Strawson may be exempted from the charge of leaving the concept in an indeterminate state, although his silence about what does a person's personhood consist in may be treated as a serious gap.

SAURAVPRANA GOSWAMI

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ON DECISION PROCEDURE

KANTILAL DAS

Like many scientific theories logical theories attempt to design instruments for measuring logical properties. Unlike theoretical investigation the nature of logical tests and procedures is peculiar, since they are purely mechanical which makes the all important distinction between logical theories and other theories. Logical theories, by and large, can be carried out by means of mechanics. This paper will attempt to survey a very important device which is simply called the device of decision procedure.

The whole course of this paper will be studied in three sections. In section one some theoretical aspects of the concept of decision procedure will be discussed. Section two deals with the examination of some logical systems which are not considered as decision procedures, and section three will be devoted to account some other logical systems which are considered as decision procedures.

I

The concept of decision procedure is predominantly concerned with the concept of decidability. Every logical system, by and large, requires a recipe for deciding whether there is some effective or mechanical procedure by which we can tell a *wff* either as valid or not; an inference either as sound or not. Such a procedure is called a decision procedure. It is usually laid down that a decision procedure must be effective in the sense that it is precisely stable, reliable and finite "which can be described in advance for providing in a finite number of steps a "yes" or "no" answer to any class of questions."¹ It is mechanical, since it acts like a computing machine so effectively that with respect to any formula it would at some point give a positive answer if the formula under consideration were in fact valid or a negative answer if the formula under consideration were in fact not valid.

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Decision Problem :

To examine whether a formula is valid or not is a matter of decision and it has been effectively decided by a decision procedure. The problem of discovering a decision procedure is called the *decision problem*. “The decision problem for any deductive system” as Copi says, “is the problem of stating an effective criterion for deciding whether or not any statement or well formed formula is a theorem of the system.”² This means that so far as the logical systems are concerned we have so many different types of decision problems. The problem of discovering a decision procedure for a predicate is called the decision problem for that predicate. Analogously, the problem of finding out a decision procedure for a class is called the decision problem for that class. So every class of objects has a decision problem; i.e., the problem of finding out an effective method for deciding whether it is a member of that class or not. There we find two types of decision problems, such as solvable and unsolvable. A decision problem may be solvable for some classes or may be unsolvable for some others. A decision problem is solvable if a decision procedure can be found within the system; unsolvable if a decision procedure can not be found within the system. If the decision problem can be found within the system, the system is often said to be decidable; if a decision procedure can not be found within the system, the system is said to be undecidable. Hughes and Londey have observed that every logical system possesses a decision problem, but not every logical system is a decidable or solvable decision problem.³ So the decision problem for any system is to find out an effective method so as to decide arbitrarily whether any *wff* of propositional calculus (pc) is valid or not. If a decision procedure is found in the predicate, the predicate is said to be effectively decidable; if a decision procedure is found in the class, the class is said to be effectively decidable. So far as the decision problem is concerned any theory or any *wff* can be answered in the affirmative if it is decidable or it can be answered in the negative if it is undecidable. An example of a decidable theory is the statement or propositional calculus, since a formula is a theorem iff it is a tautology. The method of truth-tables provides a decision procedure, since it constitutes a solution to the decision problem and it enables us to decide effectively whether or not any *wff* is a tautology.

Does a Decision Procedure Make Other Rules Obsolete?

If it is admitted that a decision procedure is an effective method which allows us to decide whether a given *wff* is valid or not, then a very natural question arises at this juncture. The question is : whether a decision procedure is responsible or not responsible for making other rules obsolete. As we have a purely mechanical or computing system at our hand for testing the soundness of an inference, why should we continue to use the rules at all? Several points may be given in response to this question. The first point is that although truth-value assignments may tell us that a certain conclusion can be drawn from certain premises, they do not tell us how to draw the conclusion. A computer or a machine gets its action if it is being operated by following certain rules. Similarly, a decision procedure may be shown to be effective if it follows in accordance with rules. Only the rules can tell us, not the method or process, how one statement can be deduced from another. Logic, of course, may be equated with mathematical reasoning, but this does not mean that logic can be formulated exclusively on the basis of matrices and truth-value assignments. We do apply matrices and truth-value assignments only for testing mathematical or logical reasoning; but does it mean that they stand for mathematics and logic? Certainly not. A conclusion is derived from the premise/premises not in terms of truth-values, but in terms of logical rules. Finally and importantly, 'even if a satisfactory theory of propositional deduction could be formulated in terms of a decision procedure,' as Anderson and Johnstone Jr. have observed, 'such a theory could not be formulated for certain more complex kinds of reasoning for which it is known that there cannot be a decision procedure.'⁴ So what we can say about it is that a decision procedure does not ignore rules; but it acts in accordance with rules.

II

We have already pointed out that in logic we have some systems which are not decidable; i.e., in these systems we do not find any decision procedure. In this section we examine some logical systems which are not decision procedures.

Proof is not a Decision Procedure :

Proof procedure is not a decision procedure; since in the case of a proof, there remains nothing to be proved as false. If we are asked to prove a formula, we know prior to its proving that it is logically true; but we do not know that it is basically false. This indicates the difference between 'proving something' and 'testing something'. In order to prove something, we have no option to make it false. But in order to test something the given may be either true or false and it is the doer's task to decide effectively whether the given is true or false. Proof, thus, establishes logical truth; but not logical falsity. But Quine observes that the impossibility of a decision procedure for validity or proving something does not prevent us from developing procedures for proving validity. He, however, points out the difference between a decision procedure and a proof procedure in saying that "a decision procedure assures an affirmative and negative answer every time, while a proof procedure assures at best an eventual affirmative answer where an affirmative answer is in order."⁵ A complete proof procedure differs from a decision procedure, says Quine, for a complete decision procedure enables us to give both positive and negative answers; but a proof procedure gives only a positive answer, 'it does not deliver negative answers.'⁶

If we adhere to the principle that a proof procedure is not a decision procedure as it fails to give a no answer to a formula, as Quine says, then what do we think about *Conditional Proof (CP)* and *Indirect Proof (IP)* ? The rule of CP can be used in dealing only with valid arguments, it can not be a decision procedure.

Like CP, IP is also a proof procedure and it should not be treated as a decision procedure. But a little bit of confusion may arise here if it has been admitted that IP is equated with RAA (*Reductio Ad Absurdum*). RAA method is considered, we shall examine later on, as a decision procedure.⁷ The question is : If RAA method is considered as a decision procedure and IP is often called the method of RAA⁸, then why IP is not considered as a decision procedure? In what sense IP is often called RAA? The similarity is that like RAA, IP also attempts to have a contradiction of the given or to reduce an absurdity of the given; but the way through which it is drawn is different. In RAA method the absurdity is drawn in terms of truth-values; but in IP the absurdity is drawn in terms of proposition or propositional variables. If the given statement is valid

then its negation is a contradiction (*both in RAA and IP*); and hence the given has to be a tautology. But if the given statement is not valid, then its negation does not lead into a contradiction and it is not to be proved as a tautology. In such a case the given statement must be either contingent or inconsistent. So far as the truth-values are concerned, RAA method enables to decide effectively both inconsistent and contingent statements. But as far as the inferential rules are concerned IP fails to determine whether a given statement is contingent or inconsistent. As a proof procedure, IP gives only a positive answer to any statement; but there is no scope of finding out a negative answer in IP and in this sense IP should not be considered as a decision procedure.

One Variable Quantification System (OVQS):

OVQS is not a decision procedure as it possesses an infinite number of interpretations. It is often claimed that there is no mechanical procedure which is so effective in determining validity, implication etc., in OVQS. Every logical system, of course, has possessed some mechanical device, but not every logical system has an *effective* mechanical device. Accordingly, OVQS has rules, but the rules it possesses have wide range of application. It has possessed some mechanical device, but the mechanism is not effective like truth-table system, since the mechanism of OVQS is more complicated to be introduced and in most cases it is not so efficient as the means as we shall use in truth-table system.

It is true that the rules of derivations that we have in OVQS are sound and complete as they enable us to prove an argument in OVQS. But the technique through which we attempt to prove a schema in OVQS is not purely or effectively mechanical as it requires some insight and ingenuity on our own part. Here we are trying very hard to prove a particular schema but we fail to do so. It is very often to be the case, because there we have so many interpretations and we may fail to choose the right one to prove the schema as valid. If we fail to make a schema as valid, then does it mean that the schema is invalid? It does not. It may be the case that there is a proof which we fail to discover by applying the correct rules or correct interpretation. So it is up to the doer to decide which interpretation is effective for making a schema as valid. But if we attempt to prove a formula in truth-table system and eventually fail to prove it, then, of course, we can always check the truth-table system for validity, but we can not

do this for those OVQS. Here we have to be careful of the problem of UI, EI, UG, EG. and their mutual transformations into each other. This opens many interpretations of this system. So it is claimed that "our rules of derivation do not furnish a decision procedure for the validity of OVQS. What they *do* furnish is called a *proof procedure*, that is, a method which will produce a proof of a schema if it is valid, but which will not tell us that the schema is invalid if it happens to be"⁹. In logic there we have some schemata which are neither valid nor inconsistent. OVQS as a proof procedure fails to prove this formula. That is why Resnik aptly puts, "..... there are also schemata which are neither valid nor inconsistent, and our proof procedure will not establish the consistency or invalidity of these schemata; nor of the negations."¹⁰ It means that OVQS does not yield a decision procedure. Resnik says, "The moral is that one-variable quantification theory is going to place much greater demands upon our ingenuity than truth-functional theory did."

Quantificational Validity is not a Decision Procedure :

Like OVQS, there is no effective mechanical procedure for quantificational validity. That is to say that we do not find here any effective method applied by man or a machine to decide arbitrarily whether a quantificational theory is valid or not. This had been developed by Alonzo Church in claiming that logic can never be fully mechanised. After Church, it was Gödel who had established a remarkable incompleteness theorem in comparing mathematical truth with provability.

But again this does not mean that quantificational logic lacks rules of inference. Quantificational logic can definitely be endowed with sound inferential rules. The rules of inference that we have in quantificational logic are, basically, the same as the rules of those used in OVQS. Furthermore, truth - functional rules may be reused here without any change. Here we find some more extensions and restrictions of instantiations and generalisations of universal and particular propositions. But the intuitive basis of these rules remains the same, since no further rules are necessary. So our all important conclusion is that although we can not test the validity, equivalence, etc. in quantificational logic like many other systems we can take the advantage of these rules to establish the presence of these properties and relations. But quantificational logic is not still a decision

procedure, because to be sure of anything about in this system we have to depend "somewhat on luck and ingenuity",¹² on our own part.

Tree-method is not a Decision Procedure :

Tree-method is not a decision procedure. Although it is true that tree-method adequately formalizes logic, the method is claimed to be inadequate. It is inadequate, because in order to test an invalid inference in tree-method, one may go on for ever. There we do not find any terminus point or any finite number of steps after which the machine classifies a given invalid inference as invalid.

Let us examine the following invalid inference :

- | | | |
|-----|------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. | $(x) (\exists y) x Ly$ | 1 $\therefore aLa$. |
| 2. | $\neg aLa$ | [denial of the conclusion] |
| ✓3. | $(\exists y) aLy$ | [1. by (x)] |
| 4. | aLb | [3 by $(\exists y)$] |
| ✓5. | $(\exists y) bLy$ | [1 by (x)] |
| 6. | bLc | [5 by $(\exists y)$] |
| . | | |
| . | | |
| . | | |

Invalid

The above inference is invalid. In answering to the question "Is this inference valid?" the machine fails to give a 'yes' or a 'no' answer since the machine could not finish the tree. The premise of the above inference starts with a universal quantifier following an existential quantifier. Hence step no-1 can never be checked off, because in this step the universal quantifier i.e., '(x)' can be legitimately instantiated by any individual constant whatsoever. So the option of instantiation in this step remains open. Now, once we instantiated the universal quantification by any individual constant, say a, then the subsequent instantiation of any existential quantification can not be legitimately applied on the same individual constant. This means that every instantiation of existential quantification brings a new individual-constant and this process is continuing



for ever. Thus, so far as the procedure is concerned, tree-method may remain open for ever in the case of an invalid inference. But if at some point the machine could predict, of course, intuitive prediction, it will never finish the tree; it could tell us at that point that the correct answer is 'no'. That is why Jeffrey aptly remarks that in tree-method. "We have an adequate "yes" machine which is inadequate as a "no" machine."¹³

Tree-method is inadequate not only for quantificational validity; but also it is inadequate for testing consistency and inconsistency. This is mainly for the reason that here we are adding individual constants in every existential instantiation and this process always opens new path. Let us examine the following set of sentences for testing consistency or inconsistency.

$$(x) [Nx \supset (\exists y) (Ny \cdot Rxy)].$$

$$(x) \{Nx \supset (y) \{Ny \supset (2) \{Nz \supset [(Rxy.Ryz) \supset Rxz]\}\}\}$$

$$(x) (Nx \supset - Rxx)$$



On Decision Procedure

$$\text{'Nb} \supset (z)\{Nz \supset [(Rab.Rbz) \supset Raz]\}$$

$$\text{'Nb} \quad (z)\{Nz \supset [(Rab.Rbz) \supset Raz]\}$$

$$\text{Nc} \supset [(Rab.Rbc) \supset Rac]$$

$$\text{'Nc} \quad (Rab.Rbc) \supset Rac$$

$$\text{Na} \supset \text{'-Raa}$$

$$\text{'-Na} \quad \text{'-Raa}$$

$$\text{'-(Rab.Rbc)} \quad \text{Rac}$$

$$\text{'-Rab} \quad \text{'-Rbc}$$

Consistent.

The initial set consists of three universal sentences which can never be checked off. After the instantiation of the first sentence of the initial set we get a new existential sentence. Every instantiation of a new existential sentence gives birth to a new individual constant, since no existential sentence can be legitimately instantiated with the same individual constant which has already been occurred in the previous step. In the above procedure the existential sentence ' $(\exists y) (Ny.Ray)$ ' gives birth to a new individual constant such as b; and that leads to ' $(\exists y) (Ny.Rby)$ '. And it again gives rise to another individual constant, say c; and that leads to ' $(\exists y) (Ny.Rcy)$ '. But how long will this process continue? It will continue for ever. So we can never construct a model based on just a finite number of individuals. So we can say that tree-method can not be a complete decision procedure, because at least in some cases there is no finite number of steps and no finite path yields a successful model. Not all paths close, but the process never ends.

III

In this section we shall examine some logical methods which are considered as decision procedures.

Truth-table Method is a Decision Procedure :

Truth-table method is an ideal example of a decision procedure. It is intuitively clear that the decision problem of PC is solvable in truth-tables method, since it enables us to decide effectively the validity of any *wff*. Every *wff* of PC has a truth-table, because every *wff* of PC is built up entirely from truth-functions, and every truth-function has a truth-table. To introduce this method we first consider how one can construct a truth-table for any *wff* of the sentential language. Suppose we construct a truth-table for this formula :

$$(p \cdot q) \supset (p \vee q)$$

A truth-table for a formula is a table in which the possible combinations of truth-value for the component variables of the formula are listed and the resulting truth-value of the formula for each possible combination indicated. The formula under consideration is made up of two variables, such as *p* and *q*. This means that there are four possible-ways in which truth-value may be assigned to the statement variables which may be set down as follows :

P	Q
T	T
T	F
F	T
F	F

If the formula under consideration is made up of three variables, it has eight possible ways, if it is made up of four variables, it has sixteen possible ways. Thus truth-table procedure satisfies 2^n principle; i.e., in truth-table one variable means 2^1 or two rows; two variables means 2^2 or four rows; three variables mean 2^3 or eight rows; four variables means 2^4 or sixteen rows and so on so forth.

Now the truth-table for the given formula is constructed as follows :

p	q	$(p-q) \supset (pv-q)$
T	T	F (T) T
T	F	T (T) T
F	T	F (T) F
F	F	F (T) T. Tautology

It seems clear from the above that truth-table method is so effective that with the help of this machine we can decide effectively the truth-value of all PC. But this procedure may be onerous or embarrassing if we have more than three variables in a wff. The problem may be cumbersome; but still the method remains to be effective.

Tautology, Inconsistent and Contingent :

So far as the values are concerned, logical statements can be classified into tautology, inconsistent and contingent. A statement is tautology if it is necessarily true; inconsistent if it is necessarily false; and contingent if it is neither necessarily true nor necessarily false. The statement : "Either India is a democratic country or not a democratic country" is a necessarily true statement. The statement "India is both a democratic country and not a democratic country" is a necessarily false statement; the statement: India is a democratic Country" is a contingent statement, since its truth or falsity depends on the existing states of affairs. It is important to note that the negation of a tautology leads into an inconsistency; the negation of an inconsistency leads into a tautology and the negation of a contingent leads to a contingent. ' $(pv-p)$ ' is necessarily true and hence tautology and its negation ' $(p-p)$ ' is necessarily false and hence inconsistent; and vice-versa. But ' $(p \supset q)$ ' is a contingent statement and its negation; i.e., ' $-(p \supset q)$ ' is also a contingent statement. Truth-table method is effective in determining whether a statement is tautology, inconsistent or contingent.

Reductio Ad Absurdum Method is a Decision Procedure :

Reductio Ad Absurdum (RAA) method is considered to be a decision

procedure, because all truth-table methods are decision procedures and RAA method is a short-cut truth-table method, so it follows logically that RAA method is a decision procedure. It is one of the many short-cut truth-table methods. In this method the truth-value of a given formula can be decided very quickly and very effectively than any other truth-table method. That is why Copi aptly says, "The *reductio ad absurdum* method of assigning truth-values is by far the quickest and easiest method of testing arguments and classifying statements"¹⁴. Let us explain the method of RAA.

The aim of this method is to prove something indirectly and it tries to get the contradiction of the given. Suppose, A is a *wff* and let us further suppose that A is not a tautology and we express this supposition by writing F under the main operator of A. Now, if we go ahead with the supposition that A is not a tautology and proceed to fill in truth-values accordingly for the components of A, we ultimately lead into either contradictory truth-values, if the given statement were in fact a tautology, or we can consistently assign truth-value to each of the components if the given statement were in fact not a tautology. If we arrive at a contradictory truth-values of any one of the components of the denial of the original statement, then our earlier supposition that 'A is not a tautology' happens to be false and as a matter of fact the given statement is proved to be a tautology. But if we consistently assign a truth-value of the components, then A can not be a tautology. Copi says, "If it is possible to assign truth-values consistently to its components on the assumption that it is false, then the expression in question is not a tautology, but must be either contradictory or contingent"¹⁵. In such a case we make an attempt to make it true by assigning truth-values to its components. If the assigning truth-values leads into a contradiction, then the formula must be inconsistent; but if the assigning truth-values make it true in some cases and false in others the formula happens to be a contingent. This method is called the method of *Reductio Ad Absurdum* method.

We have pointed out earlier that the negation of a tautology leads into a contradiction. RAA method admits exactly the same principle, since if the given statement under consideration is a tautology then its negation in question would be a contradictory. But if the given statement is not a tautology, say, a contingent, then its negation would be a contingent too. So the technique of RAA can be summed up in the following way :

- (i) Assume first that the given formula is not a tautology by placing F under the main connective of the given formula.
- (ii) Follow up the two-fold consequences : Either we finally arrive at a contradiction or we do not arrive at a contradiction.
- (iii) If we finally arrive at a contradictory truth-value of any one of the components of the given, the formula is a tautology; if we do not have, the formula is not a tautology.
- (iv) Now, if the formula is not a tautology, then it must be either a contingent or an inconsistent formula. In such a case we assign truth-values to make it true instead of false.
- (v) If this attempt leads to a contradiction; the formula is a contingent.

Let us test the following concrete example :

$$(i) (A \supset B) \supset [(B \supset C) \supset (A \supset C)]$$

Let us assume that the given statement is not a tautology by placing F under the main connective and we get the following :

$$(ii) (A \supset B) \supset [(B \supset C) \supset (A \supset C)]$$

F

Now, ((ii) can be false if its antecedent is to be true and its consequent is to be false and we have :

$$(iii) (A \supset B) \supset [(B \supset C) \supset (A \supset C)]$$

T F F

Now, to make ' $[(B \supset C) \supset (A \supset C)]$ ' to be false, we have to assign T to its antecedent and F to its consequent. Thus we have :

$$(iv) (A \supset B) \supset [(B \supset C) \supset (A \supset C)]$$

T F T F F

Now, ' $A \supset C$ ' is false, if A is true and C is false. And if C is false and to make ' $B \supset C$ ' as true; we have to assert B is false. And, again if B is false and to make ' $A \supset B$ ' as true, we have to assert A is false.

So we have the final step like this :

$$(v) (A \supset B) \supset [(B \supset C) \supset (A \supset C)]$$

F T F F F T F F T F F

It seems clear that in order to make the statement as false, we are forced to assign the truth-value of A both F and T. But this is false and it leads into a contradiction (assuming Peirce's Law that false leads to a contradiction)¹⁶. So our assumption that the given statement is not a tautology is false, and it sends us back to admit that the given statement is a tautology. Likewise we can effectively decide contradictory and contingent statements by applying RAA method. Hence it is called a decision procedure. Copi says, ".... the reductio ad absurdum method is superior to any other method known"¹⁷.

Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF) is a Decision Procedure :

Although the validity testing of all types of normal forms (such as CNF, DNF, BCNF, BDNF, PCNF, PDNF) is comparatively laborious than RAA and other decision procedures, it is still considered as a decision procedure and its utility is highly important for theoretical purpose in logic. For the sake of brevity of this paper, we restrict our discussion only to CNF.

Hughes and Cresswell have defined CNF like this : "A wff. is said to be in *conjunctive normal form* (CNF) if it is a conjunction (possibly degenerate), each conjunct which is a disjunction (again possibly degenerate), the disjuncts which are of certain specified forms"¹⁸. In another book, Hughes along with Londey have said that a wff. is in CNF iff "it is a conjunction of the disjunctions, and no negation sign has an argument other than a single propositional variable"¹⁹. Keeping the above definitions of CNF in mind any proposition can be put into CNF by following the steps in order :

- (i) Apart from '-', 'v', '.', no other logical connectives can be retained in the formula.
- (ii) Use only Impl. and Equivalence rules to obtain a formula containing only the required connectives.
- (iii) Use De.M. and D.N. to remove all negations outside parenthesis if any.
- (iv) Use D.N. to remove all double negations if any and ensure that no variable is preceded by more than one negation sign.

(v) Use the distributive law; i.e., $[pv(q-r)] = [(pvq).(pvr)]$

as many times as necessary to produce a conjunction of the disjunctions of single formulas.

Let us solve the following formula in CNF :

$$\begin{aligned}
 & (A \supset B) \supset [(B \supset C) \supset (A \supset C)] \\
 & \equiv \neg(A \vee B) \vee [\neg(\neg B \vee C) \vee (\neg A \vee C)] \text{ [Def. } \supset \text{]} \\
 & \equiv (A \cdot B) \vee [(B \cdot \neg C) \vee (\neg A \vee C)] \text{ [De.M., D.N.]} \\
 & \equiv (A \cdot B) \vee [\neg A \vee C \vee B] \cdot (\neg A \vee C \vee \neg C) \text{ [Dist.]} \\
 & \equiv [(A \cdot B) \vee (\neg A \vee C \vee B)] \cdot [(A \cdot B) \vee (\neg A \vee C \vee \neg C)] \text{ [Dist.]} \\
 & \equiv [\neg A \vee C \vee B \vee A] \cdot (\neg A \vee C \vee B \vee \neg B) \\
 & \quad [(\neg A \vee C \vee \neg C \vee A) \cdot (\neg A \vee C \vee \neg C \vee \neg B)] \text{ [Dist.]} \\
 & \equiv (\neg A \vee C \vee B \vee A) \cdot (\neg A \vee C \vee B \vee \neg B) \\
 & \quad (\neg A \vee C \vee \neg C \vee A) \cdot (\neg A \vee C \vee \neg C \vee \neg B) \text{ [Dropping brackets]} \\
 & \equiv (A \vee \neg A \vee B \vee C) \cdot (\neg A \vee B \vee \neg B \vee C) \cdot (A \vee \neg A \vee C \vee \neg C) \\
 & \quad \cdot (\neg A \vee \neg B \vee C \vee \neg C) \text{ [Reordering]}
 \end{aligned}$$

Tautology in CNF

The last line of the above derivation is a conjunction of the disjunctions of single formulae and in this step all negation signs negate single variables accordingly. The formula is a tautology in CNF, because each of the components of the formula is in the form of '(P V-P)'. The conjuncts are disjunction, and a disjunction is valid iff a variable and its negation appears as disjuncts. This is exactly the same that happened in the above CNF. So it is proved as tautology in CNF.

But what do we think about an elementary or a singular formula? Elementary formulae are called degenerate wffs. and they are also to be counted in CNF by following the moral that "Every wff. is a CNF". "A wff. is a degenerate conjunction" for Hughes and Londey, "if it could appear as one conjunct...."²⁰. For example, the wff. 'pv-pvq' is a degenerate conjunction. It is one conjunct of the disjunctions and hence is a CNF. Similarly, p, - p, q, etc., are also to be counted as CNF. 'p', for example, is a degenerate conjunction of degenerate disjunctions. Since "p = (p . p)" (degenerate conjunction) and

“ $p \vee (p \vee p)$ ” (degenerate disjunction)(see PC No : 8 and 9 respectively)²¹. To obtain a degenerate conjunction in CNF we have to be careful about redundant variables. Hughes and Londey prescribed the following suggestions :

- (i) No redundant disjuncts occur in any conjunct in a CNF. This means that ‘ $p \vee p$ ’ is replaced by ‘ p ’ and likewise ‘ $\neg p \vee \neg p$ ’ is replaced by ‘ $\neg p$ ’.
- (ii) No redundant conjuncts occur in CNF. For example; ‘ $(p \vee \neg p)(p \vee \neg p)$ ’ is replaced by ‘ $(p \vee \neg p)$ ’.
- (iii) Disjunctions variable appear in the alphabetical order; e.g., $(p \vee \neg r \vee q \vee \neg p)$ is replaced by ‘ $(p \vee \neg p \vee q \vee \neg r)$ ’.

Thus CNF enables us to decide effectively every wff. of PC either as a tautology or not as a tautology; and hence a decision procedure.

Method of Existential Conditionals is a Decision Procedure :

We have ignored the possibility of decision procedure in OVQS or MPL (Monadic Predicate Logic), because to select a schema of MPL at random and test if for validity is usually sufficient to convince anyone that the procedure is long and tedious, and apart from rules it requires some skill and ingenuity on our own part. But it was Quine²² who along with von Wright finally²³ overcame the defects of MPL by developing the procedure given by Behmann. Here we examine the *Method of Existential Conditionals* that has been presented by Quine. His method is to conjoin the premises of an argument and to combine them with the conclusion, using ‘ \supset ’ and finally to test the result for satisfiability by the method. In many cases this can be done reasonably briefly.

Let us examine the following argument :

All of the witness who hold stock in the firm are employees. All of the witness are employees or hold stock in the firm. Therefore all of the witness are employees.

Now let : Wx : x is a witness.

Hx : x is a person who holds stock in the firm.

Ex : x is an employee.

By following the above notations we can symbolise the given argument

On Decision Procedure

like this :

$$(x) [(Wx \cdot Hx) \supset Ex].$$

$$(x) [Wx \supset (Ex \vee Hx)] \therefore (x) (Wx \supset Ex)$$

Now, if we render the above symbolic form of the argument into Boolean statement schemata, we have the following form :

$$- \exists WH \bar{E}$$

$$- \exists W \bar{E} H \therefore - \exists W \bar{E}$$

now, we can test the validity of the inclusive Boolean statement schema like this :

$$(-\exists WH \bar{E} \cdot -\exists W \bar{E} H) \supset - \exists W \bar{E}$$

$$\equiv -(\exists WH \bar{E} \cdot \exists W \bar{E} H) \vee - \exists W \bar{E}$$

$$\equiv (\exists WH \bar{E} \vee \exists W \bar{E} H) \vee - \exists W \bar{E}$$

$$\equiv -\exists W \bar{E} \vee (\exists WH \bar{E} \vee \exists W \bar{E} H)$$

$$\equiv \exists W \bar{E} \supset (\exists WH \bar{E} \vee \exists W \bar{E} H)$$

$$\equiv \exists W \bar{E} \supset \exists (WH \bar{E} \vee W \bar{E} H) \text{ [Law of Existential Distribution (LED)]}$$

$$\equiv W \bar{E} \supset (WH \bar{E} \vee W \bar{E} H) \text{ [By dropping existential Schema].}$$

Now by applying fell-swoop method, $W\bar{E}$ can be true only on one condition, i.e., when $W = I$ and $E = O$ (where I stands for T and O stands for F). Now if the assigning value of the antecedent can be put on the consequent variables and get a truth-value true, then the argument would be proved as valid, otherwise not.

Fell Swoop : $W\bar{E} = I$ if $W = I$ and $E = O$

$$W\bar{E} \supset (WH \bar{E} \vee W \bar{E} H)$$

$$I H I \vee I I H$$

$$H \vee H$$

(1)

Valid

The outcome of this paper is that every logical system, by and large, has a decision procedure, since every logical system acts in accordance with rules.

But this does not mean that every logical system possesses an *effective* decision procedure. A decision procedure is considered to be effective if it enables us to provide a yes or no answer to a formula with minimum effort. Proof procedure, as we have already noted, is not a decision procedure as it fails to give a no answer to a schema. IP and CP are not decision procedures for the same reason. MPL or OVQS is not effective, because apart from rules it requires human skill and ingenuity for proving validity. Quantificational logic is not a decision procedure since it possesses an infinite number of interpretations, and to choose the right interpretation for testing validity one has to depend again on human skill and ingenuity. Tree-method is not effective too, as it lacks to give a no answer in the case of an invalid argument. But all methods relating to truth-values enable us to provide a yes or no answer to any sort of test. Proof procedure can at best be considered as a qua-decision procedure. Quine says that a proof procedure is only "a half of a decision procedure"²⁴.

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11. : *Ibid.*, p. 226.
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IS KANT A METAETHICAL FORMALIST?

A. K. M. SHAMSUR RAHMAN

This paper attempts to examine Kant's position as a metaethical formalist. In doing so, I compare his view with that of R. M. Hare.¹ In *The Language of Morals* Hare discusses his concept of universalizability. This concept of universalizability, some claim, is a kind of Kantianism. I propose that in many ways this claim is not true and that Kant is not a metaethical formalist.

In *The Language of Morals* and *Freedom and Reason* Hare attempts to discover those conditions which are necessary and sufficient for calling a judgment "moral". He seeks an analysis that will account for the fact that morality is a rational endeavour.²

Hare's position as a metaethical formalist will be clear from the following formulations:

- (i) (X) (X is a moral judgment if and only if (a) X is prescriptive and (b) the agent is willing to universalize X)³
- (ii) "X is prescriptive" means "X is an imperative or X entails an imperative",⁴
- (iii) "To universalize X" means "to accept that X holds for everyone, even the agent, in similar circumstances",⁵

This characterization is formalistic because it characterizes morality without at any time making reference to the content of moral judgments. Whether or not a judgment is moral depends solely on logical or quasi-logical⁶ properties of the judgment - namely, whether or not it is prescriptive and universalizable. Any judgment, whatever its content, whatever it in fact prescribes, is moral if it meets these two conditions. An example will serve to make this more clear. Suppose someone (a Nazi perhaps)⁷ were to offer the following as a moral

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judgment: "One ought to exterminate as many Jews as possible". Can such a judgement form a part of a moral system? According to Hare, it can if two conditions are met. First, the person offering the judgment must actually be recommending it to us as a course of action and not, for example, merely be making a sociological generalization that, as a matter of fact, people of a certain sort believe that one ought to exterminate the Jews. This is the condition of prescriptivity. Second, the person offering the judgment must be willing to accept that the judgment applies to everyone meeting the conditions specified within the judgment. If for example, it were discovered that members of the Nazi's family were Jewish or that even he himself had Jewish ancestry, he would admit that he and his family ought to be exterminated. This is the condition of universalizability. These conditions are formal because they never demand that the issue he raised of whether or not the action contemplated has consequences which are desirable in terms of some value.

Now Hare's terminology certainly has a Kantian flavor to it. However, the actual content of his theory is in many ways quite opposed to Kant's view. Kant, it will be remembered, offered the following characterization of morality:

- (i) (X) (X is a system of rational morality if and only if the maxims of the actions prescribed in X are universalizable)
- (ii) "X is universalizable" means "General action on the basis of X would leave secure the freedom of every rational being",⁸

I think that Kant and Hare would both agree that moral judgments are prescriptive. To say that one morally ought to do so and so, according to Kant, is to offer an imperative for moral action to a finitely rational being. The impossibility of meaningfully offering imperatives of morality to fully rational beings is Kant's reason for claiming that it is absurd to say, for example, that God ought to do so and so. The crucial issue however, is universalizability. And it is here that Kant and Hare are in fundamental disagreement.

For Hare, the universalizability of a judgment depends solely upon what the agent is willing to accept. He is not claiming that a universalizable moral judgment is one which in fact could be a universal law nor one which merely satisfies the condition that the agent could, without contradiction, will it be a universal law. Rather it is one which the agent does will to accept as a universal

practice. No matter how evil or even unworkable the state of affairs, if the agent is willing that he and everyone else labor under it, then his judgment is moral. The universalizability of a judgment, then, is not determined by any objective state of affairs in the agent's environment, but only by what the agent is or is not willing to put up with. If he is willing to be exterminated if it is discovered that he is a Jew, then his prescriptive judgment "one ought to exterminate as many Jews as possible" is a moral judgment. Morality, on this view, thus becomes essentially a private rather than a public enterprise. As Hart remarks :

To characterise morality ... as *primarily* a matter of the application to conduct of those ultimate principles which the individual accepts or to which he commits himself for the conduct of his life seems to me an excessively Protestant approach. Important as this aspect or kind of moral judgment is, we need to understand it as a development from the primary phenomenon of the morality of a social group.⁹

Kant agrees with Hare that the agent ought to give himself a privileged status in morality. This is the reason that the maxim of the action is evaluated and not the action itself. The issue at stake is not simply "Should I, pay Jones \$50 that I owe him at 5 o'clock? but rather the following: Is the general principle of not paying a debt moral or immoral?" I leave my own personal needs and idiosyncracies out of the picture and consider merely the *type* of action I am contemplating. This removes personal bias and is an important part of morality. But though Kant agrees with Hare that personal bias has no place in morality, his agreement is simply a consequence of his general theory - namely, that each rational agent has the same value and that action ought to be controlled accordingly.

On Kant's view, the statement "X is universalizable" is not just a statement about what the agent is willing to accept. Rather it is a statement about the consequences of X as a general performance. If X, as a general performance, would interfere with the freedom of rational beings, then X can form a part of no system of rational morality. And thus the judgment "one ought to exterminate the Jews" could not, even if the agent is willing to universalize it, be a part of a rational morality. For as a general practice it would violate the right of freedom in rational beings. Even if we are willing to see such action made a universal practice, it still is not in fact universalizable. For it would have consequences inconsistent with the demands of rational morality.

Thus I see no reason for regarding Hare's view as a kind of Kantianism. Though agreeing that moral judgments are prescriptive (at least for finitely rational beings), their doctrines of universalizability are radically opposed. Kant's theory, claiming that the value of freedom in each rational being is a limiting condition on the morality of actions, is thus teleological and not formalistic. For it argues that, to be engaged in a morality, an agent must do the following : (i) ascertain the general principle or maxim of his action; (ii) determine whether or not this maxim could exist (not merely whether or not he would be willing to put up with it) as a universal law preserving the freedom of all rational beings.

NOTES

1. William Frankena portrays Kant as a formalist in his "Some Recent Conceptions of Morality" and in "Morality and the Language of Conduct". Frankena contrasts formalists in ethics (like Hare) with non-formalists (like Hart). He says nothing about Kant. But it is interesting that those he classifies as formalists are philosophers whose ethical theories are thought to bear a close resemblance to Kant's own views. See also "Freedom and Reason", p. 34; and Richard Brandt's "Ethical Theory", pp.221.ff.
2. See, *The Language of Morals*, p. 178; and "Freedom and Reason", p. 8.
3. *Ibid.* pp. 175-179.
4. *Ibid.* pp. 163-179.
5. "Freedom and Reason", p.30-31.
6. I say quasi-logical because the principle of universalizability is spelled out in terms of what the agent is willing to accept.
7. See Hare's own example in "Freedom and Reason", Chapters 9 and 11.
8. See Beck's translation of Kant's "Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals", 39, 47, and 57.
9. Hart, *Essays and Moral Obligations* p. 100.

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THE SORITES PARADOX : A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH

MAHUA BANERJEE

The Sorites paradox is a bewildering natural language paradox and is a consequence of the problem of vagueness. Any resolution of the paradox will throw considerable light on the understanding and explanation of vagueness. Of the many possible attempts to solve the paradox, in this paper, we shall discuss Peter Bosch's contextual approach to the problem.

In Section I, I state the paradox. In Section II, I discuss Bosch's argument that vagueness is a matter of context - dependence. This theory is based on a number of presuppositions, some of which I shall contest. In Section III, I state Bosch's resolution of the paradox. Section IV is an extension of Bosch's view in order to block all versions of the paradox. Section V discusses some related issues, namely higher order vagueness and hedges.

The Sorites Paradox

It was Eubulides, a Greek Philosopher, who first formulated the Sorites Paradox - the paradox of the heap. The argument is as follows : The removal of one grain of sand from a heap will not make any difference to the heap. Subsequently, we may remove another grain: that too will not prevent us from calling the collection of grains 'a heap'. In this way, by removing one grain of sand at a time, there will come a stage when there will remain only one grain of sand and yet we will have to call it 'a heap'.

The paradoxical argument may be formulated in this way :- Thousand grains of sand constitute a heap. If n grain of sand constitute a heap then $(n-1)$ grains of sand constitute a heap \therefore One grain of sand constitutes a heap.

The premises appear to be obviously true and there seems to be nothing wrong in the process of reasoning, yet the conclusion is unacceptable to us.

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There are many versions of this paradox. Peter Bosch discusses one such version i.e. Wang's paradox, which we shall state later on.

The central term of this paradox is the vague expression 'heap'. There are no clearcut characteristics of a heap. Hence, we cannot clearly demarcate a heap from a non-heap. It is because the paradox revolves round a vague term that is said to be based on the *tolerance principle* which states that if x has a property and y is minutely different from x then y also has the same property. Vague terms are tolerant i.e. indifferent to minute change. The Sorites paradox arises because of this tolerant nature of vague expressions - the characteristic of being a heap permeates from one end of the scale to the other though at the end of the scale what we have is definitely not a heap.

It is commonly held that observational terms are vague i.e. terms that are determined solely by looking (like 'is a heap', 'is bald') are vague. In the case of such predicates the minute difference which is nondiscriminable is non-transitive. What this means is that though two adjacent shades of the colour red R_1 and R_2 may be non-discriminably different, yet R_1 may be distinctly different from R_3 . In the context of the Sorites paradox the premises :-

Thousand grains of sand make a heap

Nine hundred ninety nine grains of sand make a heap are non-discriminable from each other but the conclusion .. One grain of sand makes a heap is distinctly different from the first premise.

Thus the paradox is said to arise with respect to vague observational predicates where non-discriminable difference is non-transitive. Such predicates are vague e.g. 'is red', 'is a heap', etc.

There have been many attempts to solve the Sorites paradox. Solutions have been given by Zadeh's degree theory also from the intuitionistic standpoint and from the standpoint of supervaluationism. In this paper we are concerned with one such attempted resolution - that presented by Peter Bosch.

Bosch's Assumptions

Bosch's¹ theory is based on Frege's notion of vagueness of concepts. A concept according to Frege is the referent of a predicate. In the sentence 'Blue

Peter is a horse', the predicate is 'horse'. The concept corresponding to this predicate is what Blue Peter is, i.e. horse. When we say 'Blue Peter is a horse' it is clear that in this particular context what the concept horse means. So we may say that when the concept horse is being applied to a context, the resulting predicative expression 'Blue Peter is a horse' is true or false i.e. has a truth value. But if the concept is not defined in each and every context then it is vague. In other words in the predicative expression 'x is a heap' if we cannot clearly substitute the argument 'x' by a value in each and every context, the concept 'heap' will be vague.

On these lines Bosch argues that vagueness is a matter of incomplete definition. It is a myth, he says, to think that a concept can be defined completely for all cases possible and actual. We may often encounter a situation where we do not know whether or not to apply a term. In that context, if we wrongly apply the predicate, the resulting sentence will be a vague one.

Usually a distinction is made between two sorts of vagueness - actual and potential. 'Heap' is *actually vague* because we are not sure where to draw the line between a heap and a non-heap. But 'chair' is *potentially vague* (and apparently precise) because for most practical purposes we know the characteristics of a chair. Only when we encounter a situation like the sort Max Black presents are we doubtful about the usage of the expression 'is a chair' to the object we are confronted with (Max Black points out that we generally know what a chair is. Now if we damage one of the arms of the chair, remove a leg and so on there will come a stage where we are no longer sure whether to call it 'a chair'.² Bosch, however, brushes aside this distinction by saying that it is 'rather accidental'.

But the point here is that though all expressions are capable of being vague, normally we speak of expressions like 'cat', 'table', 'chair', etc as precise and 'heap', 'bald' as vague. Any interpretation of vagueness should reflect this distinction and Bosch fails to realize this.

Actually, vague terms are essentially vague in the sense that the rules governing the use of such terms tells us that no line is to be drawn dividing it's applicability from it's non-applicability. For example the meaning of the term 'heap' demands that the total number of grains should *not* be specified. In other words, the moment we say that only a collection of thousand grains make a

heap - not a grain more, not a grain less - the meaning of the term loses its essence. To say that a person is a child is not the same as saying that he is legally a minor. It is this lack of specificity that is the essence of essential vagueness. Such vagueness is not a matter of incomplete definition. The question of intellectual inertia or impossibility of human endeavour does not arise in such cases. This notion of vagueness is implicit in Peirce's definition of vagueness. Peirce was the first philosopher to give definition to vagueness in 1902. To quote him :

"A proposition is vague when there are possible states of things concerning which it is *intrinsically uncertain* whether, had they been contemplated by the speaker, he would have regarded them as excluded or allowed by the proposition. By intrinsically uncertain we mean not uncertain of the interpreter, but because the speaker's habits of language were indeterminate".³

This means that vagueness in this sense does not occur because we have not been able to fix the precise meaning of the terms in question due to insufficient evidence or due to our own inability but simply because that imprecision is an essential feature of such terms.

Other expressions that have clearcut meanings (under normal circumstances) are nevertheless potentially vague. We call such vagueness as 'inessential'. Inessential vagueness also arises when we are not bothered to fully define an expression. When a teacher tells her student, 'Your answer is very vague' - she has this sort of vagueness in mind. What she means is that her pupil has not bothered to fully and clearly elaborate the topic. In order to draw a true picture of natural language vagueness, this distinction between essential and inessential vagueness is very necessary.

Bosch, however, obliterates this distinction and claims that Dummett in Wang's paradox⁴ supports this view. He says that Dummett has shown that there can be observational terms which are not vague. The vagueness of such terms disappears if we compare a given shade with a colour chart. Such a term then will not be essentially vague.

It is true that according to Dummett if 'red' is viewed as a *comparative concept* with respect to a colour chart, it will not be a vague term. But he quantifies this view by saying : "It would not, however, in this case be an

observational predicate as this notion is normally understood''⁵. Thus Bosch has not shown that observational terms are not essentially vague but that comparative concepts are not so. Dummett firmly believes that observational terms are 'necessarily vague'.⁶

Before moving on to Bosch's next assumption, let us clarify what is meant by an observational predicate. Such a predicate is one whose application to an object can be determined from the experience produced by that object in standard conditions. There is a difference of opinion among philosophers regarding what constitutes observation - is it seeing with the naked eye, or is it seeing with the help of auxiliary devices like microscopes or is it a matter of frequencies and wavelengths? We shall take the first alternative as the meaning of observation. To quote Crispin Wright " 'Colour predicates, it is plausible to suppose, are in the following sense purely observational - if one can tell just by looking at it' ".⁷

Bosch believes that not only observational terms but all sorts of terms in our language can be vague. This is indeed true. Predicates like 'is honest', 'is wise' can also give rise to Sorites type argument though such predicates are not observational.

This gives rise to the question : Are only predicates vague?⁸ C. Peacocke points out that the quantifier 'many' which is neither observational nor a predicate may feature in a Sorites type reasoning. Hence, all sorts of expressions may be vague. Yet primarily it is observational predicates that lie at the heart of a Sorites paradox.

Bosch's next assumption is that "for each concept there is at least one context for which it is completely defined".⁹ It is true that not all applications of an expression are vague. It is only when we are confronted with borderline cases that we are unsure about the applicability of a word. The question that comes to mind is : What does Bosch mean by 'complete definition'? If he means the enumeration of all possible essential characteristics of an object, we can almost never completely define anything even in one single context. When we say that we know what 'heap' means we mean that we know a stereotype of a heap. A stereotype is a collection of some of the common features of an object. Despite the problem of determining how many and which characteristics will constitute a stereotype we do form ideas of them and it is with reference to

these that we understand individual objects. So to say that the meaning of an expression is understood in a context is not the same as saying that the expression is completely defined in that context.

We agree with Bosch's next assumption that communication takes place only when we apply terms in a particular context. Communication is a matter of speaker-hearer identification of the utterance in the same context - model. A vague term can be clearly understood if it is seen in the light of a context.

Bosch's Resolution of the Sorites Paradox

Bosch states Wang's paradox (which is a version of the Sorites paradox) first and then presents its resolution. Wang's paradox is as follows :

1 is a small number

If n is a small number, then $(n + 1)$ is a small number

\therefore Every number is small

In terms of predicate - calculus this paradox can be formulated as:

(i) IS - A - SMALL NUMBER (1)

(ii) Δn [IS-A-SMALL NUMBER (n) \rightarrow IS-A-SMALL-NUMBER ($n+1$)]

$\therefore n$ [IS - A - SMALL NUMBER (n)]

$\therefore \Delta n$ [IS - A - SMALL NUMBER (n)]

Premise (i) is usually accepted as true (though there may be contexts where one is not a small number). The main problem lies with premise (ii). This premise assumes that all numbers are small in the same sense. But that is not the case. Each number must be understood in specific context; the sense of the expression 'small' is not the same - in all contexts. In order to demonstrate this view Bosch develops context - models where predicates are not to be taken as constants but as functions from context - models to concepts and the premises of the paradox are to be taken as utterances that bring about changes in the context - model.

Premise (i) may be represented as :

(i) $\forall c \langle k \rangle$ (1 (i) is - a - small - number , $\langle k, \langle i, k \rangle \rangle^c \langle k \rangle$)

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there $\langle k \rangle$ stands for the semantic type of context - models and $\langle i \rangle$ stands for the semantic type of individuals, c stands for a context - model, \forall is the sign of existential quantifier. Premise (i) states that there is atleast one context - model c with respect to which the number 1 has a property which is the value of the predicate "is a small number" for that context - model.

Contexts that satisfy premise (i) are partially modelled by the context - model CM_i which is as follows :

$$CM_i = \langle I, C, P \rangle$$

$$I = \{1\}$$

$$C = \{1\}$$

$$P = \{P_1\}$$

$$1^* = \langle "1", \{P_1\} \rangle$$

$$P_1 = \langle "is a small number", \{1\} \rangle$$

This means that CM_i is a triple of sets of individuals I , a set of characters C and a set of properties P . In this model there is only one individual i.e. the number one. Hence C stands for the character of 1 and P for the properties of 1. What is noteworthy here is that C is very different from P . The character of an individual consists of the properties of the individual in question in addition to the individual's name. Let us suppose that in CM_i premise (i) is satisfied.

To come now to premise (ii) - it can be formulated as follows :-

$$(ii) \bigwedge_{\langle k \rangle} c \bigwedge_{\langle i \rangle} ((n \text{ is - a - small' - number } \quad \quad \quad c \quad))$$

(i) $\langle k \rangle, \langle i, k \rangle, \langle k \rangle$

$$\rightarrow ((n+1) \text{ is - a - small - number } \quad \quad \quad c \quad))$$

$\langle i \rangle \quad \quad \quad \langle k \rangle, \langle i, k \rangle, \langle k \rangle$

In other words, premise (ii) states that for all context - models C and all natural numbers n , if n has the property that is the interpretation of the predicate "is - a - small - number" in a particular context - model c , then $(n+1)$ will also have the same property.

Now premise (ii) is to be applied to the earlier context - model CM_i . If premise (ii) is true i.e. if 2 is a small number in the same sense in which 1 is,

then we can extend CM_i to $CM_i + 1$ which is as follows :-

$$\begin{aligned}
 CM_{i+1} &= \langle I, C, P \rangle \\
 I &= \{1, 2\} \\
 C &= \{1^*, 2^*\} \\
 P &= \{P_1\} \\
 1^* &= \langle \text{"1"}, \{P_1\} \rangle \\
 2^* &= \langle \text{"2"}, \{P_1\} \rangle \\
 P_1 &= \langle \text{"is a small number"}, \{1, 2\} \rangle
 \end{aligned}$$

On this extended model, 'if 1 is small number, then 2 is a small number' is true. Bosch, however, checks the recursion at this stage by saying that for the conditional statement, 'If 2 is a small number, then 3 is a small number' a partial model CM_i must be constructed with respect to the sense in which 2 is a small number. This is because the second argument will be as follows :

2 is a small number

If 2 is a small number, 3 is a small number

\therefore 3 is a small number

Here we have to first construct a context - model with respect to which 2 is a small number. Bosch names this model CM_i which is as follows :-

$$\begin{aligned}
 CM_i &= \langle I, C, P \rangle \\
 I &= \{2\} \\
 C &= \{2^*\} \\
 2^* &= \langle \text{"2"}, \{P_2\} \rangle \\
 P_2 &= \langle \text{"is - a - small - number"}, \{2\} \rangle
 \end{aligned}$$

It is obvious that CM_i and $CM(i+1)$ are not the same. This brings to light that "is a small number" is not used in the same sense in the two conditionals just discussed.

An Extension of Bosch's model

In spite of the merits of Bosch's context - model in checking the recursion, not all versions of the Sorites can be taken care of by Bosch's solution. Bosch has dealt with only one version of the paradox, vis-a-vis Wang's paradox where the individual (1) surely has a property (is a small number).

Let us now state a different version of the Sorites paradox where the predicate in the first premise falls in the penumbral region of its meaning. The paradox is as follows :-

x is a penumbral shade of the red-orange series

If x is a penumbral shade of the red-orange series, the $(x + 1)$ is a penumbral shade of the red-orange series

$\therefore (x + 1)$ is a penumbral shade of the red-orange series

By this process of reasoning we can arrive at the conclusion :

$(x + 100)$ is a penumbral shade of the red-orange series.

But then this shade may well be the terminal shade in the colour chart which is definitely orange.

This sort of a paradox cannot be accommodated into Bosch's context - models. Bosch only deals with cases where an individual has surely a particular property (e.g. 1 is surely small).

In order to resolve this version of the paradox we shall give the penumbral shade n of the red-orange series a property, say, 'is range'¹⁰ and a character μ^* to it. We can now restate the inference as :-

μ is range (1)

If μ is range, then $(\mu + 1)$ is range (2)

$\therefore (\mu + 1)$ is range

Stated in this way, we can accommodate it into the following Bosch type models :

For premise (i)	CMi	=	$\langle I, C, P \rangle$
	I	=	$\{\mu\}$
	C	=	$\{\mu^*\}$
	P	=	$\{P\mu\}$
	X*	=	$\langle \mu', \{P\mu\} \rangle$
	Pr	=	$\langle \text{"is renege"}, \{\mu\} \rangle$

We can extend CMi to CM (i + 1) to accommodate premise (4) :

CM (i + 1)	=	$\langle I, C, P \rangle$
I	=	$\{\mu, (\mu + 1)\}$
C	=	$\{\mu^*, (\mu + 1)^*\}$
μ^*	=	$\langle \overline{\mu'}, \{P\mu\} \rangle$
$(\mu + 1)^*$	=	$\langle \overline{(\mu + 1)}, \{P\mu\} \rangle$
Pk	=	$\langle \text{"is renege"}, \{\mu, (\mu + 1)\} \rangle$

For the conditional, 'If $(\mu + 2)$ is renege then $(\mu + 3)$ is renege we will have to construct a model with respect to $(\mu + 2)$ which will not be the same as CM (i + 1). In this way the recursion is checked, yet no artificial boundary is drawn to divide the positive and negative extensions of the word in question.

Some Related Issues

The paradox and its resolution gives rise to some important questions. We saw above how penumbral vagueness can extend to case where the meaning of the predicate is not vague. This gives rise to the question : How are we to distinguish between the penumbral and the non-penumbral region. Another question that arises is : Can borderline vagueness be explained by hedges, as Bosch claims?

First let us return to our first question i.e. Are we to draw a sharp line dividing the penumbral and the non-penumbral region of the meaning of a vague expression? If not, how can we prevent the penumbral from merging with the non-penumbral? These questions lead us to what is known as the phenomenon

of higher order vagueness. Such vagueness arises because vague predicates typically fail to draw any apparent sharp boundaries within their range of significance. To say that the penumbra does not have a sharp boundary is to say that the penumbra has borderline cases and these again have borderline cases and so on. So vagueness extends from the first level to the second level and so on.

Dominic Hyde¹¹ says that to solve the problem as to how ordinary first order vagueness leads to higher order vagueness, we need to understand what is meant by 'borderline cases'. He says that the expression 'indeterminate' is not used in the same sense in the two levels of vagueness. This expression is used precisely in the first order level and vaguely in higher levels. What Hyde seems to mean is that when we say that 'heap' has a penumbra where its meaning is indeterminate we have a precise sense of 'indeterminacy' in mind. We mean to say that there is a penumbra where the meaning of 'heap' is indeterminate. But when we speak of the indeterminacy of the penumbra itself, what we mean is that we are not sure whether the penumbra has borderline cases or not. This sort of indeterminacy of the penumbra is vague.

Thus Hyde points out; "There are broader cases for vague predicates but this need not be stated as part of the analysis of the concept of predicate vagueness any more than having said that 'red' is a predicate one must go on to state" 'red' is a predicate is a predicate", etc. Nothing new is added".

But Hyde seems to be simplifying the issue. When we say that vague predicates have a penumbra we also say that the penumbra itself does not have sharp boundaries and so the vagueness of the first order permeates into higher levels. This is not a triviality where nothing new is added, rather it makes the problem of vagueness more serious. It raises question about the nature of the penumbra itself. Even if we accept Hyde's two different interpretations of vagueness for first and second levels, the problem is far from diffused. The second sense of vagueness must be explained for a proper understanding of first order vagueness.

The final issue that we wish to discuss is that of *hedges*. Hedges are terms (usually adverbs) which are used to either clarify a predicate or make it more fuzzy. For example in the sentence 'Penguins are essentially birds' the term 'essentially' is a hedge. Someone who is not sure what penguins are, gets

a clearer idea when he knows that penguins are 'essentially birds'. On the other hand, in the sentence 'This is somewhat blue', the use of the expression 'somewhat' makes our understanding of the term 'blue' even fuzzier. According to George Lakoff :

"..... words whose meaning implicitly involves fuzziness - words whose job is to make things fuzzier or less fuzzy, I will refer to such words as 'hedges'." ¹² For example, 'technically', 'mostly', 'largely', etc. We have seen that Bosch did not deal with the version of the Sorites paradox discussed where we begin from the penumbra and move on to the paradigm member. This is because of his view that borderline vagueness can be explained by taking recourse to hedges. For example, '5 is hardly a small number of absentees' (in the context of a class most students of which are usually absent). According to Bosch, "hedges are appropriate when we cannot be bothered to get a full picture of the relevant context - model." This view is a direct fall out of his initial belief that vagueness results from incomplete definition of concepts. Had he realized that essential vagueness - the sort with which we are concerned in our attempt to resolve the Sorites paradox - is not a matter of intellectual laziness to completely define the term in question, but that the meaning of the term is such that it cannot be clearly defined, he would have constructed context- models to include terms whose meanings fall within the penumbra.

It must be pointed out here that the role of hedges in natural language communication is by no means being underestimated in our analysis of borderline vagueness. Hedges have a vital role to play in our semantics. What we wish to stress is that in order to resolve the paradox we can eliminate vague expressions like 'sort of red' and replace them with definite predicates like 'is red'. To say that a vague predicate has a definite property even in its penumbral region of its meaning is to point out that any predicate, vague or precise, can be clearly understood (though not completely defined) when we see it in a particular perspective.

Peter Bosch's resolution of the Sorites paradox stands in sharp contrast to other resolutions chiefly because his approach is contextual as opposed to the other logical approaches. Another distinctive feature of his theory is that he did not believe that precization of vague terms is necessary in order to understand and explain vagueness. What Bosch simply wished to say was that vagueness

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arises mainly because the context is often enough not specified. If we see a vague term in a given context it ceases to be vague.

Given the merits of his contextual approach, what prevented his resolution from being foolproof was his belief that vagueness was a matter of incomplete definition and that borderline vagueness can be taken care of by hedges. We use hedges, he said, when we cannot be bothered to clearly define a term. But essentially vague terms are not vague because of our intellectual laziness - rather, they are intrinsically uncertain i.e., they were never meant to be specifically defined. This oversight was responsible for versions of the paradox of the sort just discussed in Section IV from arising. But this does not take away any credit from Bosch who showed us that the Sorites paradox ceases to puzzle us when we apply it to a context.

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NOTES

THE QUESTION OF THE HUMAN ESSENCE IN THE WORKS OF KARL MARX

MURZBAN JAL

I

This paper is an exposition of the philosophical foundations of Marxism. Its chief concern is to understand : (1) how Marx's materialist conception of history operates, and (2) the relation between Marx's philosophy and the science of history.

I initiate this work with a fundamentally important paradox haunting Marxism : Does one pose the question of Marxism as a singular unity of thought, or are Marx's works structured in terms of aporic thinking? In this sense how does one relate the question of "iron laws" of absolute necessity with the question of radical praxis? What is Marx's philosophy of man and freedom?

It is with these issues in mind that I address Marx's works in terms of *the human essence (das menschliche Wesen)*. We shall use the original German term to distinguish Marx's usage from Feuerbach's and that of the Young Hegelians, and also the incorrect English translations most notably as the "essence of man", "human nature", "man's nature" and the "nature of man".¹

But would Marx's concept of *das menschliche Wesen* imply the emergence of a new meaning? How does this new meaning work in the materialist conception of history? Would the question of the human essence be able to resolve that above stated aporia? Would this aporia be related to the double writing of Hegel where the rational kernel is expressed through the mystical shell?

To claim that the question of the human essence is important is to introduce two terms :

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(1) *Idealisation of the Effect* : This is the site that presents the effect of Marx's work, i.e., historical materialism being transformed into a metaphysical discipline. Thus when Marx talks of the *complex*, hence over determined *inversion* of the Hegelian philosophy, a *simple* change of terminology is put to effect. Hence the Hegelian *Geist* (Idea) is replaced with materialistic *matter* in the philosophy of dialectical materialism and with a self-evolving *productive forces* in the science of historical materialism. The auto-movement of the Hegelian *Geist* is displaced for the self-caused auto-movement of the Marxist productive forces. Consequently the Hegelian "phenomenology of the (reified) mind" is transformed into the "dialectics of (estranged) nature". In both cases the human being, central to Marx's concern is predicated on a depersonified transcendent imaginary. This is the teleological historicist interpretation of Marxism running from Plekhenov and Bukharin to Althusser and G. A. Cohen.

(2) *Onto-idealology* : Onto-idealology is not like the spurious hermeneutic of the *idealisation of the effect*, a misreading of Marx. It is an essential aspect of Marx's *Capital* itself. In the doctrine of onto-idealology the metaphysics of idealised Being reaches its universal character. What was the leitmotif of the philosophies of high idealism - namely the *idealist sign system* being devoid of its material referent - becomes the essence of reality itself. This is the second paradox to confront Marx's materialism. Idealism becomes the dominant discourse that organises the historical materialist sites of the base and the superstructure. The Marxist base becomes the 'basic text' in which the discourse of metaphysics is written.

Onto-idealology combines three disciplines of Marxism : (1) theory of value, (2) theory of ideology, and (3) criticism of idealist philosophies. In this combination onto-idealology becomes the meeting place of idealist superstructural philosophy and the real bases of political economy. In this reified meeting place the materialist character of the actual world is displaced. *Capital* presents the "metempsychotic" and "transmigrated" world that has lost its bodily form.² The world is "estranged and irrational" a "complete mystification" and a 'false' world.³

Reading the first part of *Capital* vol. I one confronts onto-idealology as an actual historical situation confronting the human condition. Actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) is fragmented in the triad of the dissolved "material" and posited

“imaginary” and “hieroglyphic” worlds.⁴ The dominant world becomes the “transcendent”⁵ world that has now a mere “unsubstantial reality”⁶. As “existence as a material thing is put out of sight”⁷, existence is now only “ideal existence”.⁸

In the relation between the material and ideal worlds, the latter becomes the active world, the former mere “material depositories”, the “body” and “form of appearance” of the ideal world.⁹ Onto-idealology not only presents an estranged ideal world, but seeks to explain the mode of production of idealism itself. For Marx, idealism is not only a question of *speculative thought* but a fact of *social being* itself. There are two sites of importance :

- (1) The question of *use-value* and *value* in *Capital*, of which use - value is the material domain and value the idealised domain.
- (2) The young Marx’s reading of Feuerbach where philosophy is understood as onto-theology, hence “another form and manner of existence (*Daseinweise*) of the estrangement (*Entfremdung*) of the human essence (*menschliche Wesen*); hence equally to be condemned”.¹⁰

Since philosophy as the idealist signifier, on the one hand is understood as a phantasmagoria of the estranged human essence, and on the other hand reappropriation of the human essence signals the arrival of the real sensuous world, we locate the importance of the human essence which the young Marx so profusely wrote about in 1844. That is why we locate the tension in Marx’s works and ask : how come Marx in the *Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State*, *On the Jewish Question*, *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Introduction*, *Critical Marginal Notes on the Article by a Prussian*, *Comments on James Mill’s ‘Elements of Political Economy’*, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* and the *Holy Family* explicitly work on the *menschliche Wesen* as the radical moment in history, and consequently in *The German Ideology* announce the human essence as an “unhistorical abstraction”, as the “realm of dreams” and idealogical signifiers devoid of actual history?¹¹

It is at this site that the question of the Marxist production of knowledge is posed. The question of the human essence serves as the nodal point where the evolution of Marx’s thought is understood.

II

There are two layers of scientific discourse in Marx's works. One appears in what one can call after *Theories of Surplus Value* Part I as "pure form". The *Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (hitherto called the 1859 *Preface*) is an example of discourse appearing in the *pure form*. We shall have a look into it.


In this work the groundwork of history is laid bare. This groundwork is expressed as the inquiry into the "basis", "real foundation" and "conditions" where by the base - superstructure model is explicated. The model is structured according to the building metaphor whereby the economic comprising of productive forces - relations of production combination becomes the "base", that social being which is the *determinant* whereby the superstructure that holds within it the social consciousness of politics, legality, religion, aesthetics and philosophy becomes the *determined*. Thus we have the pairing of the foundation - founded, determinant - determined, ground - grounded, subject-predicate, primary - secondary, whereby the latter term within each pair unfolds out from the former element. This discourse will immediately relate itself to two sites : (1) the metaphysical doctrine of "first philosophy" (*Ursprungsphilosophie*), and (2) the Cartesian model that visualises the metaphysical Being of all discourse, where "all philosophy is like a tree, whose roots are metaphysics, the trunk physics and the branches which grow out of this trunk are all the other sciences".¹²

To recollect, the ground as explicated in the first chapter of *Capital* vol.I, has been *idealised*. It is this *idealised structure* bifurcated into the two autonomous post - anthropological moments of productive forces and relations of production that presents the reductionist - fatalistic onto-idealological moment in Marxism. One must remember that this idealist moment works "independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence".¹³

Yet there is a *second layer* in Marx's works, the *impure overdetermined layer*. It contains the working out of those concerns which obsessed Marx in his formative years (1839 - 1844), containing the doctoral dissertation on Greek philosophy, to the critique of Hegel and the Young Hegelians. To put it in a nutshell it is about humanity and alienation.

The first layer concerns itself with the mechanisms and dynamics of

history structured in this way :



On the other hand, the second layer is disordered. One may call it after the *Introduction* to the *Grundrisse* as the "chaotic whole". This layer deals with the *philosophical* aspects of Marxism, whilst the former deals with the *scientific level*. At the chaotic site of the philosophical level the question of the human essence is posed. This level relates Marxism to German classical philosophy, French socialism and English political economy.

Above all it deals with the transformation of philosophical anthropology into historical materialism and the consequent transformation of the philosophy of the human essence to the science of class struggle.

III

It is the question of relating the site of the human essence to the scientific examination of social formations which now becomes the question of critical importance. Because Althusser's *For Marx* is the classical anti-humanist reading of Marx, we detour into the Althusserian text. For Althusser the terms "human essence" and "class struggle" are mutually exclusive terms. Whilst the former is theorised as belonging to the false register of an ideological Feuerbachian past, the latter is claimed to rest on a scientific problematic evolving out after an *epistemological break*. This Althusserian break is the moment that registers the true science (class struggle) evolving from a rupture with a false ideology (human essence). Consequently there is the *single surface* evident in Althusser: *either human essence or class struggle*. This method presents the question of the human essence as idealism where "the essence of man is the basis for history and politics".¹⁴ Here actual history is presented as unfolding from a Platonic exemplar : "the ideal essence".¹⁵

At a *surface reading*, Althusser seems to be applying the historical materialist method of *The German Ideology* in the critique of humanist philosophies. For did not Marx in the critique of the Young Hegelians : Feuerbach, Bauer, Stirner and Grun critique the concepts "essence of man" and other Young Hegelian categories like "substance", "self-consciousness", etc.? But at the *deep structure*, Althusser fails to notice that the human essence is a complexly structured concept, overdetermined and structured according to the dialectical principle of the negative, hence continuously overreaching itself.

Marx's philosophy of *das menschliche Wesen* does not imply an overarching transhistorical essence that organises the site of existence, nor is it a formal transcendental apriori that attaches onto the real world from the outside. The human essence does not correspond to traditional philosophies of essence and existence. On the contrary the human essence serves as a site whereby Marx is able to give an anthropomorphic response to the Hegelian dialectic in particular and to idealism in general.

In the sixth *Theses on Feuerbach* the relation between philosophical anthropology and historical materialism is made clear : the human essence is an "ensemble of social relations".¹⁶

This thesis clarifies the direction that the Feuerbachian concepts used in 1844 by Marx, "species being", "naturalism", "humanism", "existence", "essence" take.

There are two distinct ruptures evident in 1845 : from (1) Feuerbach and (2) the Young Hegelians and True Socialists. Marx claims in *The German Ideology* that both idealise the human essence and are unable to understand the human essence in actual social formations. Whilst in Bauer, Stirner and Grun, human essence is the "concept of man", in Feuerbach it is abstract ahistorical anthropology that combines spurious biologism, psychologism and morality. The central doctrine of Feuerbach becomes "man", but a transcendentially signified "man", thus ahistorically frozen in a mythical sign system.

On the other hand for Marx, the human essence both in 1844 and 1845 serves the double purpose of (1) construction of the historical materialist category of *relations of production* in general, and (2) de-refied relations of production in particular, where he is able to argue out the case for socialism. At this site

the question of reification (*Verdinglichung*) is posed where relations between people is converted into a relation between things.

Thus the contrast is made between a reified relations of production, where "things" - capital, wage - labour, etc mediate human relations; and de-reified relations of production or society based on human relations. It is at this point where the transformation of Hegel's *abstract historicism* and Feuerbach's *abstract materialism* into Marx's historical materialism takes place.

For Marx, materialism does not signify the philosophy of inert matter, that conceives an autonomous reality existing independent of the human mind. On the contrary Marx's materialism signifies the question of humanity's being-in-the-world defined by labour. Human essence is not essentialisms' abstract universal where we have an "*idealism of the essence*" nor is it an abstract particularism where we have an "*empiricism of the subject*".¹⁷ On the contrary the human essence mediates the concepts of historical materialism : productive forces, relations of production and the superstructure. Thus it defines the conditions of historical materialism actualising itself as the *historical being-in-the-world*. This historical being-in-the-world shall be defined as the *being-in-labour*.

Yet this being-in-the-world is dialectical. It is being-a-part-of-the-world, yet being-apart-of-the-world. In this being-apart-of-the-world, the historical materialist premise of the 1859 *Preface* is articulated as "men inevitably enter(ing) into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production".¹⁸

It is in this way that the human essence manifests itself in the site of historical materialism. This transformation is of crucial importance in tracing the makings of historical materialism. Thus the importance of understanding the human essence of 1844 as *complexly structured* having multiple layers.

One will consequently have to observe the multiple layers of the human essence. Firstly it is the *Grundlage*, the "base" of the human condition - "for man the root is man himself".¹⁹ As the sensuous anti-idealist world the human essence takes on the double critique of (1) onto-theology, where God mediates human relations and (3) class society, where exchange-value becomes the

mediator. In this way the problematic of mediation is posed in Marx's works. Marx distinguishes *abstract mediation* where exchange-value mediates, and *concrete mediation* where labour defines the historical character of being-in-the-world.

It is at this stage that the importance of the complexity of the human essence in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* is highlighted. The complexity combines the philosophical levels of *substance and subject*. Thus we have man's being (*Dasein*) combining the phenomenal structure of existence (*existenz*) with the deeper level of essence (*Wesen*). Whilst the phenomenal level has within it the estranged domains of capital, wage-labour, profit, where man is defined as *being-in* - "things"; the deep structure of essence comprises the dealienated moments of labour and life-activity, man's essential powers (*menschlichen Wesenkräfte*) and potentialities, where the essential man is rooted in radical praxis. Consequently whilst the first level is of the *ideal*, the deeper level is of the *real*. To sum it up we have in 1844 :

Mankind's being-in-the-world

→ Surface Structure
(*existenz*)

This site includes capital, wage-labour, profit which is the domain of the alienation of existential man. Marx calls this the "alienation of the human essence".

→ Deep Structure
(*Wesen*)

This level includes species being (*Gattungswesen*), life - activity and human powers which is the site of the human essence.

Consequently in contrast to the deep level of the human essence, we have the non-human surface level, the level of "things", for which Marx reserves the term "reification". The relation between the two levels is that the deep level is treated as "personifications" or "bearers" of the reified level".²⁰ The relation in *Capital* is treated thus :


Individuals who are personifications of → Class relations

The surface level of class relations of production thus holds the anthropological level of humanity. The human essence of 1844 will incorporate the category of "real individuals" (*Wirklichen Individuen*) of the *The German Ideology*. Combining the building model of the 1859 *Preface* and the depth model of the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, we have the model in *Capital* as shown on next page (p. 336).

We thus have a *concretely determined* model. It *unites diverse sites* which *mediates* the concept of human essence to the categories of historical materialism: forces of production, relations of production and the superstructure.

Thus what was thought to be the *real bases*, namely the forces of production and relations of production combination, itself has a *multiply structured base* : from (A) class exploitation and class struggle to (B) exchange-value and value, and (C) real individuals and (D) the human essence. Real individuals/human essence couplet is the "bearer" of the sites : forces of production, relations of production and the superstructure. On the other hand productive forces, relations of production combination is "a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part".²¹

This "definite form" corresponds to the level of estranged *existenz* of the 1844 model and expressed as reification is dominated in the last instance by the "imaginary" and "hieroglyphic" worlds. In traditional historical materialism as the logic of mediation is ignored the human essence is bracketed to create a single level, empiricist model dominated by economism and teleologism. When the human essence intervenes as radical praxis the "imaginary" and "hieroglyphic" worlds are dissolved.



That is why it is important to state that whilst in the 1859 *Preface* Marx talks of the anatomy of history to be found in political economy, in *Capital* the philosophical anatomy is found in the theory of reification. It is reification that cancels the level of the human essence and projects the autonomous levels of productive forces, relations of production as the dominant mode of production.

Material-historical causality is different from *reified causality*. Material-historical causality is thus not a teleological one way movement from (1) productive forces to (2) relations of production, and (3) superstructure. Being the "chaotic whole" of the philosophical domain of the human essence, material-historical causality is dominated by an *empirical-historical mode of domination* and not a *teleological economic mode*. Causality thus can be reified (not teleological) or de-reified (understood and inaugurated by conscious praxis). The 1859 *Preface* demonstrates an *analytic displacement* (productive forces, relations of production, superstructure) and consequently presents the reified possibilities of historical materialism. *Capital* operates at the *condensed level* which is *concretely determined* and is not the underdetermination of economism.

To sum it up : the *teleological model of manifestation* is explained by the *de-reified model of explanation*. Thus the real opposition : human essence/reification is understood, when the de-reified level operates, the teleological movement breaks down to condense the three levels each site shifting into the other.

Productive forces cease to be the auto-moving reductionist *active cause*, where relations of production is conceived as the *passive cause* and the superstructure as the *mirrored effect* of the forces of production, relations of production combination. This is evident when Marx says that "theory also becomes a material force once it has gripped the masses",²² and later : "of all the instruments of production, the greatest productive power is the revolutionary class itself".²³

This is the way the human essence works itself as the historical being-in-the world. The concept of *das menschliche Wesen* was never abandoned by Marx. It merely dissolved itself in the long night of reification to take on the teleological mode of appearance. To reappropriate it in historical materialism is the joyous ode that Marxist philosophy now needs to write.

NOTES

1. Tom Bottomore translates *das menschliche Wesen* as "essence of man" and "human nature". See Bottomore's translation of Marx's sixth 'Theses on Feuerbach' in *Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy*, ed. Tom Bottomore and Maximilien Rubel (London; Penguin, 1990), P. 83. Likewise Louis Althusser reads *menschliche Wesen* as "essence of man" which is equivalent to "the idea of human nature". See Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster (London : Allen Lane, 1969), P. 236. Also see Norman Geras, *Marx and Human Nature : Refutation of a Legend* (London : Verso, 1983).
2. Karl Marx, *Capital* vol. I, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983), PP.54, 58, 61, 98- 9, 199.
3. Karl Marx, *Capital* vol. III, ed. Fredrick Engels (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1974), P. 830.
4. Karl Marx, *Capital* vol. I, PP. 79, 94,98-9.
5. *Ibid*, P. 76
6. *Ibid*, P. 46
7. *Ibid*, P. 45
8. *Ibid*, P. 107
9. *Ibid*, P. 44, 50, 89, 181.
10. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1982), P. 127.
11. Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, *The German Ideology* (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1976), PP. 198, 490, 496, 513, 538, 545.
12. Rene Descartes, 'Letter from the Author', in *Discourse on Method and Mediations*. trans. F. E. Sutcliffe (London : Penguin, 1968), P. 183.
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15. *Ibid*, P. 228
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18. Karl Marx, 'Preface', *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1977), P. 20.
19. Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction*, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (New York : Vintage Books, 1975), P. 251.
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21. Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, *The German Ideology*, P. 37.
22. Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction*, P. 251.
23. Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy* (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1978), P. 160.

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MOORE'S LINGUISTIC TURN

DEBIKA SAHA

Academic philosophy has undergone a striking change in recent years. The attention of philosophers has become more and more concentrated on language and linguistic consideration, which were once introduced for the sake of clarifying a question or an argument, now occupy a central place in the field of philosophy. The tendency refers back to Socrates, who was engaged in answering such questions as 'What is justice' in *The Republic* or 'What is knowledge' in the *Theaetetus*. It has been frequently believed that philosophy is a search for truth. Socrates appeared as a break-through when he assumed that philosophy must be opposed to the special sciences. It was Socrates, who believed that philosophy consisted of a special method different from the method of science. The primary purpose of philosophy is to make clear what is meant when certain questions are asked or when certain words are used. Socrates tried to clarify thought by analysing the meaning of our expressions and the real sense of our propositions.

Philosophy thus differs from the sciences. The sciences aim at discovering the truth. Philosophy discovers meaning also. The spirit of the modern "Age of Analysis" actually is an extension of what Socrates initiated. The revival of the Socratic tradition took a long time.

Against this changing perspective G. E. Moore appears in the arena of philosophy. It is Moore, who challenges the predominant philosophical views of the period and is responsible for the new conception of philosophy. He suggests that common sense and ordinary language supplies to philosophy both its problems and a touchstone by which its speculative claims may be checked. The present paper is concerned with Moore's philosophical method, namely, his way of dealing with the notion of analysis.

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Moore writes in his *Autobiography* :

I do not think that the world or the sciences would ever have suggested to me any philosophical problems. What has suggested problems to me is things which other philosophers have said about the world or about natural science.¹

This remark of Moore leads us straight to his conception of philosophy.

The notion of analysis plays an important part in his writings and there can be no doubt that he is responsible for concentrating attention of philosophers to analysis. But he himself explicitly denies in his reply to Langford in "A Reply to my Critics" that he ever engaged in the analysis of verbal expressions. So before entering into details it will be helpful to explain what Moore means by "analysis". If by analysis we mean merely counting the letters in a sentence then it is a fact that Moore never engaged in such type of analysis. But he surely deals with linguistic analysis in the sense of determination of the various senses of a word or the difference of use between philosophical and ordinary writings.

The most important use which he makes of this notion is in his "A Defence of Common Sense" where he is concerned to refute certain philosophical propositions. Now here one may ask : what does Moore mean by "Common Sense" and how is it relevant for philosophical investigation. In "A Defence of Common Sense", we do not find any definition of "Common Sense" but in his earlier writings he writes :

There are, it seems to me, certain views about the nature of the universe, which are held, now-a-days, by almost everybody. They are so universally held that they may, I think, fairly be called the views of Common Sense.²

The principal feature of the Common Sense view of the world consists in a belief in two different sorts of entities, namely, material object and acts of consciousness. The novelty of Moore's treatment lies in the fact that he does not define either material object or acts of consciousness. On the contrary, he supplies a set of propositions in favour of them. He knows with certainty that there are human beings with whom he can communicate and this proves that there are material objects. And acts of consciousness are attached to bodies as they are causally dependent on them. He criticises those philosophers who held

that material things are unreal on the ground that their denial entails the fact that they themselves do not exist.

Here a question arises. Are all those philosophers naive, who regard the above view? Are they not conscious of the above consequences? Certainly Moore is not suggesting that line. Then what is the reason for discarding their view? Moore thinks that these philosophers, who negate such 'Common Sense' beliefs outright, are unaware of a pair of important distinctions. The first is the distinction between a proposition and the analysis of that proposition. We may be perfectly certain that material things exist while genuinely uncertain how the concept 'material thing' should be analysed. It is the latter sense that philosophers are thinking when they are saying that material things are not real.

The other distinction that the philosophers are unaware of, is the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary uses of language. Moore shows that such words as 'time', 'space', 'material thing', 'mind', 'see', possess a common or standard meaning and an extraordinary meaning that is substitution of a new sense for the standard meaning without due warning of the change. As Russell says, "All that one ever sees when one looks at a thing is part of one's own brain".³ Now, what does Russell mean by this peculiar statement? Does he mean to imply that whenever the physiologist examines one's brain he is just deceiving? What kind of statement it is? Is it an empirical statement or an apriori statement? It is not an empirical statement as the perceived fact is quite different as stated. It is also not an apriori statement as its denial involves no self-contradiction. So Russell's disagreement with the common man is not about facts but about what language shall be used to describe these facts.

So here it is language that matters. Now one may question, is Russell so naive as to the correct usage? The fact is, he knows very well what distinguishes the correct usage from an incorrect one. He just wants to point out that even when the usage is infallible, here is every chance of being mistaken and indeed they are fundamentally mistaken about the nature of things.

Against the above view, Malcolm suggests there are certain conditions under which Common Sense *cannot* be mistaken. These conditions are the following : An expression must have (1) a descriptive and (2) an underivative use. It is generally said that an expression has a descriptive use when there are objects to which it actually applies. The expression "Golden Mountain" has no

descriptive use because it applies to nothing. An expression has underivative use when it can be known at firsthand as the expressions 'earlier', 'behind', 'material thing'. And when such expressions are used in their ordinary meanings it is impossible to distrust them.

Russell's philosophical statement is not only inconsistent with Common Sense beliefs, it is not in correct language. The notion of 'correctness' of language requires clarification. It is not grammatical accuracy which has been hinted at by Moore. It is just false to say Russell's statement offends against grammar. Moore believes that it is correct language to say that what we are doing now is seeing a desk, and it is not correct language to say that what we are now doing is seeing parts of our brain.

The assertion of Moore has the appearance of an apriori ruling. What justifies his assertion that one is correct language while the other is not? As Blanshard has interpreted Moore, Common Sense sets the bounds of a concept and language must obey it. This is what is understood by the word 'concrete'. Statements of philosophy must be translatable into the concrete.

Now, why this uncritical reliance on the veracity of Common Sense? Common Sense, firstly, has often been found to be wrong. Secondly, empirical things cannot be 'known for certain'. The Common Sense statement 'The earth is flat' has long been falsified. From what we can gather from Moore's writings, it appears that Moore does not intend to subscribe to all the claims of Common Sense. Common Sense beliefs differ enormously. They do not guide us. But Moore holds that there is a number of very general propositions which make up the Common Sense view of the world.

According to Ayer the phrase "know for certain" can have no proper application to empirical statement and it can only be applied to a priori statements. There is always a degree of uncertainty involved in empirical statement and it is better to say that we believe something to be true rather to say we know for certain to be true. As against this view Moore replies that it is better here to appeal to our language sense. He makes us feel how wrong it will be to say when we sit in a room, see and touch chairs that we only believe that there are chairs but do not know for certain.

The truth of the matter lies elsewhere. It is not possible that these

philosophers are making so trivial a mistake. But the fact is not that the phrase 'I know for certain' has no proper application to empirical statement. On the contrary, it is the *sense* that matters here. The sense in which it has its application to empirical statement, is different from the sense it has to apriori statement. When Ayer says that 'know for certain' cannot be applied to empirical statement, he is implying that logical certainty is not to be found there. And his statement is certainly true. What is wrong here is the fact that he expressed this truism in a false way.

Even admitting that there is a set of propositions which we can accept as Common Sense beliefs, and also admitting that we can know these propositions for certain, it is not clear how his defence of Common Sense is connected with his defence of ordinary language.

Moore's defence of Common Sense and his use of the same as a method of rejecting philosophical statements have often been subjected to severe criticism. For example, it has been said that Moore here fails in the very same way in which Dr. Johnson failed to refute Berkeley by kicking a stone. For Moore's part the procedure appears to beg the question, he seems to prove the external world by granting the existence and reality of his hands.

Further, one cannot *guarantee* which proposition should constitute Common Sense belief. In view of the rejection of so many beliefs of Common Sense, one cannot logically guarantee the abiding truth of any Common Sense belief, whatever Common Sense is in relation to the climate of the age. Of course, Moore has sometimes believed that there is always a central core of Common Sense belief which are known for certain, although we may not be in a position to prove them. Moore says that his inability to prove them does not prevent him from knowing them to be true.

Malcolm believes that the essence of Moore's technique is to point out that the philosophical statements go against ordinary language.

Language sense is one of the important factors in determining the truth or falsity of any statement. One must be aware of the ways in which language is ordinarily used. This emphasis on the variety of linguistic usage which sets the standard reminds us of later Wittgenstein's use of language game as, "I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it

is woven, the "language game".⁴ Wittgenstein is impressed by the fact that to speak a language is to behave in a certain way. And all these requires skill and this skill can be correctly or incorrectly done. To speak a language is to exercise certain techniques and our behaviour shows various abilities. One's behaviour is not an isolated mode of behaviour but it's rather woven together with the surrounding circumstances. When Wittgenstein says that to speak a language is to exercise certain techniques we are at once reminded of Moore who says of the proper and improper way of speaking.

After having discussed Moore's method it is time now to reflect on some of his views. We have to see whether Moore's position can be accepted uncritically. One very important criticism that has been offered against his view is that for many words of philosophic importance there is no standard use, but a variety of uses. And if the philosopher tries to employ all of them, his language far from being clear will be ambiguous and it will be mere crowded universe. For instance, the words 'know' and 'certain' are used in every philosophical writings. These words ordinarily mean apprehension and degrees of awareness. And if the philosophers stick to this common usage, it will be impossible to conduct any philosophical discussion.

Professor Barnes has raised a point that if one asks Moore whether he knows the meaning of 'This is a big inkstand', Moore will no doubt reply that it all depends on what one means by 'knowing the meaning'. If one is speaking about its understanding, the answer will be 'yes' and if one means the correct analysis of the sentence the answer will be 'no'. And this shows that the phrase 'knowing the meaning of' has no standard meaning on which philosophers can rely.

Moreover, Moore's proposal makes Common Sense an arbiter in fields outside its competence. For example, Moore says that material things exist as Common Sense says they do. But he also says if we are to get a clear answer to any question, we must know what it is that we are asking. But this is not the sort of question which Common Sense ever raises.

In conclusion we may say : while it is a fact that we have to face difficulties in applying Common Sense sometimes, yet one can philosophize in analysing Common Sense notion. But the condition is that one has to proceed within the bounds of Common Sense.

It appears that Moore is inclined to drive a wedge between Common Sense and philosophy (in the traditional sense). But it is not impossible to strike a compromise between them. One may very well restrict oneself within the bounds of Common Sense ontology and still engage in philosophical enquiry. The beliefs of Common Sense may provide us with a workable ontological framework; nevertheless such concepts as causality, material objects, etc. may raise important philosophical questions. It is thus not necessary to contradict Common Sense in order to formulate philosophical statements.

NOTES

1. John Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*, Penguin Books, 1980, P. 201.
2. G. E. Moore, *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*, New York : The Macmillan Co., 1953., p. 2.
3. Norman Malcolm, "Moore And Ordinary Language", *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, ed. by P. A. Schilpp, The Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. IV., Northwestern University, Evanston and Chicago, 1942, p. 347.
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SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE RELATION BETWEEN ŚAṆKARA AND BUDDHISM *

SANGHAMITRA DASGUPTA

&

DILIP KUMAR MOHANTA

I

In the history of Indian Philosophy the relationship of Śaṅkarite Advaita Vedānta to Buddhism has aroused considerable interest among scholars since ancient times. Sometimes it is said that the contents of Śaṅkara's Vedānta are all Buddhistic (*Mahāyāna*) with the outward coverage of upaniṣadic lip- service. In other words, Śaṅkara is 'a Buddhist who pretends to be a vedāntin' and his philosophy is 'Mahāyāna Buddhism in disguise'. Vijñāna Bhikṣu refers to a verse of '*Padmapurāṇa*' where Śaṅkara has been called 'a Crypto-Buddhist' (*Pracchanna Bauddha*).¹ Emphasising the points of striking similarities between Śaṅkara's philosophy and Mahāyāna Buddhism, S. N. Dasgupta, in his *History of Indian Philosophy* remarks, "His (Śaṅkara's) Brahman was very much like the *Śūnya* of Nāgārjuna The debts of Śaṅkara to the self- luminosity of Vijñānavāda Buddhism can hardly be overestimated. There seems to be much truth in the accusations against Śaṅkara by Vijñāna Bhikṣu and others that he was a hidden Buddhist himself Śaṅkara's philosophy is largely a compound of Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda Buddhism with the Upaniṣadic notion of the permanence of self-superadded".²

But against this appellation of Śaṅkara as a Buddhist in disguise, there are some strong grounds developed by some of the post-Śaṅkara Advaitins. They hold that Śaṅkara who was mastermind behind the 'downfall of Buddhism in India' cannot be called a 'crypto Buddhist'. In support of their contention, many

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of them referred to the fact of his using 'bitter and harsh words' for Buddha and Buddhism. In *Pancapādikā Vivaraṇa* Prakāśātman rules out any claim with regard to the Buddhist influence upon Śaṅkara³ and condemns a thinker who talks of the affinities between Buddhism and Śaṅkara's Philosophy as one "who talks something which befits an ignorant man and his case is indeed pitiable".⁴ It is said that Śaṅkara whose mission was to restore the supremacy of Ātman as viewed by the Seers of Upaniṣads could not be friendly with those Buddhists who often say, "even a reasoned argument from the mouth of a follower of the veda looks ugly like a necklace or a string of beads placed on the feet".⁵ However, we had to wait until the arrival of Śrīharṣa for a dispassionate appraisal of Buddhism, because most of the post-Śaṅkara Vedāntins without trying to understand the real significance of the Mahāyāna Buddhism advanced bitter and derogatory remarks against Buddhism and blindly repeated Śaṅkara's arguments.⁶ Śrīharṣa and Citsukha have depicted some similarities between Mādhyamika philosophy and Śaṅkara's philosophy in a novel way. They dispassionately argue that in order to keep the socio-cultural *milieu* of his time though Śaṅkara used the Mahāyāna Buddhists' phraseology, this does not affect his chief concern for the uplift of 'aupaniṣadic' thought. He was not a Buddhist who pretended to be a vedāntin. Here our contention is that it is correct rather to say that since historically Śaṅkara arrived after the glorious time of Mahāyāna Buddhism he could not totally avoid Buddhists' influence. But it is incorrect to characterise Śaṅkara as 'a Buddhist in disguise'. Under this perplexing context, what we intend to discuss here is a critical exploration of different aspects of the issue from the standpoint of history. We shall see that Mahāyāna Buddhism had been influenced by Upaniṣadic teaching and bitter relations between Buddhism and Vedānta were the consequences of the rivalry developed through Sarvāstivādins and Svatantravijñānavādin's philosophy. Instead of making reconciliation, these thinkers posed Buddhism as 'absolutely opposed' to Vedānta. History tells us that Buddha himself protested against the too much of vedic ritualism but he was not militant against the 'Upaniṣadic philosophy'. Before elaborating our contention, we shall try to chalk out some similarities between Śaṅkara's Vedānta with that of Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda school of Buddhism and also try to highlight the possible influences of them in the formation of 'Śaṅkara's philosophy.

II

Śāṅkara who historically figures in the eighth century AD after Śāntarākṣita,⁷ wrote extensive commentaries on different *Upaṇiṣads* as well as on *Brahmasūtras* of Bādrāyana. In *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* there are clear evidences that he was acquainted with the current philosophical trends of his time. He devoted a large section of his commentary on the refutation of the other philosophies. Among the Buddhists he vehemently criticised both Vaibhāsikas and Sāutrāntikas under the name of Sarvāstivāda, Svatantra-Vijñānavāda of Dinnāga and Śūnyavāda. In criticising the stand of Vijñānavāda of Dinnāga, he has '*Ālambanaparīkṣā*' in his mind. Among the individual Buddhist philosophers, he criticised Dharmakīrti the great Buddhist Logician. While criticising, Śūnyavāda, he takes up the popular connotation of the word 'śūnya' as 'zero' or 'nothing' and condemns 'śūnyavāda' as '*Nihilism*'. He argues that a philosophical position which pictures the empirical world as a transitory show of non-substantial appearances (*śūnya*) is not even worthy of criticism, because absolute unreality of sheer appearances without any underlying reality (*tattva*) to appear is a self-defeating proposition which cannot be defended by any instruments of valid cognition.⁹ But a careful intellectual journey through the writings of Nāgārjuna (2nd century A. D.) and his followers can definitely make it clear that Śūnyavāda is not nihilism; it does not deny the reality of the world altogether. Such a nihilistic interpretation springs from a basic misunderstanding or misconception of Mādhyamika Philosophy. Surprisingly Śāṅkara himself apprehends that Brahman, the Absolute in his philosophy may be misconceived by the ignorant as *nothing* (*śūnya*).¹⁰ Let us cite some of the fundamental aspects of Mādhyamika philosophy which will reveal how close the teachings of Śūnyavāda to Śāṅkara's own teaching and as a result, we shall be logically able to say that Śāṅkara's criticism of Śūnyavāda is only outward and springs from a misconception of the word śūnya and his too much passionate zeal to revive Upaniṣadic Vedānta. Let us begin with the word 'śūnya'.

Nāgārjuna used the word '*śūnya/śūnyata*' in order to designate both phenomenal and transphenomenal reality in a somewhat technical sense. In case of phenomena, the word *śūnyata* has two imports. It negatively means the rejection of the uncritical acceptance of the independent nature of worldly things and positively it stands for the dependent, changing nature of objects. It is a simultaneous case of both rejection and revelation. The world is called '*śūnya*',

because it is emptied or devoid of any intrinsic nature of its own (*niḥsvabhāva*). On mundane level we act on the basis of certain standpoints such as, 'is', 'is not', etc. and form different theories of reality. But these empirical determinations are not applicable to the Absolute. To put it otherwise, the world is called *śūnya*, because everything in this world is relative and mutually dependent and in this sense devoid of any self-essence. But the truth of all empirical determinations lies in their indeterminateness or the Absolute which is termed as *Nirvāṇa*. But there is no chasm or gap between *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*. *Nirvāṇa* is the unconditional transcendental ground for the conditional, phenomenal reality called *saṃsāra*. But the difference between *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* is not again absolute one; it must be relative, because if we say that this type of relativity or dependence is exclusive or of absolute nature then it would amount to the violation of the rule of relativity itself.. "The one and the same Reality when viewed through causal conditions, is declared to be the world and when these not depending or not appropriating or relative, it is called *Nirvāṇa*".¹¹

It is here where Śaṅkara's view of *māyā* and the world comes closer to Nagarjuna. Śaṅkara holds *māyā* to be beyond the reach of empirical determination which functions through the categories like 'is' or 'is not' (*bhāva*, *abhāva*) etc. We cannot categorise *māyā* as "either real or unreal or real-unreal. Even it is neither real nor unreal". This indeterminable nature is also attributed to the empirical nature of the world which according to Śaṅkara is a product of indeterminable *māyā*.¹² What is the status of the world then? The world enjoys *only a relative status*; it is neither real nor unreal either. It is not unreal (*asat*), because it is a fact of experience, it is not like 'hare's horn'. It can not be called real (*sat*) like *Brahman*, because it is not *trikāla-abādhita* - devoid of contradictions in three forms of time (i.e., past, present and future). This in turn suggests that the world is not denied by Śaṅkara as an unmitigated negation; rather he admits its relativity reality. By using the word '*śūnya*', Nāgārjuna too points to the relative relativity of the world. It is a misinterpretation that *śūnyavāda* preaches nihilism, according to which everything is unreal. The Buddha himself again and again told his disciples that truth lies neither in *Ucchedavāda* nor in *Sarvāstivāda* but in *Madhyamā pratipāda*. Nāgārjuna and his followers made this statement explicit in their works. The 'middle path' of Nāgārjunian philosophy is not a mechanical combination or meeting point of two extreme alternatives

like Aristotle's 'Golden Mean' which is meant to form a balance between two extremes. It is rather the rising above, going beyond all extreme views in order to see things as *they are* and in this sense it is 'no path' at all in the ordinary sense of the term. Nāgārjuna does not deny that there is a reality (*tattva*) behind this changing, conditional world of appearance. This reality is called *Nirvāṇa*. S. N. Dasgupta is very much correct when he says that Śāṅkara's "Brahman was very much like the śūnya of Nāgārjuna. It is difficult indeed to distinguish between pure being and pure non-being as a category".¹³

Not only this, both Mādhyamikas and Śāṅkara propounded absolutist systems of philosophy. But the question arises : How do the Absolutists explain the status of the world? The answer to such query, we think, is inherent in both the systems of Absolutism in their commitment to the degrees of truth or reality. What in metaphysical language in Śāṅkara's philosophy called *sattā* (beinghood) in epistemological language of the Mādhyamikas called *satyaṁ* (Truth). Nāgārjuna in the *Mādhyamika-kārikā* says :

Dve satye samutpāśritya buddhānām dharmadeśanā /

Loka samvṛtisatyaṁ ca satyaṁ ca paramārthataḥ //

('Dharma' in Buddha's teaching should be understood resorting to both conventional and absolute truth).¹⁴ Prajñākarmati in *Bodhicaryāvataraṇajikā* explains *paramārthasatya* which is otherwise known as '*akṛtrimaṁ vasturūpaṁ*' (*things-in-itself*) as something which remains beyond the reach of our conceptual knowability. Candrakīrti, a commentator (of 7th century A. D.) on *Mādhyamikakārikā* makes a subdivision of *samvṛtisatya* into '*alokasamvṛti*' and '*lokasamvṛti*' - seeming truth and functional truth. When we perceive a rope as "rope" and a snake as "snake" we say that our cognitions are true. These are facts of our empirical determinations or '*lokasamvṛti*'. But when our senses do not function properly, we have illusory cognition of a 'snake' in a 'rope' or of dream objects or a perception of 'double moon', we say that our cognitions are *mithyā* or false. It is '*alokasamvṛti*'. *Samvṛtisatya* which has functional value in the phenomenal world is also called *vyāvahārika satya* and is considered as a means (*upāya*), a ladder for reaching the goal (*upeya*) namely *paramārthasatya* (Absolute Truth).¹⁵

It is interesting to see here how Śāṅkarite Advaita Vedānta deals with

the hierarchy of existence or truth and how close it comes to the Mādhyamika's account. To the Śāṅkarite Advaita Vedāntins, there are three kinds of existence - *pāramārthika* (absolute), *vyāvahārika* (conventional) and *prātibhāsika* (illusory or seeming). Absolute existence belongs to Brahman, conventional existence to the world and seeming or illusory existence to 'silver in a nacre' or 'snake in a rope' etc. or in dream objects.¹⁶ The reality of the world is *vyāvahārika* or conventional/functional, because the world is considered as something which remains uncontradicted till the realization of one's identity with Brahman.

What seems to be important here is that both the Mādhyamika and the Advaita Vedānta systems of philosophy being absolutistic in nature have felt the necessity of admitting the degrees of truth or existence. And the account of conventional truth by the later Mādhyamikas are at par with the Śāṅkarite Advaita Vedānta. The difference between the two is only of linguistic phraseology. Candrakīrti's subdivision of '*alokasamvṛti*' corresponds to the *prātibhāsika* and '*lokasamvṛti*' to *vyāvahārika* levels of truth of the Advaitins. In Advaita Vedānta the world is considered as false. Though Śāṅkara distinguishes between seeming reality (*prātibhāsika sattā*), and the phenomenal reality (*vyāvahārika sattā*), the distinction between them is not absolute. Ultimately both these 'realities' are subsumed under one category, that is, false (*mithyā*). The apparent snake is false, for it does not exist in rope, its substratum; it vanishes when the rope is cognised. Similarly the world is seen as false the moment Brahman, its substratum, is directly realized.¹⁷ The Absolute truth which is known by the words '*tathatā*' or '*sūnyata*' in the Mādhyamika philosophical literature is non-conceptual, non-conventional, uncontradicted for all times. The absolute reality (*Paramārtha sattā*) which is known as *Ātman* or *Brahman* in the Advaita Vedānta is also beyond the reach of all concepts and conventions, remains uncontradicted for ever. For the absolute reality, the Mādhyamikas use the term '*advaya*' whereas the Advaitins use the term '*advaita*' and both surprisingly enough mean that the absolute is '*non-dual*'.¹⁸ So far as the degrees of truth is concerned, the difference between the Mādhyamikas and Śāṅkara seems to lie in their respective approach to uphold the Absolutism on the one hand and to sustain the relative existence of the world of our experience on the other. Śāṅkara develops an ontological approach where the emphasis is not like the Mādhyamikas on 'the correct attitude of our knowing' but unlike the Mādhyamikas on 'the thing known'.¹⁹ For Śāṅkara, when '*aparokṣānubhūti*'

takes place, all the differences get vanished, "the knowing faculty too gets concentrated and lost in it (*Brahma vīda brahmaiva bhavati*).²⁰ The difference between the Mādhyamikas and Śāṅkara seems to lie in their respective approaches, not in the thing or content to be approached.²¹ For the Mādhyamikas when reason gets despair, the hour of truth discloses. These striking similarities might have led scholar like B. M. Barua to remark : "Was Śāṅkara's Philosophy itself possible or intelligible without reference to Buddhist philosophies, the Mādhyamika in particular, which flourished in South India? The question, as we are now persuaded, must be answered in the negative".²²

III

In the historical phases of the evolution of the Buddhist thought after Nāgārjuna of the 2nd century A. D., momentum given by Asanga and Vasubandhu of the fourth century A. D. made some distinction. Like Nāgārjuna they uphold that Reality is non- dual. But unlike Nāgārjuna they positively declare that the Reality is Vijñaptimātra or Pure consciousness which is the permanent seat of changing states of empirical existence. Vasubandhu who was honoured as Second Buddha, had been a sarvāstivādin in his early period of life and authored '*Abhidharmakośa*'. It is said that he was later on converted to Vijñānavāda by his elder brother Asaṅga and he wrote his revolutionary treatise called '*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*' which comprises *Viṃśatikā* and *Trimśikā*. The author wrote commentary on *viṃśatikā* and Sthiramati wrote commentary on *Trimśikā*. In the former part Vasubandhu criticises the atomic view of the world as propounded by Sarvāstivādins and Vaiśeṣikas and in the latter he exhibits his positive philosophy. To him Pure Consciousness is the ultimate reality, *Ālayavijñāna* is the reality from vyāvahārika standpoint, Klišṭa Manovijñāna is the individual being and the world occupies the status of *Viśayavijñapti*.

But Śāṅkara while criticising Dīnnāga (5th Century A. D.) and Dharmakīrti under the general name vijñānavāda has in fact criticised svatantravijñānavāda, according to which the momentary unit of consciousness is the ultimate reality. Like Hobbes in the west, the Svatantravijñānavādin advocated nominalism and for explaining the problem of identity they spoke of the fact of similarity. It is precisely here Śāṅkara directed all his criticism which goes by the general name Vijñānavāda. A close study of Vasubandhu's work which evidences his

originality, vigour and philosophic insight immediately points to the fact that it does not have any fundamental difference with that of Śaṅkara's view developed in the latter half of the 8th century A. D. Śaṅkara's view of Nirguṇa Brahman may roughly correspond to Vasubandhu's 'Pure Consciousness' or Vijñaptimātra, Īśvara or Saṅgu Brahman to *Ālayavijñāna*, Jiva to *Kliṣṭa Manovijñāna* and *jagat* to *viśayavijñapti*. Śaṅkara's charge of subjective idealism is applicable to svatantravijñānavāda according to which consciousness is momentary and things of the world are 'modifications of our sensations or mental states. They criticised the notion of permanent self and considered changing psycho-physical cogglomeration as the so called self. In absence of any permanent principle like Pure Consciousness they try to explain the fact of identity by resemblance (*sādrśya*). Śaṅkara's criticism here resembles the Neo-Kantian's argument against the Sensationalists in the west.

But it seems to be mysterious that Śaṅkara does not criticise Vijñānavāda of Vasubandhu and Asaṅga. We know from the historical evidences that Śaṅkara's time was a period of 'mutual animosity, hatred and distrust' in extreme form among the Buddhists and the Hindus. It might have been the case that he himself could understand that there is nothing substantial to differ from Mahāyāna Buddhism. Any explanation regarding the relation of Śaṅkara's Philosophy with Buddhism would remain incomplete unless we discuss Gauḍapāda's contribution. Because it is Gauḍapāda (6th century A. D.) whom Bhāvaviveka, a junior contemporary of him, recognised as an independent philosopher and praised for his dispassionate, impartial spirit of interpretation. It is said that in Gauḍapāda's works, the best that is in Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu is contained. Gauḍapāda, who flourished about the period 780 A.D., wrote a commentary on the *Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad* in verse and clearly explicate the nondualistic teaching of upaniṣad. Gauḍapāda was the teacher of Govindapāda who happened to be the teacher of Śaṅkara. He agrees with Nāgārjuna in maintaining that from ultimate standpoint it is impossible to accept the doctrine of origination. According to him "there is neither dissolution nor creation, neither any bounded self, nor any practising saint; neither a person striving for salvation nor an emancipated self. This is the essence of truth".²³ In his *bhāṣya* on *Māṇḍukyakārikā*, Śaṅkara remarks that the words like creation and dissolution are meaningful only with reference to an existent thing. Since plurality does not exist at all, the question of creation is meaningless.²⁴ Śaṅkara

also tells us that Gauḍapāda is in complete agreement with the Vajñānavādins in holding the unreality of the external objects and the reality of Pure Consciousness.²⁵ Like Vijñānavādins, Gauḍapāda placed dream states and actual states on almost equal footings. This is perhaps the reason that some interpreters accused Gauḍapāda who pretended to be a vedāntin was actually a Buddhist in disguise. But on the contrary our contention is, that definitely Gauḍapāda was influenced by Mahāyāna Buddhism as propounded by Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu but the whole metaphysical framework of the Mahāyāna Buddhism was to a great extent based on Upaniṣads. So there is no harm on the part of Śāṅkara in being influenced by the Upaniṣadic teachings through great Mahāyāna masters and advocating explicitly the upaniṣadic non-dualism. As an independent philosopher whose business consisted largely of interpretation, Gauḍapāda inherited the non-conflicting aspects of Buddhism with Upaniṣads and worked for the revival of upaniṣadic thought in an independent way that might suit the order of the age. However, Śāṅkara was very much keen to picture Gauḍapāda as an advaitic master and did not mention many of Gauḍapāda's explicit references to Buddhism. Historically Gauḍapāda's time was later than the great Buddhist masters like Aśvagoṣa, Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Scholars like S. N. Dasgupta tried to show that Gauḍapāda's teaching as Buddhist from his Kārikās. In the fourth chapter of his Kārikās he says that "he adores that great man who by knowledge as wide as the sky realized (*sambuddha*) that all appearances (*dharma*) were like the vacuous sky (*gaganopamaṁ*)".²⁶ This resembles '*katham ca gaganopamaṁ*'.²⁷ Moreover, Gauḍapāda expresses his profound adoration to Lord Buddha in his Kārikā no IV, 2.4, when he says that "the Buddhas have shown that there was no coming into being in any way (*sarvathā Buddhairajātiḥ paridipitah*)".²⁸ All these might have led S. N. Dasgupta to state that Gauḍapāda himself was possibly a Buddha and one according to whom, the fundamental philosophical framework of Upaniṣads "tallied with those of Buddha".²⁹ Śāṅkara on the contrary, concludes his commentary on *Gauḍapādakārikā* expressing his adoration to the great Gauḍa depicted him as one who "by churning the great ocean of the Veda by his great churning rod of wisdom recovered what lay deep in the heart of the Veda, and is hardly attainable even by the immortal gods".³⁰

But to us who consider philosophy in somewhat modern sense, as a science of interpretation it is not important whether someone was a Buddhist or

a Hindu in faith. What is historically more significant is to see that every thinker is a product of certain age. In Indian philosophical heritage it is equally true. It is difficult to deny that the metaphysics of upaniṣads maintained its survival in and through different phases of historical changes, and in that historical spheres of change, no philosopher could avoid the influence of his earlier masters' voices. In such a historical juncture Gauḍapāda appeared as a product of the meeting point of upaniṣadic Hinduism and Mahāyāna Buddhism. Śāṅkara as he was, in the like manner influenced by Gauḍapāda's teachings that depict no rivalry between Upaniṣads and Buddhism regarding metaphysical foundation. But by this, we are not sufficiently empowered with historical facts to say that he was a Buddhist in disguise. He was a committed Vedāntin who enriched his methodology from the teachings of great Buddhist masters.

IV

If we look into the matter from the point of view of history, then it seems to be more cogent to say that the fundamentals of Mahāyāna Buddhism are largely the philosophy of Upaniṣads in disguise. Again, if there were no fundamental difference between Mahāyāna Buddhism and Upaniṣads, why was there so much of 'animosity and hatred' between the two approaches recorded in history? What could be the possible grounds on the part of Śāṅkara to be much vocal, to use so many harsh languages and to advance hostility against the Buddhists ?

To get a cogent and comprehensive reply, we think, we are to go back again to history itself. In India unlike the west, the line of demarcation between philosophy and theology is so thin that most of the times one overlaps other and makes it's philosophy theological and theology philosophical. Buddha himself was not fond of philosophical questions, rather his main interest was to put human beings on reasoned ground of moral uplift. He was totally disgusted with the rigidity of rituals and corrupt practices like casteism, 'with the sacrifices in which animals were butchered' and 'supremacy of the Brahmandom'. But he was not militant against the Upaniṣadic teachings. It was only after his death and during the 5th century A. D., that Dinnāga became very eager to place the philosophical aspects of Buddhism as a completely independent system and depict it as totally opposed to the Vedānta philosophy of Upaniṣads. During the

period of the 6th century A. D. Dharmakīrti instead of highlighting the philosophical richness of Vasubandhu which is very close to Upaniṣads, along with his criticism of Mimāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas "widened the gulf between Buddhism and Vedānta created by Dinnāga".³¹ Then during the period of its 8th century Śāntarakṣita and his disciple Kamalaśīla, like Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti, criticised Vedānta for its declaration of 'Consciousness to be permanent'. Moreover, it was a time in India's cultural history when in the absence of any great masters of Nāgārjuna's or Vasubandhu's stature, Buddhism was being deprived of getting patronage of the throne and wealthy in society. At the time of Aśoka, Buddhism spread rapidly almost all over India and many other countries as well. Soon after this, degeneration set in and degrading practices grew in Buddhism. Śāṅkara was born and lived in an era when the Buddhist "monasteries became rich centres of vested interests and their disciples became lax, and magic and superstition crept into the popular forms of worship".³³ Śāṅkara himself being a product of such historical situation 'has nothing but bitter and strong remarks for Buddhism'.³⁴ It is indeed true that thoughts and feelings that are common to the community or masses in vague and difused forms get crystallized and concentrated in the philosophical writings of any given period. And Śāṅkara as a philosopher is no exception to this.³⁵ Śāṅkara is surely one of such fortunate philosophers who tactfully interpreted the concepts of Upaniṣads, gradually replaced the blind forces by conscious and rational foundations, and offered the prevailing ethical practices a new direction. We should not forget that Śāṅkara was also a product of a particular socio-cultural *milieu*.

It is true that Śāṅkara was influenced by Buddhism. But it is one thing to say that the influence of Buddhism upon Śāṅkara can not be ignored; and it is completely different thing to say that he was a Buddhist who pretended to be a vedāntin or a crypto Buddhist. We do not deny that Śāṅkara's conception of *maṭha* was an adoption of *saṅgha* of the Buddhist culture. He travelled throughout India and established four *maṭhas* (monasteries) in order to bring harmony among the diverse thought-currents that were prevalent in the Indian society. He felt it necessary to formulate a philosophy which was not only a direct interpretation of Upaniṣadic texts but also different from Buddhism. To strengthen our claim that Śāṅkara was an independent thinker of Upaniṣadic heritage with originality, vigor and insight, we shall cite a few instances where he not only differs from

svatantravijñānavāda but also from Gauḍapāda and Vasubandhu. Again, before concluding our survey, we shall dismiss the claim of some post-Śāṅkara philosophers that Śāṅkara gave a fictitious status to the world.³⁶ The use of the word 'tuccha' (insignificant) for the world in *Daśaśloki* by Śāṅkara³⁷ we think, is somewhat context-oriented and to keep this usage in the proper context we would dismiss the claim that, for Śāṅkara, the world is fictitious. We have seen that against 'svatantravijñānavāda's position of 'to be perceived by the mind is to be a portion of the mind' (*sahopalambhaniyama*), Śāṅkara develops several arguments. In his *Brahma-sūtrabhāṣya* 22, 28, he argues for the difference between objective cognition and the objects in cognition (*tasmād artha-jñānayorbhedah*). The object of cognition is not the cognition it produces. Further, when Dinnāga says that 'internal consciousness itself appears as if it is something external', Śāṅkara refutes it by saying that 'if there were no external world how can we say that consciousness appears as if it is something external'? All these show that Śāṅkara was very eager to establish his system of philosophy in a way that would make it distinct from Buddhism. The concept of one eternal Brahman was not enough to mark this borderline. The urgency was felt more perhaps for another reason, that is, Vasubandhu (A. D. 420-500) in his '*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*' advocated a type of idealism which seemed to be very near to the non-dualism of the Upaniṣads. Being an independent philosopher with profound originality³⁸ Śāṅkara differs from Vasubandhu and even from Gauḍapāda. Unlike Vasubandhu and Gauḍapāda who placed dream states and actual states on almost equal footings, Śāṅkara in explaining the *sūtra* 2.2.29 of *Brahmasūtra* endorsed the view that the mundane level of reality cannot be likened to a dream. The apprehension of the external world in every act of perception cannot be denied. Here he is on the same platform with the realists and the pragmatists in admitting the existence of an external world outside and independent of the subject and judges the validity of knowledge by practical results.

Even if it were argued that Śāṅkara's description of the world as 'tuccha' in 'Daśaśloki' is a clear cut instance for 'his leaning towards Buddhism', we do not subscribe to it from the consideration of historical *milieu*. We also think that because of their richly suggestive character Śāṅkara's writings seem to 'accommodate diverse interpretations with an apparent ease'. We would propose to interpret his view on 'tuccha' in the following way : when a person has

experienced one's essential identity with Brahman, he would not attach any significance to the world as apart from Brahman. It has deep epistemological implications. Even the very method of 'not this', 'not this' (*neti neti*) in the gradual process of spiritual development, all the means of knowledge (such as, perception, inference, even scriptural testimony) and different types of scriptural injunctions - all these would become insignificant, because they are like a ladder which can be thrown away after climbing to the roof. By no means does this mean that they are mere thought-constructs or fictitious.

From the whole bulk of foregoing discussion, we are led to the conclusion that Śaṅkara was not a Buddhist in disguise but a committed Vedāntin who openly declared his philosophy to be the 'aupaniṣadic' philosophy. Since he was flourished after the great masters of Buddhism, his thoughts were influenced and he did enrich them from the Buddhistic thought-currents without sacrificing the cream of the Upaniṣadic teachings of the oneness of reality which is otherwise known as Ātman. His explication of the hierarchy of existence is similar to Mādhyamika's view of the levels of truth. A more significant aspect of this hierarchy of truth is that the earliest account of it may be traced in initial form in the Upaniṣads.³⁹ The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad's* explanation of Brahman as 'Truth of truths or Being of beings - *'satyasya satyam'* is to be considered as the seed of such gradation to be developed throughout different stages. So in this particular case also instead of saying that Śaṅkara only imitated what had been said by Mādhyamikas we prefer to say that both Mādhyamikas and Śaṅkara represented only distinctive phases of the same hierarchy of truth contained initially in the upaniṣads. But Śaṅkara's criticism of Śūnyavāda as nihilism is not correct and this has been frankly admitted by Śrīharṣa. Some writers on Indian Philosophy believe that there might have been some thinkers who took the world as *śūnya* or unreal. And Śaṅkara while criticising śūnyavāda might mean their view. However, there is no work or historical evidences in this regard extended to us. It is indeed true that Śaṅkara to a great extent was influenced by Vasubandhu's thought through Gauḍapāda. But Vasubandhu in turn declaring Pure Consciousness as the Reality only developed the philosophical germs contained in the Upaniṣads and brought Buddhism closer to Vedānta. So when Śaṅkara characterises his philosophy as 'the philosophy of upaniṣads, he in fact does not undermine the Buddhist philosophers like Aśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu. Buddhism which came as a protest against corrupt rituals in the

name of spirituality in Hinduism and advanced a reformation in society, philosophically founded by these thinkers without any genuine opposition to Upaniṣadic metaphysics. Śaṅkara also in his zeal to revive upaniṣadic thought protested against the orthodox and dogmatic Hīnāyanists and too much subjectivism of Svatantravijñānavāda. Śaṅkara historically figured in a time when there were explicit 'enmity, hatred and mistrust between Buddhism and Vedānta and it would happen to be very difficult to think dispassionately about Buddhism. It is only explicit in Śrīharṣa (A. D. 1000-1100) because historically he flourished in a time when "Buddhism was ousted and the struggle died down"⁴⁰. All these may lead us to close our survey by saying that instead of considering Buddhism and Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta as 'opposed systems', let us claim that there are different phases of development of the same non-dualistic metaphysics from the Upaniṣadic period to the time of Śaṅkara. However, it is true that sometimes the same thought current was disturbed and diverted towards other directions in the midway, but ultimately credit went to Śaṅkara who revived it and set the direction alright. Modern scholars of Indian Philosophy have the apprehension that "there was a far greater influence of the Upaniṣads on the Mahāyāna sūtras than what is supposed till now"⁴¹.

NOTES

- * The authors are indebted to Professor K. P. Sinha, Department of Sanskrit, Assam University, Silchar for his comments on the earlier draft of the paper and also for his suggestions for the improvement of the paper.
1. The verse of the *Padmapurāṇa* reads as : 'Māyāvādamasacchāstram pracchanam Baudhameva ca' - See : A. K. Ray Choudhury : *The Doctrine of Māyā* (Calcutta, Dasgupta & Co., 1952), p. 184.
 2. S. N. Dasgupta : *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol., 1 (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass), 1992, edition, p. 493-4.
 3. See : *Pañcapādikā Vivaraṇa* (Ed. R. Shastri, Benaras 1892), p. 84.
 4. See: C. D. Sharma : *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1994 edition), p. 312.

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5. See : *Tattva-saṅgraha* (3376-7) of Śāntarakṣita, Ed. by Pt. K. Krishnamacharya, Gaekwad Oriental Series, Baroda, 1926), See also C. D. Sharma, *Ibid*, p. 333.
6. Unlike other post-Śaṅkara advaitins, Śrīharṣa tries to revive the long lost glory of the great advaitic master Gauḍapāda who speaks of the affinities of his view with that of śūnyavādins. For Śrīharṣa like Gauḍapāda, Śūnyavāda does not mean 'nihilism'. Again he openly admits the affinities of his dialectical arguments with that of śūnyavādins. That 'Advaita Vedānta and Śūnyavāda are *not* two opposed systems of philosophy', is expressed in his book. He says : Tathā hi yadi darśaneṣu śūnyavādānirvacanīya pakṣayor āśrayanam tada tāvad asnūṣām nirbādhaiva sarvapathinatā', - *Khaṇḍanakhāṇḍakhāḍya* (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benaras, 1914), pp. 229-30.
7. Śāntarakṣita appears just before Śaṅkara in the 8th century. He and his disciple Kamalaśīla like Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti criticised other schools of thought and Vedānta particularly for its acceptance of Consciousness to be permanent and in this way they instead of supporting Vasubandhu's stand pictured Buddhism and Vedānta as absolutely opposed systems of thought.
8. Diñnāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā* (Reconstructed by N. Aiyaswami Shastri, Adyar Library, 1941) is not a pioneer work on Vijñānavāda. Unlike Vasubandhu of '*Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi (trīmaśikā)*' where he depicted Consciousness (will) as the ultimate Reality, Diñnāga considered momentary consciousness as reality. Śaṅkara vehemently condemns it in the general name of Vijñānavāda. But Śaṅkara's criticism cannot touch Vijñānavāda of Vasubandhu.
9. *Śāriirakabhāṣya* on *Brahma-sūtra* 2.2.31, 'Śūnyavāḍipakṣastu sarvapramāṇa-vipratīṣiddha iti tannirākaraṇāya nādarah kriyate, Na hi ayam sarvapramāṇaprasiddho lokasya vyavahāro 'nyat tattvamanādhigamya śakyate pahanotum, apavādābhāve utsarga prasiddheh'.
10. See Śaṅkara's commentary on *Chāndyogya Upaniṣad*. Chapter VIII. 'Digdeśaguṇagati phalabheda śūnyam hi paramārthasad advayaṁ Brahma mandabuddhinām asadiva pratibhāti'.
11. Ya ājavamjavibhāva upādāya pratītya vā so pratītya anupādāya nirvānam upadiśyate. - *Mādhymikakārikā*, Verse No. 9 Ch. 25. (Eng. Tra. Th. Stcherbatsky: *The Concept of Buddhist Nirvāna*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1977), p. (Text) 43.
12. See: Sanghamitra Dasgupta : Is Māyā the material cause of the world? *The Vedānta Kesari*, Vo.. 83, August, 1996, p. 305.
13. See : *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, p. 493.

14. See : *Mādhymikakārikā*, Ch. 24, Verse No. 8.
15. Vyavahāramanāśritya paramārtho na deśyate/Paramārthamanāgamya nirvānaṁ nādhigamyate// (without a recourse to conventional truth, the absolute truth cannot be understood It is impossible to realize nirvāna without understanding the absolute truth). See : *Mādhymikakārikā*, ch. 24, Verse 10; also see the vṛtti (*Prasannapadā*) by Candrakīrti thereon :
Tasmād nirvānādhigamopāyatvād avaśyameva yathāvasthitā samvṛtiḥ ādaveva abhyupeyā bhājanamiva salitārthinā". (Suppose someone wants to drink water, he should use pot to reach his goal. Similarly, in understanding the Buddha's teaching, one must take recourse to conventional truth if one wants to attain nirvāna, the absolute truth. See : *Prasannapadā*, commentary on *Mādhymikakārikā* (Ed. P. L. Vaidya Mithila Institute, Darbhanga, 1960) p. 216.
16. 'Trividam sattvaṁ - pārmāthika, vyāvahārika, prātibhāsikañceti; pārmāthika sattvaṁ Brahmaḥ, Vyāvahārikaṁ sattvamakāśadeḥ, prātibhāśikaṁ sattvaṁ sūktirajatadeḥ, Tatha "gaṭaḥ san" iti pratyakṣa vyāvahārikasattva viṣayuttvena prāmānyam' - See : *Vedānta-Paribhāṣa* of Dharmarājādhvarindra, Eng. Trans by Swami Madhavananda : Advaita Ashram, Calcutta 1993 (4th Ed., 7th Imp.) p. 81.
17. For details see : Sanghamitra Dasgupta's article entitled, "Is Māyā the material cause of the world", *The Vedānta Kesari* Vol. 83, august, 1996.
18. For details see : T. R. V. Murti : *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, (George Allen & Unwin Ltd. London, [2nd Ed], 1960) p. 217.
19. *Ibid*,
20. *Ibid*, also see *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, III-II-9.
21. See the author's article entitled : Levels of Truth in Mādhymika with a note on Advaita Vedānta, *The Essence*, Vol 4, 1996.
22. *Prolegomena to a History of Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 19 as quoted by A. K. Raychoudhury in *The Doctrine of Māyā*, (Calcutta, Dasgupta & Co. 1952) p. 186.
23. 'Na nirodho na cotpattirna baddho na ca sādhdhakah/ Na mumukṣurṇa vai mukta ityesā paramārthatā// See *Gauḍapāda-Kārikā Śāṅkarabhāṣya* 2, 61, 32, by Durgacharan Sāṅkhyā Vedānta Tirtha. For English rendering, see Hemanta K. Ganguly, *Radicalism in Advaita Vedānta* (Calcutta, Indian Publication Society, 1988), 63.
24. *Ibid*

25. 'Vijñānavādino buddhasya vacanaṁ bāhyārthavāḍipakṣapratīṣedhaparaṁ ācharyena anumoditaṁ' - See *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* on *Gauḍapāda Kārikā* IV, 27.
26. S. N. Dasgupta: *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, *op. cit.* p. 423.
27. *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* Ed. by B. Nanjio, Kyoto, 1923, p. 29.
28. S. N. Dasgupta : *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, p. 423.
29. *Ibid*
30. *Ibid*, p. 422. See also Śāṅkara's Commentary on *Gauḍapāda-Kārikā*, Anandasrama edition, p. 214.
31. See : C. D. Sharma : *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy* (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1994 Reprint), 332.
32. Two instances may be cited to exemplify how much moral degradation was prevalent in the then Indian society. Traditional Hindus used to consider their Buddhist counterpart in the society with hostile feelings and hatred. Mīmāṃsā which dealt with the karma portion of the Vedas was complementary to the latter part of the Vedas or Upanisads. A Mīmāṃsakā commented : "Because Buddha taught his doctrine to fools and śūdras, therefore, it is clear that his teachings were false like a counterfeit coin" A Buddhist also said : "Long time has passed and women are fickle by nature. So it is very difficult to ascertain the purity of Brāhmana race". these instances are recorded in Śāntaraksita's '*Tattvasaṅgraha* 3155, 3156. (Ed. Pt. K. K. Krishnamācharya. Gaekwārd Oriental Series, Baroda, 1926); also see : C. D. Sharma (1994), p. 333.
33. Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (Oxford, 1989 edition)p. 179.
34. C. D. Sharma (1994), *op. cit.*, p. 334.
35. In this context it is interesting to mention what B. Russell, says in Preface of his '*A History of Western Philosophy*. Philosophers are, according to Russell, "both effects and causes; effects of their social circumstances and of the politics and institutions of their time, cause (if they are fortunate) of beliefs which mould the politics and institutions of later days". - (London, Allen & Unwin, 1988 Ed. Preface) p. 7.
36. The chief exponent of this view is Prakāśānanda (A. D. 1500- 1600), the author of *Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvali*. Madhusudana Sarasvatī in *Advaitasiddhi* explains the theory of *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭi* propounded by Prakāśānanda . According to Prakāśānanda, 'when the knowledge of Brahman dawns, the world becomes absolutely zero. All distinctions are thus, ultimately valueless, the so-called functional reality of the world being non-different from any imaginary or fictional reality

(*alīkamevameva vyavahārikatvaṁ*). The world is not even an indeterminable reality but a case of total fiction just like a chimera. See : Sanghamitra Dasgupta; Vivartavāda Vs. Dṛṣṭi-srṣṭivāda : Some Reflections. *The Vedānta Keśari* Vol. 84, August 1997.

37. 'Jagat tuccham atat samastam tadanyat. For details see : H.K. Ganguly : *Radicalism in Advaita Vedānta*. (Calcutta : Indian Publishing Society, 1988) p. 93.
38. If the task of a philosopher is interpretation, then Śāṅkara is an excellent interpreter. On the one hand, he is unwilling to break with the past and yet open to the socio-cultural changes around him. He could stretch the sublime thoughts of old molds without breaking them and in this sense, in spite of his respect for tradition, he could claim freedom from it.
39. See : *Bṛhadārṇyaka Upaniṣad* - II. III. 6.; also see : Radhakrishnan : *The Principal Upaniṣads* (London, Oxford Univ. Press. 1989 Edition).
40. C. D. Sharma (1994), *op. cit.*, p. 334.
41. See : G. C. Pande : *Life and Thought of Śaṅkarācārya* (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1994) p. 270. The influence of the upaniṣads upon Mahāyānasūtras may be a subject for investigation from the point of view of history. The discussion on this aspect does not lie within the scope of the present paper.

WITTGENSTEIN'S CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE GAME : A LYOTARDIAN DIALECTIC

P. K. SASIDHARAN

Wittgenstein's later analysis of language-game involves the dissolution of a number of philosophical errors like dogmatism, determinism, essentialism, representationalism, absolutism, universalism, apriorism etc. This is to say that there is an irony in both the pursuit and going against philosophy. However, it is more appropriate to interpret it from a postmodern perspective, a perspective which stems from Lyotard's denial of a metanarrative and the acceptance of small narratives. Besides Lyotard, who is one of the foremost leaders of the movement of postmodernism, there is another parallel strain represented by Richard Rorty. It is Rorty who has explored and advocated the philosophical dimensions of the postmodern thought. With regard to the critique of philosophy, Wittgenstein can be looked at from the Lyotard-Rorty axis. However, at this juncture, the paper is an attempt to explore Lyotardian dimension of Wittgenstein. The notion of 'dialectic' is taken from Albrecht Wellmer's discussion of the relation between postmodernism and modernism with a view to showing that the consideration of the modernism does not exclude postmodernism.

Lyotard's identification of postmodernism with the skepticism about grand narratives follows from a perspective of the irreducible plurality of language games. In his theorisation of postmodernism, Lyotard draws the idea of language-games from the later Wittgenstein's philosophy of language whose emphasis is upon the description of language games. What follows is an attempt to show how Wittgenstein's critique of language-games bespeaks of a motif which lies close to postmodernism as attributed to it by Lyotard.

It is in the context of the explanation of the nature of knowledge-

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conditions of the post-industrial society that Lyotard embraces Wittgenstein's idea of language-game-analysis of meaning which gives emphasis to the pragmatics or performative aspect of the language. The current status of the scientific knowledge shows, as it has been expressed in the hermeneutic or historic theories of Kuhn and Feyerabend *et al.*, that science can no longer stick on to a realistic epistemology which endorses a representationistic relationship between the subject and object. And the working of the scientific and technological knowledge does not confirm the referential epistemology based on the traditional evaluative categories such as adequacy, accuracy, consistency etc. Rather what it does call for is a legitimization principle based on the performativity of sciences.

Lyotard characterizes the knowledge scenario created by the transformations in the nature of knowledge in highly developed society as "the computerization of society". Here knowledge is the form of an informational commodity. And,

along with the hegemony of computers comes a certain logic, and therefore, a certain set of prescriptions determining which statements are accepted as "knowledge" statements.¹

Though the general paradigm of progress in science and technology is based on the notion of cumulative, scientific and technological knowledge, it has never gone unchallenged, as the scientific knowledge does not represent the totality of knowledge. As a kind of discourse, scientific knowledge has always been an addition to another kind of discourse of what Lyotard calls, "narrative".

However, since what the computerization of society shows is that the transformation of knowledge has its effects on public and civil institutions, the economic growth and the expansion of socio-political power seem to be natural complements to the general paradigm of progress of science and technology. This has created the problem of legitimation of scientific discourse according to the legitimation of political power of the legislator. For Lyotard, this is due to, a strict interlinkage, that existed since the time of Plato, between the kind called science and the kind called ethics and politics. In the contemporary world, this subordination of science to the prevailing power seems more complete than ever

before. This is the situation Lyotard describes as the *modern*, when, on the one hand, science is pursued on the basis of the rule of its own, and on the other hand, it appears to be a metadiscourse of politics or ethics as the rule for its own legitimization. However, with the emergence of contemporary post-industrial society and postmodern culture, the question of the legitimization of knowledge has also undergone transformation in such a way, entailing the loss of its credibility of the unifying and legitimating power of the grand narratives of progress and emancipation. Therefore, Lyotard attempts to understand this with the help of the insight provided by Wittgenstein's idea of language-games.

As Lyotard says, according to Wittgenstein's language game investigation, each of various categories of utterance can be defined in terms of rules specifying their properties and the uses to which they can be put in, exactly and same way as the game of chess is defined by set of rules determining the properties of each of the pieces, in other words, the proper way to move them.²

From the attempt to see the effects of different modes of discourse or the different types of utterances, Lyotard draws a set of three principles about the idea of language games. *Firstly*, their rules do not carry within themselves their own legitimization, but are the object of a contract, explicit or not, between players. This does not mean that players invent the rules. *Secondly*, that if there are no rules, there is no game. And *thirdly*, every utterance should be thought of as a "move" in a game.

Thus, Lyotard wants to see the *third* aspect as the first principle underlying whatever the perspective or approach of the whole method of analysis, called as postmodern. The principle in question is that "to speak is to fight, in the sense of playing, and speech acts fall within the domain of general agonistics." The "delegitimation" process of postmodernity where science plays its own game, other than incapably attempting to legitimating the other language-games is something that follows from Wittgenstein and from thinkers like Martin Buber, Emmanuel Levinas, who developed Wittgenstein's theme in their own way. Lyotard's attempt is to present language-game investigation as a "general methodological approach"³ which is not far removed from the idea of postmodern perspective. Or rather as a theory of games which accepts

agonistics as a founding principle to understand social relations from a pragmatic point of view. This way of attempting to locate the focal point of postmodern concern around the notion of "language-games" signifies that the whole issue is a matter of viewing the nature and status of knowledge and reason in the reflective endeavour. Thus, as opposed to the absolutist and universalist conception of knowledge and reason, envisaged in the history of traditional philosophy throughout, the language-game approach is said to have envisaged a "pluralistic conception of reason" and knowledge.⁴

Lyotard's appropriation of Wittgenstein's idea of language-games could be seen as a remarkable attempt to emphasize the methodological character of Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language-game analysis. This is also Lyotardian endorsement of the later Wittgenstein's model of language, which consists in the admission of plurality of language-games. As McGowan has pointed out, the fundamental theoretical assertion of Lyotard's *The Postmodern condition* and *Just Gaming* is that there exists "no common measure" among different language-games. McGowan states that language use is not subjected to a set of universal rules but it is organised instead, into a number of smaller more local purviews, each of which operates according to its own set of conventions, procedures and goals.⁵ This can be called as case-by-case account of language games. It is against this view that Lyotard identifies the postmodernism with the skepticism about grand narratives, from the perspective of the irreducible plurality of language-games.

However, for Lyotard, the incommensurability of language-games does not mean that there is only the absolute absence of a 'common measure'. It only means that we know of nothing that is in common with those different language-games. And he continues to say that,

We merely know that there are several of them, probably not an infinite number but we really do not know. In any case, the number is not countable for the time being or if it is, it is so provisionally at least.⁶

This dialectical nature of the notion of irreducible plurality of language games is more explicitly given when Lyotard elaborates Wittgenstein's idea of language-game. According to this, each of the various category of utterances can be defined in terms of rules specifying their properties and the uses to which

they can be put. This is exactly the same way as the game of chess is defined by a set of rules determining the properties of each pieces of chess. And to know the set of rules of the game is, in other words, to know the proper way to move the pieces in a chess game.

For Lyotard, the pluralistic condition of postmodernity has made it impossible for the tenability of an approach or an evaluative strategy which is based on a distinct, unified language or totalising rationality. Since there are many games in any language, there is the possibility of no common measure between the *scientific* and *literary* languages. And one is not derivable from the other : Therefore, it is quite difficult to define an artistic language-game by way of an experimental sort, as in the case of a scientific language-game that describes a reality.

The untenability of a universal language or totalising reason has got its implication that the enterprise of philosophy cannot be taken to be a metanarrative or an encompassing theory which could get the norms for all actions and endeavours. As Watson has elaborated, from the point of Lyotard, philosophy cannot be identified as the meta-narrative. It is to say that there is no way to identify it to be so. Only by giving the status of meta-narrative, we could identify it. Otherwise the identity cannot be established. Since there is no identity, there is no meta-narrative. But for Lyotard, the identity of narratives is there. They are rather the identity of non-identicals.

Even though it is generally understood that Lyotard's critique is directed against the possibility of meta-narrative, it remains an open question whether Lyotard's critique loses when it is presented as the replacement of another meta-narrative. Thus he might have moved one but at the same time *re-moved* other one as it was pointed out by Jean-Loup Thebaud, the interviewer, towards the end of the *Just Gaming*. To the question whether Lyotard has put forward yet another 'meta-narrative, the answer was his laughter. More pointedly, the question was about the acceptance of the plurality of the language-games in Wittgenstein's sense. Having accepted the failure of the meta-narrative of language owing to its heterogenous character, what right Lyotard has to introduce the plurality of language-games except as a meta-narrative? It is this which evokes laughter. This is a sufficient indication of the acceptance of meta-narrative in the place of one which is rejected.

NOTES

1. Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition : A Report on Knowledge*, Trans. by Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi, Manchester University Press, 1979, p. 4.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
3. Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thebaud, *Just Gaming*, Trans. by WladGoldzich, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1985, p. 15.
4. Albrecht Wellmer, 'The Dialectic of Modernism and Post-Modernism : The Critique of Reason Since Adorno's', in his *The Persistence of Modernity : Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics and Postmodernism*, Trans. by David Midgley, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1991, p. 93.
5. John McGowan, *Postmodernism and Its Critics*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1991, p. 182.
6. Lyotard, 1985, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

DAYAKRISHNA'S CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY : SOME REFLECTIONS

D. N. TIWARI

The unique excellence of philosophizing of Dayakrishna has been attracting and instigating the minds of scholars constantly since last more than four decades. The way he philosophises has led to the depolarisation of the traditional theory impregnated philosophies on the one hand and has emphasized the role of the freedom of minds and thoughts in philosophizing the problem for conception and clarification to the extent that traditional scholars of philosophy conceive him indigestive and contestant on the other hand. His conception of philosophy is very comprehensive in its range and accurate in its spirit. It escapes the distorting effects of dogmatic philosophy and competently differentiates the objects or subject-matter of philosophy from those of other disciplines of learning and, finally, presents it as a system of cognitive activity par excellence.

Here, in this paper, we propose to present an account of our exposition of the conception of philosophy as analysed by Dayakrishna particularly in his book entitled '*The Nature of Philosophy*' (1955). I have utilized, in related matters, the excellence of his critics and his reply to his critics edited by Bhuvanchandel and K. L. Sharma in a recent edition entitled '*The Philosophy of Dayakrishna*' (1996). A brief account of the issues to be discussed, here, in this paper, may be given as follows :

1. What does Dayakrishna mean by 'philosophy and 'philosophizing'?
2. Philosophy is simultaneously a name for the conceptual confusions that arise in thinking about any object and an attempt at the clarification of those confusions.
3. Philosophy is a cognitive activity par excellence.
4. Philosophy is concerned not so much with the problems raised by the specificities of this or that concept, but rather with the very

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'conceptuality' of the concepts.

5. His conception of language as referring tool and its consistency with his conception of philosophy.
6. His conception of conceptual or theoretical problems as philosophical-being or as object-proper of philosophization and its consistency with his conception of philosophy.

Conclusively, I observe that it is not justified to estimate his philosophy as negative and that if one goes thoroughly through his philosophical reflections one cannot miss to appreciate the attraction of his analysis and his positive concern with philosophical problems as monumental work everdone during recent years for philosophical clarity, conception and rational satisfaction.

It is a unique feature of his philosophical enterprize of '*The Nature of Philosophy*' that it neither supports the philosophical conclusions of a philosopher or of a system, however venerable they might be, nor tries to establish a system of his own but fortifies his faithful attempts of analysing the philosophical confusions and problems involved in the very conceptuality of the concepts with a view to solving them and, during the course, his philosophy has got a shape of its own kind.

'*The Nature of Philosophy*', though written in the very early days of his youth, contains the boldness of his philosophical maturity to the extent that he, inspite of all his later creative ideas, himself claims that it possesses the basic out look of his philosophy constantly lying as a basic unity of what he has philosophised till date. Replying to his critics, he remarks

any attempt at an articulation of what philosophy is, tries at best to mirror what oneself doing that is to articulate what one does when one philosophizes and as this goes on changing as one grows (or declines) over a period of years, one's understanding of what philosophy is, may also change as time passes by. But I hope there has been continuity in my views of philosophy even if some new facets have been added to what was said before' (1996, p. 304).

If the said continuity, of what Dayakrishna has philosophized so far, is taken for granted then our task becomes easy. Our task, here in this paper, is confined to an exposition of his conception of philosophy and, in that light, to

view his conception of language and the philosophical-being.

1. The most general feature of philosophy, according to Dayakrishna is that *it is the result of philosophizing* which, for him, is a never ending process and its creativity is marked by the uncovering of the many faceted dimensions of an issue at hand. Philosophizing is a reflective activity and, hence, distinct from other activities of mind in which consciousness is object-consciousness. It is a reflective activity but different from subjective or objective mode of reflections suffering from psychologism and theory impregnation. It is a self-conscious reflection in which consciousness is self-conscious neither of this or that, spiritual or material, subjective or objective entities which are concerned with object-consciousness nor of the formation of their concepts but of the very conceptuality of concepts. On the basis of this feature of philosophical reflections he, on one hand, differentiates philosophy from other disciplines like religion, sociology, science etc. which have a concern with object-consciousness and differentiates different types of self-conscious activities and self-consciously misconceived activities from the self-conscious activities of philosophizing on the other hand.

Dayakrishna's concept of self-consciousness is different from the self-consciousness as conceived by metaphysicians or ontologists who accept that the self-consciousness cannot be the self-consciousness of the self-consciousness. He writes '*it reflects not merely on the objects that confronts but also on its reflections thereof*' (1955, p. 231). It is by taking this idea in view that he interprets that philosophy has the history of its own and not of the other i.e. Science, religion, history etc. The concept of philosophy, for him, is not identical with history of philosophy but, perhaps, is a *philosophy of philosophy*. By 'philosophy of philosophy' he does not mean a tracing of the generic development of philosophy from its crude beginning and by analysing together the different stages but that it has its own history distinct from the history of other subjects (1955, p. 182). It stands on a subtle level of reflective consciousness in which we confront ourselves with the theoretical problems involved in the conceptuality of the concepts, dig out them and lead to the principles and patterns of reason unravelled for analysing and removing them to the extent of clarity.

2. To be self-reflective is not a general but very unique character of

minds which confront with the confusions involved in the very formation of concepts and take those theoretical problems seriously as those to be solved by philosophization. Self-consciousness flows when the objective flow of mind is stopped and stops when the objective flow of the mind or the object-consciousness flows and, hence, philosophization is an occasional activity of occasional minds. It is, perhaps, this fact on the basis of which he conceives philosophy as disentangled from its close embrace with other disciplines on one hand and distinguishes philosophization as purposeful cognitive activity on the other hand. But why that occasional at all? If a machine is running smoothly without any hitch, we could not come to know how it works and what is the economy of its parts. Similarly, philosophy begins with inadequacy, confusions, incompatibilities, dissatisfaction, etc., sought to be involved in the formation of concepts regarding an issue and to remove them for clarity and conception. Emphasizing this view he defines '*philosophy as simultaneously a name for the conceptual confusions that arise in thinking about any subject and an attempt at the clarification of those confusions* (1955, p. 233). We confront with the conceptual confusions when we become self-conscious of the very formation of the concepts. The same issue or the objects of one and the same class are generalized differently by different thinkers according to their own experiences of different aggregates of attributes and activities to form different concepts of that issue and sometimes the supposed generalizations differ from one another to the extent that they cause theoretical problems which involve a thinker in a way that he analyses the problems and tries to resolve them in order to get clarity. These problems are theoretical and are not the problems for themselves, and, hence, can be resolved by philosophization.

These confusions and problems for Dayakrishna, constitute the whole realm of philosophical reflection. It is actually a very revolutionary and novel way of observing the subject-matter of philosophy accurately as confined to the realm of problems. In this context, it seems surprising to note as to why Indian scholars have eschewed the challenge and most of them are still involved in such misconceived activities which are not actually assigned to them as a philosopher. On Dayakrishna's conception of problems as the subject proper of philosophization, I will discuss elaborately in the last portion of this paper.

Dayakrishna is very bold in saying that *philosophy lives in the clarification of its own confusions, a clarification that is its own death* (1955,

pp. 229-30.) In Indian philosophical systems, it is said that the removal of ignorance leads to the absolute extinction of the flow of consciousness and that of the self-consciousness as well and, therefore, there is no possibility of any philosophical activity at that stage. That stage is the achievement of summum-bonum but of no philosophical importance as there is no possibility of any confrontation with theoretical confusions and problems of a realizer (*Jñānī*). On the other hand, the state of those who are ignorant to the extent of insensibility to those problems are incapable of enjoying self-conscious activities. But those who possess a unique intellectual sensibility always confront with such problems and involve in philosophizing till the issue at hand is clarified. It is, perhaps, this fact in the light of which Dayakrishna's meaning of the term 'death of Philosophy' be properly understood. He rightly observes

'the temper of a philosopher is such that he is hardly ever in a state in which he is not bothered by one confusion or the other. Even if certain problems get solved to his satisfaction, certain others are found to arise and engage his attention' (1955, p. 230).

The term 'Death of Philosophy' is relatively used for emphasizing the removal of confusions inviting and involving the philosophical reflexivity and, the moment they are clarified to the extent of his satisfaction, the flow of self-consciousness stops and the mind returns to its object-consciousness.

Philosophizing is not a bonded labour as mind enjoys full freedom from object-consciousness in philosophizing. It is not speculative or imaginative construction of mind but a state of awareness of rare minds in which they become self-reflexive to the problems which arise because of a supposed incompatible conceptuality that requires reformation of a concept or a renewed analysis of them or both (1955, p. 229).

3. The very specific feature of philosophy for Dayakrishna is that

it is not concerned so much with the problems raised by the specificities of this or that concept but with the very conceptuality of the concepts. This is one reason why philosophical problems arise during the course of reflection on any subject (1996, p. 301).

Philosophy is not exactly the conceptual analysis of the concepts but of the very conceptuality of the concepts, and, thus, it is a very subtle and deep

activity of mind marked by Dayakrishna as a self-conscious activity. Philosophization is self-reflexivity of self-consciousness and this reflexivity of self-consciousness is marked by him as a second order activity of mind in contrast with the first order activity of the mind in which it functions as object-consciousness -- the consciousness is consciousness of this or that object or concept with which disciplines like science, ontology, religion, history etc. other than philosophy are concerned, He makes the point clear when he says '*it is an activity where the reflexive consciousness is not exclusively dependent on the first level world of which the concepts are concepts of*' (1996, p. 302). Religion, science and disciplines other than philosophy belong to the particular kind of consciousness in which concepts are concepts 'of and, as reflections on those concepts are possible, we have the philosophy of religion, philosophy of science etc. In more clear words, the formation or abstraction of concepts and their analysis belong to object-consciousness while the problems lying very deep into the structure of the supposed abstractions belong to the self-conscious activity of philosophizing. It is the ground that differentiates and distinguishes philosophy from other disciplines non-philosophical in nature and, as it is inevitably concerned with renewal and reformulation, distinguishes a better philosophy from other philosophies or misconceived philosophies on the other hand. Self-conscious activity, concerned with conceptuality of the concepts, is a cognitive activity and it functions independently of things-in-themselves of any sort (physiological, psychological or transcendental), independently of imaginative constructions of mind and independently of the subjective or objective mode of reflections and, hence, it does not claim certainty as epistemologists or ontologists claim but it leads to clarity, conception and rational - satisfaction. The empirical evidences and epistemological justifications on the basis of which they claim certainty are themselves based on certain rules and patterns of reason which are unravelled by philosophical reflections and not by evidences and justifications themselves. Now, if philosophy as concerned with conceptuality of the concepts is taken for granted then the theoretical problems of all sorts of rational branches-critical, creative, analytic, synthetic and other fall in the domain of philosophizing.

4. An other distinctive feature of philosophy according to Dayakrishna is that *it is a cognitive activity par excellence* (1955, p. 215.) Here the term 'cognitive' is not used in usual sense of experiencing particular objects or any

realm of objects or the whole of the objects or the facts or the propositions (1955, pp. 215-217). It concerns with concepts and the problems that arise there in, seem to arise from the conceptuality of the concepts and not from the things or even from the problems if they are some thing-things-in-themselves.

The generally accepted views of philosophy as cognitive activity considers cognition in relation with truth. Observing this view, Dayakrishna writes *the determination of truth and falsehood is so central to the cognitive enterprize that without that it can hardly be regarded as making any sense at all (philosophical theory and social reality p. 28)*. In fact, truth and falsehood based on verification, confirmation and falsification of a statement on the basis of experience, are related with the problem of drawing a demarcative line between the statements verifiable or otherwise and, are not concerned directly with the cognitive activity of self-consciousness which hardly demands such demarcative lines concerning language and its relation with experience as well. The problems regarding the concepts and the very formational incompatibility lie in abstracting them from the subject-matter of this cognitive activity and in such a cognitive activity compatibility, incompatibility, inadequacy-adequacy, dissatisfaction etc. are confronted and, this in turn, causes theoretical problems to be resolved by philosophization. Dayakrishna observes '*philosophical enterprize is cognitive in the sense that the problems regarding it are neither a matter of feelings or imagination nor of action but involves arguments and counter arguments concerning questions and problems that are primarily theoretical and arise mostly from the conceptuality of the concepts*' (1996, p. 303). It is acclaimed as knowledge not in the sense of experiencing and abstracting, their verification and confirmation but in the sense of awareness of the principles and laws lying in the very formation of concepts and in analysing the problems caused thereof which, in no way, belong to object-consciousness. It does not aim to verification and truth but clarity and wisdom and, thus, the cognitive character of philosophical activity is involved in the very structure of the self-consciousness and in the very nature of the problems it confronts as well.

It is clear from the aforementioned account that Dayakrishna has defined the realm of philosophy as the realm of awareness-an awareness with the cognitive problems independently of really reals or things-in-themselves which are outside the realm of philosophical reflexivity. This definition of philosophy

as self-conscious activity differentiates philosophy and philosophical problems well from other disciplines and the problems associated with them respectively. In philosophy, the problems are theoretical while they are ontic, or factual or imaginative in other disciplines. In philosophy, the problems form the subject-matter of it while the subject-matter itself gives rise to the problems in other disciplines. The problems in philosophy do not exist for themselves while they, in other disciplines, exist for themselves. There can be no problems by themselves. *All problems are problems for consciousness or better for self-consciousness* (1955, p. 217) and, thus, philosophical reflections are different from the subjective and objective mode of reflections based on consideration of the problems as problems-in-themselves. This very character of philosophical reflection differentiates philosophy from other disciplines on one hand and considers the philosophy of religion, philosophy of sociology, philosophy of Art, Philosophy of history, philosophy of science etc. distinctly as included in the realm of philosophy on the other hand.

5. Now, if philosophy is taken as self-conscious activity concerned with the concepts and the conceptuality of the concepts and if arguments and counter arguments are applicable within it and not outside the system how is discourse possible? How can we argue with and communicate and convince others to an activity acclaimed as cognitive? It can not be taken as a matter of rational taste and temperament. The situation may lead to religion if philosophy as a constant dialogue with the mind is accepted.¹ Over all, if concepts are abstractions-abstracted differently on the basis of different experiences of different attributes and functions and, hence, different to one-another, how can dialogue and communication be possible? How can one claim a better philosophy comprising full compatibility and adequacy? Can abstraction² without language be possible and even if possible, can it be of any philosophical significance without language? The problems raised above are concerned with one's view of language in a philosophical activity.

To begin with Dayakrishna's conception of language, it seems necessary to say, first, that on the concept of language he has not philosophized separately and we have to rely only upon some fractions on generally accepted view of language articulated in general way by him while reflecting on chapter 2nd and

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chapter 4th of '*The Nature of Philosophy*'.

Language, according to Dayakrishna, is referential in character.

Its reference may range from the purely general to the uniquely particular Language is able to express all and the success of the expression on each occasion lies in the fact that we understand the referent (1955, p. 39).

It is remarkable to note, here, that Dayakrishna does not deny other functions of language rather, he accepts them but considers the referential function as primary. he contends

'the idea that there are other functions of language besides the referential one, though correct, does not basically effect my contention as all of them can give rise to philosophical puzzle and as far as the cognitive issue is concerned, the referential mode even with respect to these, remains primary,

(quoted from the comments of Dayakrishna on an earlier draft of the paper (30.5.97). it is on the basis of relative stability or dynamic changing character of the referents of Language that he tries to solve the problem of cognition and communication of the facts - universal or particular in character (1955, p. 52). One may object to the aforesaid position of Dayakrishna by observing his interpretation as one sided. It can also be added that the problem of relation between language and the conceptuality of the concepts cannot be solved properly if the former is taken as void of and independently of the characters of the latter and that there is no sense in denying the universality or particularity of language but these all will give rise to philosophical puzzle in the context of Dayakrishna's view of language. However, as conceptual problems, for him, are concerned inevitably with arguments and counter arguments, the inevitable relation of language with the conceptuality of the concepts as their very esprit and the esprit of the self-conscious activity, is acceptable to him on the basis of which objectivity of cognition and the accomplishment of communication can be well explained in his trend. Overall, Dayakrishna comes to a more subtle and philosophically relevant conclusion when he says that the dependency on referents of empirical or transcendental world for truth and falsity is the intrusion of things-in-themselves in an activity which is conscious in nature and for which things-in-themselves stand outside the domain. Truth and falsity, according to

his philosophy, are after thought judgements just meant for the demarcation of statements empirically tested so and others outside the domain of such a test. This very idea is a natural carollary of the definition of philosophy as a cognitive activity par excellence. Although, he has not discussed this idea in any detail, one can derive important philosophical implications on the basis of the aforementioned idea, i.e. the distinction of cognition as such and the cognition by intrusion of things-in-themselves for truth and falsity. Philosophy is concerned with the former while the latter is concerned specifically with the empirical-evidences and epistemic-justifications in the pursuit of which referential mode of language stands primary.

6. Now coming to the subject-matter of philosophy, it can well be said that Dayakrishna's philosophical concern with philosophical-being of the problems is purely philosophical. The philosophical-being of the problems is emphasized by him as object proper of philosophy different from and independently of really-reals, factual, facinated or imaginary reals and others. Arguing against the traditional ontological thinking, Dayakrishna, writes

philosophy is neither the determinatin of really real (1955, p. 211) nor the presentation of the world view based on coherence in a system (1955, pp. 213-14) but a cognitive activity par excellence (1955, p. 215).

The most significant point to be noted, here, in this context, is that Dayakrishna has provided a very revolutionary and novel way of looking at the contents of philosophical reflections. The object of philosophy, for him, is neither really real nor any realm of spiritual, psychological or physiological objects concerning subjective or objective modes of thinking. It is concerned neither with actual nor with possible state of affairs or facts nor with the propositions. He writes

'It should be noted that neither the person who advances an argument nor the person who opposes him are concerned with the some actual or possible state of affairs. They are concerned with the argument of each other and not with the facts possible of verification. Of course they, generally, do bring in facts but only as subsidiary to the main argument (1955, p. 223).

Here, in the context, 'arguments' stand for the arguments concerning philosophical problems and not concerning facts in themselves. In order to know

the nature of the subject-proper of philosophy, we should observe as to how he defines a philosopher. A philosopher, according to him, is a philosopher only when he is philosophically concerned with philosophical problems (1955, p. 219). It is obvious from this definition that he considers the objects of philosophical activity as confined to the philosophical problems as the very subject-matter of philosophy. We have already clarified that these problems are philosophical in the sense that they are concerned with the conceptuality of the concepts or that they are theoretical problems-theoretical in the sense that they can be solved by no way than philosophical reflections. Dayakrishna rightly observes 'A problem exists only for self-consciousness and not for itself. 'These problems comprise the whole realm of philosophical objects. It is very significant to note, in this regard, that Dayakrishna, quite in tune with his conception of philosophy and the subject-matter of philosophy, accepts that the problems are neither empirical nor logical but stand in between the two and this mid region belongs neither to science nor to logic nor to any transcendental but to philosophy. The term 'mid way region' is used, by him, not in an ontological sense but in the cognitive sense or in the sense of the awareness character of the existence of the problems. The choice of 'philosophical' for describing an approach and subject-matter which is neither empirical nor logical nor transcendental seems fairly appropriate in as much as both the subject-matter and the approach refuse to be deduced to any subject or approach which has already a distinct name of itself (1955, p. 227). This is, perhaps, excellently an original contribution of Dayakrishna to the history of philosophy not only in the sense that it vindicates the fact that philosophical activities have been non-existent if the problems had not been there as problems but also in the sense of the philosophical orientation of the subject-matter of philosophy which views that *it is the problems themselves that form the subject-matter of philosophy and not a subject-matter that gives rise to any problem* (1955, p. 217). The idea of problems as the subject-matter of philosophy alienates philosophical activity from the garb of reality on one hand and distinguishes philosophy from other disciplines on the other hand. His conception of philosophy as self-conscious activity and of philosophical being i.e., conceptual problems as the object of reflections specify the proper way of doing philosophy against misconceptions misleading philosophical conclusions. His view of philosophical reflections as confined to philosophical being of theoretical problems ranks him as a

philosopher who observes not only the possibility of but the very fact of philosophizing independently of any thing-in-itself viz absolute, fact, proposition or even the problems if they are some thing in themselves. Concluding the whole discussion of the *Nature of Philosophy* Dayakrishna rightly observes

'here is a region, a realm, a set of problems. It only needs a name and we submit that the word philosophy' can adequately perform this function..... The philosopher should not don the false plumes of the shaman, the priest or the prophet. If he is ashamed of his job, he may as well leave it, rather than deceive the people with regard to a function which is not his own (p. 233).

Concluding the discussion, we are in a position to say that Dayakrishna has defined philosophy in such a distinct way that naturally specifies its function and subject-matter, respectively, as cognition activity and as the conceptual analysis and the clarification of the conceptual confusions and problems caused by them distinctly. It does not concern with really real of any sort but with the conceptual confusions and problems belonging to very conceptuality of the concepts and, thus, it is very comprehensive in its range. The conception of philosophy as a cognitive activity par excellence and that of the objects of philosophy as philosophical or cognitive being of the theoretical problems are real contributions of Dayakrishna to the history of philosophy and are highly relevant for the philosophical thinking of today. It is on the basis of these conceptions that he, observes in his *The Nature of Philosophy*, the following points in a cognitive purview - 1. the nature of philosophy as a science of awareness, 2. the subject-matter or field of philosophy as cognitive being of theoretical problems, 3. the method of philosophy as conceptual analysis and finally, 4. the aim of philosophy as the removal of conceptual-confusions concerned with the conceptuality of the concepts for clarity, wisdom and rational satisfaction.

NOTES

1. It is a statement applicable to those who define philosophy in view of mystical experiences. So far as Dayakrishna is concerned, he makes a difference between

philosophical reflections and such experiences by taking the former as a cognitive activity par excellence.

2. Due to lack of space my observation on Dayakrishna's conception of 'abstraction' is not fully elaborated here and in order to avoid any further confusion on this issue, it is proper to put his position here in his own words, Till the concepts are seen as abstractions, philosophical problems do not arise and one remains at the empirical level, where the 'reality' that the concepts refer to remains outside themselves. Philosophy arises only when the concepts assume a reality of their own and it is at this level that their conceptuality gives rise to philosophical problems''. Quoted from his comments on an earlier draft of the paper, dated 12th July 1997.

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PLATO AND NĀGĀRJUNA ON SAMVṚTI AND PARAMĀRTHA : SOME CONVERGING PERSPECTIVES

C. P. SRIVASTAVA

If the popular proverb 'to err is human' be accepted as an adjustive behaviour, then 'Not to err is inhuman' can well be logically deduced from the former proposition. Now, the word 'inhuman' when analysed in the context of experiential values, would connote both the senses, that is, the above-manly as well as below-manly behaviour simultaneously. Hence, for a moment, leaving aside the human beings to continually err, the inculcating of the above-manly attitude due to the Platonic viewing of the soul as a captive in a living body on earth would definitely enliven us with the sublime ideas, such as courage, truth, beauty, justice etc. judiciously assessed and delineated in Plato's dialogues.

The highly potential problems we find being discussed by Socrates and his fellow philosopher in Plato's dialogues are of utmost importance even today. According to Harris "Plato's philosophy is the product of reflection upon the thought of the two preceding centuries—one of the most intellectually productive periods in the world's history.¹ Plato's thought is both technical and mystical, his style is amazingly abstract and poetical. Hence his dialogues provide insights and produce a continuous joy to read.

In India, Nāgārjuna, the renowned Buddhist philosopher of the second century A. D. (it is miserably strange that, his association with Nāgārjunakondā i.e. hill in Telugu language, on the right bank of the river Kriṣṇā has not been established on the basis of either archaeological finds or pertinent literary tradition) had been one of the greatest exponents of śūnyavāda or Mādhyamaka school. While studying Plato and Nāgārjuna one should never be satisfied with a few generalizations like the intellectual west and the intuitive east and so on. An attentive one would find that some of the arguments advanced in Plato's dialogues are astonishingly analogous to those of Nāgārjuna's dialectic. To

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mention a few in this regard : Nāgārjuna has refuted the doctrine of origination, the concept of subject, object, space, time, causality, matter, motion etc. and proved them to be unreal. They are in fact, not as false as a skyflower or a hare's horn, but they do not have abiding or ultimate validity too.

At the outset, when we start inquiring into the nature of a physical object, we find that its description is full of contradictions. Nothing persisting is ever attributable to it.

“No sooner are objects thought about than they are dissipated”². Even the concept of an object itself is full of self-contradiction. We can not logically prove whether an object is an aggregate of parts or a whole. Because if it be an aggregate of parts or atoms (very subtle though dependent particle of a thing is called an atom which is invisible to the naked eyes) then a simple aggregate of invisible atoms must necessarily be invisible. If we assume that an object is an integral whole beyond its constituents we instantly fail to explain satisfactorily the relation between the two, namely an object and its constituents. The same is the fate of all empirical things whether existent or merely referent of propositions.

Similarly, we find analogous arguments for the refutation of a material thing in Plato's dialogues. There too, according to Parmenides, multiplicity, difference, divisibility, motion and rest are considered as illusory. These are termed as ‘the way of Belief’, as opposed to ‘the way of Truth’. Parmenides precisely enumerates four possible relations of two things : (1) Sameness (2) otherness (3) Part and whole (4) Whole and part³ and finally proves all of them to be self-contradictory.

Further, Nāgārjuna has shown that the concept of motion is logically impossible. We cannot travel a path which has already been travelled, nor can we travel a path which is not yet travelled. And a path which has neither been travelled nor yet to be travelled, is also not being travelled. The mover does not move, the non-mover indeed does not move. Thus, motion, mover and destination are all being relative unreal⁴.

Motion has, certainly, very important role in the interpretation of nature. Since Plato believed the visible realm as unreal so he emphatically argues against the possibility of motion in ‘*Parmenides*’. Parmenides gives a detailed account

of the different forms of motion, such as, change of nature and locomotion. He again distinguishes between two forms of locomotion (a) in a place and (b) from one place to another. In this connection, Parmenides' disciple Zeno had advanced quite interesting arguments against the possibility of motion. "A moving body (for example, an arrow) must at each instant coincide with the space it occupies (that is, the points that make up its length); therefore at each instant it must be stationary, as is the space it occupies. But points and instants are indivisible, so between one set of points and the next, nothing intervenes; and between one instant and the next, there is no time in which the arrow can change its position", hence can not move at all. "Again, A body can not traverse a given space (or length) unless it first traverses half of the space; but it can not traverse half unless it first traverses half of that, and so on ad infinitum. Therefore, a body cannot begin to move".⁵

To clarify the above we can, here, well remember the last few pages of Plato's 'The Republic, Book VI' where Socrates says to Glaucon to draw a line and cut it into two unequal parts. The line so drawn would express the ladder of truth through which Socrates describes both the visible things and the intelligible things. Each division has been again divided and thus there are four subdivisions altogether : two in the visible and again two in the intelligible realm. "The first division in the sphere of visible consists of images i.e., shadow and reflection in water and in solid, smooth and polished bodies". Second division belongs to "the animals we see and everything that grows or is made". In other words, whatever is perceived belongs to the visible sphere whether that be impermanent or comparatively permanent. Plato distinguished between two divisions or sections of visible in respect of their clearness and want of clearness.

These divisions are surprisingly similar to the divisions made in Śūnyavāda. We are, here, reminded of Chandrakīrti, a staunch follower of Nāgārjuna, who has further distinguished between the two aspects in the phenomenal reality itself; that which is phenomenally true Tathyasamvṛti and that which proves to be phenomenally false mithyāsaṁvṛti after a careful inquiry. Those things are phenomenally true which are perceived by people through correctly functioning sense organs; otherwise, things in a dream, a mirage, hair in the atmosphere, double moon etc. are even phenomenally false.⁶

According to Plato, the realm of visible is inferior to the realm of

intelligible which is the fontal source for the visibility and maintenance of the former. The lower division in the realm of intelligible implies the sphere based on hypotheses such as Geometry, arithmetic etc. whereas the higher realm connotes the sphere of ideas or forms like courage, beauty, justice and above all 'the idea of good'. "That the word Idea in this connection is very misleading transliteration, and in no way a translation of the Greek word 'Idea' which with its synonym 'Eidos', Plato frequently applies to these supreme realities".⁷ In other words "in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses and goes upto a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of images that is to say, as steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that the soul may soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole".⁸

Plato quite cautiously uses the term 'first principle' as singular which is 'the idea of good'. Plato never tried to explain 'the idea of good' in terms of phenomenal predication except once when he speaks of 'the idea of good' as one. 'The good, said Plato, has a place of honour yet higher the author of science and truth, and yet surpasses them in beauty'. Again, "..... the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power".⁹

Parmenides' assertion about the singularity of the Reality i.e. The Real or The Being is one, the undifferentiated whole, Also *Republic*, VIth Book's 'the idea of good' and *Symposium*'s 'sea of beauty' seem to be interwoven and tripartite manifestations of the Indescribable 'Absolute Reality' as was once made in the tripartite division of the soul in Plato's famous dialogue '*Phaedrus*'.

It is worth considering that Plato's reluctance to describe 'the idea of good' again brings him closer to Nāgārjuna. Nāgārjuna too spoke about the reality or Śūnyatā as indescribable. It is Absolute (Paramārtha) Truth.

"That which can only be directly realized, that which is calm and Blissful, that where all plurality is merged, that where all cries of intellect are satisfied, that which is the Non-dual Absolute".¹⁰

It is very interesting to note that Parmenides assumes his undifferentiated whole or the being as spherical. But the spherical conception of being was

vehemently criticized by many western scholars as inconsistent and was thus rectified by Melissus one of Parmenides' able disciples.

I understand that the concept of spherical is, by no means, a novel concept in Indian context. Words like Maṇḍal, Parimaṇḍal and Bhūmaṇḍal (The earth is also round shaped) are in frequent use right from the beginning of Indian culture and civilization. Ṛgveda's hymns are divided in ten maṇḍals, Brahmapurāṇa also speaks of similar implications about the golden egg or Hiranyagarbha which was later divided into two hemispheres the heaven and the earth.

Furthermore, we observe that both Plato and Nāgārjuna are keenly interested in dialectical experimentation with a view to prove the unreality or the concealing nature of Saṃvṛti as held by Nāgārjuna or shadows or visible world as declared by Plato.

Finally, we again perceive Nāgārjuna re-examining and re-evaluating his own doctrine of śūnyavāda in Vighraha-Vyāvartanī. The same is the case with Plato. A thorough criticism of the theory of Ideas appears in the Parmenides. Though, in fact, Plato and Nāgārjuna were not criticising their main doctrines, they were rather criticizing the theory as misinterpreted by some of their own followers as well as opponents.

In the light of some of the aforesaid facts and similarities one may candidly discover the thread of underlying unity in Plato and Nāgārjuna regarding sublime values to transform human knowledge into human virtue without residue.

NOTES

1. Harris, E. E., *Fundamentals of Philosophy*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969, P. 13,
2. "Yathā Yathārthāścintyante Viśīryante tathā tathā". Mādhavācārya, *Sarva-Darśana-Saṃgraha*, 1986, P. 31.
3. *The Dialogues of Plato*, Tr. in Eng. by Jowett, B., Random House, New York, 1937, Vol. II, P. 111.

4. *Mūlamadhyamaka Kārikā*, Nāgārjuna, 2/1-25.
5. Harris, E. E., *Fundamentals of Philosophy*, PP. 22-23.
6. Mādhyamakāvatāra as quoted in *Bodhicharyāvatārapañjikā*, *Prajñākarmat*, P. 353.
7. Grube, G. M. A., *Plato's Thought*, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1935, P. 1.
8. *The Dialogues of Plato*, Tr. in Eng. by Jowett, B., Random House, N. York, 1937, Vol. I, P. 772.
9. *Ibid*, P. 770.
10. "Aparapratyayam Shāntam Prapañchairaprapañchitam.
nirvikalpam anānārtham etat tattvasya lakṣaṇam."
Mulamadhyamaka Kārikā, Nāgārjuna, XVIII, 9.

NOTES

AESTHETIC NOMINALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF CLASSIFICATION IN AESTHETICS

MILIND S. MALSHE

The process of classification or categorization is pertinent to every field of human enquiry. Natural sciences, social sciences and humanistic studies – all these fields have developed their own ways of classifying the subject-matter they deal with. Some of the more familiar examples are: the taxonomies of plants and animals (Biology); the classification of matter in three 'states', viz. gases, solids and liquids (Physics); the personality types such as 'introvert' and 'extrovert' (Psychology); the typology of social organization, e.g., 'Gemeinschaft', i.e., societies based on spontaneous, personal and organic relationships, and 'Gesellschaft', i.e., those based on formal, impersonal and bureaucratic relationships (Sociology); the lexical categories traditionally called the 'parts of speech', the sentence types and linguistic typology like 'agglutinative' etc. (Linguistics). In every case, the classificatory system is a vital part of the theoretical models in these fields, and is therefore looked upon as a valuable process in the enquiry. Classification presupposes perception of the similarities as well as the differences between individual objects, phenomena, etc., and as such, is directly related to the processes of identification, definition, abstraction and systematization.

Many theoreticians believe that the processes of abstraction and systematization are not relevant to the domain of aesthetic activity. As a result, classification has become an anathema to many aestheticians – particularly those under the influence of Kant. The position that art-works are non-classifiable is one of the major assumptions of what Frank Kermode has called the 'Romantic-Symbolist' aesthetic.¹ This assumption has its origins in Immanuel Kant's theory of 'free beauty', and has been further developed by aestheticians such as Walter Pater, Benedetto Croce, Susanne Langer and Harold Osborne.

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The Kantian position mentioned above can be aptly described as 'aesthetic nominalism', following Warren and Wellek², because it argues that all categories in aesthetics are nominal in nature.

This paper debates the theoretical implications of this position, first directly, by raising some objections against it, and then in a rather indirect manner, by examining two important levels of aesthetic classification, observing how they interact significantly and how our generic decisions influence our perception of the nature of the different arts.

I

Aesthetic nominalism challenges the very act of aesthetic classification on the ground that every aesthetic object is unique and non-classifiable. The argument generally offered in support of this position is based on a distinction between the cognitive and the utilitarian aspects of experience on the one hand, and the aesthetic aspect on the other. On this view, any classification is treated either as a cognitive/logical act, or as an act necessitated by pragmatic or utilitarian considerations.

Aesthetic creations are treated as 'autonomous', that is, not guided by the cognitive and utilitarian principles. Kant's assertion that the judgment of taste is necessarily 'singular' since it is not based on any concept, is the philosophical source of this position.³

Walter Pater's version of the Kantian position is in terms of 'sensations'. In his Preface to *The Renaissance*, he argues that the aim of aesthetics is 'to define beauty, not in the most abstract but in the most concrete terms possible, to find not its universal formula, but the formula which expresses most adequately this or that special manifestation of it. ... The aesthetic critic ... regards all the objects with which he has to do ... as powers or forces producing sensations, each of a more or less peculiar or unique kind.'⁴

Unlike Kant, Croce treats beauty and art as forms of knowledge, but makes a radical distinction between two forms of knowledge, logical and intuitive, and treats all the generic categories as logical, intellectual, non-intuitive, and therefore non-aesthetic. He attacks what he calls 'intellectualism' in aesthetics, arguing that the theory of artistic and literary kinds is 'the greatest triumph of the intellectualist error.'⁵

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Susanne Langer's distinction between discursive and non-discursive symbols and her characterization of the non-discursive of 'presentational' symbol similarly emphasizes the unique qualities of the aesthetic object: 'In the non-discursive mode...there is no intrinsic generality. It is first and foremost a direct presentation of an individual object.'⁶

More recently, Osborne has argued that in the domain of aesthetics, all systems of classification are 'pragmatic', and that 'none of them impinges on aesthetic character or quality. Classificatory Order stops short of aesthetic Order', the latter being immediately or directly apprehensible unlike the 'rational Order' of science.⁷

If aesthetic judgments are non-conceptual, singular, and based upon 'intuition', how do we identify, describe, characterize, interpret, compare and evaluate aesthetic objects? The nominalist position invalidates all these processes which together constitute reception of art or what is traditionally called art criticism. It must be pointed out that it is not only the critics or the receivers but also the artists who make certain basic conceptual distinctions which are embodied in their creative choices.

Let us discuss a few examples. An Indian classical musician, for example, makes at least the following distinctions quite explicitly:

- (a) what is 'musical' and what is 'non-musical',
- (b) what is 'classical' and what is 'non-classical' (- in a concert of classical music, the *rāga* and the *tāla* are usually announced);
- (c) what belongs to his/her own *gharāṇā* or musical style and what does not (- in Hindustani vocal music training and performance are largely governed by the stylistic ideology of the *gharāṇā*);
- (d) what is simply a musical 'exercise' meant to be used in training and practice and what is musical 'expression'.
- (e) what is to be performed before a large, lay audience and what is to be performed before a compact, knowledgeable audience.

These distinctions and the musician's decisions based upon them could hardly be called non-aesthetic, non-musical or 'pragmatic', unlike, say, the decision about how he/she should dress for a performance or whether or not

to consume tobacco while performing.

Literary artists too make basic conceptual distinctions which guide their aesthetic choices. At the most obvious and direct level, we may cite the example of those writers who have consciously chosen to use, modify, or radically challenge a particular generic category. It has been pointed out that Milton was consciously using abstract notions of the epic and tragedy, and further, he knew 'how to Christianize and Miltonize the Aeneid, and 'how to tell his personal story through a Hebrew folk tale treated as a Greek tragedy' as in *Samson Agonistes*.⁸ Another fairly obvious example of the conscious use of the generic categories by a creative writer is Fielding's characterization of what 'kind of writing' he was attempting in *Josiah Andrews*: 'a comic epic poem in prose.'⁹

We may now make two basic observations about the nominalist position. Firstly, in any aesthetic theorizing, the 'aesthetic' needs to be distinguished from the non-aesthetic; and it is here that the process of classification begins at its most fundamental level. Secondly, within the aesthetic domain, the different arts need to be distinguished, because the processes of creation as well as reception appear to be quite different in the various arts.

This is obvious from the fact that the ability to create and receive, say musical works does not guarantee the same ability in, say, the visual arts. From the point of view of what in psychology is called 'nurture' at least, the creative and receptive sensibilities need to be specifically tuned to the particular mediums of the arts, and it is here that the distinct generic elements have an active role to play.

II

Apart from these rather obvious distinctions, there are two other levels of classification which can be identified with some precision. We shall first locate them with the help of a few examples and then explore them a little further to examine how they are interdependent.

The first of the two levels is the level of classification of the arts into broad clusters, according to certain aspects of their mediums: for example, music and dance, in their 'live' form, naturally form a cluster because in these arts the work of art is realized only when it is 'performed' in the presence of an

audience. The other examples of such clusters are the 'temporal' arts and the 'spatial' arts. An interesting use of the cluster can be seen in Aristotle's formulation of the criterion of the 'means of imitation'. Aristotle specifies the means as 'rhythm, language or harmony, either singly or combined', and classifies the arts into different clusters accordingly.¹⁰ A modern classificatory scheme is to be found in T. M. Greene's *The Arts and the Art of Criticism*, where the six major arts are classified into three broad cluster, viz. 'abstract' (music, dance and architecture), 'representational' (sculpture and painting), and symbolic (literature).¹¹

The second level of classification is to be located within each art: for example, music has varieties such as 'classical', 'light', 'pop', 'folk', etc.; films can be feature films, documentaries, animated films, etc.; paintings may be classified into portraits, genre paintings, abstract paintings, and so on. To invoke Aristotle again, using the criterion of the 'manner of imitation', poetry can be classified into two major types: 'the poet may imitate by narration ... or he may present all his characters as living and moving before us. Further, the Aristotelian criterion of the 'object of imitation' leads to a further sub-classification of the dramatic poetry, viz. comedy and tragedy.¹²

The two broad levels of aesthetic classification mentioned above are indeed distinct. What is equally important, however, is that they are interrelated and interdependent in certain significant ways. The case of drama is worth examining in this context. Is drama a performing/theatrical art, or is it a verbal/literary art? Is it to be grouped with music and dance, or with poetry/literature? This is a question at the first level of classification - i.e., the level of the broad clustering of the arts. Our answer to it, however, directly influences the subgeneric distinctions made at the second level of classification, i.e., the classification within each art. Let us observe how this happens.

We may begin with a brief comparison between the classical Indian and Western (i.e. Greek) approaches to the nature of drama. Etymologically, the Sanskrit word *nāṭya* (theatre) is derived from the root *nat* (नृत्) which means 'to dance'. Conceptually too, *nāṭya* comprises dance and drama, for in both these arts, it is the *abhinaya*, i.e. the histrionic element, that plays a crucial role.¹³ This contrasts sharply with the Aristotelian view of drama. Though an important distinction is made in the *Poetics* between the narrative and the dramatic forms

of poetry, drama is, for Aristotle, an essentially literary or poetic since 'plot' is its most crucial element ('soul'), while 'spectacle' is 'the least artistic': the power of Tragedy, we may be sure, is felt even apart from representation and actors. Besides, the production of spectacular effects depends more on the art of the stage machinist than on that of the poet.¹⁴

Aristotle's commitment to the essential 'poeticity' of drama is clearly reflected in the way he subcategories drama into tragedy and comedy. The criteria used are not theatre-oriented, but are literary and moral -- viz. the status of characters ('low' in comedy, 'high' in tragedy); and their actions (mean in comedy, noble in tragedy). In the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, on the other hand, Bharata's criteria of sub-categorizing drama into ten types of *rupa* (i.e., play) are preeminently performance-based -- e.g. the use of verbal discourse, the density and nature of conversation the number of characters, the actual presentation of certain types of scenes such as wars, etc.¹⁵

A similar kind of interdependence of the two levels of aesthetic classification can be discerned if we observe some of the more recent controversies over the nature of drama. The more conventional (i.e. Aristotelian) critics and theoreticians of drama, such as Allardyce Nicoll and Eric Bentley, treat drama essentially as a literary work (or, to use a more fashionable term, 'discourse'), and look upon performance as 'stage presentation' of a given script, that is, as something additional to or superimposed on the literary script. For example, Bentley asks: 'What does acting add to a play?'¹⁶

More recently, however, critics, directors and theoreticians, such as Jerzy Grotowsky, Bernard Beckerman and Richard Schechner, have challenged the classical view. These new theorists have described drama variously, but the underlying common feature is their emphasis on performance: 'imagined act', 'happening', 'event', 'actual' (used as a noun), 'spectacle', 'encounter', 'process', 'transformation' have been some of the key terms in their writings. Schechner also talks about 'using theatre as a way to experience with, act out and ratify change', and about its 'ability to frame and control, to change from raw to cooked, the most problematic (violent, dangerous, sexual, taboo) items of human interaction'.¹⁷

Given these two opposing approaches, what happens to the subgeneric distinctions? Significantly enough, the classical subgeneric distinctions, such as

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tragedy, comedy, melodrama and farce are dependent on our viewing drama as 'literary' or 'verbal' in nature. For example, Bentley's "freudian" attempt to distinguish tragedy from melodrama is based on the assumption that the essence of drama lies in the 'literary' nature of the script: 'Whereas in melodrama we identify ourselves ... with innocence, and live under the constant threat of other people's villainy, in tragedy we identify ourselves with guilt, and live in conflict with ... (ourselves).'¹⁸ On the other hand, if drama is seen primarily in terms of performance, the criteria for subgeneric distinctions are very different: for example, one of the criteria is the degree of the 'improvisability' of the script or text; another is the degree of 'alienation' or 'intimacy' achieved. Schechner's distinction between 'aesthetic' drama, 'ritual' drama and 'social' drama is revealing in this context: "... There are at least three categories of performance: (1) aesthetic where the audience changes consciousness while the performer 'rolls over', (2) ritual drama where the object of ceremony is transformed while the officiating performer 'rolls over', (3) social drama where all involved change".¹⁹

It should further be noticed that Schechner uses the term drama in a very wide sense. Ritual dramas are cultural situations where, for example, a young man who is a 'bachelor', is transformed into a 'husband' through the ceremony of marriage, while social dramas comprise arguments, combats, rites of passage and political ceremonies.²⁰

The concept of performance thus not only projects the subgeneric distinctions within drama in an entirely new way, but also shifts the borderlines between art and non-art too. Drama becomes an activity which at many points is continuous with other socio-cultural activities that are not necessarily viewed as 'aesthetic', such as feasting, warring, lovemaking, dreaming, etc.²¹

III

We have thus identified three distinct levels of aesthetic classification: one is the fundamental level of the distinction between aesthetic and non-aesthetic; the second is the level of the clustering of the different arts; and the third is the generic classification within each art.

It can be argued from this that the process of classification in aesthetics need not be given up either as a purely cognitive or a purely 'pragmatic' process,

implying that it is irrelevant to aesthetic creation or reception. Nor do we need to give it up as hopelessly chaotic. The processes of identification, definition, abstraction, systematization and evaluation are relevant to aesthetics as to any other field of human inquiry. Without doing violence or injustice to the complexity of aesthetic phenomena, it is theoretically insightful to posit levels of classification in aesthetic phenomena, it is theoretically insightful to posit levels of classification in aesthetics and observe how these levels interact with one another. From the point of view of the semiotics of art, the theoretical schemata of classification can be viewed as mental codes which are employed both by the practising artists as well as the receivers of art.

NOTES

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2. Austin Warren and Rene Wellek, *Theory of Literature*, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1949), p. 235.
3. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, (trans. by J. C. Meredith) (Oxford, 1952), pp. 41-89. For a recent critique of Kant's conditions of beauty, see Denis Dutton, "Kant and the Conditions of Artistic Beauty", *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, vol. 34, no. 3 (July, 1994) 226-241.
4. Walter Pater, *The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry* (1873; Macmillan, London, 1935), pp. vii-ix. Emphasis added.
5. Benedetto Croce, *Aesthetic*, (trans. D. Ainslie) (1922; Calcutta: Indian rpt.), p.35.
6. Susanne Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art* (New York: The New American Library, 1942), p. 78.
7. Harold Osborne, "Aesthetic and Other Forms of Order", *The British Journal of Aesthetic*, vol. 22, no. 1, (Winter, 1982), pp. 3-16.
8. Warren and Wellek, *Theory of Literature*, p. 233. Also see Richard B. Sewall's *The Visitation of Tragedy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959) where it is argued that the generic concepts of tragedy, comedy and epic had a vital role to play in the creative processes of writers like Marlowe, Shakespeare, Ben Jonson and Milton.
9. Henry Fielding, *Joseph Andrews*. (1742. London: Dent, 1965), p. xvii.
10. Aristotle, *Poetics* (trans. S. H. Butcher) (Dover, 1951)

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11. Theodore M. Greene, *The Arts and the Art of Criticism* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1940), pp. 29-45.
12. *Poetics* (trans. Butcher), p. 13.
13. See Kapila Vatsyayan, *Classical Indian Dance in Literature and the Arts* (New Delhi: Sangeet Natak Akademi), pp. 23-34. For an edition and English translation of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, see : *Nāṭyaśāstra* (edited and translated by M. Ghosh) Test: Vol. I, Ch. 1-27 (Calcutta: Manisha Granthalaya, 1967); Vol. II, Ch. 28- 36 (Calcutta, 1956); Translation: Vol. I (Calcutta: Manisha Granthalaya, 1967); Vol. II (Calcutta: Bibliotheca India, The Asiatic Society, 1961). The *vṛttis* are discussed in Chapter 20.
14. *Poetics* (trans. Butcher), pp. 29-31.
15. The major principle underlying the classification of drama into ten types is the *vṛtti*, i.e. 'the mode or manner of speech delivery for different types of action, theme or locale -- the graceful (*kaishiki*), the energetic (*ārabhati*), the verbal (*bhārati*) and the grand (*sātvati*)'. *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Chapters 18 and 20. Also see Vatsyayan, *Classical Indian Dance*, p. 8.
16. Eric Bentley, *The Life of Drama* (London: Methuen, 1966), p. 166. Emphasis added. Also see Allardyce Nicoll, *The Theatre and Dramatic Theory* (London: George G. Harrap, 1962), pp. 33-80.
17. Richard Schechner, *Essays on Performance Theory: 1970-1976* (New York: Drama Book Specialists, 1977), p. 123. Also see Jerzy Grotowsky, *Towards a Poor Theatre* (New York: Simon and Schuter, 1968) and Bernard Beckerman, *Dynamics of Drama: Theory and Method of Analysis* (New York: Alfred K. Knorf, 1970).
18. Bentley, *Life of Drama*, p. 261.
19. Schechner, *Essays on Performance Theory*, p. 125.
20. *ibid*, p. 124.
21. A similar point has been made in a more provocative way while discussing the term "aesthetic" by T. J. Diffey: '... the term "aesthetic" has taken on meanings and resonances that cannot be exhausted by identifying it with art or beauty. ... My idea is that we should regard the term "aesthetic" as a term that extends thought, stretches the mind, and leads us into new and uncharted territory'. "The Idea of Aesthetic Experience", in *Possibility of Aesthetic Experience* (ed. Michael H. Mitias) (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), pp. 10-11.

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QUINE ON OBSERVATION SENTENCES

P. R. BHAT and GOPAL SAHU

I

Quine has based many of his philosophical theses on observation sentences ascribing seven distinctive roles. First, they were probably the origin of language. Man must have used them like the call of the birds and cries of animals. Second, they are the infant's entry to language. As a new born baby, one has to depend on the observation sentences for acquiring the basic rules of language. The child learns first the one word sentence "Mama", "Milk" etc. and learns other sentences later. Third, they are the basis of translator's entry to a jungle language. A translator is different from the child in one important sense that he knows a language already. If the knowledge of the working of his own language is an advantage for an adult, then interference of his linguistic habits would be a hindrance to his learning a second language. The only way he can make contact with the alien language is by basing his hypotheses on the basis of observation sentences the way a child would do in learning a language. Fourth, they are the vehicles of evidence for our knowledge of the external world. We do speak of the objects of the world and we base our knowledge of these objects on our sense perception and the sentences that we form on their basis. Fifth, they are the shared reference-points for two theories. When we have to compare or relate sentences belonging to two different theories, the only common reference points would be the observation sentences. We will not be in a position to know whether the disagreement arising out of the difference in the perspective or the theory is about one and the same thing if we do not have objective reference points. Sixth, they are the primitive source of the idioms of belief and other propositional attitudes. Without the aid of the observation sentences, it is not possible to make statements about the beliefs and values. We behave in a certain way which is the proof of our belief and attitudes and

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therefore observation sentences are to be considered primitive source of these attitudes. Seventh, their holophrastic role bears significantly on the epistemology of ontology. These observation sentences help us to identify the ontological commitments of our epistemological theses.¹

Going by the list of roles that are identified with observation sentences, it is beyond doubt that observation sentences occupy central position in Quinian philosophy. Observation sentences help him to avoid two extreme and unrealistic philosophical positions: scepticism and solipsism. Apart from linking observation sentences to ontology, translation, theory, hypothesis, verification, to name a few, he relates the observation sentences to vital human abilities such as spacious present, innate ability to perceive similarity, and our ability to modify the perceptual similarity to make room for language based theoretical kinds in the process of naturalizing epistemology.

Observation sentences are contrasted with other types of sentences: occasion sentences, observation categoricals, standing sentences, eternal sentences and so on. Not all the sentences are mutually exclusive. An observation sentence "It is cold" is also an occasion. It is a sentence which is sometimes true and sometimes false. For instance, "It is raining" is true on some occasions and false on some other occasions and hence this sentence also is an occasion sentence. Thus, Quine defines an observation sentence as "an occasion sentence on which speakers of the language can agree outright on witnessing the occasion".² An example of observation categorical is "When the sun comes up the birds sing".³ An observation categorical has normally two components. They are normally derived from the theory and hypothesis taken together. Moreover, some observation categoricals are also considered to be standing sentences. For example, "When a willow grows at the water's edge, it leans over the water" is a standing sentence.⁴ Furthermore, a standing sentence can also be eternal sentence. There are also other eternal sentences. Any observation sentence by mentioning space and time can be converted into an eternal sentence. It rained on such-and-such a day at such-and-such a place can be an eternal sentence in this sense.⁵

On reflection, we notice that all the sentences can be clearly put into two basic groups: one, eternal sentences which include some standing universal sentences and occasion sentences with their space and time co-ordinates; second,

observation categoricals, occasion sentences which have no truth values. Strawson has drawn our attention to the distinction between a sentence and the use of a sentence. A sentence like "I am hungry" is neither true nor false unless it is uttered by someone in a context to make a statement. The same sentence is uttered by several people at different occasions for making different statements some are true and some are false. Thus, the use of a sentence, Strawson preferred to call it a statement. That is to say, the sentence in question here acts as a variable. When it is used in a context, it behaves like a constant having a definite truth value.⁶

Quine too makes this distinction between a sentence and the use of a sentence, but prefers to retain the term "sentence" in his discussions rather than statement for simplicity.⁷ He also does not want to use the term "proposition" as having truth value for the same reason.⁸

II

In *Word and Object* Quine had thought that there is similarity in the sense-data which results in the similarity of perception which becomes the base of objective knowledge. But this 1963 version is replaced by 1981 version of observational statements. In this version, Quine adopts the mechanism of defining objectivity for only one individual if the perceptual response is the same irrespective of the difference in the sense stimuli.⁹ This is comparable to something that is called 'specious present'. Using this notion one can define the identity of the perceptual object. This is the same object which I had perceived earlier. Then Quine speaks of bilingual, who knows the identity of meaning of a sentence uttered in two languages.¹⁰ Having achieved objectivity at the individual level, he moves to the intersubjectivity. Even here, he says that the individual differences drop out. This is because, he is no more speaking of the stimulus meaning. The notion of stimulus meaning is replaced by the notion of linguistic meaning. Here, he invokes the concept of speech community where people belonging to one community have the same language and use their language in an intersubjective manner despite there being some differences at the individual level of perception.¹¹

In order to fully appreciate the issue at hand, we need to map the road through which Quine takes us to his grand programme of naturalizing

epistemology starting with neural intake and returning to it via backlog theory. Though he has made minor changes in certain pockets of his theory, the general outline of the theory remains the same. He is not interested in going into the actual firing of neural and other physiological processes even though he had located the base of our experience of similarity in stimulus. We do not need to go into details of the physical properties of firing of the nerve endings since we are interested in perception and knowledge, not the physical processes involved. Rightly, Quine has emphasized this point and stops his analysis at this level.¹² He confines his enquiry to the level where an epistemologist has a role to play. Thus, the starting point is the acknowledging the fact that we are born with some instinctive ability to recognize similarities. Recognizing similarity can be across time and across space. The ability to re-identify the object would be to recognize the similarity across time, and the ability to see similarity among several objects would be the ability to acquire a natural kind term. For instance, we have the ability to identify or re-identify the lost bag of ours. We have the ability to perceive motion when discreet resembling pictures with slight variations are screened at the rate of eighteen per second. Quine has recognized this ability which is normally identified as "specious present". The span of perception is minimum 1/16th of a second, the psychologists have measured and told us. We retain any perception for this period even if the object hits our nerve endings is less than this. This human ability is the one which is able to give us continuity of perception of objects eventually resulting in identity of the objects.

Since learning depends on perceptual similarity, perceptual similarity itself cannot be learned by using something else. Nothing this, Quine grants this basic learning of similarity to be innate. But he believes that the standards of perceptual similarity change when we advance in learning.¹³ He ascribes the innate standards of perceptual similarity to natural selection in evolution.¹⁴ Whether one accepts the theory of evolution or not, the point that Quine makes is not controversial. We have ability to recognize natural kinds is well accepted. All of us have the ability to distinguish between plants and animals; we have the ability to distinguish between palatable things from non-palatable ones; dangerous from non-dangerous ones without which the species of *Homo sapiens* would not have survived.

The epistemological significance of observation sentences lies in their ability to link our sensory stimulation with that of our theories about the world.¹⁵

Quine opines that observation sentences are not reports of sense data but they are reports of external circumstances.¹⁶ Early stage in language learning involves association of words with a range of stimulation and conditioning. Observation sentences consisting of these terms are theory free. These very observation sentences can be viewed from the point of view of a theory as well. Thus, the observation sentences logically connect observation on the one hand, and theory on the other. Now the observation sentences have become theory-laden indeed. An observation sentence containing an ordinary word like 'water' can join theoretical sentences containing terms as technical as ' H_2O '. Quine writes: "Seen holophrastically, as conditioned to stimulatory situations, the sentence is theory-free; seen analytically, word by word, it is theory-laden."¹⁷ What this means is that the terms embedded in observation sentences recur in the theory formulations. What makes a sentence as observational is not a lack of such terms, claims Quine. He invokes the notion of global sensory stimulation to overcome the difficulty: "What qualifies a sentence as observational is not a lack of such terms, but just that the sentence taken as an undivided whole commands assent consistently or dissent consistently when the same global sensory stimulation is repeated".¹⁸ What related the observation sentence to theory is the sharing of embedded terms, claims Quine.

Always we have something that is given as the established backlog theory constituted of sentences having logical connections among them.¹⁹ We consider a hypothesis for possible incorporation into it. We derive observation categorical from the backlog theory and the hypothesis making use of other statements which are not controversial ones. The theory tells us that if the hypothesis under consideration is true, whenever, a certain observable situation arises, a certain effect could be observed. A theory is tested on the basis of synthetic observation categoricals. So we set up the situation in question. Thus it solves the problem of linking theory to observation, as well as epitomizing the experimental situation, says Quine.²⁰

The theory and the hypothesis put together are said to imply an observation categorical. The derived observation sentence is called observation categorical compounded of two or more occasion sentences. It is itself an independent sentence though implied by the scientific theory and the hypothesis put together. But we do not know how to go about verifying such an observation sentence without making further distinction between *free* observation categorical

and the *focal* observation categorical.²¹ Focal observation categorical would have the form 'Whenever ... it ...'. Quine considers the pronoun 'it' to be a vital new link between the two components of the observation categorical. In the free observation categorical, the link between the two components would not be specific. For instance 'Whenever there is a raven, a raven is black' will not help us since it shows only weak link between being raven and being black. For instance whenever there is a raven, a raven is black' is compatible with white raven.²² 'All ravens are black' requires the focal categorical, for instance, 'Whenever there is a raven it is black' where 'it' is essential pronoun, and hence reification.

Observation categoricals can be observed independent of the theory; in fact, this itself is a miniature theory. Sometimes progress in science takes place without prior planning even; a scientist having no hypothesis may happen to note an anomalous phenomenon. The scientist may happen to chance on a counter-instance of an observation categorical which ought to have been true on the current theory as a whole, points out Quine.²³

And if the occasion sentence turns out false, it does not prove that the theory is false.²⁴ Quine believes that different possibilities are open here. The falsity of the observation categorical refutes sometimes only the conjunction of sentences that was needed to imply the observation categorical. In order to withdraw that conjunction, one need not always withdraw the hypothesis itself.²⁵ By making appropriate modifications in the auxiliary sentences, we can save the hypothesis. Sometimes, we may make changes in both the hypothesis and the auxiliary sentences to save the accepted theory if the prediction fails. Only in the event of having no option, do we recommend the modification of the theory. Quine is of the opinion that this is the way work in science progresses.

The sharp distinction between language and theory is not possible at the level of theory, holds Quine. He is of the firm opinion that the distinction between language and theory fades away once we go beyond observational sentences.²⁶ This is the reason why he believes that certain changes are easily permitted and certain other changes are not so easily permitted by the society. When it is the case of the belief in the occasion sentences, Quine is of the opinion that we are willing to readily change our opinions, but when it is a matter of more serious kind, for instance, the change in the vocabulary, we resist

such change.

When we verify an occasion sentence, it turns out to be an eternal sentence. Quine is of the opinion that time and place are enough to identify the occasions in order to find whether an occasion sentence is true or false. The occasion sentence "It is raining" can be verified on 15th June 1997 at Mumbai. If it is known to be true that on this day it rained in Mumbai, then the sentence would be true for ever. The sentence enters the web of beliefs as an eternal sentence. An eternal sentence is one which has unchanging truth value. Even after two decades, the sentence would be true of Mumbai that it had rained on 15th June 1997. Thus, Quine remarks: 'What enter the web of the beliefs as protocol are their records, as dated eternal sentences. These depend for their credibility on whatever theory attests to the fixity of records or memory'.²⁷

An occasion sentence is capable of producing several such eternal sentences. A simple sentence like "It is raining" can produce uncountable eternal sentences whenever and wherever it is uttered to make correct statements. Like this, other occasion sentences also would have their corresponding eternal sentences listed in our web of beliefs. Similarly, "I am hungry" also would have entered our web of beliefs with appropriate proper name replacing "I" in the sentence with appropriate co-ordinates of space and time. That is to say, for every event and every distinguishable feature of the world which can be observed, there could be corresponding eternal sentence²⁸ in our web of beliefs. All the standing sentences also do figure in our web of beliefs since they are also eternal sentences.

III

Having acquainted with the basic terminologies that are related to observation sentences, we are in a position to appreciate philosophical issues arising out of them. Of the most striking ones, we shall begin asking some simple but important question about natural kinds. Next, we shall discuss some difficulties regarding the nature of occasion sentences, followed by the nature and status of observation categoricals.

Quine bases his argument in favour of naturalizing epistemology heavily on the innate notion of similarity. He finds it essential to have two types of

similarities: one at the level of phonetics, i.e., language and the other at the level of perception²⁹ in order to have scientific knowledge. Similarity at the basic level is provided by our innate notion of natural kind which helps us to have primitive induction. Without involving the notion of inductive generalization by simple enumeration, we can learn the notion of one crow, two crows, three crows, he claims.³⁰ But when we go beyond observation, our notion of similarity depends on language, i.e., the notion of theoretical kinds. We need to modify our notion of natural kind to make progress in science. Thus, the notion of similarity at this level is theory-laden. We have backlog theories which have several notions of theoretical kinds. As noted earlier, we derive observation categoricals from the backlog theory and the hypothesis put together. We can imagine several of such cases where the observation categorical involves the theoretical kinds, but not the natural kinds. For instance, grouping of whales with mammals; grouping of kangaroos with marsupial mice;³¹ the scientists account of wooden table in terms of arrangement of molecules;³² describing water as H_2O are all of this type. However, the difficulty would arise when we are to verify observation categoricals involving theoretical kinds. In order to pave way to theoretical kinds, we had to modify our natural kinds. When we verify an observation sentence, we verify only that observation sentence which involves natural kinds and not theoretical kinds. Since theoretical kinds modify the natural kinds, the verification of observation sentences in terms of natural kinds is of no relevance to science. We cannot help but to use the natural kinds to perceive the world since our theoretical kind cannot modify our mechanism of sense perception at that level. We are incapable of using the specialized language of scientist at the observational level since the scientists' language involves several theoretical kinds which are theory-laden. However, Quine believes that what relates the observation sentence to theory is the sharing of embedded terms. Unfortunately, if the theoretical kinds are modified version of natural kinds, then verifying of observation categorical using sense perception is not possible.

The nature of observation categorical itself poses a different problem. Let us analyse observation categoricals to have better clarity on them. Observation categoricals are derived from backlog theory as well as arrived at in the form of primitive induction. For instance Quine writes "An observation categorical is a miniature scientific theory that we can test experimentally by waiting for

an occasion where the first component of the categorical is fulfilled, or even by bringing about its fulfilment, and then watching for fulfilment of the second component."³³ There are singular observation categoricals, for instance "Sugar is sweet" and there are complex observation categoricals having two components, for instance "When the sun comes up the birds sing". The question is about the nature of these observation categoricals. Should we take an observation categorical to be a singular sentence or a compound sentence having several conjuncts as its implicit parts? It is possible to view "Sugar is sweet" to be a singular sentence in the sense that it takes either of the values true or false; and speaking of degree of truth value would not make sense here. It is also possible to treat this sentence to be a compound sentence constituted of all the several observation sentences. For instance, "This sugar is sweet" and "That sugar is sweet" and so on without missing a single occasion where the sentence could be used. Thus, the components of this sentence would consist of all the possible situations where we could use the sentence "Sugar is sweet". Of course, a compound sentence is said to be false even if one of the components is found to be false. One could prove that the observation categorical "Sugar is sweet" is false with one observation if this analysis is correct. However, to verify fully and establish the truth of this observation categorical would never be possible since there would always be the cases which are unobserved since time would have never come to an end. Moreover, if the observation categorical is derived from the theory, the theory cannot give us *a priori* the number of applications that the observation categorical would eventually have.

The other possibility is that the observation categoricals are complex but singular sentences in the sense that they take only one truth value either of the values true or false. If this is the correct analysis of observation categoricals, then even one predicted observation sentence is verified, the theory is justified since the sentence does not permit us to ascribe the degrees of truth. This further implies, contrary to what Quine believes, that there is no need to continue the process of confirmation if the theory is once verified. Moreover, the thesis that observation categoricals are not compound sentences but are individual sentences with binary values goes well with the feeling that science consists of eternal sentences, i.e., sentences which is true once and for all. It was quite soothing to believe that scientific theories are consistent and dependable.

A theory in science is a web of standing sentences which are said to be true once and for all.³⁴ The set of all the standing sentences include all those observation categoricals which are incorporated into the theory after verification. Of the two eternal sentences, i.e., the true observation sentences with their spatio-temporal co-ordinates and the standing sentences which constitute the backlog theory, the latter are dubious eternal sentences. The observation categoricals, which are standing sentences by virtue of their being part of the backlog theory are said to be eternal sentences even though they are synthetic. Their truth value does not depend on the meaning of the constituent words, nor in their sentential structure. Paradoxically, such eternally true synthetic sentences are considered to be true till they are proven to be false. When they are proven to be false, we do not say that those sentences were true but became false. "We say that to our surprise it was not true after all".³⁵ We never accept that standing sentences change their truth value since they are eternal sentences.

The thesis that a single observation sentence can falsify the observation categorical, is dubious. Some facts of scientific practice are to the contrary. We have several cases of natural laws having exceptions. For example, when the temperature increases, the density of the material decreases is a law. But, the behaviour of ice is an exception. Density of ice is maximum at 40°C and it has less density at the lower temperature. We also know that electrical resistance of a metal or alloy is a function of temperature decreasing as the temperature falls and tending to zero at -273°C . But it is found that for certain metals and alloys, e.g., lead, tin and vanadium, the resistance changes abruptly becoming vanishingly small at a temperature close to a few degrees above -273°C . This phenomenon is called superconductivity. The law of conservation of mass states that mass can neither be created nor destroyed. However, exception to this law is found in the case of nuclear fission where the new particle called neutrino gets created. Ohm's law states that $V = RI$ where V is voltage, R is resistance and I is electric current. Exceptions are found to this law in the case of semiconductors. Given this law, if the temperature is kept constant the resistance should not increase, but we find that in the case of some semiconductors that increase in current results in the increase in the resistivity. What these examples indicate is that since certain laws of nature have exceptions an observation categorical or a standing sentence cannot be falsified with one example. A counter instance, would make us modify our hypothesis such that the exception

is not found or accept the hypothesis as a part of the theory with stated exceptions.

Quine links *free* observation categorical to *focal* observation categorical so that one can verify the observation categorical without much difficulty. For instance the focal categorical "Whenever there is a raven, it is black" is different from the free observation categorical "All ravens are black". The two occasion sentences "It is a raven" and "It is black" are linked with essential pronoun "it" in the focal categorical. Quine is of the opinion that we cannot go and verify free observation categoricals since they have the generalized form. However, what the pronoun 'it' does in the focal observation categorical is to link the subject of the one component of the sentence with that of the second component of the same sentence. The pronoun 'it' does not work as a demonstrative pronoun and hence does not link the observation categorical with that of observation sentence. For example, if one does not know which bird is called 'raven' 'Whenever there is a raven, it is black' is of no help for verification. Neither the word 'raven' nor would the pronoun 'it' would help us to identify the ravens if we do not know what it is to be a raven as a natural kind.

To overcome the difficulty of linking observation sentence with that of observation categorical, we need to invoke the notion of occasion sentences. "An observation sentence is an occasion sentence that the speaker will consistently assent to when his sensory receptors are stimulated in certain ways, and consistently dissent from when they are stimulated in certain other ways".³⁶ Thus, it looks as though Quine links observation sentence to the sensory receptors. However, the occasion sentences have different truth values in different contexts. The two values of assenting to and dissenting from do not seem to serve the purpose without selecting and rejecting firing of sensory receptors. Noting this Quine says "many of the receptors will be irrelevant to any particular sentence; but this excess is harmless, concealing out. Only the relevant receptors will be triggered on *all* the occasions appropriate to the sentence in question".³⁷ Given this account of what is the link between an occasion sentence and the sensory receptors, it would be possible to link *focal* observation categorical with that of occasion sentence. One has to observe what the responses are. When the first component is assented to whether the second component of the *focal* observation categorical is also assented or not. If there is consistency in their assent or dissent from in different contexts, then

accordingly the observation categorical is verified or falsified.

Quine shows how perspectives can alter our notion of similarity. For instance, we perceive three dimensional objects in two dimensional space. We perceive slanted figure as rectangle. "Still they will be perpetually similar, for we have a learned or instinctive propensity to associate perspective",³⁸ Our ability to perceive modified similarity is very limited. Despite the change in perspective, we will not be able to change our perceptual similarity beyond a point. Moreover, perceiving similarity within a perspective does not give us the objective ground which we are searching for verification. The observation sentence which would verify the observation categorical if it involves perspectivised similarity, then the theory would be valid only to those who adopt this perspective. It would be like Kant's spectacles. If we look at hills and valleys through red glasses, all objects would look red. Thus, the occasion sentences meant to verify the observation categorical cannot be theory free.

The above account is quite satisfactory if the observation categorical uses terms which are natural kinds and not the modified natural kinds. However, when we reach the advanced level of development in science, we do not use natural kinds and we use modified natural kinds. The similarity notion is no more dependent on the sensory receptors, but on the language or theory. If anything that guides the perception, it has to be these theoretical kinds. In such a situation, if one looks for consistency in assenting to or dissenting from to an occasion sentence, one is only looking for regularity in human behaviour. Quine had made the problem of induction redundant when he spoke of primitive induction and the innateness of natural kinds. However, by modifying the natural kinds and replacing them with global sensory receptors he has invited the problem of induction again. The strength of the evidence would depend on the number of occasions where we have tested the occasion sentence. It is now the same as induction through simple enumeration.

IV

We would be quite happy to go with Quine that the statements in science are to be considered as eternal sentences. And the data that verifies these eternal sentences themselves are observational sentences with their time and space co-ordinates and thus are to be presented as eternal sentences. Thus, the theory

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and observations have the eternal relationship as long as none of them are rejected either on the basis of logical inconsistency in the theory or error in perception due to some psycho-physical factors or due to systematic distortions. If one notices counter example to the theory, one need not reject the theory in many contexts. In fact it becomes a new challenge for the scientists having the following issues to be settled: how to account for previous observations, what aspect of the theory to be modified, whether counter instance has to be accepted as valid or declare the result as some distortion or whether to treat it as an exception. Quine is better in this respect in comparison to Grunbaum in holding a better version of his holistic theory. Of course, what Quine points out is a logical point that if conclusion is false, that does not imply that all the premises are false. It is possible that the hypothesis which figures as one of the premises is false as it stands and is in need of modification and the backlog theory can be retained as it is, opines Quine. We would like to make an entirely different point. When a counter instance is found, the scientist is made to reconsider everything: backlog theory, hypothesis, the present counter instance and the past evidences. As an observation sentence, the present counter instance has as much evidential validity as that of the previous ones which had justified the theory. To acknowledge the present observation sentence as counter evidence to the theory is equally a challenge about the previous observation sentences which have supported the theory. The scientist has the obligation to show not only why he considers the theory to be false but also the status of those observation sentences which have supported the theory. Obviously, if several observation sentences have supported the theory, how can a few counter instances have higher epistemic status that they are able to falsify the theory? would be a legitimate question. That is to say, the scientist has to show how the past and present observations are consistent granting some backlog theory. If he rejects the theory on present observations, then the past observations which supported the theory might serve as counter instances. If both observations past and the present are considered together, they do lead to anomalous situation till we are able to invoke new hypothesis which can explain both : past and present observations.

What the counter instance does is to show an anomalous situation. Even one evidence is enough to show the limitation of the theory, Certainly, the counter evidence does this, but it does not necessarily falsify the theory. It only indicates that the scientific community cannot claim that it is rational and yet

maintain that all the three hold, namely, the backlog theory, the evidences that have supported it in the past and the counter evidence that is observed now. The counter evidence forces a decision. A decision has to be taken by the scientific community. What decisions they would take cannot be predicted. It could be that they find the law not a strict law. For instance, Ohm's law is not taken as a fundamental law of nature, since it applies to certain substances under certain conditions. Or the decision could be in favour of a new theory which is wider in scope, capable of accounting for both earlier evidential statements as well as the counter instances. Einstein's theory of relativity is said to be one of this kind which explains all the observations that are made in Newton's theory as well as the anomalous observations made regarding fast moving celestial bodies. Or one might declare certain phenomena as only apparent. For instance all the errors occurring in visual perceptions due to the change in the behaviour of light while changing the medium. The observation is normally dubbed as optical illusion, and thus not to be trusted. Sometimes, certain errors are taken to be errors in measurements. For instance, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle states that the velocity and the position of an electron cannot be measured simultaneously and precisely.

NOTES

1. Quine, W. V., "In Praise of Observation Sentences" *The Journal of Philosophy* Vol. 90, 1993, pp. 110-112. In "The Nature of Natural Knowledge" in S. Guttenplan (ed.) *Mind and Language*, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1975 p. 72. Quine speaks of three important features of an observation sentence : First, its truth value varies with the circumstances prevailing at the time of the utterance. Second, its truth must depend on intersubjectively observable circumstance. Third, the witness must in general be able to appreciate that the observation which they are sharing is one that verifies the sentence.
2. Quine, W. V., *Pursuit of Truth (PT)* revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1992, p. 3.
3. *PT* p. 12.
4. *PT* p. 10. Quine also makes the distinction between standing sentences and eternal sentences.

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5. *PT* pp. 78-79.
6. Strawson, P. F., "On referring" in *The Philosophy of Language*, edited by A. P. Martinich, OUP, 1985, p. 223.
7. Quine, W. V., *Theories and Things (TT)*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1981, pp. 31-34.
8. Quine, W. V., *From Stimulus to Science (FSS)*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1995, pp. 77-78.
9. Quine, W. V., "Three Indeterminacies" in *Perspectives on Quine* Edited by Robert Barrett and Roger Gibson, Basil Blackwell, 1990, pp. 3-4.
10. *FSS* pp. 78-81.
11. *Three Indeterminacies*, p. 3.
12. *Three Indeterminacies*, p. 3.
13. *FSS* p. 19. What is to be noted is that the change in perceptual similarity is not because of the change in the innate abilities of ours, but because of the change that is brought about by our new perspectives and their concepts.
14. *In Praise of Observation Sentences*, p. 113.
15. *Three Indeterminacies*, p. 2.
16. *Three Indeterminacies*, p. 2.
17. *PT* p. 7. For detailed discussion on Observation Sentences, also see, *FSS*, pp. 22-24.
18. *TT* p. 26
19. *TT* pp. 2-3.
20. *Three Indeterminacies*, p. 8. Also see *PT* pp. 4-5. Also see *FSS*, pp. 43-45.
21. *FSS* pp. 27-28.
22. *FSS* p. 28.
23. *Three Indeterminacies*, pp. 10-11.
24. Quine says that verification is a difficult process, but falsification can be decisive: "refutation of an observation categorical by an observed counter-instance. This is how some of our false inductions get weeded out, and how science keeps a grip of reality. In principle, a hypothesis can be tested, if at all, by deducting an observational categorical from it in conjunction with auxiliary laws and then testing the categorical". W. V. Quine, "Responses", *Inquiry*, 37, 1994, p. 503.

25. *Three Indeterminacies*, p. 10.
26. *Responses*, p. 501.
27. *Responses*, p. 502.
28. *TT* p. 26.
29. *Natural Kinds*, p. 32.
30. *FSS* p. 28, *TT* p. 27
31. *Natural Kinds*, p. 40.
32. *TT* pp. 28-29.
33. *FSS* p. 26.
34. *TT* p. 26.
35. *FSS* p. 67.
36. *TT* p. 25.
37. *TT* p. 25.
38. *FSS* p. 19.

BOOK - REVIEW

Bharadwaja, Vijay : *Form and Validity in Indian Logic*, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, in association with Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, New Delhi, 1990, pages 127, Rs. 100/-.

One of the striking features of Vijay Bharadwaja's book, *Form and Validity in Indian Logic* is the peculiar method he uses in approaching the phenomenon called Indian Logic. Except in the last Chapter, the author does not consider the logical theories of Buddhism, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsa and Vedānta in their abstract forms, but tries to construct them afresh in the light of the concrete examples given in these theories. This unconventional way can give new insights into the nature of Indian logic. The examples, for instance of certain modes of good or bad reasoning given by certain philosophers are sometimes likely to be more expressive of their metaphysical commitments than the strength of the logical theories they exemplify. In that case what appeared to be logic may be found to be a rationalisation of metaphysics or a metaphysics projection on logic. Vijay Bharadwaja's programme of unearthing the true nature of Indian logic needs, therefore, to be welcome, although one may disagree with the results of the working out of this programme by him.

Bharadwaja's approach to Indian logic may be called materialist in that it starts with concrete examples and constructs (or deconstructs) abstract models from them. It may be contrasted with the conventional approach which is formalist in that it starts with the abstract forms and substantiates or examines them with or without the help of concrete examples. Bharadwaja, by using the materialist method discovers many mistakes committed by the formalist Scholars of Indian logic. He almost shows that it is wrong to search for the so called 'logical form' or 'formal validity' in Indian theories of *anumāna*. The title of the book is therefore to be taken as ironical.

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The author is unhappy even with the term Indian Logic. The appropriate words according to him are '*pramāṇaśāstra*' or 'methodology of knowledge'. It seems amply clear that *pramāṇaśāstra* or methodology of knowledge as a whole cannot be identified with formal logic, because *pramāṇaśāstra* is concerned not only with *anumānapramāṇa* but many other *pramāṇas* such as *pratyakṣa* and *śabda*. But what about that part of *pramāṇaśāstra* which is concerned with *anumānapramāṇa* alone? Is it not concerned with formal logic? Here too the author's answer is in the negative. If we use the word logic in a broad sense in the sense of a theory of inference/argument principally concerned with the determinants of goodness and badness of inference/arguments then we can certainly regard Indian theory/theories of *anumāna* as logic/logics. Now we can legitimately ask the next question whether Indian logic is formal, where by the term 'formal logic' we understand that logic which regards formal validity as the only or at least an important determinant of goodness of an inference/argument.

The author discusses this last question in the first three Chapters of his work, with particular reference to Buddhist logic. He analyses the concepts of good and bad inference according to the Buddhist logicians Dinnāga, Dharmakīrti and Mokṣākaragupta, with the help of the various examples of good and bad inferences cited by them. He contends that the acceptability of an argument according to Buddhist logicians does not consist in its deductive validity but it has to be understood in terms of relevance, truth and support (given by reason to the thesis). So all the efforts of the formalist scholars to understand Indian logic in general and Buddhist logic in particular in the image of Aristotelian Syllogism or Deductive formal logic have gone in a wrong direction.

The author's account of Buddhist logic can be appreciated as an antithesis of the modern interpretations of the same modelled on formal deductive logic (whether Aristotelian or Modern), but whether it leads to the correct interpretation of the Buddhist logic is a problem.

One problem about the author's account is that it is essentialistic and unhistorical. In Chapter I he discusses "the Buddhist theory of *trairūpya* or three conditions of justification mentioned mainly by Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti" and he does so without taking into account the major differences between the views of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti and also the historical development of logic from

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Diñnāga to Dharmakīrti. To talk of Buddhist logic without acknowledging the major differences is to essentialise it. In Chapter III also he does 'not take into account the historical differences that might have appeared during the period from 500 A. D. to 1200 A. D.' (p.31). This problem becomes serious because the author's characterisation of Buddhist logic as something concerned with the ideas of relevance and support but not with deductive validity, seems applicable to Diñnāga's logic in particular and pre-Dharmakīrti Indian logic in general, it is not applicable to Dharmakīrti's theory of inference. In Dharmakīrti's version of *trairūpya* the second and the third condition of a good *hetu* get identified as the positive and negative expressions of the universal and necessary rule of *vyāpti*, and the statements of *pakṣadharmatā* and *vyāpti* become necessary and sufficient elements (*avayavas*) of an argument (*parārthānumāna*) on the ground that the thesis/conclusion necessarily follows from them. This view of Dharmakīrti indicates his awareness of deductive aspect of the problem of inference. The author does not pay due attention to this important fact.

If, however, we restrict the scope of the author's comments on Buddhist logic to Diñnāga's theory of inference, we may be able to appreciate them better. Now we can understand how it is thoroughly misleading and wrong to understand Diñnāga's concept of inference on the model of Aristotelian syllogism because the former gives no room for universal *vyāpti*-statement which is necessary for the validity of *anumānavākya*. So the author seems to be right in rejecting the formalist interpretation of Diñnāga's logic. But he does not stop at that. He also offers an alternative interpretation of Diñnāga's theory of inference. Whether he is right in it is the further question.

Different questions can be raised at various stages of development of the author's interpretation. Let us take the three formulae of the three *rupas* of *hetu*.

- (a) *Hetu* must be present in *Anumeya*
- (b) *Hetu* must be present in *Sapakṣa*
- (c) *Hetu* must not be present in *Vipakṣa*

Diñnāga and others clearly use ontological language, i.e., the language of existence and non-existence of *hetu* with respect of *Anumeya/Pakṣa*, *Sapakṣa* and *Vipakṣa*. Consider for instance the inference : "Sound is impermanent, because it is a product". Here the *hetu* viz. being a product satisfies all the

three conditions because it is present in the sound (*Anumeya/Pakṣa*), it is also present in the impermanent things like pot (*Sapakṣa*) and it is absent from the permanent things like space (*Vipakṣa*). This is the commonly accepted understanding of *trairūpya* which implies that in the context of *trairūpya*, *hetu*, *anumeya* (or *pakṣa*), *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* all stand for objects or classes of objects. The author, however, takes *anumeya* as thesis and *hetu* as reason (which are both propositions and not objects) and then interprets *trairūpya* in the following way :

- (a) The reason must be relevant to the thesis.
- (b) It must support the thesis.
- (c) It must not support what is opposite of the thesis.

The author need not be regarded as solely responsible for this 'propositional turn' in his interpretation of *hetu*, *pakṣa* etc. because the ancient logicians themselves have used these terms in more than one sense. For example the thing smoke is called *hetu* in the context of *svārthānumāna* whereas the statement '(because) there is smoke' is called *hetu* in the context of *parārthānumāna*. It is for us not to be carried away by this ambiguity and to see the situation in a clear way. Similar ambiguity is there with respect to the term '*pakṣa*'.

In other words the non-propositional concepts of *hetu* and *pakṣa* which are central to *svārthānumāna* need to be distinguished from the respective propositional concepts which are central to *parārthānumāna*. It also needs to be noted that *trairūpya* refers to the triple character of the thing *hetu* and not to *hetu* and *pakṣa* in their propositional sense and the relationship between them. Many modern scholars of Indian logic, however, seem to have neglected the distinction between the two concepts of *hetu* and those of *pakṣa* and have propositionalised the concepts of *hetu*, *pakṣa*, *trairūpya* etc. under the influence of modern logic. In spite of his honest intention of rescuing Indian logic from the influence of formal deductive logic, the author too has not freed himself from this propositionalist bias.

To be fair to the author, we can suppose for the time being that though *trairūpya* of *hetu* is an objective, material set of conditions and it is not propositional or linguistic in nature, when it is brought to the notice of another

person it does assume a propositional/linguistic form of an argument. The question, however, can be raised at this stage as to whether we can appreciate the conditions of good reason as they are described by the author. It is not at all easy to appreciate the author's interpretation of *trairūpya* even at this stage. We have seen that the author interprets *trairūpya* in terms of relevance, support and non-support to the opposite of the thesis. The author does not make it clear as to what he means by the terms relevance and support. The ideas of relevance and support are not mutually exclusive (because support presupposes relevance) whereas the three conditions of *hetu* are supposed to be mutually exclusive. On author's interpretation every example of *asiddha* fallacy will be an example of *anaikāntika* (because lack of relevance implies lack of support). And this is never accepted by any Buddhist logician. It is also not clear as to what the author would say about the relation between the first and the third condition, because the reason violating the third condition will automatically fulfil the first condition. For how can a reason support the opposite of a thesis without being 'relevant' to it? The author's interpretation, therefore, does not make out any clear case for Dinnaga's theory of inference.

In Chapter IV the author discusses several inter-connected issues concerning the 'four logical alternatives' (*catuskoṭi*) as used in Buddhism. In early Buddhist literature, the enlightened one is said to have observed silence on certain metaphysical questions which were presented to him in the form of four alternatives : assertion, negation, both and neither. The author explains in this chapter how those metaphysical questions were called *avyakata* (unanalysed, unexplained, unclear, incomprehensible) and hence *sthapanīya* (those to be set aside). By taking a critical review of earlier and contemporary accounts of these questions, the author develops his view in consonance with K. N. Jayatilleke that the Pali Canonical position is characterised by *rejection* of the four alternatives and not be their negation. Unlike Jayatilleke he pursues this insight further and contends that the *avyakata* questions are rejected according to the canonical position not on any logical ground but on the pragmatic ground. This is done, according to the author, in the pragmatic criterial framework of four noble truths. By discussing the *avyakata* questions in this way, the author brings home the spirit of early Buddhism by rescuing it from the logicist interpretation of some of the modern scholars.

Though the author's attempt to dissolve the logical problem involved in

the *catuskoṭi* as used in early Buddhism seems convincing, his extension of the same strategy to Nāgārjuna's use of *catuskoṭi* does not. Here the author tries to dissolve the problem by referring to the conceptual frameworks of *pratītyasamutpāda*, *śūnyatā* and *nirvāṇa* on the one hand and four noble truths on the other. But he rather forgets that --

- (a) Nāgārjuna addresses the concepts like origination, *nirvāṇa* and four noble truths to the same critical method (which amounts to split the concept into two or four alternatives and reject them one by one) to which he does other concepts. So *nirvāṇa*, *pratītyasamutpāda* or *āryasatya*s are not beyond the scope of application of his method; they do not constitute the framework within which his method operates.
- (b) *Śūnyatā* also is not supposed to be a part of the framework beyond or behind the application of his method, but it is supposed to manifest itself through the application of the method.
- (c) Nāgārjuna has used the same critical method even with respect to *pramāṇas*. This is clear from his *Vigrahavyāvartanī*. So it is not correct to say : "He accepts only two criteria of knowledge. He uses them to decide whether a certain piece of knowledge is true or false" (p. 61)

In Chapter V, the author analyses the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of *tarka*. He understands the form of *tarka* as that of a contrafactual conditional and criticises the natures and roles of *tarka* as understood by both the Nyāya logicians themselves and by some modern scholars of Indian Logic. He ably shows that (a) *tarka* being itself supported by a law-like statement (*Vyāpti*-statement) cannot be used for supporting *vyāpti*; (b) to regard *tarka* as a kind of *apramā* is inconsistent with assigning to it the two fold role of rejecting the opponent's thesis and removing the doubt about the possibility of *vyabhicāra*; (c) the form of *tarka* being that of contrafactual conditional cannot be identified with that of a material conditional or that of *vyāpti*.

In Chapter VI the author analyses 'arthāpatti' as introduced by Mimāṃsakas and Vedāntins. He rejects the traditional understanding of *arthāpatti* as a means to knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and also some of its modern interpretations in terms of 'implication', 'hypothesis' and 'transcendental argument'. His

interpretation of *arthāpatti* as 'Contextual interpretation' is novel and interesting, but it needs to be critically examined in view of the following considerations :

- (a) 'Contextual interpretation' as the author explains it is basically an interpretation of a sentence/linguistic expression. This obliterates the basic distinction that Vedāntins and Mīmāṃsakas make between *dr̥ṣṭa-arthāpatti* and *śrūta-arthāpatti*. For example, one experiences silver in place of a conch-shell and when he looks closely, finds that it is not silver but a conch-shell. The apparent inconsistency between the two experiences is removed by thinking that the silver seen in the first experience must be illusory. (*mithyā*). This according to *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* is a case of *dr̥ṣṭa-arthāpatti*, but the author construes it as *śrūta-arthāpatti* because he makes it a matter of consistent interpretation of two contradictory statements : 'This is silver', 'This is not silver' (p. 79).
- (b) There is another difficulty in regarding '*arthāpatti*' as 'interpretation'. Here the distinction between *abhīdhānānupapatti* and *abhihitānupapatti* (as made in *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*) is relevant. According to this distinction the question of *arthāpatti* can arise at two stages.
 - i) One may find it difficult to understand the full and consistent meaning of an expression. *Arthāpatti* may help one to understand the meaning in the light of the context. So the expression 'Door' may be interpreted as 'Close the door', depending upon the context. This is the case of *abhīdhānānupapatti*. Here *arthāpatti* clearly plays the role of (contextual) interpretation.
 - ii) One may understand the complete meaning of an expression without any difficulty. But the difficulty may arise about the justifiability/truth of the statement. In that case something over and above the meaning of the expression may be accepted for justification of the truth of the statement. For example in order to justify the statement "Jyotṣoma sacrifice may be performed by the one who desires for heaven" some link between the performance and fruit of the sacrifice is accepted and this link is called *apūrva*. Here *arthāpatti* plays the role of an explanatory device, rather than an interpretative one.
- (c) Whether *arthāpatti* is to be understood as an interpretation or an

explanation or both, a strong relationship between what is interpreted/explained and the terms in which it is interpreted/explained is accepted by both Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins which they call *anyathānupapatti*. There is no mention of this relationship in the whole analysis of *arthāpatti* given by the author.

- (d) The term 'contextual' in the author's description of *arthāpatti* is not clear. Does the context in which a statement is made always play a distinctive role in deriving another statement from it by *arthāpatti*? Does it do so, for instance, in knowing by *arthāpatti* that Devadatta must be eating at night time from the statement : 'Devadatta has grown fat though he does not eat at day-time'. The knowledge of context certainly plays an important role in the case of *abhidhānānupapatti* (Cf. the door-example as cited above) but not in all cases of *arthāpatti*. So *arthāpatti* is neither necessarily an interpretation, nor is it essentially contextual in nature.

In the last chapter of the book the author makes a critical survey of Jaina logic. He makes many ingenious remarks which need to be considered seriously. I would like to discuss only two of them.

- (a) *Pramāṇa* and *Nyāya* are generally accepted in Jainism as two different kinds of understandings of (the same) reality, one being complete and the other partial. The author goes a few steps further and says that these two devices have different areas of application. *Pramāṇas* are concerned with the things in the world whereas *Nayas* are concerned with the Non-Jaina points of view. He further distinguishes the areas of operation of *Pramāṇa* and *Naya* from that of *Sapta-bhaṅgī* (*Syādvāda*). The area of operation of the latter according to the author is the metaphysical reality. Though this view of the author provides us with a convenient way of dealing with Jaina epistemology and logic, it is not supplemented by sufficient textual evidence, because Jaina logicians (including Yasovijayagani whom the author quotes frequently) also distinguish between *Pramāṇa*-hood understood from common place (*laukika*)-point of view and that from ultimate (*tāttvika*) point of view, in which case *Nayavāda* will go with the former and *saptabhaṅgī* with the latter. Moreover Jainas are fond of using the concept of *nayabhāsa* (rather than *naya*) while discussing the Non-Jaina points of view.

- (b) The author discusses Syādvāda in considerable details. He opposes the commonly accepted view that the sentences prefixed by 'syāt' give us the statements of a special kind (such as modal, conditional or probabilistic). He maintains that *Syātvākyas* do not have the status of statements or assertions at all. However, his criticism of the view that *Syāt-Vākyas* are conditional statements is not clear. It is hard to see the difficulty he envisages in assimilating the three kinds of expressions introduced by B. K. Matilal as the interpretations of a Syāt-sentence :

- (i) If p then A is B.
- (ii) A Conditional 'yes'.
- (iii) In a certain sense, Yes. The following example may be used to show that a *syāt*-sentence can be restated in all the three ways.

(A) *Syāt, ghaṭah asti*. This means :

(A₁) The pot is real in a certain way.

This 'certain way' is made clear in (A₂)

(A₂) The pot is real if 'the pot' refers to the earthen container which exists before us now.

(More technically : Pot exists in *sva-dravya*, *svakṣetra* and *sva-kāla* sense of the word 'pot'). A₂ implies that -

(A₃) 'The pot exists' is true under certain conditions.

If the 'The pot exists' is symbolised as q and the condition in which q is true is symbolised as p, then the whole sentence can be expressed in the three ways :

- (i)' q, if p
- (ii)' q is conditionally true.
- (iii)' q is true if a certain expression contained in q means so and so. It is not hard to see that (i)', (ii)' and (iii)' are similar in form to (i), (ii) and (iii) above.

The above symbolisations bring another important fact to our notice. It

is that the condition under which q is true pertains to the meaning of the sentence q itself. So the conditional sentence which *prima facie* appears to be a statement about the thing *pot*, is also a statement about the meaning of a sentence (or a part of a sentence) which describes the *pot*. This is the meta-linguistic aspect of the *Syāt*-sentence.

So the problem with Matilal's interpretation is not that it construes *Syāt*-sentence to be conditional, but that it does not bring out clearly the disguised metalinguistic character of the *Syāt*-sentence. Hence the author's suggestion that *Syāt*-sentence is not an empirical statement at all may be appreciated not because of the reasons he gives, but because of the fact that *Syāt*-sentence lacks a purely object-linguistic character.

Generally speaking, the author seems to have undertaken a two-fold task in this book. On the one hand he has tried to expose and criticise the pseudoformalist and pseudo-logician interpretations of various concepts and doctrines of Indian logic. On the other hand he has tried to pave a new way for the right understanding of Indian logic. He has certainly achieved remarkable success in his first task. But his success in the second task is mixed and unclear.

PRADEEP P. GOKHALE

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THE MIRROR AND THE MASK : ON THE TECHNOLOGY OF PHILOSOPHICAL MACHINES

SANIL V.

Why should thought be concerned about technology? Is there anything significant which philosophy alone can tell us about technology? Today, technology with its speaking and hearing aids, has become an irresistible provocation to talk about itself. Is there anything significant to be said about technology which the talking machines would never tell us? In my opinion a philosophy of technology should begin with these questions. Unless we clarify the immanent relation between thinking and technology, all our philosophical talk on technology would remain mere external criticism. Under what authority or right that philosophy takes hold of technology as an object of investigation?

Are these questions mere symptoms of an unwarranted hesitation of philosophy to get on with its task? It need not be so. Philosophical critique takes hold of its object through the self scrutiny of thought regarding its authority and right to do so. Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* does this in the case of scientific knowledge. However, Kant did not take on technology as a proper object of philosophical criticism. In fact in the case of technology, philosophy had to wait till Heidegger to formulate an immanent critique of technology -- more than a hundred and fifty years after the publication of Kant's First Critique¹. That we had to wait till the 20th century to witness the destructive potential of technology can only be a mere excuse. The unavailability of a philosophical critique should not give us the impression that the 18th century Europe was not concerned about technology. In fact technology had become a matter of concern much before Kant. Its immeasurable possibilities and demonic powers had come to the notice of all sections of the society. Luddites had by then gone on rampage against the growing spectator of technology. However, the signs of an immanent threat of technology which were so obvious even to the common man escaped the critical thinker. There seems to be a delay in the critical experience of the present making its imprint on philosophical thought. Can we philosophically account for this

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delay of philosophy?

In *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant demonstrated and delimited the legitimate authority of reason by giving one of its faculties the autonomy to pursue scientific investigation. We ought to do science and we are capable of doing it. He discovered the *a priori* conditions under which we seek knowledge. Kant also brought to light the illusions which reason generates in its own act of delegating the authority for the pursuit of scientific knowledge to one of its faculties. Reason is capable of taking the responsibility for generating these illusions -- as the price for its achievements in knowledge. Though it cannot prevent the generation of these illusions it can escape from their spell. More importantly Kant assured us that even though we can hope to know only the domain of appearance, scientific research is a worthwhile activity for human beings to pursue.

However, Kant could not provide any such demonstrations and demarcations in the case of technology. In *Critique of Practical Reason* technology does not find a place as a distinct human activity. Practical reason does not take any specific interest in technical action. This could not have been an oversight. First of all, for Kant, the Second Critique is not a critique of pure practical reason. Unlike the use of reason in the speculative interest where reason cannot legislate itself, the practical use of reason does not generate illusions. When reason works in its practical interest it does not delegate its authority to anyone else. The illusions it generates are not due to its own operations but due to external impurities. In this sense pure practical reason does not need any critical examination. Hence when reason acts in practical interest technology - for that matter any specific domain of human activity -- cannot be a source of illusions which merits philosophical scrutiny. Either technology "as applied science" is left to the domain of 'knowing' or is included in the domain of 'doing' and subsumed under the moral imperative.

The post Kantian critical philosophy sees the cause of this philosophical silence on technology in the inability of Kantian practical philosophy to critically illuminate the concrete moral situations of modern life. Kantian formalism has been accused of being subjectivist and empty. There have been two major critical responses to what is perceived as the emptiness or powerlessness of Kantian philosophy. Hegel's critique of Kant and Marx's metacritique of Hegel pave the

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way for a critical response which leads to the critique of instrumental reason advanced by the Frankfurt School. The second response comes from hermeneutic phenomenology which aims to give content to practical philosophy by bringing together Husserlian phenomenology and an hermeneutically retrieved Aristotelian ethics. Both these traditions endorse a practical turn in philosophy, though they understand this turn differently. The agenda of the Hegelian-Marxist tradition is the practical overcoming of the deformities of reason. The hermeneutic tradition aims at an ontological understanding of our being in concrete situations. Both these traditions have been vigilant against technology in their own ways.

The critique of instrumental reason advanced by the Critical Theory is directed at the bifurcation of reason in modern society and the resulting reification of our inner and outer natures. It takes as its point of departure the splitting of reason into autonomous spheres of social rationalisation. The technological age has been seen as the dominant age of instrumental rationality which leads to the domination of nature and hence of man. Horkheimer and Adorno traced this crisis of our historical present to the nature of reason itself. In the works of the contemporary exponents of this tradition, critique of technology becomes a critique of the colonisation of the life world by steering mechanisms like money and media. Despite internal differences this tradition characterises technology by the form of purposive rationality which works with a means-end schema. As we shall soon see Heidegger's critique begins by questioning such instrumental definitions of technology.

For hermeneutic phenomenology, the reason which governs human practice does not consist in the application of a predetermined law to instances. Practical reason moves from the instances to the universal, enabling one to find one's bearing in a concrete situation of action. This practical knowledge is an ontological condition for the theoretical knowledge of science and for the skill of the craftsman. This hierarchy of knowledge is maintained through a retrieval of the dispositions of the soul available in Aristotle - *sophia*, *episteme*, *techné* and *phronesis*.

The core of the hermeneutic reception of Aristotle is the distinction between *poiesis* and *praxis*. According to Aristotle, *poiesis* was making whereas *praxis* was doing. While *poiesis* has its end outside of the activity of making -

in the image of the product in the mind of the maker, *praxis* has its end within itself. While *poiesis* is predictable and definite, *praxis* is ambiguous and open to the fragility of human existence. The mode of knowledge proper to *poiesis* is *techné* whereas that which is proper to *praxis* is *phronesis*. The aim of grafting this distinction onto the phenomenological consciousness was to discover an ontological ground beneath the predominance of the technical activity of our age. This onto-phenomenology provides the ground for a critique of technology.

All these responses presuppose an instrumentalist or technological definition of technology. Technology is defined within a means-end schema which in turn is criticised. For Marxian and praxis philosophies, technology is essentially technological. They expect technology to respond to human existence in the same way machines respond to their operators. This conception enables them to celebrate the good uses of technology and condemn the bad uses and ask whether bad uses are avoidable errors or are essential to technology. It provokes us to search for alternative technologies. The technological definition of technology leads us to apparently contradictory conceptualisations of technology - technology as human activity which can be controlled by human choices and as an inhuman determinant of human existence. It also provides us with a set of criteria for evaluating the merits and demerits of technology - the well being of man, the safety of the planet, the survival of rare species of animals and plants etc. However, in the last instance, all these diverse responses form a meta-technology of technology. Philosophy, in making these pronouncements assumes that it is uncontaminated by the menace of technology. But so far as philosophy precludes such contamination its criticism of technology remains external.

It was Heidegger who noticed that the essence of technology is not technological. Technological definition, instead of freeing us, only advances the technological. However, nothing is more difficult for philosophy than posing the question of the essence of technology. Heidegger realised that it is a mistake to think that things would offer their essences to philosophical questioning without resistance. So he made the stubborn refusal of technology to thought as the guiding clue of his investigation. In order that technology shows a reciprocal concern for the question concerning its essence, the philosopher needs to establish a free relationship to it. Hence, for Heidegger, a thoughtful encounter with technology becomes the practice of freedom.

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At the outset we shall ask what motivated Heidegger to choose technology as the locus of thinking. Of course, Heidegger came to experience that "everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it". But by the time Heidegger wrote his essay on technology this experience had become common place. Humanity had already suffered the worst consequences of its bondage to technology and amidst the loud cries and criticisms the words of the thinker would not have been a solace or a solution. Still what was the motivation for the thinker to wake up late from his slumber and ask about technology?

By posing the question of technology Heidegger was in fact responding to a crisis of thinking as much as to the crisis of technology. His untimely meditations on technology are less focused on airplanes, television and coal mines than on a certain resistance experienced along the path of thinking itself - the resistance of metaphysics. Both technology and the poetry of Helderlin become indispensable for thinking which yearns to free itself from its own history. So thinking takes aim at technology not to pass a judgement on it but to see in it a clue for the practice of freedom. In other words philosophy turns towards technology in search of a philosophical clue. Here questioning is not merely a theoretical endeavour. It opens up human existence to technology.

Of course we have to begin with the technological definition of technology - that is the only definition we seem to have - and think it through to its provenance. Hence Heidegger pursues the instrumental to its essence. Our idea of the instrumental is a distorted or a worn out version of what the Greek experienced in word *techne*. The Greek used the same word *techne* for the excellence involved in the production of both arts and crafts - *poiesis*. In Heidegger's 'destructive retrieval' of Greek concepts *Poiesis* had nothing to do with the practical performance of making. It was a mode of revealing - revealing of whatever that does not bring itself forth.

However, this originary experience of the Greek word is denied to us. In fact technology is this very denial of the originary experience of the word. According to Heidegger, technology is no longer a bringing forth but a challenging forth. More than production it is provocation. Heidegger's term for the revealing that holds sway in technology is "enframing" (*Ge-stellen*). As enframing technology sets up nature and also man to stand by on call for further

ordering. Within the frame of *Ge-stellen* they are revealed as standing reserve.

What is the mode of revealing specific to enframing? Heidegger distinguishes the production involved in framing from that of forming. Forming of matter is the mode of being of equipment. Machines are not equipment nor framing is forming. Technological production is not the imposition of forms on inert matter. A hammer or a pair of shoes are pieces of equipment but an aeroplane waiting to take off is a machine. What is the difference between them?

An equipment receives form with regard to a certain use. Such usefulness is never assigned or added on to the equipment. "Usefulness is the basic feature from which this being regards us". The equipmentality of the equipment consists in this usefulness. But this usefulness rests in "the abundance of an essential Being of the equipment. For Heidegger the abundance which sustains the equipment is reliability. Reliability gives us the security to handle the equipment without reflection and explicit knowledge. "The repose of equipment resting within itself consists in its reliability. "But unlike the equipment, machines are neither the making of man nor can their essence be understood in relation to use. Machine, like a painting is a framed being. What is the mode of being of enframing and the abundance on which it rests? For Heidegger, the surplus that sustains technology is not that of reliability but of ambiguity. For Hegel, the machine was an autonomous tool. The Hegelian teleology of technology unfolds from the tool to the machine. Heidegger rejects both these technology and teleology.

Enframing should be distinguished from exploitation. Technology enframes nature; it does not exploit. First of all exploitation brings in a means-end schema which is not pertinent to technology. Secondly, the concept of exploitation presupposes the determination of value as the materialist predication of the subject. According to Heidegger, technology is the unbridled installation of the subject. Technology effects the pure value positing element as the subject. There is no subject as the producer of value who is subjected to exploitation. The subject of technological production is not a suffering agent but an overpowering one. It produces nature as a reserve.

The essence of technology is ambiguous or Janus-faced. Technology is at once the danger and the saving power. This ambiguity is not due to any slackness on the part of technology or the thinker. It is through totalisation, by

setting upon the whole nature as standing reserve that technology renders itself ambiguous. However, we shall not think that by designating this ambiguous essence as "enframing" we escape from the ambiguity itself.

No sooner than Heidegger tries to name the revealing of technology, language seems to refuse him. The voice of Being begins to sound monotonous.

The fact that now, wherever we try to point to modern technology as the revealing that challenges, the words "setting-upon", "ordering", "standing-reserve", obtrude and accumulate in a dry, monotonous, and therefore oppressive way, has its basis in what is now coming to utterance.²

According to Heidegger, language brings beings to words and appearance. "Only this naming nominates beings to their Being from out of their Being". However, the names the thinker invents for technology seem to conceal the Being of technology. This is not due to the lack of the "poetic essence" of the thinker or of thinking but due to the nature of unconcealment prevailing in technology. When it comes to enframing - the master word for technology - Heidegger realises that he is really twisting the arm of language.

According to ordinary usage, the word *Gestell* [frame] means some kind of apparatus, e.g., a bookrack. *Gestell* is also the name for a skeleton and the employment of the word *Gestell* [enframing] that is now required of us seems equally eerie, not to speak of the arbitrariness with which words of mature language are so misused. Can anything be more strange? Surely not.³

However, the thinker's daring to invent unfamiliar words to name the essence of technology is not pointless. Misuse of language has been an old custom of thinking.

We, late born, are no longer in a position to appreciate the significance of Plato's daring to use the word *eidos* for that which in everything and in each particular thing endures as present. For *eidos*, in the common speech, meant the outward aspect (*Ansicht*) that a visible thing offers to the physical eye. Plato exacts of this word, however, something utterly extraordinary: that it names what precisely is not and never will be perceivable with physical eyes. But even this is not the full extent of what is extraordinary here. For *idea* names not only the nonsensuous

aspect of what is physically visible. Aspect (*idea*) names and also is that which constitutes the essence in the audible, tasteable, the tactile, in everything that is in any way accessible. Compared with the demands that Plato makes on language and thought in this and in other instances, the use of the word *Gestell* as the name for the essence of modern technology, which we are venturing is almost harmless.⁴

The essence of technology comes to language in the word 'enframing'. But this word belongs to a language of error and is open to misinterpretation. It appears that both thinking and technology are entwined in an essential errancy and ambiguity. By inventing the word "enframing" Heidegger is not providing us with a correct description of technology. Instead, this word helps us to step into the ambiguity of language and technology. It releases us to the mysterious danger of technology. This releasement enables Heidegger to say at once "yes" and "no" to technology.

We let technical devices enter our daily life and at the same time leave them outside, that is, let them alone as things which are nothing absolute but remain dependent upon something higher. It would call this comportment towards technology which expresses "yes" and at the same time "no" by an old word, releasement towards things.⁵

According to Heidegger, technology with its ambiguous essence presents or depicts a certain ambiguity that characterises Western thinking on essence since Plato. Like the Van Gogh painting of the peasant shoes displays the equipmentality of the shoes - setting its truth to work - technology seems to put the essence of thinking on display. Technology is thought displayed within frames or on state. (The *stellen* of *Ge-setellen* retains the echo of *Darstellen* which means staging.) In this sense enframing is not confining something within a frame. It is an ambiguous production or revealing. This frame is a collaborative work of thinking and technology. The frame is the locus of exchange between metaphysics and technology. The essence of technology mirrors the philosophical question of essence. This relationship between thinking and technology is a curious one. By putting on the appearance of the philosophical production, the essence of technology thoroughly conceals its ambiguous essence. By provoking philosophy to question it, technology hides itself. Philosophy is the mask of technology. However, philosophy, as the game of unmasking, is the most easily penetrable mask. As philosophy, the mask is at once the clue to what it hides.

Van Gogh's painting of the peasant's shoes is a work - a work of art. It depicts or sets to work the equipmentality of the shoes. In a similar way can we say that technology, which depicts the truth of thought is a piece of work? Heidegger's answer would be ambivalent. It is a work in the sense that it discloses the truth of thinking. But its depiction or disclosure is so thoroughly distorted and concealed to merit the stature of a work. The essence of technology, precisely because it has entered into a relationship with thought - or it speaks to the thinker even if through a language of error -, is fragile and precarious. What is more dangerous and more effective than hiding behind the veil of truth?

According to Heidegger, Nietzsche is the first thinker to be contemporaneous with technology. In him thought and technology strike a perfect accord. Nietzsche raised the power of fiction to unconditional installation and allowed it to dominate truth. He discovered the fictionalising essence of reason as the power to posit the same over chaos. He understood this discovery as the inversion of Platonism which privileged truth over fiction. Nietzsche could think the most self-contradictory thought - truth is a necessary illusion - because in him metaphysical thinking simulates the metaphysical concept of truth. Thinking which simulates itself, becomes contemporaneous to the age of technology where life makes itself known through propaganda wars, in sheer facade and pomp - through simulation. Nietzsche founds philosophy as art when art has become mechanical or electronic reproduction or simulation. The thought of Nietzsche and technology are mirror images of each other - images of the Same. If questioning is the piety of thought, technology is the best answering machine. In the age of technology everything is open to question. Against the historical articulation of metaphysics, technology provides the metaphysical articulation of history as modernity. When metaphysics proposes the calculating subject, technology grants calculability the status of the subject rendering it frighteningly incalculable. In all respects thinking and technology imitate each other.

This imitative relationship is thoroughly misunderstood when we characterise technology as an imitation of nature or of man. Nowhere else is this misunderstanding more acute than in the philosophical debates on Artificial Intelligence. Before the philosophical debates on the relation between man and machine, the relation between philosophy and technology needs to be clarified. In fact by deciding to think the man-machine issue as a response to a certain technological invention - computer - we have already surrendered the claim of

thinking to technology. The debate on "whether machines can think?" only hides certain machines which are already at work in thinking.

Perhaps, the most probable place to discover philosophy imitating technology is where philosophy thinks the question of imitation. Imitation or mimesis as mere reproduction has always invited the contempt of philosophers. At the very beginning of western metaphysics, imitation was delivered the severest blow by Plato himself. While Plato's characterisation of art as imitation has been criticised, his privileging of *poiesis* over mimesis or production over reproduction continues to remain unexamined. Living in the golden age of Greek art Plato responded to his present by decreeing the expulsion of art from the domain of *Idea* and the ideal state. In a similar way, today the triumph of technology comes to thought in the most negative terms. We condemn Platonism only by repeating it. Is there a machine at work within these reversals and repetitions?

For Plato, *eidos*, was the manifestation of true being. The apparent being-*eidola* - manifests being only in an impaired manner. Hence the table made by the carpenter is at one remove from the *eidos* of the table. The table painted by painter is twice removed from the idea and suffers a diminution of being. However, while establishing this ontological hierarchy which is against art, Plato, in fact, grants being to the apparent being or the semblant. According to Heidegger, Nietzsche develops this Platonic slip into a style of philosophical thought. This style makes him contemporaneous with the age of technology where the semblant comes to dominance.

From Plato to Nietzsche, thought is a machine that works by fits and starts. Plato put this machine to work when he tried to think from the production by the craftsman to the production by the artist. While a craftsman can master only the art of making one or at the most a few things, a painter can produce almost everything, at the stroke of his brush without mastering any of the crafts required for the production of his models. How do we conceptualise such a production? All that we need to do is a thought experiment. Think about a man who produces everything that every other craftsman is able to make. He would be a wonder worker - a man of enormous powers. He could produce all things, himself and the god - 'anything and everything'. This is not a mere fantasy. Each of us are capable of such fantastic production. "you can do it quickest if

you just take a mirror and point it around in all directions''. By turning the mirror "you will quickly produce the sun and what is in the heavens; quickly too the earth; and quickly also you yourself and all over living creatures and implements and plants and everything else we mentioned just now".⁶

According to Plato, art is this wonder work. The artist produces everything and anything. In this sense artistic production is the encompassed consummation of all production. The mirror technology imitates the philosophical production of the idea. Art drives this imitation to the limits. The artist imitates the trajectory of philosophical production from the particular to the universal by moving from the making of specific things to the making of everything and anything.

This mirror-machine which boosts up production has always been at work in the speculative production of thinking. By imitating speculative production art is mirroring the work of the *speculum* itself. However, art while imitating and extending speculative production without limits and reserve also impoverishes it. The productive imitation of the speculative mirror suffers and falls into mere mirror work when imitated by the absolute mirror work of art. Mimesis is this absolute and mad mirroring which is at work in all production.

Mimesis suffers and falls in stature only in so far as it installs the philosophical machine - mirror - to do the work. The mirror ensures that all manners of production imitate the philosophical production. However, the mirror in the hands of a craftsman is only an equipment or tool. Only in the hands of an artist who imitates philosophical production by turning the mirror around with infinite speed and in all directions that it begins to function as a machine. The transformation of equipment into the machine does not take place without the philosophical touch. In this sense the credit for the invention of the machine goes as much to the philosopher as to the technologist. However, the philosophical moment is not the one which as Hegel thought would make the tool autonomous. Instead it drives every equipment to delirium. It is this delirium that makes the mirror to conceal and to distort. Mirror, once mechanised, becomes a mask. This mirror-mask is the primitive machine. There is no philosophical essence which is not already contaminated by the technological. There is no technology without the collaboration of the thinker. Such is partnership between thinking and technology.

Man as a thinking and doing being has always been placed at the intersection between thinking and technology. As we have seen, Heidegger 'dislocates' this interface to a mirror-mask machine. The precarious position of man with respect to this interface is attested by the prevailing anxiety over the immanent possibility of machines taking over or dominating man. While the mechanical imitation of man's bodily functions is seen to be useful the simulation of the power of thinking is perceived as a threat. As we have indicated earlier, by posing the question "can machines think" as a question about the essence of man and machine we fail to interrogate the essence of imitation which is already at work in thinking. However, technology has gone a step ahead of philosophy in affirming the importance of imitation by acknowledging the cognitive status of 'modelling'.

Scientists often build models of the phenomena which they want to understand. Very often these models are treated as mere heuristic devices. Once they throw some light on the phenomenon, they are discarded as mere metaphors or models. We are told not to mistake models for what they represent. For example, an Artificial Intelligence system, modeled on human thinking, though it can perform many human tasks more efficiently than human beings, is only a mere model. Those who advocate the triumph of technology too erase the specificity of the model. The outcome of the AI debate depends only on the conceptions of essence of man and machine and the question about the nature of modelling is not even posed.

Derrida's scattered reflections on the machine could be read as attempts to invent a mechanics of thinking which would reexamine the relationship between man, machine and mimesis. We shall briefly consider his essay *Freud and the Scene of Writing*⁷ to indicate the possibility of this new terrain of investigation.

Freud tried out several mechanical models to represent psychic functions. On the one hand, psychic functions are representational. On the other hand, Freud is searching for an adequate representation of these representational functions. He wanted a machine which would run by itself, like the psyche. But as Derrida notices, Freud's project failed for "what was to run by itself was the psyche and not its imitation or mechanical representation. For the latter does not live".⁸

The Mirror And The Mask

The model is a mere machine, whereas the psyche is alive. This assumed opposition between life and death seems to ground the distinctions between man and machine and also between the original and the model. The limit of resemblance between the machine and the psyche is prescribed in the inimitable essence of the psyche itself. Derrida gives up these reassuring distinctions and confronts the failure of Freud with a new question.

What questions will these representations impose upon us? We shall not have to ask if a writing apparatus - for example the one described in the "Notes on the Mystic Writing Pad" - is a good metaphor for representing, the working of the psyche, but rather what apparatus we must create in order to represent psychical writing, and we have to ask what the imitation, projected and liberated in a machine of some thing like psychical writing might mean⁹.

Freud failed to question the very possibility of the machine even beginning to resemble the psyche. This question would have uncovered the very possibility of a rhetorics and didactics of the psyche. According to Derrida this possibility of imitation, of metaphor and of mechanisation invades and contaminates the very essence of the psyche.

Metaphor as a rhetorical or didactic device is possible here only through the solid metaphor, the "unnatural", historical production of a supplementary machine, added to the psychical organisation in order to supplement its finitude. The very idea of finitude is derived from the movement of the supplementarity.¹⁰

Supplementarity as the relation between two apparatuses is the principle of the mirror-mask machine. Psyche is imitable by machine only to the extent that it is originally connected to a supplementary machine. Technology is not a mere application of cognitive representations or models because representation and modelling cannot even begin to work without the machine. It is within this supplementary machine that thought encounters technology.

NOTES

1. Heidegger, Martin "The Question Concerning Technology", in *Basic Writings*, ed. D. F. Krell, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1977, pp. 288-317
2. *Ibid*, p. 299.

3. *Ibid*, p. 301.
4. *Ibid*, p. 301.
5. Heidegger, Martin *Discourse on Thinking*, trans. John Anderson and E Hans Freund, Harper and Row, New York, 1959. p. 54.
6. Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Vol. 1. trans. D. F. Krell, Harper and Row, New York, 1979, p. 177.
7. Derrida, Jacques, "Freud and the Scene of Writing", *Writing and Difference*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1978, p. 196-231.
8. *Ibid*, p. 227.
9. *Ibid*, p. 198.
10. *Ibid*, p. 228.

IS CONFIGURATION (ĀKṚTI) DENOTED BY A WORD ?

RAGHUNATH GHOSH

The Present paper gives a critical account of the theory of configuration denoted by a word (*Ākṛtivāda*) with a special reference to Śabara. Śabara has opined that *ākṛti* or configuration of an object is denoted by a word while Kumarila accepts that a word denotes universal which is equivalent to Configuration (*ākṛti*). The systems of Indian philosophy express their difference of opinion on the view whether a word denotes universal (*Jāti*), individual (*vyakti*) or form (*ākṛti*). An effort has been made in this paper to throw some light on the theory which propounds that the configuration (*ākṛti*) is denoted by a word according to the Pūrvamīmāṃsakas in general and Śabara in particular. Incidentally the Mīmāṃsā position on the eternality (*nityatva*) of a word, its meaning and their relation that are very much connected with this *ākṛtivāda* has been highlighted and defended, which is followed by some critical and evaluative remarks.

It has been argued by the opponents that a word and its meaning are not naturally related on account of the fact that both of them remain in two different domains. Word remains in the mouth by virtue of being manifested there while meaning exists in the external world i.e., outside the mouth. Moreover, a word is understood as such but not as meaning while meaning is understood as such but not as word. When someone utters the word 'Cow', it merely indicates an animal endowed with the characteristic features like dewlap etc. The importance of such deliberation lies on the fact that the word 'Cow' exists in speaker's mouth and the meaning referred to by this remains in the characteristics of the cow. As the domain of a word (*Śabda*) and its meaning (*Artha*) is completely different, there cannot be a natural relation between them as claimed by the Mīmāṃsakas.¹

In response to the above-mentioned view, Śabara has left no stone

untuned to substantiate the fact that there is a necessary relation between a word and its meaning. To him, a word always denotes configuration (*ākṛti*) which alone constitutes the meaning of a word. The meaning of the term 'cow' is an animal characterised by a dewlap etc. (*Sāsnādiviśiṣṭa ākṛtiritibrumah*). The configuration (*ākṛti*) cannot be said to be identical with universal (*jāti*) or individual (*vyakti*). It is also to be borne in mind that without *ākṛti* one cannot have the idea of universal and individual. As one always remembers the form or *ākṛti* through the utterance of a word, this, being the meaning of the same, is permanently related (*nitya*) to the word.² From this it follows that a word is invariably associated with the configuration (*ākṛti*) which is actually perceived. The object which is already perceived is always taken as being established, and hence there is no necessity of forwarding some arguments in favour of its existence (*na pratyakṣa sati sādhyā bhavitum arhati*).³ Śābara has described *ākṛti* as a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and hence, a qualified object (*viśiṣṭa*) is known in terms of its qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). In other words, the knowledge of a qualified object (*viśiṣṭa*) presupposes the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). Without the knowledge of a qualifier i.e. *ākṛti* the objects like cow etc. cannot be known. One can understand the meaning of the term 'cow' which is taken as *viśiṣṭa* in terms of its configuration (*ākṛti*) which is qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) here (*Na hyapratite viśeṣaṇe viśiṣṭam kecana pratyeturmarhantīti*).⁴ The main function of a qualifier is to eliminate something from others (*itaravyāvartaka*). In the present case the characteristics (*ākṛti*) of a 'cow' like dewlap etc. serve the function of distinguishing 'cow' from non-cow. Hence, *ākṛti* of an object distinguishes it from the rest (*itarabhedaka*) by a way of pointing out its characteristic feature. As a word is the cause of the awareness of the form of an object (*ākṛtipratyayasya nimittam*),⁵ it is called *viśiṣṭa* and the *ākṛti* which is known through this is called eliminating or distinguishing factor.

The *ākṛti* functions in two ways—first, it gives rise to the knowledge of an individual (*vyakti*) and secondly, it can show the inherent similarity among the individuals by way of integrating them. That a particular cow (*govyakti*) is not different from other cows is known only through its *ākṛti*. That is why, *ākṛti* serves the function of a universal. In this way, the Mīmāṃsakas have tried to show that *ākṛti* is the key-factor which ultimately points to both individual (*vyakti*) and universal (*jāti*).⁶ The view of the Naiyāyikas that a word refers to universal, individual and configuration (*vyaktyākṛtijātayastu padārthah*)⁷ can be

refused by the Mīmāṃsakas in the above-mentioned manner. In fact, if *ākṛti* is accepted as meaning of a word, it will adhere to the law of parsimony (*Lāghava*). There is no strong reason behind accepting the three (*jāti* etc) as the meaning, because the *ākṛti* of an object itself can refer to both individual and universal.

The *ākṛti*, Śabara observes, is permanently related to an individual. As a relation is called *dvistha* i.e. existing in two relata, the knowledge of one of the relata i.e. *ākṛti* gives rise to the knowledge of the another i.e. *vyakti*.⁸ It is a self-evident fact that as soon as a word is uttered, an individual (*vyakti*) is understood through it. It is very difficult to differentiate whether this awareness of an individual arises from the word or from the *ākṛti* denoted by the word. Which one is more important in this context is to be understood with the help of methods of agreement and difference (*anvayavyatireka*).⁹ When the *ākṛti* of an object is known, the individual is also known simultaneously as it serves as a differentiating element of a particular individual from others. On the other hand, when a word is uttered and corresponding *ākṛti* is not remembered due to some mental indisposition, it cannot give rise to the knowledge of *vyakti*.¹⁰ From this Śabara intends to say that it is *ākṛti* alone which constitutes the meaning of a word.

Now Śabara is trying to justify how *ākṛti* of an object is known. The characteristic features of an object are known through the repeated use of the term and its corresponding experience. Through the utterance of the word 'Cow' (*go*) one can understand its *ākṛti* if there is repeated use of the term to refer to this particular *ākṛti*. The configuration of an object is known through a word if we are familiar with the constant use of the term.

Though Śabara has accepted the importance of repeated use of the word to understand the *ākṛti* of an object, it should be clearly borne in mind that word and its denotation (*ākṛti*) do not depend on the conventional usage of the word. To him a word is used to indicate a new-born calf which is not seen before. On the other hand, a word 'Cow' has not been applied previously to a new-born calf.¹¹ On account of this the term 'Cow' indicating an individual does not depend on the actual usage of the term. In other words, it can be said that the meaning of the term does not depend on the conventional usage. If the meaning of a word depends on the experience, it would be regarded as conventional, which is purely undesirable to the Mīmāṃsakas.¹² It may be recalled in this

connection that between a word and its meaning there is a constant or permanent relation which indicates the non-conventional character of the same.¹³

Śabara thinks that *ākṛti* is the meaning of a word. This *ākṛti* is neither opposed to meaning (*artha*) nor subordinate to meaning (*artha*), but *artha* or meaning itself. The words by which some objects having *ākṛti* are expressed remain in the visible world. But there are many words or sentences which cannot express things having *ākṛti* as meaning. The injunctions like *Svargakāmo yajeta* cannot express the meaning in the form of *ākṛti* as these words do not bear any visible character. The term '*Vidhāna* i.e. injunction is derived from '*vidhiyate anena iti*' i.e., that by which something is enjoined. This injunctive sentence cannot be taken as capable of referring to *ākṛti* or to *vyakti*.¹⁴ When Śabara says that a word indicates *ākṛti* of an object, it is applicable to only visible dimension of reality. But so far as the non-visible (*Adṛṣṭa*) dimension of reality is concerned, this thesis propounded by Śabara is not applicable there. For, the words indicating the invisible (*adṛṣṭa*) dimension like *devatā*, *Svarga* etc. do not have any visible *ākṛti* at all. As to the supersensuous entities like deity, heaven etc., one cannot assign a proper name (*sarājñā*) to them. One can name the objects having particular features and one can do so keeping the particular features in view. If there is an entity having supersensuous character, any outward feature of the same is not found through which they can be described in terms of language. After considering this dimension of reality the Mīmāṃsakas have accepted the relation between a word (*śabda*) and its meaning (*artha*) as *apauruṣeya* (i.e., not caused by any person). The imperceptible objects like deity etc. cannot be described by name etc. because proper names are generally used to inform the particular feature of an object. If these particular features are not known at all due to their imperceptible character, the ascription of name is not possible. That is why, the relation between a word and its meaning is described as *apauruṣeya* (i.e. not caused by any person).¹⁵

One can utter a word many times in different occasion and one can understand the same word permanently due to its unifying significance. That is why, Śabara has accepted the eternal character of a word due to the reference to its *ākṛti*. If uttered, it produces a particular *ākṛti* without any fail. Here the term '*nitya*' is to be taken as conveying the sense of permanence, consistency and continuity.

Is Configuration (Ākṛti) denoted by a word ?

If a word is pronounced eight times, it is known as the same by everybody. This cognition of perceptual form gives the certainty of *nityatva* of word. If a word 'Cow' is uttered in many times, the same set of phonemes (*g,am* etc.) is realised in each case of perception, as they are not different from a word.¹⁶

It may be argued that a word uttered yesterday and that uttered today is completely different. So how the sameness or *nityatva* of a word is established. In reply, Śābara rejoins that a word uttered yesterday is not destroyed and hence it is capable of being perceived today. The understanding of the previously uttered word today is a kind of recognition which comes under perception. Had it been perished the other day when it was uttered, there would not have been the possibility of recognising it. It is evident from our day to day behaviour that we can recognise our father, mother etc. for the second time, which leads us to assume the sameness or *nityatva* of the object. This notion of *nityatva* or sameness of an object leads them to accept that *ākṛti* is denoted by a word. For this reason the Mīmāṃsaka⁸ have taken the word '*nitya*' in a completely different sense. To them *nityatva* of an object is capable of being perceived. Due to its perceptible character it can neither be taken as beginning-lessly eternal (*anadinitya*) nor unchangeably eternal (*kuṭasthanitya*). For this reason *nityava* cannot be taken in a metaphysical sense, but in the sense permanent and consistent which is capable of being perceived. In other words, a word is called *nitya* on the strength of our experience of its continuous and consistent use. The *nityatva* does not refer to the temporarility, but it refers to the consistency between a word and its meaning i.e. *ākāra*. The *ākāra* which is signified by a word has got unity (*aikarūpya*) and without parts (*niravayatva*), which are the marks of *nityatva*.¹⁷ *Śabda* being *niravayava* (having no parts does not have any cause of production and destruction. As a word (*śabda*) is characterised by unity etc, it is *nitya* in character. In order to substantiate this *nityatva* of a *śabda* the Mīmāṃsakas have accepted the unity of *ākāra* signified by it.

The aphorism of Jaimini - *Ākṛtiṣṭu Kriyārthatvāt*¹⁸ is formulated primarily for the refutation of the theory called *Vyaktivāda* and Substantiating *ākṛtivāda*. One point is to be kept in mind that the term *ākṛti* is not taken as combination of the parts (*avayavaśānsthāna*) as accepted by the Naiyāyikas. *Ākṛti* which is denoted (*vācya*) by a word is nothing but *jāti* according to Kumarila. To him, the wise persons describe *jāti* as *ākṛti* because it is *jāti* alone through

which *vyakti* is determined (*ākṛti*). The object i.e. *jāti* through which a *vyakti* is ascertained (*vyaktirākriyate yayā*) is called *ākṛti*.¹⁹ If *ākṛti* is taken in the sense of *jāti*, then alone the *niravayavatva* of a word and its denotation can be proved, which indicates the *nityatva* of a *śabda*. If *ākṛti* is taken in the sense of the combination of the parts, it will lose its *nitya*-character. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, both *Vācya* i.e. signified object and *Vācaka* i.e. the signifier are taken to be *nitya*. Though each and every individual case of 'cow' is different from each other, there are common features among all the cows through which a cow is differentiated from a horse. These common features described as *ākṛti* are perceptual and hence, no argument against this position is tenable. The truth realised universally through perception cannot be challenged, as it will go against perceptual awareness (*anubhava*). Hence, i.e. *Vācya* (i.e. *ākṛti*), *Vācaka* (a word) and their relation are *nitya*.²⁰

For another reason a word is described as *nitya*. In the *sūtra* '*sarvatra yaugapadyāt*'²¹ it has been said that due to simultaneity of knowledge of all individuals a word has to be accepted as *nitya*. When the term 'go' (cow) is uttered, it can provide us the knowledge of all cows and hence, it can be accepted as *nitya*. If *ākṛti* in the sense of *jāti* is accepted as the meaning of a word, it cannot be taken for granted that it has relation with a word which is temporary in nature. For, when an individual knowing relation points to a particular cow as the meaning of the term 'cow', the knower does not understand this particular cow as the meaning of the term, but all the cows. Otherwise, there would not have been the verbal comprehension of another cow. If a word is taken as temporary (*anitya*), the relation or the knowledge of the relation between a word and its *ākṛti* would not be possible at all. For, it is very difficult to ascertain the meaning of all words if they are admitted as temporary. If a word is accepted as external, it being in past and present can be apprehended by the knower through the method of agreement and difference (*anvayavyatireka*) after observing their relation in many times. Hence, a word and *ākṛti* is *nitya*.²²

Jaimini and Śabara have forwarded another reason in favour of *nityatva* of a word. If it is said that ten persons are fed, it indicates the difference of individuals (*vyaktibheda*). On the other hand, the statement - 'The person has been fed ten times' indicates the non-difference of the individuals (*vyaktyabheda*) as well as difference of action (*kriyābheda*). If someone utters the word 'cow' ten times, it indicates the difference of the action of utterance and non-difference

of the individual cow.²³

Though the sun is seen in the east in the morning, in middle in midday and in the west in the afternoon, the same sun is perceived by all. From the movement of the sun one cannot assume the multiplicity of the sun. In the like manner, the word perceived by various persons in various places cannot be said to be many.²⁴

It may be argued again that the Mīmāṃsakas accept the word, meaning and their relation as eternal. If it is so, the change of meaning of a particular word in a difference place and time cannot be explained. The meaning of a particular word which prevailed in ancient society may be changed in present social context. As the present meaning is new to us or produced, the word, meaning and their relation is not eternal.

In reply, it may be said that though the word, different meaning of it and their relation exist near our auditory sense organ, it is not always related to us. As a word is all-pervasive, the nature of it is covered with non-agitated air. When the air of the mouth of the speaker hits this non-agitated air, the air becomes divided leading to the manifestation of sound. So, the sound is not always manifested though eternal in character. Following the same line of argument it may be said that from the non-manifestation of a particular meaning it does not follow that this meaning was not associated with the particular word. Different meaning of a word may exist in non-manifested condition and afterwards it may be manifested. Hence, there is no origination of the meaning of the particular word. Keeping this manifestation in view, perhaps Śābara has used the term '*Aupattika*' (having a beginning) as an adjunct of word, meaning and their relation. It should also be kept in view that once a particular meaning is attached to a particular word, it will go in future conventionally. Hence, the term '*Aupattika*' or '*Nitya*' is to be taken in a technical sense mentioned above,

It has been stated earlier that the term *nitya* is not used in the sense of absolute eternity, but it has been accepted as a permanent and consistent entity. The view is substantiated again through the coinage of the term '*aupattika*'; in the sense of *nitya* which means the coexistence of the sound with its meaning in an 'inborn' relation. As the Vedas are not made by any individual (*apauruṣeya*), the sound, its meaning and their relation are not produced, which again leads us to accept the *nityatva* of it.

be explained. The second alternative is also not tenable, because a single utterance of a word cannot establish convention. If somehow convention is accepted, it cannot justify the usage of the same eternally. The third alternative is also not acceptable, because there is no place for God (in Pūrvamīmāṃsā) who can be accepted as the cause of setting up convention. Hence, the meaning of a word is not created through convention.²⁶

Moreover, if a word, its meaning and their relation is accepted as conventional but not *nitya*, the initial verbal usage to denote an object at the time of first creation cannot be explained. An animal having dewlap etc. is denoted by the term 'cow' at the time of initial creation after dissolution. As at this stage, there is no convention, how is such usage possible? In reply, it can be said that between these there is a *nityasambandha*. Between the word 'cow' and *ākṛti* denoted by it there is consistency or invariability. That is why, the word gives rise to its *ākṛti invariably*. For, this relation is otherwise described by the Mīmāṃsakas as *aupattika* i.e. inborn, which implies that as soon as a word is originated, it inheres the capability of indicating a particular *ākṛti*. Even if it is accepted that there had been in existence before that and hence the said relation between them could have no beginning in time.

It has been said earlier that proper name or *saṃjñā* cannot be assigned to the real objects that are *adrṣṭa* in character. The words like heaven, *devatā* etc. have no comprehensible external character or *ākṛti* which can be denoted by the terms. If it is so, the problem arises how can the meaning of these words be known? If *ākṛti* constitutes the meaning of a word, these words would have been meaningless due to the absence of *ākṛti* capable of being seen. In reply, the Mīmāṃsakas could say that *ākṛti* is common in both *drṣṭa* and *adrṣṭa* dimension of reality. The *ākṛti* existing in the invisible object is not capable of being discussed, as it is not in the specific form. Dr. Gachter observes : "Moreover, he (Śabara) sees no reason to explain the *ākṛti* of *devatā* in any concrete way, simply because there is no complete information available apart from their presence in and through *śabda*. *Śabda* has its support in the invisible as is known from inference based on perception in the visible dimension of reality... In fact he does not and cannot deny *ākṛti* for the *adrṣṭa* dimension without restricting *śabda* only to the *drṣṭa* dimension... However, it is evident for him that one cannot describe the invisible, the *ākṛti* of the invisible dimension is not at our disposal in which sense it is ineffable".²⁷ In fact, *ākṛti* is to be

accepted as of two types-*vyakta* (manifested) and *avyakta* (non-manifested). The invisible objects like *svarga*, *devatā* etc. must have some '*ākṛti*' which is not capable of being expressed. Had it been not there, there would not have been corresponding concept with the utterance of the terms. It cannot be said that these are meaningless words and hence these words give rise to meaning which is nothing but '*ākṛti*' of them. Though these *ākṛtis* cannot be expressed due to the absence of any external concrete form, some *ākṛtis* in the forms of ideas have to be accepted there. Hence, Śābara's view that *ākṛti* is denoted by a word is very much consistent.

NOTES

1. "Svabhāvato hvasambaddhāvetau śabdārthau. Mukhe hi śabdam upalabhāmahe, bhūmāvartham. Śabdo'yamna tvarthah, arthoyamna śabdaḥ iti ca vyapadiśanti. Rūpabhedo'pi bhayati. Gauriti imam śabdam uccārayanti. sāsñādimantam artham avabudhyante". *Śābarabhāṣya* on 1. 1. 5.
2. "Gośabda uccarite sarvagavisu yugapatpratyavo bhavati. Ata akṛtīvacanavarṇ. Na cākṛtya śabdasya sambandhaḥ śakyate kartum. Nirdiśya hvākṛtiṃ kartā sambadhnīyātNitye tu sati gośabde vahukṛtva uccaritaḥ śrutapūrvaścānyasu govyaktiṣvanvayavyatirekābhyām ākṛtīvacanam avagamaīṣyati tasmādapi nityaḥ". *Ibid*, on 1. 1. 19
3. *Śābarabhāṣya* on 1. 1. 5.
4. *Ibid*. on 1. 3. 33.
5. *Ibid*.
6. Othmar Gächter : *Hermeneutics and Language in Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, Motilal, 1983, pp. 49-50.
7. *Nyāyasūtra*, 2/2/66/195.
8. "Ākṛtirhi vyaktyā nityasambaddhā, Sambandhinyām ca tasyāmavagatāyām sambandhyantaramavagamyate". *Śābarabhāṣya* on 1/3/33.
9. "Tadetadātmapratyakṣam, Yacchabda uccarite vyaktiḥ pratīyate iti. Kiṃ śabdāduta ākṛteriti, vibhāgo na pratyakṣaḥ, so'nvayavyatirekābhvāmavagamvate. "*Ibid*.
10. "Antareṇāpi śabdam vā ākṛtimavabudhyeta avabudhyetaivāsau vvaktiṃ.Yastūccarite'pi śabde manasādapacārāt kadā-cidākṛtiṃ nopalabheta na jātucidasāvimām vyaktimavagaccheta". *Ibid*.

11. "Tasmāttatra na vartīṣyate yadi yatra prayogo dr̥ṣṭastatra vṛttiḥ. ādya jātāyām gavi prathamaprayogo na prāpnoti tatrādr̥ṣṭatvāt". *Ibid.*
12. "Tasmanṇā prayogāpekṣo gośabdo vyaktivacana iti śakyata āśrāyitum". *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.* on 1. 1. 19.
14. "Vidhīyate" neneti vidhānam śabdaḥ ...Na tasyākṛtīvacanatā nyāyā na vyaktivacanateti". *Ibid.* on 1. 3. 16.
15. "Anupalabdhe ca devatādāvarthe 'narthakaṁ samjñākāraṇaṁ aśakyam ca. Viśeṣān pratipattum hi samjñāḥ kriyante viśeṣāṁścoddiśya. Tad viśeṣeṣvajñāyamāneṣu ubhayamāpya-navakṛptam Tasmāt apauruṣeyaḥ śabdasya arthena sambandhaḥ". *Ibid.* 1. 1. 5.
16. "Aṣṭakṛtvo gośabda uccarita iti vadanti nāṣtau gośabda iti kimato vadyeṣām. Anena vacanenāvagamyate pratyabhijñāntīti". *Ibid.* 1. 1. 20.
17. "Niravayavo hi śabdaḥ avayavabhedānavagamānniravayavatvācca mahatvānupapattiḥ". *Ibid.* on 1.1.17
18. *Ibid.* 1. 3. 30.
19. "Jātimevākṛtiṁ prāhurvyaktirākriyate yayā/sāmānyam tacca piṇḍānāmekabuddhinivandhanaṁ.¹¹ Ślokavārtika, Ākṛtivada - 3.
20. *Bhāṣyabhāvārtha* on sūtra - 1. 3. 33. Edited by Bhutanath Saptatirtha, vol. I, pp. 187-190. Basumati.
21. *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* - 1. 1. 19.
22. *Śabarabhāṣya* on 1. 1. 19.
23. "Śamkhyābhāvat" - *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* - 1. 1. 20. and *Śabarabhāṣya* on the same.
24. Sukhamay Bhattacharyya : *Pūrvamīmāṃsā darśana* p. 26.
W. B. B. B., 1983. "Ādityavad Yaugapadyām". *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1. 1. 15.
25. Ruegg D. S. *Contributions a l'histoire de la philosophie linguistique indienne*. Paris, 1959, p.56.
26. *Ślokavārtika* (Sambandhākṣepaparihāra).
27. Othmar Gächter : *Hermeneutics and Language in Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, Motilal, 1983, p. 53.

MASTER-SLAVE RELATIONSHIP IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

MUHAMMAD KAMAL

This paper is concerned with a significant aspect of Hegel's philosophy which has a widespread influence on Marxism and Existentialism. To begin with I would prefer to discuss the concept of 'Time' by Hegel which provides a clue in understanding the nature and structure of 'Consciousness.' In pursuing this interpretation we need first to distinguish mathematical time, as the latter determines the stream of "world-spirit" or 'Consciousness' analysed in the *Phenomenology of Mind*. As we know, mathematical time deals with quantity and lifeless reality and is divided into equal units. Human time, by contrast, is qualitative consists of unrepeatable events in which every new event is richer in content than those antecedent to it. This concept of time is central to Hegel's philosophy. One can find explicit references to Hegel's concept of human time in the *The Phenomenology*, where he states that,

"Time appears as Spirit's destiny and necessity, where Spirit is not yet complete within itself."¹

The revelation of Consciousness in the self-formative proocess of human history takes place in two different ways; First, Consciousness posits itself as something temporal and dynamic. Second, it objectifies itself and becomes a lifeless entity or something spatial. And then it stands as an opposition to that kind of spatial entity or 'Being' which is Consciousness in its otherness.

In this confrontation, Consciousness as an imperative condition for the sake of achieving self-realisation completely. As we see, Hegel's view of time is distinct from that which Kant has described in his *First Critique*. For Hegel, Time and Space are not subjective conditions of sensory experiences, but ontological, simply because time is the formative process of Consciousness

without which history is unthinkable and since that process takes place in the world, time is, then, not subjective. Conversely, one could also argue that since all the categories in Hegel's philosophy are real and 'Time' is one of them, then 'Time' is real or ontological. Temporality of Consciousness draws a line of demarcation between human beings and the given objects. Since Consciousness on this view is temporality, then, it is not something identical to itself like an inanimate entity. In other words, Consciousness is what it is not, because it is incomplete and dynamic and is in the state of constant change striving to fill itself with content. This movement of Consciousness is also self determined. The 'Other' is its own externalisation and for this reason there is no distinction between externality and internality of Consciousness. This significant characteristic of Consciousness provides the ground for freedom and quite essential for the category of 'True Infinite' in Dialectic Logic, where Hegel remarks;

"The Being of spirit may be understood by a glance at its direct opposition-matter. As the essence of matter is gravity, so, on the other hand, we may affirm that the substance, the essence of Spirit is freedom."²

As I understand them Hegel's notions of temporality and Consciousness have had a profound impact on the philosophies of Heidegger and Sartre. Human existence (*Dasein*), in Heidegger's philosophy, has been described as an ability to anticipate and direct one's self towards future possibilities and towards a realised end. This is what Hegel tries to generalise in his philosophy. But the intrinsic difference between Hegel and Heidegger arises with the notions of *Dasein*'s authentic mode of existence and individuality. History for Hegel is one of a collective Consciousness. It is a public history in which the individual is subordinated by the universal will and the parts are therefore determined by the whole. By contrast, Heidegger distinguishes between public life and the authentic mode of existence and, for him, public life gives an end to the authenticity of *Dasein*. In this context, freedom is an essential characteristic of the authentic being and history is the history of individuals rather than a universal will. The dynamics of human reality on this view stresses novelty and no historical event will remain eternally true. Human existence is nothing but a constant negation of itself and an external reality.

It has been mentioned before that consciousness and Being oppose each other and the oppositions in Dialectic Logic are identical and different, and contain each other. This kind of relationship suggests that Consciousness realises its distinction from and similarities to Being. As a result that alienated reality will be understood as nothing more than another form of Consciousness and for that reason it will be negated as an independent reality and preserved. The transformation of Being is initially accomplished theoretically, through the epistemological grasp of Being of different stages in Dialectic of Consciousness which has occupied the first half of the *Phenomenology*, and then, transformation of Being is accomplished practically in (Desire) by Labour. These two different ways namely, theoretical and practical, are necessarily connected and supplement each other. Theoretical appropriation is the conceptualisation of Being for the sake of change. This relationship between theory and practice, however, does not label Hegel a pragmatic philosopher like William James and John Dewey, because all kinds of knowing is not doing.³ But at the same time, Hegel does not deny that knowledge can become a force or must become a force for social change. It should be remembered here that Karl Marx as one of the Hegelians, has put a great emphasis on the necessary relationship between theory and practice and firmly believed that theory be prior to practice, for example in *Das kapital* he remarks that,

"A spider conducts operations which resemble those of weavers, and a bee puts many of human architect to shame by the construction of its honey comb cell. But what distinguishes the worse architect from the best of bees is that the architect builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in work. At the end of every labour process, a result emerges which had already been conceived by the worker at the beginning, hence, it already existed ideally."⁴

Generally speaking, Hegel's view of unification of Consciousness with Being can be understood on the grounds of his ontology, logic and epistemology. If we look at Consciousness and Being in the super triad of Hegel's ontology, we find them as two main oppositions having a dialectic relationship. On one side they appear to be identical because Being is the self-externalisation of Consciousness. Yet, on the other side they are different because being is the idea in its otherness and alienated from Consciousness. Logical unification consists in the application of the same dialectic relationship in the realm of logic.

Consciousness is taken as thesis and Being as antithesis. Thesis and antithesis in every triad are identical because the latter is derived from the former and then antithesis is something other than thesis. The contradictions between thesis and antithesis are superseded in their unity understood as synthesis. Epistemological unification is the theorisation of Being and is accomplished at the end of dialectic movement of Consciousness. In Dialectic of Consciousness being is apprehended conceptually and transformed into ideality. This Movement from reality to ideality renders another movement from ideality to a new reality. The first part of the *Phenomenology* treats four stages in which Consciousness develops itself and transforms its object epistemologically from "Sense-certainty" to "Perception", "Understanding" and "Reason", where the external reality is apprehended by Consciousness and loses its independence and otherness. In this new movement, Dialectic of Consciousness integrates into Dialectic of Labour or theory into practice with the help of 'Desire' (*Begierde*), which turns Hegel's philosophy from pure epistemological tendency to a pragmatic approach to reality. In Dialectic of Consciousness the external reality, as it is stated before, does not completely vanish but loses its independence. Paradoxically, the external reality must be both preserved and destroyed. Desire attempts to resolve this paradox by making the external reality its own, by taking possession of it. With this shift to practical ground we find ourselves confronted with new realities and are therefore more concerned with life and social conflict in history. Dialectic of Consciousness gives us an account of reality theoretically which does not ascertain complete negation of Being. Now, with Dialectic of Labour we discuss the initial attempts to specify a practical attitude of Consciousness in the world, and to find the relationship between what we know and what we do.

Humans are thinking-beings. In thinking, Consciousness reflects from itself, contemplates external reality and becomes aware of the objects in the world. Hegel's account of Consciousness is different from that offered by Descartes in his Second Meditation. Humans, in dialectic philosophy are not only thinking beings but also self-conscious. To be aware of the objects in the world should be accompanied by self-awareness. But then, what bring consciousness back to itself? Consciousness becomes aware of itself and sets out to prove its master of being by finding itself in a state of desire (*Begierde*), an intentional reflection in which Consciousness becomes aware of the objects

as well as aware of itself. When I feel thirsty and having desire to drink, I become aware of two things; the desired object and that I am thirsty.

The Concept of 'I' is revealed to me through my desire to drink and then I direct my negative power to master and to assimilate the desired object. In this case, 'Desire' becomes a power of negation and modifies the object into something mine. On the other hand this desire utilises human knowledge for the transformation of the given reality into commodities and tools. Here I would like to mention that the category of 'Desire', in some ways, resembles the concepts of *Eros* in Plato's *Symposium*, 'will' for Schopenhauer and Nietzsche and the existential of '*Sorge*' in Heidegger's philosophy. Consciousness as Desire is a vacuum striving to fill itself. The need for a positive content pushes Consciousness to appropriate the desired object but the absence of that positive content is the same in all sentient beings. Then, what is the difference between animal desire and human desire?

In order to understand the difference between these two kinds of desire, one must make a distinction between two kinds of objects. The corporeal objects which are for biological needs and the non-corporeal objects. Consciousness desires the objects in the world, appropriates and uses them. This type of desire is not distinct from animal desire but the needs of individual Consciousness are fulfilled through association with other individual Consciousness as Hegel says, "Self-Consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-Consciousness."⁵ This kind of desire which is for recognition distinguishes human desire from animal desire. I desire that my freedom and my values be recognised by other. Desire for recognition is a major reason for the fight to death and the division of society into antagonistic classes. Findlay believes that a self-conscious being desires another self-conscious being because he/she sees herself in the other, "a more adequate exemplification of itself where a phenomenal object is living; a living thing has something of the perpetual direction toward self which is characteristic of the self-conscious subject and therefore serves to mirror the latter."⁶ This description of human relationship in the *Phenomenology*, however, contradicts Hegel's theory of Right and Duty in the *Philosophy of Right*. The *Phenomenology* portrays terror and fight to death as a necessary condition for human freedom. Whereas Hegel's interpretation of rights and duty stresses mutual recognition among the individuals and gives no indication to this hostile situation.⁷ Mutual recognition

is a reciprocal relationship through which each person is committed to treat others as 'persons' or as self-conscious beings rather than objects. This idea has also inspired thinkers such as Heidegger and Sartre, in their discussions on authenticity and Commitment. Sartre, for example, believes that our recognition of others as human beings includes their freedom and in Heidegger's philosophy, the individuals are authentically bound together only when each one of them recognises the freedom of the other. The *Phenomenology*, as a philosophical description of human history, deals with inequalities and non-mutual recognition. In this kind of interpersonal relationship, when the recognition is not mutual, the recognised-desire treats the recognising-desire as a mere object and puts itself in a position of a sadist who requires the victim to become an object and no longer the source of threat and challenge.

Let us say, two self-conscious beings meet for the first time. As soon as they confront each other the problem of the certainty of their freedom becomes problematic, because both of them have their own point of view on the world and are free to do so prior to this confrontation with the other's otherness. And, hence, they seek recognition of each other's freedom. But since both of them are self-conscious beings, holding similar claims and demands, recognition will not be an easy task and it can be achieved only in a fight to death. Fighting out the battle is the only way an individual could come to self-Consciousness or to the knowledge of freedom. Each of these individuals tries to negate the other by killing and risking its own life but the fight between them does not lead to the death of one of the adversaries, because the recognised individual requires a witness rather than a corpse. Killing the other destroys that witness and then recognition becomes impossible⁸. For this reason the recognised-desire (the master) does not kill the vanquished, and the recognising-desire (the slave) cannot transcend his/her animal desire to risk life for freedom. She prefers servitude to death and his life will be determined only by her desire to live.⁹ This relationship between two individuals is the result of an attempt by Consciousness to negate the external reality and to achieve recognition.

Therefore, Hegel has arrived at a conclusion, that an individual's desire needs another desire for self-certainty and freedom as a witness, "Self-Consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that and by the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say it is only by being acknowledged and recognised"¹⁰. In this regard an individual's desires are not

a threat for each other, but necessary too. They provide objective certainty and recognition for each other. The existence of other is essential and at the same time a threat; essential, as one needs recognition by others, and a threat, in the sense that others bring limitation and obstacles to one's freedom. Recognising someone as another human being like myself is recognising that, this human being has power to have his/her own desire and his/her own point of view. This significant property the other possesses is an ability to both escape from and challenge me. The best way to express this interpersonal relationship is in Sartre's statement in *No Exit*, that 'Hell is the other people'. Another motif behind human's desire for another desire is that desire for natural objects suffers frustration and cannot negate the totality of Being, simply because desire depends upon its object to exit. Desire is always desire for something, and since desire makes human beings conscious of themselves, then the moment our desire for an object is extinguished we cease to be self-conscious beings. Our animal desire is temporal and ends with the negation of the object. We want our desire to become constant, and that is possible only when we have a constant object for it; an object that cannot be negated completely. A constant object of desire cannot be a corporeal entity, but another living being like myself. As a desire-object, the other does not vanish and my desire therefore continues. Accordingly, animal desire brings frustration to the structure of human existence and that makes us, as Sartre says, a 'useless passion'.

Still one may not understand why an individual subjugates another individual for recognition? or why it is necessary for the desire to put themselves into the fight and engage themselves into an anti-social situation for recognition? The answer to this question for Hegel is quite simple. He believes that a self-conscious being seeks satisfaction only in another self-conscious being, because he/she needs objective certainty. A human being, who lives in solitude, is independent and has his/her own values, but how far is he/she certain about his/her freedom? As we see the problem of certainty gives birth to the conflict for recognition. And then recognition, in human history, has not been obtained without struggle, because both adversaries have claimed equal demands. One of the major clues in understanding this problem is Hegel's category of Being-for-self, used to define Consciousness.¹² Since human beings are being-for-self, or self-determined, then, they are free. Actual freedom is grounded on certainty and certainty is possible only by the recognition or negation of the other as an

external threat. Consequently, subjugation of one desire by another, becomes the negation of external conditions as obstacles for one's own freedom. When the other is subjugated there will be no more fear or trembling, because the other does not stand as a threat to our freedom. What Hegel has explained in the *Phenomenology* is a historical phenomenon. His views are descriptive as well as critical. He attempts to clarify the contradictions in every stage throughout history and reaches new stages where the contradictions are superseded and new ones are born. The fight to death is dialectical like all other historical stages. The recognised-desire, which becomes the master at the end of the battle, sublates all contradictions with the recognising-desire (the slave) by making it dependent and therefore deprived of freedom.

Just what are the interpersonal relationships between these two types of desire at the end of this fight? But before discussing this point it should be noted that the existence of the 'Other' in Hegel's philosophy is a necessary condition for the self-realisation of every individual: I become fully aware of myself and can be certain that my freedom is objective only when the other recognises my freedom. Consequently, the absence of the other brings uncertainty to me about my freedom. The master, as we have seen, does not kill the slave but keeps him/her as a mediator between Being and himself. And this mediation is created by the slave through his labour. The slave becomes the power of negativity in the labour which transforms Being into a world desired by the master and for the master. Everything in the life of a master is the product of slave's labour, but nothing is owned by a slave.

According to Hegel, fight to death has created two unequal antagonistic classes in history. The master (the recognised desire) becomes idle and does not work but owns everything, the slave on the other hand, does everything but owns nothing. The alienation of the slave from the product of labour is an historical phenomenon and is rooted in the fight for recognition. This concept of alienation has become a foundation stone for Marx's interpretation of capitalism and his theory of surplus value. Alienation, for Marx, is also a social phenomenon and the main characteristic of a society predicated on class, particularly capitalism. And hence it can be eliminated by the abolition of the class system.

The recognition of the master by the slave enables the master to self-consciously acknowledge his objective freedom. But such a claim is incorrect and freedom becomes an illusion for the master for five reasons;

First :

The master needs the slave for recognition. That is what objective certainty means here. But this recognition is not reciprocal, as the master is recognised by someone whom he does not recognise, thus recognition from one side is not sufficient.¹⁴ The master wants to act as a self-conscious being by directing desire towards another self-conscious being. But the case here is completely different. The slave is not considered by the master to be a self-conscious being and is reduced to thing hood. The desire of the master is now, directed towards an object and s/he is recognised by an object. The master is wrong in thinking that s/he is recognised by another self-conscious being. His objective certainty is not confirmed and he never gets satisfaction by being recognised by a slave.

Second :

There is no master without a slave. A person becomes a master only when he is recognised by a slave. Accordingly, the master depends on the slave to become a master. That may be called formal dependence.

Third :

On the other hand, the master depends upon the slave materially. His life and enjoyment are totally bound by the products of the slave. Whatever he possesses is produced by the slave. The master therefore, is not an independent being, but dependent on the slave formally as well as materially.

Fourth :

We have mentioned before that the master is idle, his relation to Being is mediated by the labour of the slave. The slave, on the contrary, is active and has direct relation with Being. The relationship of the slave with Being is dialectical, because Being is negated and transformed by his/her labour. The main force behind the negation of Being is the slave and not the master. It is true that the slave works for the master, but projects him/her self in the work and transcends the given reality.

Fifth :

Human beings become self-conscious through Desire and become slaves due to the fear of death or the apprehension of Nothingness. Death is a necessary condition for the revelation of one's existence or one's authenticity. If we agree with Heidegger, it is the slave and not the master who realises him/her self as nothingness and becomes self-conscious through the realisation of death. Nothingness and labour bring back the slave into him/her self. It is here, in this regard, Hegel considers the slave to be the agent of social revolution.

According to Hegel, the terror of death has played its role twice in human history. In the first instance, terror gave rise to the institution of slavery and in the second case, it became the foundation for religion.¹⁵ We are not mistaken if we say that Hegel's view on the role of fear in 'Unhappy Consciousness' resembles Freud's interpretation of religion. A religious slave is incapable of solving social contradictions and accepts a new subordination; submission to a metaphysical master. In both cases, historical as well as metaphysical, the slave attempts to escape the reality of death. The contradictions in religion are between eternity and temporality and these contradictions are superseded in the personality of Christ. Let us say that Christianity has given a solution and has superseded the contradictions between the infinite and the finite beings. Then what is the solution for historical slavery? or how are we to reconcile Mastery with Slavery?

Hegel answers this question by giving us evidence and facts from history when the Roman Emperor accepted Slave ideology and became a Christian. As Hegel says, the war among the states results in the stimulation of the weaker ones by the stronger ones. The strongest among them will be able to survive and expand their power beyond current territory and becomes an Empire. The citizens of the Empire (not the slaves) will no longer be obsessed by the notion of war as all external threats vanish. The Empire, in this case, intends to arrange mercenaries to protect itself. Hence, the master does not claim superiority over the slave. Superiority of the master is given in war for recognition, but there is no more war and the master becomes a peace-loving master. In this way, there will be no distinction between the master and the slave, neither of them risk life in a new fight for recognition, and the master has no hesitation to accept slave's ideology.¹⁶ A Christian master is without a slave, and a Christian slave is without

a master. But there is no master without a slave and no slave without a master, for this reason, they are pseudo-master and pseudo slave. The master without slave is what Hegel calls the Bourgeois, the business man in a new form of community. A bourgeois is a master in the sense that he does not work under compulsion for others and owns private property. But since he does not possess any slave and does not risk life in a fight for recognition, then he is not a real master. On the other hand a bourgeois, like a slave is determined by animal desire and works for capital. Again, one can say that the freedom of the bourgeois master is an illusion, because s/he works for property and becomes the slave of capital.¹⁷ The acceptance of the reality of death and the risking of life is the only way of self-emancipation from slavery. The moment the slave realises this and is ready for a new fight the possibilities of socio- historical mobilisation arise in the life of community. According to Hegel, the realisation of death took place and was secularised among the intellectuals in the French revolution and finally human history was completed by the revealed God manifested in Napoleon, who consolidated a new form of society on the principle of reason where a social order is built on the rational autonomy of the individual. Human history reached its final stage of culmination and self-Consciousness, and obtained absolute knowledge because all distinctions between Consciousness and Being were abolished and unification was accomplished and that was the end of history. The French Revolution, however, disappointed Hegel at the end. The downfall of this revolution was in its failure to do away with despotism and a self-destructive freedom. Individuals carried out terror against the state and the power of the state was subordinated by the power of individuals. The state, by contrast, as a universal form of "World-Spirit" must be superior to the power of individuals and the individuals must bear the relation of duty to the state.

NOTES

1. Hegel, G. W. F. *The Phenomenology of Mind*. translated by J. B. Baillie. New York: Harper & Row publishers. 1967. p. 800.
2. Hegel. *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences. Part One. Foreworded by J. N. Findlay*. London : Oxford University Press. 1985. p. 141.
3. Soll, Ivan. *An Introduction of Hegel's Metaphysics*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1969. p. 6.

4. Marx, Karl. *Capital*. Moscow: Progressive Publisher. 1974. p. 71.
5. Hegel. *The Phenomenology of Mind*. p. 173.
6. Findlay. *Hegel : A Re-examination*. London : George Allen and Unwin. 1958. p. 94.
7. Hegel. *Philosophy of Right*. translated by T. M. Knox. Oxford University Press. 1971. pp. 37-40.
8. Soll. Ivan. *op.cit.*, p. 20.
9. Kaufmann, Walter. *Hegel : Reinterpretation*. New York : Garden City. 1965. p. 153.
10. Hegel. *The Phenomenology of Mind*. p. 229.
11. Hegel. *Encyclopedia*. p. 141.
12. Hegel. *The Phenomenology*. p. 233.
13. Kojève, Alexander. *A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press. 1980. p. 19.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
15. Hegel considers Christianity to be slave ideology in the *Phenomenology*, but he contradicts himself in the *Encyclopedia* where he says'', the real ground why there are no more slaves is Christian Europe is only to be found in the very principle of Christianity itself, the religion of absolute freedom. Only in Christendom man is respected as man, in his infinitude and universality. (see: *Encyclopedia. Zusatze*, p. 227)
16. Kojève. *op.cit.*, p. 65.

SARTRE'S NON-EGOLOGICAL CONCEPTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

ALOK TANDON

Heidegger reminds us that, in reality, human existence is, from the very outset, existence in the world (*Dasein*). But we have forgotten this unity and replaced it by a dualistic division between the isolated subject on the one hand, and the world on the other. While Heidegger identifies this tendency to introduce dualism into the primordial unity of Being-in-the world as Cartesian, it is Sartre who, spells out in exact detail the mechanisms by which Cartesian Dualism is instituted, and by which it may be overcome. Sartre shows that Descartes' 'Reflective *Cogito*' is an act of reflection by which consciousness affects to stand outside itself which replaces the primordial unity of Being-in-the world, with a reified consciousness, an ego dualistically divided from the world. The understanding of such an ego and its capacity to act freely upon this world is thus rendered problematic. But, Sartre points out that, in the absence of such reifying reflection the egological conception of consciousness is 'deconstructed' in favour of a non-egological conception of consciousness which is quite literally *No-thing* other than totality of cognitive, evaluative and active *capacities* or ways of being *related to*, the world. Therefore, the problems of relating to the world through knowledge and action are simply dissolved. One cannot fail to see the significance of such a fundamental change in our understanding of what it means to be a human subject, not only for philosophy of mind but for other disciplines too. The purpose of this paper is to elucidate Sartre's non-egological conception of consciousness and to find out if it can successfully account for the unity, continuity of identity of the consciousness.

I

Sartre accepts the thesis of intentionality whole-heartedly when he says:

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"All the consciousness, as Husserl has shown, is consciousness of something. This means that there is no consciousness which is not a positing of a transcendent object, or if you prefer, that consciousness has no content".¹

Though intentionality is taken to be the main characteristic of consciousness, the major theme is that consciousness is not a thing of some kind. Sartre's contribution is to provide an explanation of how it is possible to have consciousness and yet to think in terms of 'nothingness'. This he achieves first by reducing consciousness to its capacities such as those exercised in perceiving, remembering, imaging, judging and willing etc., and next, by showing that to explain the unity of consciousness one need not take recourse to an egological conception of it. Similarly, he claims, the continuity and identity of consciousness can also be explained by reference to the notion of consciousness as capacities.

In actual fact, Sartre reminds us, consciousness is never available to us independently of the exercise of its capacities. Thus, empirically we have no acquaintance with consciousness *per se*. Moreover, in each case exercise of these capacities is an intentional act which involves 'a pure and simple negation of the given'² in favour of what is not given. For example, in perception one sees a figure standing out against a *background* which the *figure is not*. Similarly, in evaluation, for example, to regard a person as good is to regard him as *not evil*, 'while more generally the capacity to evaluate a situation etc., presupposes the capacity to imagine it as other than it is, to post an alternative, which is to say conceptually to negate the actual, in the name of the possible which it is not'.³

However, when consciousness considers itself as 'object', there is yet another surpassing of consciousness by itself. This happens as soon as consciousness reflectively becomes aware of its own identity as a consciousness of. Thus, according to Sartre, consciousness is a double nihilation of the *being which it is* and the being in the midst of which it is.⁴ In this way consciousness comes to be aware of its own nothingness which is derived from both, its awareness of an object in the world and its awareness of itself as an 'object' when it reflectively posits itself. Sartrean view of consciousness can be summed up as follows in his own words:

"Consciousness is a pure and simple negation of the given, and it exists as the disengagement from a certain existing given and as an engagement

toward a certain not yet existing end".⁵

The above view can be confirmed from our ordinary experience. For example if you take the consciousness of the tree before you to exemplify the cognitive relation between a subject and an object and try to be aware of what Sartre calls reflected consciousness itself, the reflected consciousness as such simply eludes you. Intuitively we know that it is there but we cannot cognise it while it is there. Only by a separate mental act which Sartre calls 'reflective consciousness', can one know that one is aware of the tree. However, Sartre does recognise a 'pre-reflective consciousness' which is immediately and non-cognitively aware of unreflected consciousness without knowing it to be knowledge. Sartre describes this illusive feature of consciousness as a 'vacancy' or an 'emptiness' - an 'openness' to the world or a 'pure directedness' on to the objects external to itself.

Sartrean notion of consciousness is essentially non-egological. It means that there is no consciousness of an ego prior to reflection. The reflective consciousness has the same, as in case of ordinary pre-reflective experience, two dimensional structure as the consciousness of an object and a non-positional consciousness of the act of reflecting.⁶ Thus the ego is not *in* consciousness, it is an *object* of consciousness. If the ego were to exist *in* consciousness, Sartre contends, "it would tear consciousness from itself; it would divide consciousness, it would slide into every consciousness like an opaque blade."⁷ In all egological conceptions of consciousness, the ego is imagined at the centre, as the source or the cause of all conscious activities, together constituting an independently existing thing or substance. But, as Sartre has shown, neither do we have an experience of consciousness as a reified object nor do we need any reference to the ego to account for conscious acts since consciousness is reducible to those capacities which are exercised in the acts of consciousness, such as in perceiving, remembering, evaluating, etc. Yet Sartre acknowledges that there is an ego encountered in reflection,⁸ but this ego is a transcendent object of reflective consciousness, not the transcendental ego which Husserl and Descartes believed was the experienced subject of human consciousness. Further, Sartre claims that the ego is an ideal synthetic object, comparable to a melody, whose unity is that of a continuing pattern of acts, states and utterances. He calls ego 'transcendent' in three senses of the term, First, Sartre notes that since consciousness has the power to transcend what is factually given in imagining

and pursuing a future goal, the pattern discovered in reflection is unified in relation to individuals fundamental project. Second, the ego is transcendent in the sense of not being immanent in consciousness, it is an object for my consciousness, as well as an object that others can experience. Third, the ego discovered in reflection is transcendent in the sense of not being limited to the moment of discovery; it is given as a pattern which has been recurring and which will probably continue.⁹

Thus, empirically speaking, we do not need any reference to the ego to account for conscious acts. Sartre goes further to argue that the unity and continuity of consciousness in an individual can also be accounted for without any reference to a psychic entity the 'I' or 'me'. The unity and continuity of consciousness is realized in apprehending the unity and continuity of a transcendent object. Sartre's argument is that if on the basis of otherwise distinct cognitive acts, a unified and continuous object can be recognized as such, then there must be a synthetic unity of those acts themselves. He says, "Consciousness must be a perpetual synthesis of past consciousness and present consciousness".¹⁰ But the question is how this synthetic unity is achieved? Sartre's answer is: "It is consciousness which unifies itself, concretely, by a play of "transversal" intentionalities which are concrete and real retentions of past consciousness".¹¹ It is better to understand this explanation by an example.

Let us consider that you are in the middle of counting and someone asks, 'What are you doing'? You reply, 'I am counting'. The reply suggests that consciousness can instantly reflect upon what it is currently doing and become aware of it. But since counting as a whole is a serial activity, it is not given in the instant which you become reflectively aware of. So the reply also suggests that you see your instantaneous reflective awareness of what you are currently doing as a part of a series of acts amounting to the activity of counting. And this in turn implies that the whole series has been retained in the consciousness somehow. Further, though only what you were currently doing was reflected upon, your immediate reply suggests that the retention of the whole is reflected in the reply. This means that the retention in question was implicitly present in the current conscious doings which was instantaneously reflected upon, even before it was reflected upon. This fact of retention suggests that consciousness was immediately present to itself in a synthetic unity. Here Sartre explains, "it is the nonthetic consciousness of counting which is the very condition of my

act of adding. If it were otherwise, how could the addition be a unifying theme of my consciousness? In order that this theme should preside over a whole series of synthesis of unifications and recognitions it must be present to itself, not as a thing but as an operative intentionality which can exist only as the revealing-revealed, to use an expression of Heidegger's'.¹² What Sartre intends to say is that consciousness, apart from being simultaneously, pre-reflectively aware of itself, leaves a 'non-thetic memory' of itself. The intentional act which aims at the answer to the question above, apart from reflecting upon the current doings, invokes the pathetic memory of previous acts - thus unifying them all. Indeed that unity is already present, since at each stage of counting the current consciousness is 'transversally aware of itself as counting, though not explicitly but only pre-reflectively. Each act of consciousness has an immediate non-cognitive awareness not only of itself but also of another. Thus the unity and continuity of the consciousness is explicable from within, and therefore renders the ego redundant'.

Finally, to complete Sartre's non-egological account of consciousness, we must describe how he explains personal identity from within the resources of consciousness. The question is how one set of continually uniting acts of consciousness constituting one 'identity' is distinguished from another identity without involving reference to individual egos. In actual fact, as we have already seen, consciousness is indistinguishable from its manifestations into acts of consciousness. So far as an individual is identical with his consciousness, he is, at any given moment, quite literally identical with the consciousness he is engaged with. Thus, the 'I' refers to a changing identity, from one act to another. Yet a sense of enduring personal identity running through the individual identities cannot be denied. From where do we get this sense of enduring identity? Sartre derives his reply from his contention that all these separate acts of consciousness are in fact attempts at the realization of a 'Fundamental Project' and therefore share a common end. Just as a number of conscious acts get united to each other, and distinguished from other unities, because they are all directed towards the same transcendent object, so a number of sub-projects get united into a hierarchically related manifestations of a Fundamental Project by which one individuates a single identity, distinguished from other identities. Thus, Sartre accounts for the identity of consciousness without recourse to the notion of an ego conceived as a mental unity. This further strengthens his major contention

that consciousness is a kind of nothingness; it is empirically indistinguishable from its capacities. In the next section, we shall deal with some of those critics who claim that Sartre's non-egological conception of consciousness cannot sufficiently account for the unity, continuity and identity of the consciousness.

II

Some scholars like Alfred Schutz, Wilfred Desan and John Scanlon have claimed that Sartre actually presupposes or discovers a transcendental ego without acknowledging it. Others like Peer Caws, have criticized Sartre for denying that there is any subject of consciousness.

Peter Caws claims that Sartre's description of consciousness leaves us with 'nobody to carry on the enquiry'.¹³ It rests on Sartre's early declaration that prereflective consciousness is 'impersonal' which has been interpreted as a denial that there is any subject of consciousness. But this is not the correct interpretation. There may be differences between individuality - concepts of *TE* and *BN*, but Sartre never denies a subject of experience. Consciousness in *TE* is characterized as impersonal but at the same time as individual, while in *BN* the pre-reflective consciousness is provided with a personal structure. According to him, body is that continuing subject. The conscious body lives most of its pre-reflective experience focussing on the objects with which it is engaged, rather than on its own activities. It is like to be some one engrossed in the objects his or her concern, but cannot be denied that there is some one who is concerned. Similarly, Sartre says, "The consciousness that I have of you is never a consciousness of a consciousness. It is a consciousness, of a being that is animated with a consciousness, that possesses a consciousness that is a consciousness and at the same time a body. Consciousness of a consciousness however, only exists in the form of reflexivity".¹⁴

Another related criticism is that Sartre's account of the transcendent ego fails to explain the unity of consciousness. In addition to synthesising activity of consciousness and that provided by the continuing objects of consciousness, as discussed in the previous section, Sartre's descriptions of lived body show that it is the subject of experience; it is the spatial centre of all action and its strict continuity through time enables it to fulfil the traditional role of the subject. Another way of accounting for the unity of consciousness, we have seen, is the

fundamental project. Interesting to note, it can also account for certain forms of discontinuity. In case of 'radical conversion', Sartre argues that a choice of a totally new fundamental project may result in time a totally new transcendent ego.¹⁵ The conscious body of the person, in such case, would remain the same throughout his life time but he would be a new person in a real and important sense. Such changes, though rare, are explained more readily by Sartrean account than if a continuing transcendental ego were supposed to be in charge. Thus, if Sartre's discussion of the role of conscious human body and of the fundamental project are taken into consideration along with remarks about object unity and the synthesising activity of consciousness, he can successfully answer the criticism that his conception does not account for the unity of the consciousness.

The strong objection by Desan¹⁶ and others, against Sartre's view of Egoless consciousness that it incorporates a transcendental ego either by presupposing it or by discovering it but misinterpreting the experience, needs to be considered in some detail. The following reasons have been given in support of the above contention.

(a) The ego is unavoidably present in authentic reflection which means reflection or reflective level. This is so because it implies that I consider myself as knowing an object. Even the pre-reflective cogito is known only because there is a reflective cogito which is characterized by the presence of the ego. Thus, Sartre is always confronted with the ego while trying to eliminate it from consciousness.

(b) Sartre's use of intentionality of consciousness as a proof against the existence of a personal 'I', in fact establishes that it is 'I' who know, desire choose and negate the world.

(c) The sharp opposition between the for-itself and the other, posited by Sartre, reinforces the individuality and personality of 'I'. The concrete existence of the other gives me a strange and growing self-consciousness.¹⁷

(d) The description of For-itself as nothingness and definition of bad faith as self deception indicate that there is an ego who effects the nothingness and indulges in bad faith.

Desan's criticism of Sartre seems to be based on the assumption that consciousness is a quality which necessarily needs a personal 'I' as its support.

However, Sartre claims that original consciousness does not require another consciousness or an ego to be conscious of itself. For instance, pleasure cannot be distinguished from the consciousness of pleasure. The very existence of pleasure implies the consciousness of pleasure. There is no pleasure first and consciousness of pleasure afterwards.¹⁸ Thus by granting consciousness a mode of existence which is at the same time consciousness of its existence, Sartre has tried to eliminate the ego from the field of consciousness. Consciousness does not require an ego in order to remain self-identical, as we discussed in the previous section. Therefore, Desan's claim that Sartre presupposes a transcendental ego is not correct in Husserlian sense. But Sartre seems to speak in Kantian terms when he accepts that a transcendental and non-positional consciousness is a condition for all experience; consciousness must be conscious (of) itself in a non-positional manner in order to make possible a positional consciousness.¹⁹

III

Observers like Sabhajit Mishra²⁰ have drawn attention to some striking similarity between Sartrean conception of consciousness as nothingness and the Upanisadic characterization of consciousness (Atman) as not - this, not this (neti-neti). This Upanisadic nothingness is an expression of the essentially free character of the consciousness as is the case with Sartre's egoless consciousness. M. M. Agrawal²¹ has also pointed out the common features of the notions of consciousness held by Sartre and Krishnamurti, Sāṅkhya concept of subjectivity also shows striking resemblance to Sartre. But, both Mishra and Agrawal have criticized Sartre for the implications he draws for human freedom from his egoless conception of consciousness. For them, by freeing itself of its ego-character alone can consciousness regain its pristine purity, which is subjectivity itself and which is synonym of human freedom. Human subjectivity, to both Sāṅkhya and Advait Vedānta is a positive principle, negation is only one aspect of it. By negating the objective it realizes that there is a positive being which is freedom. Sartre fails to realize that there is a positive dimension behind the nihilating dimension of consciousness. Nothing has to be removed or appropriated in order to return to the repose of self-identity; only one's wrong attitude to and unreal relation with the other or the it-self have got to be removed. Other is either ultimately unreal or the relation with it is unreal. Either of the

two attitudes suggested by Advaita Vedānta and Sāṃkhya respectively can help obviate the sufferings and frustrations of the struggling individual of Sartre.

The above criticism, in my opinion, rests upon some misunderstanding of Sartre's pre-reflective consciousness which is not the Upaniṣadic or Advaitic *turiya* consciousness. Neither is it dissociated subjectivity of Sāṃkhya. According to him the object, which the consciousness confronts in its activities, is a real object. Pre-reflective consciousness is of a psychophysical subject. It is not an immaterial substance. Sartre is a materialist though he cannot exactly account for consciousness in a materialistic theory. But it is still a material problem for him.²² Pre-reflective consciousness should not be conceived as revealing selfidentity, and therefore, there seems no reason to glorify it.

NOTES

1. Jean Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (Hereinafter *BN*) translated by Hazel E Barnes, Methuen & Co. London 1986 p. XXVII.
2. *B.N.* p. 478
3. Simon Gelyn, *Sartre*, Avebury, England, 1987, p. XXIX.
4. *B.N.* p. 486.
5. *Ibid*, p. 478.
6. Jean Paul Sartre, *Transcendence of the Ego* (Hereinafter *TE*) translated and introduced by F. Wims and R. Kirkpatrick, Farrar, Strans and Geiroux, N. York, pp. 44-45.
7. *Ibid*, p. 40.
8. *Ibid*, p. 88.
9. See, Phyllis Morris, (*Sartre on the Transcendence of the Ego*) in Simon Glyn, *op. cit.* p. 15.
10. *T.E.*, p. 39.
11. *Ibid*, p. 39.
12. *B.N.*, XXIX
13. Peter Caws, *Sartre*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1979 p. 56.

14. Leo Fretz, *An Interview with Jean-Paul Sartre* in Jean Paul Sartre: Contemporary Approaches to His Philosophy, Ed. by H. J. Silverman & F. A. Elliston, Duguesne University Press Pittsburgh, p. 226.
15. B. N., 573.
16. Wilfred Desan, *The Tragic Finale: An Essay on the Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre*, Harpur & Row, New York, 1960, pp. 149-53.
17. *Ibid*, pp. 155-156.
18. B. N., LIV.
19. Leo Fretz, *op. cit*, p. 228.
20. Sabhajit Mishra, *The Anguished Freedom*, G. D. K. Publications, Delhi 1979 p. 65
21. M. M. Agrawal, 'Nothingness and Freedom: Sartre and Krishnamurti', *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. IX, No. 1, Sept. Dec. 1991, pp 45-58.
22. Leo Fretz, *op. cit*, p. 235.

NATURE OF ETHICAL DISAGREEMENT

ABHA SINGH

When we look at our ethical life we very often come across situations where two or more persons express some kind of controversy on ethical matter. And ethical controversies result in some kind of disagreement e.g. if A says 'X is good' and B says 'X is bad', they are in a controversial state or in a state of disagreement. Whenever we have a conflicting points-of-view on some moral problem we find ethical disagreement. But the fundamental questions that arise in this connection are: what is the nature of ethical disagreement? Is ethical disagreement a disagreement in belief, or is it a disagreement in attitude?, or does it have a dual nature? or does it consist in something else? Metaethicists of this century have tried to treat these problems from different angles. Basically, there are three different point-of-views on this theme such as : (a) ethical disagreement is a disagreement in belief, (b) ethical disagreement is mainly a disagreement in attitude and (c) ethical disagreement is of a dual nature. But besides these, there can be still another point- of-view the fundamental thesis of which would be that matters of ethical disagreement rest on imperatives.

ETHICAL DISAGREEMENT AS A DISAGREEMENT IN BELIEF

In this connection I shall discuss the view of metaethical cognitivists particularly of this century. However, I shall also make some passing reference to some cognitivist stand-points of earlier periods also. Cognitivism, maintains that ethical language is mainly descriptive in nature. Ethical language, we know, comprises of ethical words, sentences, paragraphs and arguments etc. When ethical words or sentences express something, these particular expressions aim at giving some information or knowledge concerning ethical life. Certain implication of this thesis in regard to the general nature of ethical language can be seen on ethical disagreement. Since ethical language aims at certain kind of

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description, the resulting controversy or disagreement on ethical matters would assume the form of a disagreement in belief. A disagreement in belief is a matter of dispute as to how a thing is to be described.

There is however another side to the controversy as to whether the thing described is a fact or event or something representing a normative or an ideal state. Some early thinkers of nineteenth century keep ethical phenomena on a par with certain factual states e.g. J. S. Mill equates ethical phenomena with psychological ones, and naturally in his scheme of things a disagreement on the matter of ethics would have direct affinity with psychological state of mind consisting in enjoyment of pleasure or happiness. If anyone disagrees on an ethical matter the disagreement can be said to be due to lack of proper estimation of a psychological state of mind. He would say that one who is able to formulate a proper generalization must agree with him that happiness or pleasure is our sole end. Ethical controversies in his scheme would centre round the problem, whether everyone desires his own happiness or not. Mill's utilitarianism has not been styled in a metaethical frame-work, but still we can say that according to him ethical disagreement is a disagreement in belief and that too on par with factual disagreement. Mill's sentence is suggestive of this." ... desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable, ..."¹

If we make a dent into still earlier period, we find that even in the writings of Jeremy Bentham we find it in a suggestive form, how a disagreement on ethical question relates to certain factual states. Bentham, we know, is a utilitarian of hedonistic type and has accepted as the fundamental maxim of this doctrine 'the greatest pleasure for the greatest number'. All such ethical words as 'ought', 'right', 'wrong', have meaning only when they are interpreted in terms of pleasure or happiness. He says 'when thus interpreted, the words *ought* and *right* and *wrong*, and others of that stamp have a meaning; when otherwise, they have none,'"² Though the question of ethical disagreement has not been discussed by him yet on the question of admissibility of some disputant's hypothesis he has made certain suggestion in the direction that ethical disagreements are mainly factual in nature and thereby consisting in a disagreement in belief. The following passage is suggestive of this :

Has the rectitude of this principle been ever formally contested? It should seem that it had by those who have not known what they have been meaning ... Not that there is or ever has been that human creature breathing, however stupid or perverse, who has not on many, perhaps on most occasions of his life deferred to it ... There are even few who have not taken some occasion or other to quarrel with it, either on account of their not understanding always how to apply it, or on account of some prejudice or other which they were afraid to examine into, or could not bear to part with?³

We have hitherto discussed the nature of ethical disagreement in the light of some naturalistic account given by Bentham and Mill. We have in this connection also noticed that a disagreement on a moral matter has a status of factual disagreement consisting in, to use Stevenson's terminology, belief. An ethical disagreement is a disagreement in belief but cannot be granted a natural status, has been the contention of some non-naturalists like G. E. Moore, Hudson and W. D. Ross. They have particularly supposed a doctrine called 'intuitionism'. We do not intend to discuss in details the different views of various intuitionists on the question of the nature of ethical disagreement. We would, however, like to make a synoptic treatment to Moore's notion of ethical disagreement.

At the very outset two clarifications need to be made. Firstly, Moore himself has not consistently endeavoured to discuss on this matter in the style of some recent metaethicists and secondly, we also notice some shift in his attitude from his first book *Principia Ethica* to his second book *Ethics*. It should however, be said that Moore is a commonsense realist and in regard to knowability of certain ethical properties he has recommended intuition as a source and intuition is not something like a mystic experience. But it is more akin to some kind of special perceptual capacity.

In order to discuss Moore's view on ethical disagreement, one is naturally led to examine this issue in the light of his view regarding 'intuition'. In the situation, A saying 'X is good' and B saying 'X is bad', Moore would recommend that 'intuition' is that faculty which, if rightly applied, gives an opportunity to decide, whether 'X is good' or 'X is bad'. He also holds that matters of ethical dispute cannot be subjected to logical reasoning and intuition only seems to be the right basis for one's ethical position. He says,

'... Pleasure is the only good' is based on my intuition of its falsehood. My intuition of its falsehood is indeed *my* reason for holding and declaring it untrue; it is indeed the only valid reason for so doing ... intuition can only furnish a reason for *holding* any proposition to be true; this however it must do when any proposition is self-evident, when, in fact, there are no reasons which prove its truth.⁴

Moore's use of the term 'intuition' makes us arrive at the conclusion that at least in his *Principia Ethica* stage he is inclined to maintain that an ethical disagreement is mainly a disagreement in belief. But, C. L. Stevenson has endeavoured to point out a change in his previous stand-point in the direction of what Stevenson has suggested in his own book *Ethics and Language*. In an article entitled "Moore's Arguments against certain forms of Ethical Naturalism"⁵ he has brought to notice a shift in Moore's previous position in his *Principia Ethica*. Following passages from Moore's *Ethics* are suggestive of this :

If, whenever I judge an action to be right, I am merely judging that I myself have a particular feeling towards it, then it plainly follows that, provided I really have the feeling in question, my judgement is true, and therefore the action in question really is right. And what is true of me, in this respect, will also be true of any other man ... It strictly follows, therefore, from this theory that whenever *any* man whatever really has a particular feeling towards an action, the action really is right, and *whenever any* man whatever really has another particular feeling towards an action; the action really is wrong.⁶

And,

If we take into account a second fact, it seems plainly to follow that the same action must be quite often both right and wrong. This second fact is merely the observed fact, that it seems difficult to deny, that, whatever pair of feelings as a single feeling we take, cases do occur in which two different men have opposite feelings towards the same action.⁷

These two passages are suggestive of the fact that on the matters of ethical disputes cognition or intuition or conviction is not the only thing but feeling and attitude have also some place in it.

Ethical Disagreement Consisting In Attitude

We have in the previous section tried to discuss a particular thesis on the matter of ethical disagreement, the fundamental assumption of which has been that an ethical disagreement is mainly a disagreement in belief. Almost all the cognitivists have taken side with this view but the non-cognitivists particularly those who adhere to some kind of strict emotivism have expressed the opinion that ethical disagreements are disagreement in attitude. In this connection we would like to discuss the stand-point of A. J. Ayer in his "Critique of Ethics and Theology" and "On the Analysis of Moral Judgement". Ayer is fully aware of the situations where two or more persons disagree on moral matters. But, negatively, such a disagreement cannot be said to have a factual basis. He is an emotivist, to use the term in a very wider sense, and according to him there is no factual or descriptive content of moral judgements. Ayer's own assertion "Thus if I say to someone, 'you acted wrongly in stealing that money,' 'I am not stating more than if I had simply said, 'you stole that money'. In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had, said 'you stole that money',⁸ is suggestive of the fact when two persons disagree on a moral matter, the disagreement is not a factual one consisting in a disagreement in belief. He further makes his stand-point affirmative when he says "The moral judgement expresses the attitude in the sense that it contributes to defining it".⁹ Since attitude is a defining characteristic of moral judgement, all ethical disagreements given in the form of different moral judgements must lie in a disagreement in attitude.

Ethical Disagreement : Dual In Nature

Under this caption we intend to discuss C.L. Stevenson's thesis on ethical disagreement. In this connection it is to be noted that Stevenson is fully aware of the two basically opposed points-of-view, the first treating disagreement to be a disagreement in belief and the second regarding it exclusively consisting in attitude. He is inclined towards the attitude theory, but is conscious of the fact that in the cases of ethical disputes or disagreements there is also some amount of disagreement in belief. He has, therefore, rejected the one sided view of cognitivists on the one hand, the extreme emotivists, on the other, and has said,

When ethical issues become controversial, they involve disagreement that is of a *dual* nature. There is almost inevitably disagreement in belief, which requires detailed, sensitive attention; but there is also disagreement in attitude. An analysis which seeks a full picture of ethics, in touch with practice, must be careful to recognize both factors, neither emphasizing the former to the exclusion of the latter, nor the latter to the exclusion of the former.¹⁰

C. L. Stevenson is of the view that various issues concerning ethical disagreement can be decided only on the basis of our observations of various situations in which disagreements occur. Generally, when we are confronted with situations of ethical disagreements we observe the presence of both kinds of disagreement viz. disagreement in belief and disagreement in attitude. In the proper estimation of the nature of disagreement both the factors must be taken into account. Certainly when two persons disagree on the ethical value or moral quality of an action or of a person, they have disagreement of belief as well as of attitude. None of them is ignorable. Suppose X says 'A is good' and Y says 'A is bad' in that case they are not only referring to different beliefs, but also they have different attitude regarding A. Actually, the situations of ethical disagreements are very complicated ones and this complication makes one examine the various pros and cons involved therein. Emphasizing first the disagreement in belief he says, "If we examine the concrete ethical problems that arise in daily life, we shall easily see that they have much to do with beliefs The beliefs that are relevant to determining the value of an object may be extremely complicated-no less than to the network of causes and effects in which the object lies. There can be no thought of marking of certain beliefs as ethically relevant, and certain others as ethically irrelevant".¹¹

Indeed, it is true that according to Stevenson ethical disagreements, generally have some elements of belief. But, they also contain the element of attitude. Emphasizing how agreement or disagreement in attitude is peculiarly found in ethical judgements of diverse nature, Stevenson has said, "Agreement and disagreement in attitude are so characteristic of ethics that their presence is felt even when judgements are relatively isolated, and do not lead to any overt discussion".¹²

Stevenson has made some generalization in regard to the nature of ethical disagreement, particularly its dual nature but does not completely rule out the

possibility of there being some ethical disagreements exclusively consisting in belief. His own words are. "Yet if the controversial aspects of ethics may involve disagreement in belief, and in ways that become very complicated, it must not be thought that they involve this kind of disagreement exclusively".¹³ But, apart from certain cases of ethical disagreement consisting in belief, the general notion, he believes is that ethical disagreements are of a dual character. They have the elements of both belief and attitude.

Although Stevenson has put forth his thesis on ethical disagreement emphasizing its dual nature, he has nevertheless deviated from his attitude theory by giving some special significance to attitude. Expression of this has been made in the form of granting attitude a fundamental role compared to belief in the cases of typically ethical disagreements. He has assigned two reasons for accepting attitude to be fundamental in ethical disagreement. Firstly, it is attitude which gives a definite ethical character to a disagreement. We distinguish an ethical disagreement from other kinds of disagreement only on the basis of presence of attitude in it, Stevenson has said, "It is disagreement in attitude, which imposes a characteristic type of organization on the beliefs that may serve indirectly to resolve it, that chiefly distinguished ethical issues from those of pure science".¹⁴ The second reason for accepting attitude as enjoying a fundamental character has also been assigned by him. He is of the view that, it is disagreement in attitude that decides the mode and workability of ethical arguments. What argument will be relevant to terminate an ethical disagreement, this is decided only by going into the elements of attitude in disagreement. Stevenson says, "Disagreement in attitude is the factor which gives the argument its fundamental unity and motivation. In the first place, it determines what beliefs will relevantly be discussed or tested; for only those beliefs which are likely to have a bearing on either party's attitudes will be *a propos*".¹⁵

Thus, we find that according to Stevenson ethical disagreements are though of a dual nature, yet disagreement in attitude is the fundamental factor in them.

Having explained C. L. Stevenson's view on ethical disagreements we have been serviceably placed with a comprehensive account of them. There are some more views on ethical disagreement, particularly one needs to be explained. According to still another view maintained by I. A. Richards, ethical

disagreements are disagreement in belief about attitude. Richard's conclusion has been in regard to any controversy on the normative questions, but this is equally applicable to ethical disagreements as well. He said, "We can now extend our definition. Any thing is valuable which will satisfy an appetency (i.e., desire, which may be unconscious) without involving the frustration of some equal or more important appetency". He further says, "The importance of an impulse (i.e., appetency or aversion) can be defined ... as the extent of the disturbance of other impulses in the individual's activities which the thwarting of the impulse involves".¹⁶ His two passages are very much suggestive of the fact that according to him, ethical disagreements are disagreements in belief about attitude. A somewhat similar point-of-view has been expressed by R. B. Perry in his book, *The General Theory of Value*.

In recent times a new trend in metaethics has been noticed. A particular group of metaethicists who preferred to be called prescriptivists viewed some metaethical problems not from the angle of meaning of the ethical terms but from the angle of their uses. J. L. Austin recognized the role of performative act in the speeches. And R. M. Hare, S. E. Toulmin and Abraham Edel tried to set a new direction to metaethical discourses and according to them the language of ethics is prescriptive in nature in so far as it aims to answer what should one do?, or its precise aim is to guide our choices. So far the role of prescriptive element in moral judgements is concerned Rudolf Carnap¹⁷ went to the extent that moral judgements are imperatives in a "grammatically misleading form." And R. M. Hare opined that moral judgements have descriptive element but this content does not constitute its real ethical nature, prescriptivity and universalizability are two marks of them. Moral judgement, though they are themselves not imperatives, entail some kind of imperatives. Now, in this light we can see R. M. Hare's view of ethical disagreements.

R. M. Hare is, to some extent, in agreement with C. L. Stevenson in assigning a dual character to ethical disagreements i.e. it has some elements of difference in regard to how a matter is to be described i.e., it involves some kind of disagreement in belief. R. M. Hare says, "moral judgements beside their function as prescriptions, have also a descriptive meaning".¹⁸ Both Stevenson and Hare agree in granting a secondary status to disagreements in belief in the cases of ethical disagreements. But, whereas, Stevenson has stuck to attitude theory or emotivism and has granted disagreement in attitude as enjoying a

supreme place in ethical disagreement. R. M. Hare, though he has not developed his view on ethical disagreement in the manner of Stevenson, is a critic of emotivism. If two persons disagree on a moral matter the disagreement naturally would assume the form of some disagreement in belief and also in regard to its imperative nature e.g. the judgement "One should not tell a lie" can be contrasted with other person's judgement that "One should sometime tell a lie". Here the two persons can be said to be in the state of disagreement. And they might be referring to different principles in accepting their point-of-view. The resulting disagreement would involve different commands.

My observation on the basis of the foregoing discussion is that ethical situations are so much complicated that one cannot sufficiently make any generalization in regard to ethical disagreement in the form that this or that alone is the factor wholly responsible for an ethical disagreement. Ethical disagreements have significance in the field of ethical methodology in view of the fact that they alone provide scope for use of various methods to terminate ethical disagreement and arrive at a point of mutual agreement.

NOTES

1. J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism* (London, J. M. Dent & Sons' Ltd., 1936), p. 36.
2. J. Bentham, *Principles of Morals and Legislation* (Oxford, the Clarendon Press, 1778), p. 4.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
4. 'G. E. Moore, *Philosophical Studies*, "The Conception of Intrinsic value" (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1922) p. 144.
5. C. L. Stevenson, *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, ed. P. A. Schilpp (New York, Tudor publishing Company, 1952).
6. G. E. Moore, *Ethics* (London, Williams, and Margate, 1912) p. 91.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
8. A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, (London, Victor, Gallacz, 1967) p. 107.
9. A. J. Ayer, "On the Analysis of Moral Judgements", *Philosophical Essays*, p. 238.

10. C. L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), p. 11.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
16. I. A. Richards, *Principles of Literary Criticism* (Harcourt, Brace, 1924), pp. 48-51.
17. Rudolf Carnap, *Philosophy and Logical Syntax* (London, Kegan Paul, 1955).
18. R. M. Hare, "Ethics", in *Essays on the Moral Concepts*, (London, The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1972), p. 53.

DIMENSIONS OF MAN'S ENCOUNTER WITH THE OTHER

INDU SARIN

Encounter with the other implies face to face direct, immediate relationship in contrast with indirect, impersonal kind of relationship through books, artifacts, journals, newspapers, media etc. The former kind of relationship is a living experience which involves practical engagement whereas in the latter case, one acquires encapsuled, verbal or descriptive knowledge about the other. In the following pages, I propose to reflect on the various dimensions of man's encounter with the other. The significance of encounter will be revealed not only in the context of human relationships but also with all types of others which affect personal identity.

Why does one distinguish encounter from simple awareness? Why is not knowledge sufficient? Knowledge is impersonal, detached and presupposes subject-object division - I know the other as separate from me. The encounter on the other hand touches me personally and brings the latter closer to the former.

The encounter is not just a physical proximity but to uphold full-blown conscious attitude towards the other which may lead to transformation of one's identity (wherein the relationship is onesided) or of both (in cases of mutual reciprocal relationships). It is this function of the encounter towards the constitution of the self which needs appreciation.

The exploration of self into the other makes the individual realise that the quest for total control is illusory. It emancipates him from narrow egoism and thus broadens his attitude to envision his presence in finite living beings, nature and the plenitude without getting lost in them. It is this promise of self-identity which is the agenda of authentic encounters. The quest for self-identity avoids egocentricism as well as complete absorption of oneself into the other. It implies -- I be myself and let others be, thus opening the realms

of freedom, creativity and values. It binds the individual with his peers of different languages, races, cultures and nations. Such a relationship is interminably dialogical and transformative.

The authentic person is open and realizes the inevitable difference of perspectives with what he encounters. While those who claim to assert only their own narrow moorings, and are votaries of collective identity invariably commodify culture into stereotypes leading to the malaise of depersonalisation and blight the possibility of genuine encounters. The commercial manipulative 'stereotypes' are dehumanising means of shutting ourselves to the other's authentic identity.

One's attitude towards the other can be of various kinds:

1. Manipulative-mechanical handling leading to pragmatic encounters.
2. Emotional-merging oneself into the other.
3. Understanding based on love leading to an open dialogue.
4. Faith - It takes one from the level of finitude to that of infinitude bridging all the communication-gaps.

The other in the broader sense includes the following :

1. Fellow-beings
2. Animate objects - life-forms other than full-blown persons.
3. Inanimate objects - Nature
4. Infinitude

Man's encounter with his fellow beings constitutes crucial and complex problems. In distinction to his relationship with things and other life-forms, the confrontation with his fellow-beings is more satisfying but it can be very frustrating too. The very being of man is as Heidegger calls it - 'Being-with'. Heidegger holds,

'With' ... to be understood *existentially*, not categorially. By reason of this with like (mithaften). Being-in- the-world, the world is always the one that I share with others. The world of Dasein is a with-world (*Mitwelt*). Being-in is Being-with others.¹

Heidegger's concept of Being-in-the-world eliminates the dualism of thinking man and the world constituted of things and other human beings. The

individual (*Dasein*) for him does not encounter the world from outside but is in it - he dwells in it and belongs to it. The others are with him, they are not discovered later. For Heidegger, being-alone is also being with others. He says,

Even *Dasein*'s Being-alone is Being-with in the world. The other can be missing only in and for a Being-with.²

Heidegger's analysis of the world is not to be understood ontically (scientifically as an assembly of finitary close entities) but ontologically - how the individual (*Dasein*) encounters it existentially reflecting on its significance i.e. worldhood. Heidegger states,

'Worldhood' is an ontological concept and stands for the structure of one of the constitutive items of Being-in-the- world ... 'World' is used as an ontical concept, and signifies the totality of those entities which can be present-at-hand within the world.³

The entities of the world can be explained only in abstraction scientifically in terms of categories but these cannot exhaust the meaning of the world. Heidegger distinguishes man's being-in- the-world and his being in the midst of the world. Man is present in the world not in the way two inert things are next to each other, his presence reveals the hidden layers of the world as well as of his own being.

Heidegger's notion of care explicates man's direct involvement in the world and through which the individual forms different ties with the others. he is concerned with the objects and is solicitous towards his fellow-beings. Heidegger affirms that the individual only in and through his relationship with the objects and his fellow-beings, quests for self-identity.

Heidegger holds that our everyday dealings with the world are in terms of "a web of functional relationships" wherein others are encountered in terms of their roles and functions. The things are seen in their interactive relationships. He calls man as a "tool maker" who uses things as well as his fellow-beings for his self-interests. No doubt the functional relationships are important but these make only one dimension of man's being in the world.

Heidegger argues that the individual is not fully satisfied with these kinds of functional relationships. Unlike other living creatures, he wants to rise to a personal kind of relationship - identifying himself with the others and seeing

them in their "otherness" without falling captive to them and becoming a mass-man listening to the dictates of mass-culture. The mass-man drifts with the crowd and merges himself in the anonymous "one" or "they", thus forms what Heidegger calls *dasMan*.⁴ *DasMan* does not have its own self and is incapable of projecting its own possibilities, leading to absorption in the public world. This is "authentic encounter". The difference between authentic and inauthentic dimension is not that the former is in seclusion and the latter is involved. The difference lies in the individual's way of relating himself to the others. In the authentic dimension, he is fully conscious of his own self as well as of others whereas in the inauthentic dimension, he loses his self-identity.

From the foregoing discussion of Heidegger's concept of Being-in-the-world, it emerges that although man is necessarily rooted in the world yet he should not become its victim. He need not develop master-servant relationship with his fellow-beings - neither controlling them completely nor getting himself enslaved by them. This type of relationship will lead to exploitation alienation and dehumanisation.

Most of our situations and everyday matters remain at the level of reducing the other to the level of an 'I-It' (treating the other person as an object), manipulating him and seeing him only in terms of functional relationships. The individual not only treats the other as an object, most of the time he treats himself also as an object determined by roles and functions, conforming to the stereotypes. Both the cases - whether one determines the other and gets oneself determined by the other, are instances of inauthentic encounters. Is authentic communication possible? Can there be progressive feed-back chain of cumulative intentional transformations?

The authentic relationship is possible only in "I-Thou" confrontation wherein I treat myself as a free being and treat the other also as an autonomous subjective being. The gulf between myself and the other is bridged by intimacy. There is mutual resonance leading to perpetual transformation and awakening of the dormant potentialities. Successive responses redefine the relationships on a higher level. This sort of communication brings about revelation of oneself and that of the other. One comes to grasp one's historicity through the other. The existential encounter cannot be achieved once for all but involves an endless process. It involves active process of inter-personal sharing which is possible

through "dialogical relationships". It is this sort of rippling cascade of enriching being that is to be contrasted with sheer togetherness or mechanical juxtaposition of persons. The dialogical relationships are grounded on love and understanding. Love is the origin of the desire to communicate but it is not whimsical but rather guided by reason. The communication based on whim is bound to break down at some moment or the other. To be adamant, blind, and fanatical possibly can paralyze the "dialogical relationships".

However, even authentic communication is not totally free from conflicts. Jaspers calls communication as "loving struggle". There is a conflict between two selves in which each has a radical viewpoint of other's contentions. Each individual wants to be independent but he knows that it is only through the other he can realise himself. The other is not a perceptual object but he also experiences me. Love must be strong enough so as to promote mutual frankness in the interpersonal communion. It should have reverence for the difference and celebrate it.

We have seen that the individual's relationship with his fellow-beings forms a very significant dimension of his being-in-the-world. But the world is also constituted by animate and inanimate objects and the individual cannot help noticing them.

These days the ecologists emphasise care for all beings. They hold that nature and other myriad life-forms should not be taken as merely of instrumental value to our narrow chauvinistic impulses. Interestingly Heidegger's concept of freedom as "letting be" has impressed the ecologists. The point of view of the ecologists is welcome for human welfare. But in the final analysis, it turns out to be scientific for maintaining the ecological balance. It does not existentially encounter the entities *per se*, but rather views them from the third person perspective of controlling and manipulating them to seek our long time perceived interests.

Man's attitude towards animals is usually manipulative. He uses them to serve his own self-interests. But he also develops emotional attitude towards them. The animals also reciprocate by being faithful or becoming hostile. The role of pets can often be fetish like fixations. Possibility of curiosity, tenderness, fear, love, desire, hatred or their combinations are markedly enhanced in the

encounter with animals and this affects the constitutive mechanism of man's identity.

Besides animals, one also develops friendly attitude towards plants. Animals at times go hostile but trees have always been good friends. The awareness about the need of trees for supporting human existence is scientific. A closer relation with trees and plants could be seen in the old mythologies and fables of many cultures. Personification of trees may be fictional but one cannot fail to appreciate this idolization of the living relationship with plants. The heart of the great poet Wordsworth dances with the Daffodils deepening his state of consciousness. Nature derives its celestial messages to the poet only through suspension of petrified views. The individual thus is inextricably linked with nature. Normally we are not aware of this vital relationship. It needs a poet's heart and a scientist's investigating eyes to understand nature which forms an important dimension of our encounter with the other. It enables us to understand the meaning of being in the richer new light.

There are different ways of looking at nature. The individual manipulates nature to serve his civilizationally rutted purposes. The scientist exploits nature in order to control it. He attempts to counter the negative effects of nature as well. The poet idolises it, ponders over it and gets inspired to be more creative and transforms images of the passive, dumb, laid-back attributes of things and events, and enables our sensibilities, in form, texture, and expression.

Nature has tremendous effects on the personality of the individual both in the positive and negative ways. It can inject within the individual the feeling of sublime - the natural beauty fills his heart with joy. The negative role in the form of natural catastrophies can render man completely helpless or frustrate him by obstructing his praxis. One often falls in the limbo of despair and realises the meaninglessness of our whole enterprise. Sometimes this type of realisation impels him to take the leap of transcendence and changes his whole attitude towards life, and deliver oneself to freedom and creativity.

This takes us to an encompassing dimension of man's encounter with infinitude personified wherein all the above mentioned dimensions of man's encounter with the others are converged and harmonised. The immanent and transcendent dimensions of man get synthesised in this encounter. Objects, events

and persons are experienced in terms of ultimate meaning. This encompassing encounter frees man from all the conflicts and transfigures him completely. The temporality and finitudes of man puts him in the face of inevitable situations. One realises that the so-called world is not everything. The encounter with infinitude is the comprehension of the spirit that elevates the finitude into plenitude, a self-transformative upthrust leading to ecstasy and ushering in the revelation of multi-splendoured plenitude. Such an experience brings inward transformation and regulates the life of the individual.

The encounter with infinitude is possible through faith which enables the individual to realise all his possibilities and instil within him the courage to stand against dissolution, obscurantism, importunities which daily confrontations impose on the person. Faith implies subjective certainty and live through all the risks of life. It overcomes despairing rejection of oneself and issues in profound self-affirmation and realisation of supreme worth. It makes one rise from evanescence to plenitude of freedom. The individual dissatisfied with contingency yearns for infinitude which makes him rise above humdrum existence. To have a relationship with infinitude is to attain self-mastery - beyond egocentricity and takes one to the dimension of the sacred - the fusion of horizons. This sort of encounter puts man into a new dimension and discloses the depth of one's being.

The above dynamics of faith (the dialogical bridge) is to be radically distinguished from familiar gory history of dogmatic religious belief which everywhere unthinkingly glorifies stereotyped religious symbols leading to conflicts and fanaticism breaching human communication, vitiating encounters, and ensuing decrepitude of possible human presence.

The quest for transcendence is not an escape from the reality of the world. It rather implants within man the courage and freedom to face the latter with constructive attitude making his life worthwhile. It kindles the flame of humanism within man to embrace the entire mankind. This kind of attitude is very much needed today as the world is divided on the basis of languages, races, religions, nations and cultures. Due to fast strides of information technology, the world has already virtually shrunk into a "global village". The talk of

cross-cultural communication is not merely a theoretical need but a pressing demand of our contemporary existence. Therefore an inter-cultural dialogue is needed in the contemporary scenario. To understand the "culturally other" despite the cultural diversities be the global agenda for human solidarity.

NOTES

1. M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1973, pp. 154-155.
2. *Ibid.* pp. 156-157.
3. *Ibid.* pp. 92-93.
4. *Ibid.* p. 164.

SOME REMARKS ON ERNEST ADAMS' THEORY OF INDICATIVE CONDITIONALS

C. CHAKRABORTI

By 'indicative conditional', in this paper I shall mean natural language statements such as 'If I get the ticket, then I shall go to the play'. Ernest W. Adams has claimed that these statements have only conditional probability, and that they do not have truth-conditions. He has proposed that the use of standard formal truth-functional logic to these statements must be supplanted by that of a separate logic based purely on probability axioms, which he himself has devised exclusively for these statements. Several of his arguments thus have a common theme; namely, that the "application" or the use of standard formal truth-functional logic to indicative conditionals is not defensible. Among these arguments, in this paper I have focused on three of his better-known arguments. The objective is to argue that none of these arguments warrants the conclusion that the standard truth-functional logic is not applicable to indicative conditionals.

I

In one of his arguments, Adams presents the following natural language inferences containing indicative conditionals as crucial supporting evidence.

- F1. John will arrive on the 10 o'clock plane. Therefore, if John does not arrive on the 10 o'clock plane, he will arrive on the 11 o'clock plane.
- F2. John will arrive on the 10 o'clock plane. Therefore, if he misses his plane in New York, he will arrive on the 10 o'clock plane.
- F3. If Brown wins the election, Smith will retire to private life. Therefore, if Smith dies before the election and Brown wins it, Smith will retire to private life.

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- F4. If Brown wins the election, Smith will retire to private life. If Smith dies before the election, Brown will win it. Therefore, if Smith dies before the election, then Smith will retire to private life.
- F5. If Brown wins, Smith will retire. If Brown wins, Smith will not retire. Therefore, Brown will not win.
- F6. Either Dr. A or Dr. B will attend the patient. Dr. B will not attend the patient. Therefore, if Dr. A does not attend the patient, Dr. B will.
- F7. It is not the case that if John passes history, he will graduate. Therefore, John will pass history.
- F8. If you throw both switch S and switch T the motor will start. Therefore, either if you throw switch S the motor will start, or if you throw switch T, the motor will start.
- F9. If John will graduate only if he passes history, then he won't graduate. Therefore, if John passes history, then he won't graduate (Adams, 1965, pp. 166-167).

Each of F1-F9 is truth-functionally valid in the sense that symbolized in the way of traditional truth-functional calculus and analyzed truth-functionally no combination of truth-values of components makes the premises true and the conclusion false. However, Adams expects that his readers will concur with him that these inferences are 'invalid' in a different sense. He writes:

We trust that the reader's immediate reaction to these examples agrees with ours in rejecting or at least doubting the validity of these inferences - one would not *ordinarily* 'draw' the inferences if one were 'given' the premises (Adams, 1965, p. 167, *Italic mine*).

Granted that F1-F9 are 'invalid', it follows, he believes, that F1-F9 pose a serious problem for the application or the use of standard formal logic in the analysis of indicative conditionals (Adams, 1965, p. 167-168). For, he maintains that there is a causal link between the special sort of 'invalidity' of these arguments involving indicative conditionals and the following "extremely dubious" assumption about indicative conditionals: that for the sake of formal analysis indicative conditionals can be treated as truth-functional in the sense

that they are true only when their antecedents are false or consequents true and false only when their antecedents are true and consequents are false. Regarding the assumption of truth-functionality, he puts it as follows:

...one might immediately be led to expect that fallacies would rise in applications of the formal theory which tacitly make the assumption. Examples F1-F9 might be regarded simply as confirmation of this expectation (Adams, 1965, p. 168).

According to him, this assumption of truth-functionality is one of the basic principles upon which the application of formal logic to indicative conditionals relies. It follows, he believes, therefore that F1-F9 pose a serious problem for the application of standard formal logic to indicative conditionals.

A key point for this argument is that the alleged 'invalidity' of F1-F9 somehow is the consequence of applying formal logic to indicative conditionals on the tacit assumption that these statements can be treated as truth-functional. Unfortunately, although Adams suggests that the 'invalidity' of these inferences is somehow linked to the assumed truth-functionality of indicative conditionals in them, from his sample inferences, however, nothing as unequivocal as that follows.

Moreover, it certainly is not the only explanation possible of the alleged 'invalidity' of F1-F9. For instance, a far more simple explanation, which I shall try to develop in the following, of why in F1-F9 one would not infer the conclusion given the premises would be that in these cases one is not sure that one is 'logically' safe to do so. Granted that these examples contain indicative conditionals and mostly are structured according to argument-forms the primary connective of which is the symbol ' \supset ', it is a moot point, however, whether they establish anything exclusively about indicative conditionals as such. I contend that Adams' examples simply reaffirm the need for some simple precautionary measures for the application of the schemata of formal logic to natural language arguments in general. To be more specific, I shall argue that one would not infer the conclusion which according to formal truth-functional logic follows from the given premises in F1-F9, because certain basic pre-requirements for the application of truth-functional logic have not been fulfilled in these arguments. My aim is to thus challenge the soundness of Adams' argument under consideration with an alternative explanation of the

'invalidity' of F1-F9 which neither involves the assumption of truth-functionality nor implicates the application of formal logic to indicative conditionals. Explanation follows.

In his appeal to his readers, where he expects them to find the examples 'invalid' in an ordinary, non-truth-functional sense, Adams has supposed his readers to be ordinary reasoners. He assumes them to have enough logical intuition to go beyond the usual truth-functional analysis of his sample inferences and "immediately react" to the above-mentioned truth-functionally valid samples in a certain way. My alternative account makes a few more additional assumptions about such ordinary reasons. It assumes, for instance, that it is also natural for such a reasoner to recognize the obvious fact that indicative conditionals, like many other natural language statements, are context-sensitive in the sense that their interpretation and evaluation are susceptible to changes in their context. A reasoner of this sort is supposed to be alert and sensitive to the interplay of the content of a natural language statement and its context. Thus, it is assumed that the kind of reasoners Adams has in mind would try to assess the truth or falsity of indicative conditionals with due consideration to and in relation to their context of utterance; *not* irrespective of it.

The rules of inference of standard formal truth-functional logic, taken just by themselves, are pure formal exercises presenting in the barest, skeletal form what according to them follows from a given set of premises. However, since natural language statements such as indicative conditionals are context-sensitive, a fundamental assumption of this paper is that the application of rules of inference of standard formal logic to actual natural language argument-instances involving indicative conditionals requires that certain discreet, common-sensical expectations, which will be discussed shortly, about the context of an inference are met. It is further assumed that where these expectations are not fulfilled, a common reasoner feels uncomfortable about inferring the conclusion from the given premises. I shall appeal to the latter assumption to explain why a common reasoner would react to these inferences just as Adams expects them to. I shall argue that this reaction alone does not warrant Adams' conclusion.

An assumed 'normal' context often helps us to understand what an ordinary statement says and to evaluate what it says. Given the statement 'Crows

are black', for instance, we try to understand the statement against an assumed context of what usually or 'normally' is the case. That is, the existence of albino crows is kept aside strictly as unusual exception. Without this assumption in effect, the assessment of the even simple statements such as the following conditional becomes a problem:

- (1) If I drop this pen, it will fall to the floor.

This conditional is determined true *assuming* that the circumstances presupposed by it will be 'normal'; i.e., no one will try to catch it in the mid-air, this event is not taking place in zero-gravity, the pen is a 'normal' pen and the floor a 'normal' floor, and so on. Its evaluation [that (1) is true] presupposes that this *ceteris paribus* clause is in effect. When any of the presupposed circumstances change, it is understood that accordingly the evaluation will be affected. If, perchance, the context for (1) changes to an unusual one, where for instance the pen-dropping experiment is taking place in a zero-gravity situation, then obviously the formal appraisal will have to be withdrawn.

The same is true about understanding and assessing a natural language inference. We assume a pertinent 'normal' context for them on the basis of the information provided by the premises and the conclusion. Since inferences involve a process of sequential transition from premises to conclusion, the *ceteris paribus* clause further assumes that for the same inference this context will remain, relatively speaking, the same throughout in the sense that (a) if for some reason some change in the initial contextual conditions has to be allowed, the conditions will change within 'reasonable', 'expected' parameters, and (b) that a change in the conditions will not be such that it can be accommodated only by a context which is drastically different from, or is inconsistent with, the initially supposed one. For instance, in the following inference,

If I drop this pen, it will fall to the floor. If it falls to the floor, then ink will splatter. Therefore, if I drop this pen, then ink will splatter.

The conclusion follows from the premises *assuming* that the operating circumstances are 'normal', as explained in relation to (1). However, there is also the additional assumption that for the same inference there will not be a sudden shift in the background assumptions for instance, while making the transition from the premises to the conclusion. It is not allowable, for instance,

that in the context of the premises the referred-to pen is assumed to be a liquid-ink pen, whereas the context of the conclusion chooses it to be the kind whose ink, when dropped, does not 'splatter'. Such a shift is a direct violation of the *ceteris paribus* clause required by the evaluation of the inference, and for that reason is not a permissible move from a common reasoner's point of view.

In most of the inferences of F1-F9, this *ceteris paribus* clause has not been observed. There is a noticeable change in the context or the background assumptions either while in transition from one premise to another, or from one premise to the conclusion. For instance, in F3 the premise, which asserts Smith's retirement given Brown's victory in the election, clearly assumes that Smith will be alive when the election is over. However, the component newly inserted in the antecedent of the conclusion, namely, 'Smith dies before the election', ushers in a totally unexpected scenario which is in direct conflict with the above-mentioned assumption of the premise. In F4, the original premise "If Brown wins this election, then Smith will retire to private life" clearly assumes a certain situation within the parameters of which Smith is supposed to be alive *after* the election is over. However, the context changes significantly with the next premise. The second premise suddenly brings in a conflicting consideration about Smith's death prior to the election. Thereby, it effectively places the argument in a whole new scenario, one that is not only drastically different but also is inconsistent with the context assumed by the first premise. Consider also F2 which relies on the fact that the idea of John missing the plane in New York in its conclusion virtually cancels the premise. Clearly, the additional clause of missing the plane was not originally intended to be a part of the argument when the argument was initiated. Thus, the newly introduced component creates for the conclusion a context that is drastically altered from that assumed by the premise. Similarly consider F1, in which the premise states clearly and without any hesitation that John will arrive on the 10 o'clock plane, and thus assumes an appropriate background in which that is well-affirmed possibility, e.g., in which John has already confirmed that he will arrive on the 10 o'clock plane. Yet, the conclusion assumes a rather different set-up in which John's arrival by the 10 o'clock plane does not have the same degree of surety, and which also allows the possibility of his coming by later planes. As for F5, its premises jointly assert two contradictory consequences of Brown's victory, such that both cannot be true at the same time. One of them is not tenable unless we assume

a total shift in the background of the other. Similarly, the first premise of F6 asserts a disjunctive possibility about who will attend the patient. However, by the time the second premise is asserted, the context which led to the assertion of this disjunctive possibility is no longer binding. For, the new premise clearly cancels one of the possibilities.

In F7-F9, the violation of the *ceteris paribus* assumption is subtler. From a given set of premises, infinite number of truth-functional valid conclusions follow.¹ However, among the myriad of valid conclusions, we neither choose at random nor choose each and every thing that follows from a given set of premises. The meaning of the premises, their interplay against the backdrop of a specified context are pointers to an informative, appropriate conclusion. Same thing applies to F7- F9. The conclusions in each case are among many that follow truth-functionally from the premises. However, all things being equal, these would not be the conclusions we would ordinarily draw. For instance, from the premise of F7, truth-functionally it also follows that John will not graduate. From the premise of F8, a truth-functionally valid conclusion is also that if you throw switch S, then if you throw switch T then the motor will start. Judged from the viewpoint of the assumed context of the premises, both seem more appropriate than the ones Adams has deliberately chosen.

Adams might state that this is precisely his point, namely, that the improper moves in these inferences are all there inspite of staying within the dictates of formal logic. The fact remains, he might say, that following the principles of truth-functional logic we can arrive at argumetns which nevertheless are 'invalid'. Hence, he would argue, his claim stands firm, namely, that examples such as these show that the application of truth-functional logic to indicative conditionals is problematic.

To this, my reply is as follows. Although the formal truth-functional logic is helpless against the moves mentioned above, common reasoners, who apply this logic to natural language arguments for their own purpose, are not. They can reject these spurious moves on the ground that there has been a willful violation of a tacit *ceteris paribus* assumption in these arguments, and that a common reasoner is uncomfortable with that.

Adams has also argued that the standard criterion of truth-functional validity is essentially ineffective as it allows even spurious argument-forms as valid.² On the other hand, he claims, his own probabilistic criterion of soundness, according to which "it should be impossible for the premises to be probable while its conclusion is improbable" (Adams, 1975, p. 1), is a much more effective criterion in comparison since it delivers exactly where the truth-functional criterion fails. Since the use of truth-functional logic for formal analysis to indicative conditionals depends heavily upon the standard criterion of validity, this point, in his opinion, therefore constitutes yet another ground against the application of truth-functional logic to indicative conditionals.

Adams claims that there are counter-instances to some truth-functionally valid argument-forms. The following, for instance, is what he believes is a counter-instance to the argument form *contraposition* ($B \supset \sim A$, therefore $A \supset \sim B$) :

If it rains tomorrow there will not be a terrific cloudburst' ($B \supset \sim A$).
Therefore, if there is a terrific cloudburst tomorrow it will not rain
($A \supset \sim B$) (Adams, 1975, p. 15).

Although *contraposition* is a truth-functionally valid argument-form, according to him this inference is invalid in the sense that we would assert the premise, but we would not infer the conclusion from it. Similarly, he contends that the argument form ' $A \vee B$, therefore $\sim A \supset B$ ' has a counter-instance in:

Either it will rain or it will snow in Berkeley next year. Therefore if it doesn't rain, then it will snow in Berkeley (Adams, 1975, p. 16).

The following, as mentioned earlier in relation to the first argument, are his examples of a counter-instance of the argument-forms *hypothetical syllogism* ($A \supset B$, $B \supset C$, therefore $A \supset C$) and *antecedent restriction* ($B \supset C$, therefore $[A \& B] \supset C$) respectively:

If Smith dies before the election Jones will win. If Jones wins then Smith will retire. Therefore, if Smith dies before the election then he will retire (Adams, 1975, p. 16).

If Jones wins the election then Smith will retire. Therefore, if Smith dies before the election and Jones wins then Smith will retire (Adams, 1975,

p. 17).

Adams argues that since standard truth-functional logic has no means to stop these questionable argument-forms, therefore for an "adequate" theory of these conditionals one must look for "other dimensions of rightness besides truth and other criteria of soundness besides the classical one..." (Adams, 1975, p. ix). He claims that his probabilistic criterion, on the other hand, fulfills this need. For instance, with the aid of this criterion the argument form *contraposition* can be shown to be "probabilistically unsound". That is, it can be shown that it is possible to have instances of this argument-form to have highly probable premise and improbable conclusion. For instance, using a Venn diagram it is possible to represent the high probability of the premise by depicting almost all the A-area as included within not-B area, where A is the bigger circle and B is a small circle within A. In that case, the probability of 'If B then Not-A' will be zero. Similarly, for the argument-form ' $A \vee B$, therefore $\sim A \supset B$ ', Adams attempts to show its probabilistic unsoundness by a figure, in which A is a large rectangle and B is a very small circle outside of A. In that case, the probability of ' $A \vee B$ ' may be high, but the probability of ' $\sim A \supset B$ ' will not be high. This shows, in Adams' view, that the argument-form is probabilistically an unsound one. Examples such as these show, Adams claims, that clearly his new probabilistic criterion is far more effective than the old truth-functional one.

This argument relies heavily on the claim that some of the truth-functionally valid argument-forms can be shown to have 'counter-instances'. It is not clear to me, however, exactly what these instances 'counter'. They certainly do not counter the truth-functional validity of the argument-forms, e.g., *contraposition*; for, Adams' examples against them are not truth-functionally invalid. And if they are supposed to 'counter' the traditional criterion of truth-functional validity and establish the supremacy of Adams' probabilistic criterion of validity over it, then too their success is debatable. For, comparatively speaking, Adams' own probabilistic criterion is not that perfect either. Adams considers it a big victory for his own criterion that it can correctly detect impermissible argument forms while the truth-functional criterion is not that perfect either. Adams considers it a big victory for his own criterion that it can correctly detect impermissible argument forms while the truth-functional criterion cannot. For instance, as mentioned earlier, he claims that his criterion

does not sanction the argument form *contraposition*. Consider, however, the following instance of *contraposition*:

- (2) If an American is a senator in U. S. Congress, then he is not black.
Therefore, if an American is black, then he is not a senator in the U. S. Congress.

This is an unacceptable inference, but Adams' probabilistic criterion of soundness, which merely looks at the high probability of the premise as against that of the conclusion and has no concern for the truth-value of the statements, cannot stop it. For, the conditional probability of the premise is on the high side, and so is that of the conclusion. Of course, none of them are true, but Adams cannot use that to explain the failure of the inference.

More importantly, however, the sole concern of Adams' criterion with probability alone without much ado for truth leads to the consequence that it cannot stop some the truth-functionally invalid arguments which even the standard truth-functional criterion of validity can. Consider for instance the following,

- (3) If it is good coffee, then it is from Brazil. Therefore, if it is from Brazil, then it is good coffee.

However, the high probability of both the premise and the conclusion allows it to pass through Adams' probabilistic criterion.

III

Adams has also claimed that indicative conditionals have a certain feature which creates a "fundamental difficulty" for the application of, not only standard formal truth-functional logic, but for *any* bivalent truth-conditional logic to these statements (Adams, 1975, 1981). This crucial feature, according to him, is that indicative conditionals do not have probability of truth; unlike any other statement they only have conditional probability.

Although usually the assertability of a statement is given by the probability of its truth; or, as he puts it, by the sum of the probabilities of the "possible states of affairs" (Adams, 1975, p. 2) in which the statement would be true, Adams claims that for indicative conditional statements their assertability

goes by their conditional probability. For instance, we assume that in a poker game there is good reason to accept the indicative conditional 'If X calls he will win' only when "the chances of X's calling and winning sufficiently outweigh those of his calling and losing..." (Adams, 1981, p. 332). This weighing of chances of one possibility against that of the other, according to Adams,

...is equivalent to measuring conditionals' probabilities by *conditional probabilities* (this assumption is not a tautology,) and it is well known that these probabilities do not conform to the laws of unconditional probability. (Adams, 1981, p. 332).

Adams maintains that the fact, that an indicative conditional has only conditional probability, has many serious consequences. One of them is that this creates a problem for applying classical criterion of validity to indicative conditional. For, he asserts, it is a well-known fact that conditional probability does not conform to the laws of unconditional probability and, he claims, classical criterion of validity takes it for granted that the statements it is dealing with have unconditional probability. He puts it as follows,

...assessing provisional reasoning according to the classical criterion of deductive soundness rests on assumptions about probabilities that are not valid in the case of reasoning involving conditionals (Adams, 1981, p. 332.).³

He explains as follows:

What follows immediately from the fact that a piece of reasoning from premises which are not certainties is 'classically sound' is that if it is highly probable that all of the premises have the value 'true' in some perhaps artificially stipulated sense, then it is also probable that the conclusion has the stipulated value. *But what needs to be shown in the case of provisional reasoning to conditional conclusions...is not that it is probable that they have any one value, but rather that the likelihood of one of two non-exhaustive values is high relative to that of another value.* (Adams, 1981, p. 332, *Italics mine*)

The showing of this relative value, Adams claims, is the "most essential criterion of adequacy" (Adams, 1981, p. 332) for an improved theory of conditionals; but which, he thinks, no theory of conditionals can satisfy if it is

based on truth-conditions and uses the classical criterion of soundness. Since this assumption is not valid for the probability of an indicative conditional, he contends, the stumbling block will not go away with a different set of truth-conditions. Thus, according to him, *no* truth-conditional analysis can ever be the right account for indicative conditionals. In his own words,

If the conditional probability measure for conditionals' probabilities is correct, and given other standard assumptions of probability theory, there is no way of attaching dichotomous truth values to conditionals in such a way that their probabilities will equal their probabilities of being true. (Adams, 1975, p. 5)

For indicative conditionals, "Truth conditions," Adams concludes, "are just not enough" (Adams, 1975, p. 7). Thus, he maintains, since the probability of indicative conditionals are not reducible to truth-conditions of any kind, it follows that for indicative conditionals the application of standard truth-functional logic should be supplanted by another logic, one which requires no reference to truth-conditions whatsoever and is based purely on axioms of probability instead.

In order to establish his strong, universal claim, that *any* truth-conditional analysis will necessarily be inadequate to deal with conditional probability, Adams needs to show that there is something directly conflicting, inherently contradictory or inconsistent, about the joint assignment of a truth-condition to a statement and its having a conditional probability value such that the presence of one nullifies the other possibility. It goes against him, however, that his arguments do not show anything as conclusive as that. Adams has made several attempts to argue for this point. Among them, I shall consider what appears to me as Adams' strongest argument on this point. In it, he argues that the "fundamental difficulty" for *any* truth-conditional analysis will be the classical criterion of soundness which simply cannot deal with conditional probability. This criterion, according to him, only considers the high probability of which *one* value, 'true' or 'false', the conclusion has when it needs to show the "likelihood of one of two non-exhaustive values is high relative to that of another value" (Adams, 1981, pp. 321-322). To this, I have the following comments to make. In his premise, Adams suggests that there is a veritable connection between any given truth-conditional analysis of conditionals and its accepting the same allegedly inadequate classical criterion of soundness to assess inferences involving these conditionals. However, it is never made clear why

this highly controversial universal claim must be true. Adams hints at a connection between the assignment of truth and the assignment of, not conditional probability, but absolute probability. His point, however, remains vague as he does not provide us any further explanation on this crucial point. Whether such a theory can provide a systematic, uniform semantics for indicative conditionals is another issue, but it certainly shows that Adams' supposition that truth-conditional theories cannot account for conditional probability, is wrong.

Finally, according to his view, these oft-used statements have no truth-conditions, but only probability-conditions, and that too of a very special kind in comparison to the probability of other statements. This has some bizarre consequences for ordinary reasoners. Some of them are as follows. Consider the statement:

(4) If $2 + 2 = 4$, then Thailand is in Asia

Ordinarily, we would reject or at least doubt its assertability. However, Adams, who complains about the stipulated truth-conditions handed down by truth-functional logic, would require us to disregard our common intuitions about its assertability, and would ask us to accept its assertability on some stipulated dictum, e.g., that the chances of $2 + 2$ being 4 and Thailand's being in Asia significantly and sufficiently outweigh the chances of their not being so.

Adams' account also places an unreasonable and inordinate amount of burden on the reasoner. It demands in every reasoner a certain level of proficiency in probability calculus as a pre-requirement even for the most insignificant use of indicative conditionals. for a proper assessment of each of the occurrences of indicative conditionals in one's own reasoning as well as in that of others, the reasoner has to be able to correctly compute the conditional probability value of the conditional each time. Also, for assessing the worth of each inference involving these conditionals (either as premises or conclusion or both) one has to have enough skill and contextual information to correctly measure the joint probabilities of the premises and weigh it against the improbability of the conclusion. And that is not all. Since our reasoning does not consist of indicative conditionals alone, there will be the usual presence of other assertions in it as well which will have truth-conditions. This will require an ordinary reasoner to be adept enough in his logical abilities to mesh well all the special non-truth-conditional probabilistic calculations about indicative conditionals with

the usual, truth- conditional considerations for the rest of the ordinary connectives to arrive at a complete assessment of a piece of ordinary reasoning. Thus, accepting Adams' characterization of indicative conditionals is too steep a price for an average, ordinary reasoner to pay.

Adams also demands that with respect to indicative conditionals we give up all considerations of truth in favor of the notion of conditional probability. This is highly counter-intuitive. For, our basic intuition about indicative conditionals is that, whether truth-functional or not, these statements definitely are true or false. Moreover, it is not immediately obvious at all that the proposed concept of conditional probability of an indicative conditional can be a successful replacement for any consideration about the truth of these statements. High conditional probability may be an important concern for judging the assertability of an indicative conditional, but it certainly is not our only concern about these statements. Occasionally, it is not even our primary concern, as for instance when we are interested in the plain and simple truth of a statement. Consider, for instance, the following conditional,

(5) If an American is a senator of the U. S. Congress, then he is a rich white man.

The conditional probability of this statement, i.e., the probability of (that this American is a rich white man *given* he is a senator of the U. S. Congress), is pretty high; so is its assertability. However, most people would reject (5) on the ground that it is not *true*.

NOTES

1. For instance, from any premise 'p', we can deduce the premise itself. Thus, the conclusion will be 'p'. Next, we can conjoin these two statements to deduce 'p.p', and similarly to deduce 'p.p.p'. and so on.
2. William Cooper (1968) took the argument a step farther. He claimed to have also shown that some classically invalid argument forms have "corresponding" instances in natural language which are usually accepted as valid in ordinary reasoning.

3. My interpretation of this claim is that Adams is unwarrantedly assuming here that the standard criterion of soundness, as it is concerned with the truth of the statements (premises), is only concerned with the absolute probability of statements.

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ON COGNITION AS A RELATION

NILAKANTH DASH

After seeing a sandalwood from a distance one says that 'sandalwood is fragrant' (*surabhi candanam*). When the man says that I see a piece of fragrant sandalwood, he has an immediate perception of the object with its fragrance. In this case, the visual sense organ can operate on the piece of sandalwood only, and not its fragrance. Fragrance can be known only through the nose, but there is no contact of the nose with the fragrance. When such knowledge arises after seeing the distant sandalwood, it appears, that what one visually perceives is not only sandalwood, but also the fragrance inherent in it.

How to explain the case of such a perception? All types of perceptions take place due to some sense-object contact. The present paper tries to explain the above case of perception and would show the contact, by which such knowledge arises.

The *Naiyāyikas* explain this problem with the help of one supernormal contact. i.e., 'the contact of the form of knowledge' (*jñānalakṣaṇasannikarsa*).

Knowledge resides in the soul by the relation of inherence. We get perceptual knowledge, when our sense organ comes in contact with the object. Sense organs are six including the mind. Mind is the internal sense-organ and others are external sense-organs. This (*jñāna*) cognition serves as a contact when the external sense organs are connected with the mind, the mind is connected with the soul, where the knowledge inheres. If this knowledge, while inhering in the soul can be brought out by remembrance, to get the knowledge of its own object in connection with some object present outside, then the cognition in the form of remembrance serves as a contact between the object and the sense-organ, which is called *jñānalakṣaṇāpratyāsatti*. In case of mental cognition the remembrance of the object of a knowledge can be done by mind itself.

When something is cognized that cognition produces an impression

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(*saṃskāra*) in the soul. Remembrance is possible when that impression is evoked somehow. This cognition, in the form of remembrance serves as a contact to connect the object known previously with the object to be known at present, as an adjunct. When seeing a sandalwood from a distance, which is impossible to be inhaled, one says 'I see a fragrant sandalwood', there the knowledge of fragrance comes due to the remembrance which is *jñānalakṣaṇāpratyāsatti*.

The author of *Kiraṇāvali* on *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* explains it like, "on the first day by inhaling one gets the knowledge that sandalwood is fragrant; on some other day just after the glance of sandalwood from a distance, even without inhaling it, he says, 'the sandalwood is fragrant', to some other person who is anxious about it".¹

In this later knowledge, there are three things, viz., sandalwood (*candana*), the property of sandalwood (*candanatva*) and fragrance (*saṃrabha*). Here the person gets the knowledge of sandalwood by the relation of contact with the eyes, its property by *saṃyukta-samavāya*. Both are normal contacts. So '*surabhi candanam*', in this perceptual knowledge the fragrance (*saṃrabha*) is cognized as an adjunct to sandalwood. The fragrance of sandalwood cannot be grasped by the eyes, which is connected with the *candana*. *Candana* can be perceived with the eyes but fragrance always is perceived by the olfactory organs, not by the visual organs. Then how the fragrance comes as an adjunct in the knowledge of *candana*? The *Naiyāyikas* say, though the fragrance is not accessible to the visual organs, yet we should accept the total structure of knowledge as apprehended by the eyes. No doubt, that sandalwood is perceived by the eyes; but the fragrance which comes in the perceptual knowledge and remains as adjunct, is the knowledge of fragrance acquired previously. So the existence of fragrance in sandalwood is experienced previously in some other case. This past experience is remembered instantly on seeing the sandalwood, the object of that past experience i.e., fragrance is related to the present sandalwood as adjunct. This is how fragrance appears as a qualifier to the sandalwood even, in the case of the visual perception of sandalwood.

We get perception of that object, which is in contact with the same organ. In this case of visual perception we should accept that the fragrance experienced in the past is in connection with the eyes. We can say the whole knowledge as perception, if we accept the cognition of remembrance as a contact. In other

words, if we accept the past cognition of fragrance serving as a contact here, then only we can say 'sandalwood is fragrant' is a perceptual knowledge. For this reason, *jñānalakṣaṇāpratyāsatti* is to be accepted.

The *Vedāntins* are not in a position to accept the above explanation. *Dharmarāja*, the author of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* opines that the above cognition involves two steps viz., perception and inference. Perception of that, which is present before the sense organ and inference of that, which was perceived in the past. Thus as per *Dharmarāja*, the case of 'sandalwood is fragrant' is a case of getting two knowledge. Perception operates in case of sandalwood and inference, in case of fragrance. But one traverses from the perception of sandalwood, to the inference of fragrance so quickly that it seems, as if he perceives the fragrant sandalwood.²

The *Vedāntins* also object that to say the above case as perception is to ignore the difference between perception and inference. So they reject the idea of *jñānalakṣaṇāpratyāsatti*.

The *Vedāntin* view is that, apprehension of *candana* is immediate and the apprehension of fragrance is mediate. But the whole knowledge appears as one. People get the perception of fragrant sandalwood. If it appears as perception, the *Naiyāyikas* have given one epistemological explanation of the fact, people have the cognition of fragrant sandalwood as perception. This is done by *jñānalakṣaṇāpratyāsatti*, where the past cognition is taken as a relation. With the same, *Naiyāyikas* have also tried to solve some other epistemological problems.

The explanation of this case as containing two distinct knowledge is not tenable. Because 'sandalwood is fragrant' (*surabhi candanam*) is a qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭajñāna*) as per *Nyāya* terminology. Here fragrance (*saṃrabha*) appears as a qualifier to the sandalwood. It is a single cognition in which the fragrance is presented as a qualifier to the sandalwood through the remembrance of the fragrance. Moreover, if this is treated as two distinct cognitions, the causal relationship between the qualified cognition and the effort (*pravṛtti*) cannot be explained. Hence the *Vedāntins'* view cannot be accepted.

Naiyāyikas have propounded three supernormal contacts viz., *sāmānyalakṣaṇasannikarṣa*, *jñānalakṣaṇasannikarṣa* and *yogajasannikarṣa*. With the help of *sāmānyalakṣaṇasannikarṣa*, we get the knowledge of all the

individuals of a class, after the normal perception of one individual of that class. In this case, the knowledge (*jñāna*) of the universal serves as the contact. In case of *jñānalakṣaṇasannikarṣa*, the knowledge (*jñāna*) of remembrance of the qualifier serves as a contact. We should observe here that in both *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* and *jñānalakṣaṇa*, the contact is based on some kind of knowledge (*jñāna*). Here somebody objects, as to what is the difference between the two then?³

The reply to the above objection is, in *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, the knowledge of the universal leads to the perception of the individuals, in which it inheres, whereas, in *jñānalakṣaṇa* a past knowledge leads to the present perception of its own object.⁴

Naiyāyikas have explained some other epistemological problems also with the help of *jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti*. Those are the cases of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), awareness (*anuvyavasāya*), the perception of absence (*abhāvapratyakṣa*) and the illusory knowledge (*bhramajñāna*). *Śrī Harirāma Tarkavāgiśa* in his *Jvānalakṣaṇāvicārarahasyam* deals with these possibilities in detail.

While coming across a rope people sometimes commit an error as, 'this is a snake'. The *Naiyāyikas* explain this expression as a case of pure perceptual judgement. They do so with the help of *jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti*. In case of such an error, snake is not physically present before us. But, because of certain peculiarities like the crawling and coiling nature of the rope similar to that of a snake etc., added to the lack of sufficient light, our mind gets the idea of a snake, which has been already experienced on many occasions. Thus this past memory serves as a contact and the expression of perceptual error comes in the form of 'this is a snake'. Out of this expression, one part i.e., 'a snake', is brought with the help of *jñānalakṣaṇa*.

Viśvanātha adds, that when a mass of dust is erroneously cognized as smoke and afterwards one becomes aware of this illusion, then the next perception (*anuvyavasāya*), comes in the form of 'I cognized the mass of dust as smoke'. In this *anuvyavasāya*, the knowledge of mass of dust by mental perception is caused through the *jñānalakṣaṇasannikarṣa*.⁵

Moreover, in case of a valid knowledge, when a pot is perceived by the eye, the awareness of the same perception will occur at the stage of *anuvyavasāya*

(ghaṭam ahaṃ jānāmi), by *jñānalakṣaṇa*, because the mind cannot have the visual perception of the pot through normal contact.

In Psychology, the expressions like, 'ice looks cold', 'the stone looks hard' are given the name of 'complication'. "The sight of ice", says Ward, "yields a fore-feel of its coldness". Stout is of the view that what we have in such cases is rather a perception than a mere forethought. The ice is not merely thought of as cold, it has a cold look. The residual of past sensations of cold become entwined with our visual sensation so as to modify its character as an immediate experience. So here the revival and original sensations coalesce into a single complex sensation.⁶

The sight of a suit of polished armour, "says Ward, "instantly reinstates and steadily maintains all, that we retain of former sensations of its hardness and smoothness and coldness". As per Stout, the armour looks hard, smooth and cold and appears as a single cognition. But this peculiar appearance to the eye does not necessarily involve any distinct representation or idea or separate sensation of hardness, smoothness or coldness. The corresponding tactile and other experiences are not produced as separate and distinct modes of consciousness. They are not discriminated from the visual experience itself. So in complication, it is impossible to separate by inspection what is actually sense-given from what is ideally supplied.⁷ Some scholars have compared this with the *jñānalakṣaṇāpratyāsatti*, by turning the example like, 'the sandalwood looks fragrant', and say, this may be regarded as another instance of what Stout, Ward and Wundt call "Complication".

So to conclude, we should see that in the above case of perception, there was a problem, as to, how the fragrance not amenable to the visual organ, comes in the perceptual knowledge. The explanation is given by the *Naiyāyikas*, with the help of *jñānalakṣaṇāpratyāsatti*, that the past cognition of fragrance serves as a relation, to present fragrance in the content of the perceptual knowledge.

Both *sāmānyalakṣaṇāpratyāsatti* and *jñānalakṣaṇāpratyāsatti* are introduced in the *Nyāya* texts, to explain certain epistemological problems. The application of *jñānalakṣaṇāpratyāsatti*, where, the cognition serves as a relation, is limited to a few epistemological problems. One cannot apply this relation in a general way everywhere.

NOTES

1. *Prathamadivase cāndanam ghrātvā 'surabhi candanam' - iti niścītya divasāntare 'ghrātvaiiva dūrataścandanadarśanamatreṇa 'surabhicandanam' - ityanyasmai jijñāsamānāya vadati. Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, Chowkhambha Prakashan, 1990. p. 214.*
2. *Surabhicandanamityādijñānamapi candanakhaṇḍāmśe aparokṣaṃ saurabhāmśe tu parokṣaṃ saurabhasya cakṣurindriyāyogyatayā yogyatvaghāṭitasya niruktalakṣaṇasyābhāvāt, Vedāntaparibhasā ed. Musalgaonkar, G. N., Chowkhamba Surabharati Prakashan, 1963, p. 49.*
3. *Nanu jñānalakṣaṇāpratyāsatti yadi jñānarūpā sāmānyalakṣaṇāpi jñānarūpā tayorbheda na syāt, Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, Chowkhambha Prakashan, 1990, p. 214.*
4. *Viśayī yasya tasaiva vyāpāro jñānalakṣaṇaḥ sāmānyalakṣaṇāpratyāsattirhi tadāśrayasya jñānam janayati. Jñānalakṣaṇāpratyāsattistu yadvīśayakaṃ jñānamtasyaiva pratyāsattiriti. Ibid. p. 214.*
5. *Evam yatra dhūmatvena dhūlipaṭalaṃ jñātaṃ tatra dhūlipaṭtalasyānuvyavasāye bhānam jñānalakṣaṇayā. Ibid. p. 214.*
6. Stout G. F. *A Manual of Psychology* p. 205-6.
7. *Ibid. p. 207.*

MORAL PERSONHOOD

SAURAVPRAN GOSWAMI

Professor P. F. Strawson in his celebrated essay "Freedom and Resentment",¹ an essay on moral issues, has drawn a picture of a person on the canvas of inter-personal relationships. However, his business here is not to define or describe a person as it was in his earlier essay "Persons". Rather he is here concerned with the ethical question of the role of determinism, if any, in our ascription of moral responsibility to persons. Although throughout the essay Strawson has never held explicitly that whosoever can be judged morally responsible is a person and those towards whom we suspend moral reactive attitudes, on grounds elaborately discussed in the essay, are not, still this corollary follows obviously from it.

The concept of moral responsibility or obligation, and for that reason, that of a moral agent presuppose the concept of inter-personal relationships. This is but the human commitment to participate in the ordinary human life. This participatory life is characterized by reactive behaviour on the part of its participants towards each-other. Strawson broadly distinguishes two such reactive attitudes -- gratitude and resentment as a typically opposed pair on the personal level. The basis of these reactive attitudes is that --

"we demand some degree of good will or regard on the part of those who stand in these relationships to us".²

However, gratitude and resentment represent only one kind of reactive attitudes -- the "personal reactive attitudes" as he calls it -- that is, that which we show or feel towards others when our personal interests are affected by their actions or behaviour. There are two other kinds - "moral reactive attitudes" -- that which we feel for others for affecting not our own interests but some others' interests and "self-reactive attitudes" - the one which we feel towards ourselves

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for affecting others' interests by our action or behaviour. There are also typically opposed pairs in these two latter kinds corresponding to gratitude and resentment on the personal level. We have moral approval and indignation on the vicarious or impersonal level, and pride and remorse on the level in which oneself is involved.

These reactive attitudes, either personal, moral or self-reactive ones, we feel or express towards others or ourselves only in cases when things go normal. Reacting in these ways however, is not always meaningful. When, for example, one does something purely inadvertently, out of ignorance or under compulsion; or when one does something under conditions in which one departs from one's true self temporarily, e.g. "under post-hypnotic suggestion;" or when one is "only a child" or a "hopeless schizophrenic" -- in all these cases we suspend our reactive attitudes towards the agent in question.

The reason for suspending reactive attitudes in all these cases mentioned above is that we do not demand any "inter-personal regard" on the part of those whose actions are now under consideration. We refuse them entry to our ordinary participatory life. And by doing this we start looking down upon them as a *sub-person species*. What they may read in our faces is not any of the reactive attitudes, but only an "objective attitude".

"To adopt the objective attitude to another human being is to see him, perhaps, as an object of social policy; as a subject for what, in a wide range of sense, might be called treatment; as something certainly to be taken account, perhaps precautionary account, of; to be managed or handled or cured or trained; perhaps simply to be avoided ..."³

In this attitude we may have the feelings of repulsion, fear, pity, even some sort of love, for that agent, but not those of resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, anger and the like that are very common in inter-personal relationships. This difference in the attitude makes us treat the *subject* of objective attitude not as a person equal in status with me and other persons, but as an *object* that falls somewhere below the average line. I am afraid of him, I pity him, but I do not love (in the participatory sense) him, I do not hate him either. He is not my friend, nor is he my enemy; he is an object.

This objective attitude when adopted outside the sphere of mere inter-personal relationships, viz. in case of impersonal relationships, makes any

moral evaluation whatsoever of the agent's actions pointless. The agent in question is not a "term of moral relationships" not a "member of the moral community".

Moral responsibility presupposes moral freedom. Although Strawson has not directly defined freedom in the said essay, his conception of it may be said to be something like that of his "optimist" as "nothing but the absence of certain conditions the presence of which would make moral condemnation or punishment inappropriate".⁴

Prof. A. J. Ayer has also defined freedom in a similar way -

"The best way to make clear what is meant by saying that a person was free to perform a given action, whether he actually performed it or not, is to set out the conditons under which this power would not be granted him".⁵

For Ayer, the man who is hypnotized is deprived of the power of choice; the kleptomaniac is represented as one who has no option but to steal; the man at gun-point has no reasonable alternative but to comply with his assailant's order; habitual subservience robs one of any inclination to disobey. These are "constraints". But when the determining factors do not amount to constraints, the agent can fairly be accounted free.

So in all cases where we do not have a Strawsonian "objective attitude" or an Ayerian "constraint", we can hold one morally responsible for one's actions. This is because we consider one to be a free agent - a *person*. The person could have acted otherwise had he chosen so.

But do all these cases of objective attitudes and of having constraints hinder us from ascribing moral responsibility to people, thereby degrading them from the status of person? We may however venture to arrive at the opposite conclusion viz. that the so-called cases of adopting objective attitudes or of having constraints do not always inhibit our holding of reactive attitudes.

Professor Rajendra Prasad in his ingenious essay "Reactive Attitudes, Rationality and Determinism"⁶ maintains that the "logic" of holding such reactive attitudes towards others is that, the reactive attitude -

“implies or presupposes a hope, and not merely a wish, that it is going to influence the behaviour of the agent ... the belief that it is possible for the agent to be influenced by it, i.e. possible for him to modify his behaviour in the required or suggested manner. It is *not rational*, therefore for me to blame A for having done X when I know or believe that my doing so is going to have no influence at all on him”.⁷

Prasad may be thought to be right in connecting the having of reactive attitudes and the hope or belief to influence the agent's behaviour thereby. But it does not show the *logic thereof*. Because in both the ends of the connection there exist only two psychological factors. The psychology of having reactive attitudes is no less complex and complicated than the psychology of hope and belief. We may have no reactive attitude even when both, we and the agent whose action affects our interest, are normal adult human beings. Again we may *hope* to influence the behaviour even of a lunatic by showing our ‘resentment’ over his actions. We cannot be deprived of this psychological freedom by calling it “irrational”. It would at most involve a psychological inconsistency if we give up all hope to correct the lunatic's behaviour and still continue to have reactive attitudes towards his action. Logically there would be no contradiction. Nor is it empirically impossible. Once it is granted, we may say that adoption of objective attitude and suspension of reactive ones do not always go hand in hand. In fact, we very often adopt what may be called *corrective* reactive attitudes towards children who are supposed to be non-moral agents and hence objects of objective attitude. Of course, since a child is *ex-hypothesi* a non-moral agent, the reactive attitudes shown towards him may not be strictly moral ones. The conclusion to which we are led from such considerations is that it is possible, without being irrational, to hold an objective attitude in the Strawsonian sense and at the same time to show some reactive attitude towards someone. This is of course not to say that we cannot have objective attitudes without having reactive ones. But in those cases where we have reactive attitudes, there must at least be some moral content. We may not hold an object of objective attitude morally responsible and may not, therefore, go to reward or punish him, but the reaction (if) we show to him itself serves as reward or punishment in so far as it happens to be encouraging or corrective one.

We should get here two points clarified to a little more extent: one is about the object of an objective attitude, and the other is what is mentioned just above that a reactive attitude must have a moral content.

(1) What Strawson means by the adoption of objective attitudes is the suspension of reactive ones either temporarily, i.e. during the short time of the action's being done, or wholly throughout the life, or a part of life, of the agent who is for some reason or other counted either temporarily or wholly, a non-moral one. On this explanation a normal adult human being when acts *inadvertently* or when he is *unusually impaired* by abnormal circumstances, or when the agent himself is abnormal, in these circumstances, is *immune* from moral appraisal -- his immunity being due to his insanity or immaturity. Strawson classifies these three types of inhibitors into two groups - the first one in the first group and the remaining two in two sub-groups. Then, any agent falling under either of the above groups is an object of objective attitude. We shall, for convenience, call the three kinds of objects of objective attitude 'Object-1', 'Object-2(a)' and 'Object-2(b)' respectively.

When it is a case of 'object-1' then we suspend the reactive attitudes only very temporarily -- i.e., during the time of the involuntary action's being done. For all other times he is a normal person and therefore an object of reactive attitudes.

The case of 'object-1' therefore seems to be clear. The agent is not held morally responsible for his unintentional deeds. But these unintentional actions require to be precisely described. There must not, for example, remain any scope for any counter-plea, such that - "You could have been a little more careful not to tread on my toes". Or again, should the agent be allowed to repent long after the action was done, may be after persuasion, in order to withdraw the reactive attitudes towards him?

'Object-2(a)' are normal persons acting under abnormal circumstances - "under very great strain", "under post-hypnotic suggestion" (Strawson) or "at gun-point" (Ayer). Here also the abnormal situation or the unusual impairment needs to be precisely defined so that the possibilities of augmenting the list of such situations by adding "under alcoholism" and the like, be ruled out. Again, acting under physical compulsion or force from outside do not always make one

an object of objective attitudes. We may, as an example, consider the case of the man at gun-point. Clearly he is not free. He has to comply with the assailant's order. And, *ex-hypothesi*, as we adopt an objective attitude to him, we do not feel any moral indignation at his actions. But, suppose, the assailant demanded of the man at gun-point an action the consequence of which will be very much harmful to the society or humanity at large, then shall we refrain from exhibiting any moral reaction (supposing that the man complies with the order) on the plea that the man was not free? For example, if the demand was to obtain a permit for selling contaminated baby food? Or shall we suggest that the man should get rather killed than to comply with such a demand?

'Object 2(b)' are abnormal or sub-normal human beings -- 'a hopeless schizophrenic' or 'a child'. Their abnormality and immaturity make them immune from moral evaluation. But, as mentioned earlier, the immaturity of a child cannot stop us from holding what we called corrective reactive attitudes. For reacting in this way is proved to be *fruitful*.⁸ Again, we also react in the same corrective way, often fruitfully, to a lunatic. It may be said therefore that only in extreme cases of insanity and/or in extreme cases of immaturity holding of reactive attitudes would not be *rational*.⁹ These two extreme cases may then be said to be the proper objects of objective attitudes.

These three kinds of objects of objective attitudes modified in the required way are exempted from moral evaluation. In so far as reactive attitudes are suspended towards them, they are not persons. ('Object 1' and 'Object 2(a)' would say, for example. "I was not the *person* I am).

The above analysis is meant to bring out the exact antagonism between the adoption of the two kinds of attitudes -- reactive and objective. That is, objective attitude is to be re-defined in strict terms so that the very possibility of holding both of them towards any one at the same time is ruled out outright. In such a redefinition we must be more specific about the conditions under which an objective attitude is to be adopted. Standing on such a precise definition we can hold, as a working conclusion, that an object of objective attitude, either temporarily or permanently - depending upon the span of time throughout which it is taken towards one, is not counted as a person; whereas an object of reactive

attitude, of necessity is a person. Because --

(2) All reactive attitudes have a moral content in various degrees, and it implies that anyone towards whom it is adopted is a responsible moral agent - a person. However, Strawson has not clearly held in "Freedom and Resentment" that all reactive attitudes have moral counterparts. Of course he has revised his view after it was pointed out by Jonathan Bennett in his "Accountability".¹⁰

So it confirms the second part of our working conclusion. It shows that any object or subject of reactive attitudes is a responsible moral agent which we take here to be the characteristic of a person. On this point, however, we have to exclude a few familiar cases :

(a) On the personal level -- when resentment is not based on a justified demand e.g., the demand for sweets by a child with disordered liver. Such demands have no moral counterparts.

(b) On the level of oneself -- when one is guided by self-biasness, and when it is a case of emotional overwhelming. A lunatic is perhaps overpowered by either of these two factors which is why he does not count as a moral agent.

But we have yet to confirm the first part of our working conclusion, viz. objects of objective attitudes are not persons.

We shall take two extreme cases of objects of objective attitudes for consideration - an extremely lunatic and a very young child. Considered from the point of view of moral responsibility both are on the same status, i.e. immune. But are we on that plea ready to deny them personhood? Of course we may very aptly deny them to be responsible persons; but denying them personhood as such would be to arbitrarily draw the limiting line of the realm of persons.

The only plea, then, to deny them personhood is that they are not moral agents. We do not hold them responsible for their deeds. So we do not react towards them. It means, we do not demand any "good will or regard" on their part towards us. It may be thought to rule out the possibility of there being inter-personal relationships between them and us. But are we ready to say that I have no inter-personal relationships *with* my young child? Or even *with* my

insane brother? The relation may not be one of give and take. I may not hold them responsible for their deeds, but can I evade *my* responsibility towards them? I may not demand a good will and regard from them, but do they not demand them from me? If I recognize this responsibility of mine and their demands, it implies that I look with a different eye at them than I do at a physical object. In this look I have good will, regard, love, sympathy and what not. And this qualifies them to be, what may be called *unqualified* persons as distinct from persons qualified with responsibility.

This question has been disputed over by a vast majority of thinkers on the issue of moral personhood. The tendency found among them to be almost common is to deny an infant or a lunatic personhood on this or that plea. What do they do is somewhat ridiculous in that they try to limit the scope of persons by haphazardly laying down a number of criteria which they themselves satisfy. These conditions are rationality, consciousness, higher-order intentional capacity, ability for verbal communication, capacity for inter-personal relationships and the like. Laying down such criteria is meant to narrowing the scope of persons and thereby to present it as a sacrosanct ideal. In doing this, they become selfishly quick. Because a child's or a lunatic's personhood can be defended even within the framework of such conditions. For example the adoption of a Strawsonian objective attitude prevents one from being a person. But Strawson cannot dictate towards whom an objective attitude is to be taken. It will be determined by the degree of attachment I feel for someone.

"If, for instance, I predict that a particular plant -- say a potted ivy -- will grow around a corner and up into the light because it "seeks" the light and "wants" to get out of the shade it now finds itself in, and "expects" or "hopes" there is light around the corner, I have adopted the Intentional stance towards the plant, and lo and behold, within very narrow limits it works".¹¹

NOTES

- 1 *Proceedings of the British Academy* (1962). Reprinted in his *Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays* (1974) and in Watson, G. (ed.) *Free will* (1982). All references here are to *Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays*.

2. *Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays* Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1974, p.6.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
5. *Freedom and Morality and Other Essays*, p. 12.
6. *The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson*, Sen, P. K. & Verma, R. R. (ed.), I. C. P. R., New Delhi, 1995.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 354 (emphasis added).
8. Here I assume Rajendra Prasad's thesis of the connection between expressions of reactive attitudes and their fruitfulness to be true for the time being.
9. 'Rational' in Prasad's sense.
10. *Philosophical Subjects*, Van Straaten, Z. (ed.) Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, p. 46. Also Strawson's reply in the same volume, p. 266.
11. Dennett, D. : "Conditions of Personhood" in Rorty, A. O. (ed.) *The Identities Of Persons*, University of California Press, 1976, p. 180.

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DISCUSSION - I

MUSINGS ON THE CONCEPT OF AHIMSĀ (NON-VIOLENCE)

On 'Reflections on Ahimsā : A Practical Approach'

by Prabhat Misra, *I. P. Q.* Vol. XXV No. 2

Non-Violence as an Ideal

Translated, the word 'Ahimsā' becomes blatantly negative: it is no longer associated with ideas like Āsteya, Maitrī, Karuṇā etc. One tends to forget that it belongs to an ideological cluster.

Ahimsā Paramo Dharmah (Non-violence is the supreme religion) is a valued Indian precept. So long as Ahimsā remains a religious or ethical ideal, no one can question its worth. Even before the religions extolling Ahimsā (Jainism, Buddhism), the ancient religion of Zoroasterianism or Judaism exhibited a non-violent character in succumbing to the victimisation of Powers ready to use violence and thus being ousted from the lands of their origin. The wandering Jews remained non-violent, often treated by the Christian world with contempt as 'cowards' till a confederation of Christian Nations gave them a country, Israel and weaponised them to the teeth. Interestingly, even Christianity, as a religion, upholds the ideal of non-violence in asking a true Christian to offer the other cheek if one is slapped. Jesus Christ, on the Cross, asking his Heavenly Father to forgive the perpetrators of violence on him, remains an epitome for all times, of Ahimsā as an ideal.

Two religions that preach the tempering of Ahimsā, the supreme ideal, with a judicious use of violence, are Hinduism and Islam. Islam is widely known as a militant religion. However, Prophet Mohammed never advocated unrestrained violence, as can be seen from the following quotes:-

1. "Defend yourself against your enemies, but attack them not first; God hateth the aggressor". Sura II, 190.
2. "God loveth not the transgressors;if they attack you, slay them;.....but

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if they desist, let there be no hostility, except against the ungodly". Sura II, 186.

3. "Let there be no compulsions in religion.....Invite all to the way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching, and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious; for thy Lord knoweth best, who have strayed from his path, and who receive guidance". Sura XVI, 125.

Undoubtedly, Hinduism, in spite of its Upaniṣadic paeans favouring Ahimsā, is also a militant religion in its own way. I shall support this statement throughout in this paper by means of a variety of arguments. Initially, it will be sufficient to point out that the revered epics, Rāmāyana and Mahābhārata, centre around the subjugation by means of violent warfare, of such enemies who are preceived as evil or unrighteous. In fact, the word "Dharmayuddha" coined in India, has a wider and deeper meaning than the later word, "Crusade", about which more analysis comes later.

Non-violence as a Myth

It has been very aptly pointed out by Prabhat Misra in his article, that the very term 'Ahimsā' has a negative character. Yet, Misra states very casually that "Ultimately this (he means love as a positive constituent of Ahimsā) may materialise in love or a tradition of love-force".

However, Indian History prior to the advent of Buddhism, did not have any such tradition of love-force or conquest by love and Ahimsā. The historical reality of India is that of 'Digvijaya' (conquest of other kings in warfare) taken to be the greatest achievement for a king. The word 'Dharmavijaya' echoing 'Digvijaya' was a departure from traditional Hindu religion which did not believe in religious conversion.

Non-violence wedded to a political program is never the Ahimsā of religious ideology. It cannot, without violating the essence of it, become a practical agenda; in Indian History, a transmutation of negative non-violence to positive love-force was attempted, much later, by Mahatma Gandhi. The original attempt in 'Dharmavijaya' was the substitution of one religion by another. In reality, religions of a benign, tolerant and love-professing type, e.g. Jainism and Buddhism rose as a protest against the older tradition of violence. One cannot

write Indian History by referring to its brief spells of non-violence. It must not be forgotten that before embracing Buddhism, King Ashoka had earned the epithet 'Chandāshoka' by transgressing the permitted limits of violence.

From the time of the epics till the present century, Indian History has mainly been a history of violence, of conquests and valiant resistances, and the resultant amalgam of invaders who stayed on and the original inhabitants who judiciously co-operated and accepted these outsiders like the Huns, the Pathans and the Moghuls. To blend this amalgam into a loving community, thinkers like Tagore had written, in his poem, 'Bhārat-Tīrtha' --

'Those who came in a trail of war and blood,
singing the notes of victory
Are no longer aliens. In my blood reverberates
their multi-hued music.'

A man like Mahatma Gandhi, an unusual human being, through his life, acts, character, and also his spoken and written words effected this blending and almost achieved the equation of Ahimsā with love yet, as an ethico-political strategy, the role of Non-violence in Indian History has to be critically re-assessed.

Non-violence as Reality

In reality, non-violence used as a strategy of resistance, loses its character. Every resistance, active as well as passive, is some sort of pressure-tactics, some assault on the mind-set of another person or group.

In reality, any transmutation of non-violence into a 'positive love-force' is possible only through dialogue and personal meeting. 'Dialogue' includes the writings of persons, and personal meetings can be supplemented with conferences and committees, but group-discussions can never take the place of person-to person(s) communication. Gandhi's appeal to his followers was based on all these and also on the charisma of a person embodying courage, love, selflessness.

The reality is that it will be absurd to hope that the violence from an opponent can be neutralised by stating 'I oppose you with non-violence' unless

this statement originates from a Buddha or a Gandhi, whose lives and teachings serve as their protective armour. The reality is that even an exemplary super-person like Jesus Christ failed to conquer violence by non-violence (and Gandhi fell victim to the violent assassin's bullet), because a ruthless aggressor or a merciless enemy may not respond to the the human endeavour symbolised by Ahimsā. It is questionable whether the Gandhian strategy of passive resistance or civil disobedience would have any success unless the British as a nation had some up-right, just and human values. Both in South Africa and in India, Gandhian non-violence operated in the framework of:-

- (a) The opponent not being barbaric and ruthless
- (b) The actions of resistance interspersed with dialogue and exchange of views
- (c) Resistance coupled with acts of voluntary co-operation and help, proving the good will of the non-violent resistor

In reality, non-violence in the Indian scene had an extremely limited success. Indians, whether Hindus or Muslims, are core- believers in the power of fighting violence with judicious violence, after negotiations fail. After the offer of peace in exchange of just 'five villages' failed, the Pāṇḍavas of Mahābhārata obtained inner sanction for 'Dharmayuddha'. 'Dharma', in Indian philosophical terminology, does not stand for a particular religion, but for 'righteousness'; and the war fought in Mahābhārata was that of defending righteousness. It was not 'Crusade' for a cause, religious or personal.

In reality, though the lifting of 'Ahimsā' from the religious text-books to the battlefield of Indian politics of the 20th century was a stunning move by Gandhi and had an instant magical effect, the theory that Indian Independence has been achieved through non-violence, must be given up. To glorify Gandhi as "the Sant of Sabarmati who gave us Āzādi without using sword or shield" (the popular Hindi Cinema - song) is to forget the heroes and heroines of the Sepoy Mutiny, that first War of Indian Independence: to forget the thousands of martyrs in Punjab and Bengal contributing their constant effort to keep the desire for freedom burning in Indian hearts, to forget the revolutionary Veer Savarkar and Lokmanya Tilak who gave the first clarion call for swaraj, to forget Chittagong Armoury Raid which set up Independence for a second spell after

the Sepoy Mutiny; to forget the Azad Hind Army and Netaji Subhash; to forget the historical fact that almost every time Gandhi gave a call for Satyāgraha along with the non-violent, the violent activists courted arrest, torture and death.

In reality, non-violence can never end violence by challenging it. Baring your breast before the bullet is not a language of love, but that of definance. It may even incite the enemy towards further violence. Such suicidal actions, including the strategy of fasting-until death are violence towards self, and cannot be categorised as non-violent. Vincent Shean, one of Gandhi's biographers, contends that Fasting for Gandhi was not a Pressure tactics, but a matter of personal conviction that through fasting one could attain self-purification or self-chastisement. However, fasting as a threat in the hands of any and every Politician is not even remotely positive. As Vincent Shean states, about (Socrates, Buddha, Jesus) "All of them believed that other men could do what they did. They were wrong, and so was Gandhi".

Non-violence, the Legacy of Gandhi

Perhaps till Martin Luther King, the legacy continued to convince the world. Nelson Mandela escaped the fate of King, though stories of how plots of poisoning him were hatched are now going around. The resistance to Apartheid often took violent form, though there was conscious effort to restrain violence; what finally worked was dialogue.

Dalai Lama, the modern apostle of non-violence, remains an ineffective figure, allowing more and more compromises in his initial demand. There is also the Palestinian Centre for the study of non-violence, founded by Mubarak Aead, called the Gandhi of Palestine, That he had very small success is quite clear. A few more centres and preachers of non-violence are struggling to perpetuate the legacy, among whom is Desmond Tutu. The Gandhian principles are basically not different from Buddhist or Christian principles; the question is:- how far are we observing and respecting these indubitably high and humanitarian truths in today's materialistic and pragmatic world, where violence is a more recognised charter for righting a wrong?

RAJLUKSHMEE DEBEE BHATTACHARYA

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Editor : DAYAKRISHNA

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DISCUSSION - II

A Note on

‘Is “Tat Tvam Asi” the same type of Identity statement As
‘The Morning star Is the Evening star’?

In his paper¹ under the above caption Dayakrishna has raised and discussed in a rambling manner an interesting and important issue namely, whether the imports of the Upanisadic statement “Tat Tvam Asi”- (meaning “That Thou Art”) which is known as “Mahāvākya”, and the wellknown Fregean statement “The morning star is the evening star” are similar or not and if they are similar what they are. In the course of the discussion of this issue several other issues quite irrelevant to the discussion have been brought up by Dayakrishna and rather questionable solutions to these issues have been suggested by him. In fact almost every paragraph in the paper contains some questionable statements which call for critical examination. So a paragraph-by-paragraph examination of the paper is first attempted in this note. This is followed by an independent discussion of the above semantic issue in the light of traditional Advaitic doctrine of the import of the Mahāvākyas.

First, Dayakrishna says that the Upanisadic and the Fregean statements share the same problematic. This assertion is totally incorrect. In the Upanisadic statement the referends as well as the senses of the demonstrative terms “That” and “Thou” are different from each other (although the coordinate use of the terms creates the impression that at least the referends of the terms are the same). This is not the case with the Fregean statement as the coordinate terms “the morning star” and “the evening star” occurring in it may have identical referends (the morning star can be an evening star too). Further the Upanisadic statement is not presented and discussed to explain the distinction between the sense and the reference of a word which is the main purpose for which the Fregean statement is discussed. Besides the proper understanding of the meaning of the Upanisadic statement does not consist (as it does in the case of the Fregean statement) in the apprehension of the identity of the referends of the

1. IPQ, Jan. 98, pp. 1-13.

demonstratives. The full grasp of the significance of the statement requires (as Dayakrishna rightly says towards the end of the paper) the existential - or more precisely the spiritual realisation of the identity of one's individual self with the universal self. Even the solutions of the semantic issues pertaining to the two statements are not similar. As will be explained in the sequel the right meaning of the Upaniṣadic statement is sought to be explained by taking recourse to a special type of the suggestive mode of meaning.

Next Dayakrishna goes on to make another equally questionable assertion that the referends in both the foregoing statements are experienced as both different and identical. In view of this he asks why the identity of the referends be supposed to override their difference? This is not a proper question to ask in this context but having asked it Dayakrishna has not answered it. However the above assertion itself is incorrect. It is not true that both identity and difference of the referends in the statements are experienced. Is the form of the statements such as to give rise to the experience of the difference of the referends? The words used for the referends are coordinate with each other both being in the nominative case. According to grammar two coordinate terms cannot give rise to the meaning of difference between their denotations (even if these were actually different from each other). So there is no question here of identity overruling difference. If the referends were different from each other then the statement would be false but not cease to be significant.

In the next paragraph Dayakrishna says - on the basis of what he has said earlier, - that with regard to the said statements there are two problems to be considered namely, the problem of interpreting the statements and the problem as to why the identity -- interpretation (if adopted) be treated as fundamental. As a matter of fact there is no occasion for the second problem to arise with regard to the statements. The statements express the identity of referends which appear to be different. This identity needs to be justified if it is real. This is precisely what the interpreters have sought to do. The difference in the sense-meanings of the subject terms engenders doubt about the identity of the referends. This doubt is removed by adopting the suggestive mode of meaning in one case and distinguishing sense-meaning from reference-meaning in the other case.

In the following paragraph Dayakrishna has made some mutually

inconsistent statements. These are as follows : "There is the basic problem of coming to know that two things which are considered identical are really different....." The objection is raised to this that unless two things are regarded as two their identity cannot be considered at all. This means that even only numerically different entities cannot be considered to be identical. If this were true then in the given expression identity-interpretation cannot be made as the difference of sense and reference in the meanings of the expressions obtains.'

It is not clear from these few sentences what exactly Dayakrishna wants to say about what he refers to as "the basic problem of coming to know things considered to be identical as really different. If he intends to say that it is a problem to know that things commonly treated as identical are really different then this statement implies that knowledge of identity is not dependent upon the knowledge of difference. This implication however is inconsistent with what Dayakrishna mentions as the objection to this in the next statement to the effect that "unless two things are regarded as two their identity cannot be considered at all". This means that the knowledge of (some kind of) difference of two things is essential for the knowledge of their identity. The inconsistency of the above two statements is quite obvious. Now let us move to the next statement..... "even only numerically different entities cannot be considered to be identical". If knowledge of the difference of two entities is essential for the knowledge of their identity then the knowledge even of the numerical difference of two entities must not be opposed to the knowledge of their identity. What Dayakrishna fumblingly seeks to convey through all these sentences is the simple fact that things considered to be identical must be known to be different from each other in some respect. Absolutely different things known as such cannot be regarded as identical with each other.

Having stated what he considers to be the problems relating to the two statements Dayakrishna refers to two solutions-which he calls "traditional" - of the problems. One solution is the view that all proper names are denotative not connotative. The other solution is the view that all common nouns are purely connotative, so they have no denotation. From the verbal cognition of the property connoted by a word it cannot be known if there is anything characterised by the connoted property.' How these views are called traditional solutions of the semantic problem by Dayakrishna is an enigma. Neither any Indian nor any western philosophical school has advocated either of these views as a solution

of the problem. Besides they are totally irrelevant to the problem. Neither in the Upaniṣadic nor in the Fregean statement there occurs any proper name as, "That" and "Thou" in the Upaniṣadic statement and "Morning star" and "Evening star" in the Fregean statement are, not names at all. The first pair of words are demonstratives and the second pair significant adjectives. Even if, for arguments sake the demonstratives are treated as proper names how can this help resolve the problem? "That" and "thou" denote different entities. "That" means "that which is not present before the speaker" and "Thou" means "the person who is being addressed by the speaker". It is because these denotations cannot be treated as identical with each other that the Advaitins adopt the suggestive mode of meaning for interpreting the Upaniṣadic statement.

As regards the Fregean sentence, even if the adjectival terms are regarded as names and thereby the identity of the denotends of the names is established, the main purpose of discussing the sentence would have been defeated. Frege presented the sentence to highlight the distinction between sense-meaning and reference-meaning. If there is no sense-meaning at all to the terms what will be the use of considering the sentence? It may also be noted in this connection that the Upaniṣadic statement is called "Mahāvākya" or a most important statement in the whole Upaniṣadic literature mainly because it embodies most important spiritual truth which only a competent teacher can impart to a well-groomed disciple. If it were just the identity of the denotations of two names that the statement was supposed to convey, then it would have to be regarded as a very trivial statement. It is extremely surprising how Dayakrishna could think of the denotative view of proper names as a possible solution of the above semantic problems.

So far as the proposed second solution is concerned it is not clear which traditional school Dayakrishna has in mind while referring to the view as traditional. Mīmāṃsā does of course advocate the view that a common noun or word stands for the generic universal common to all the individual specimens of a class commonly supposed to be denoted by the word. But the manner in which the connotative view is presented by Dayakrishna does not at all agree with the Mīmāṃsīst account of the view. Mīmāṃsā says that although it is the generic universal that alone is meant by a common word like "Pot" or "Tree" yet the concerned individual or individuals characterised by the universal enter the final verbal cognition produced by the sentence containing the word

by way of implication. For example, if I say to someone, 'Bring the book' the word book does mean "bookness" only, yet since bookness cannot be connected with any action, the hearer of the sentence connects bookness with the action of bringing through the book asked for. Thus bookness is indirectly connected with the action indicated by the verb. This sense of the sentence is called-on this account the subsequently concocted sense (in Saṅskrit, Pārshthika sense). In view of this explanation of the Mīmāṃsā view what Dayakrishna says about the second solution does not seem to square with any traditional view. According to him, if a common word is purely connotative then the individuals characterised by the universal connoted by the word and commonly supposed to be referred to by it remain unknown. If this is so then how does the individual form part of the verbal cognition?

But what is most puzzling about the presentation of this so-called solution is how Dayakrishna could think of it as a solution of the semantic problem. Neither in the case of the Upaniṣadic statement nor in that of the Fregean statement the semantic difficulty is resolved by the "solution". If the properties connoted by the demonstratives in one instance and by the adjectives in another instance are all different from one another how are the identities in the two instances going to be justified?

Leaving these objections aside if we turn to what Dayakrishna says against these so-called "traditional solutions" we find that it is highly objectionable. Against the view that proper names are denotative-not connotative- he says that names do connote properties, they are not purely denotative, that the same name can be applied to different individuals, that even in an ideal language names assigned to things do not always remain denotative and that names come to be associated with different properties by frequent use (in different contexts). None of these views pertaining to names as stated by Dayakrishna is advocated by any Indian or western thinker. They do not also bear critical scrutiny. First, it is true that some names like say, Kalidas, in the sentence "Shakespeare is the Kalidas of the west" connote the property of "being a great playwright". But as used in the sentence even the name "Kalidas" is transformed into a common noun. Second, it is not correct to say that the same name can be applied to different individuals. The word "John" for example used for naming a person is also denotative of a lavatory but no thinker treats the word to be the same in both of its uses although it appears to

be the same. Third, if names used in an ideal language come to be associated by careless use, with things for which they are not coined then they are replaced by other names. In no case the specificity of the use of names in the ideal language is ever sacrificed. Thus both the proposed solution and its criticisms suggested by Dayakrishna are simply unacceptable.

Dayakrishna goes on to add that the identity-problem can arise even in respect of names as the same individual can be called by different names or even described by menas of different descriptive properties. Yes, this is so. There is no problem in this. If names are supposed to be denotative or they simply name things, in either case one and the same thing may quite well be denoted or named by different names or even described by different descriptions.

Coming back from this diversion to the main theme of the paper Dayakrishna makes the rather queer remark that both Brahman and Ātman (the respective references of "That" and "thou") are theoretically postulated entities and that, it is their identity that is exhorted in the Upaniṣadic statement. Here it may be conceded that Brahman is a theoretically - postulated entity but this cannot be said about the Ātman or the empirical self. Śaṅkara, the founder of the Ādvaita says explicitly in his Bhāṣya (commentary) that it is not at all true that Atman is not experienced (Nāyamekāntenāviṣayah asmatpratīyayaviṣayatvāt). Everyone always experiences his or her self and expresses the experience by words like "I" "We" etc. If both Brahman and Ātman were only theoretically-postulated entities then the Upaniṣadic statement under consideration would not be a subject-predicate statement. In such statements the subject is always the given or previously-known. It is only the predicate that is novel (or ungiven).

In this connection Dayakrishna trots out a view of his own concerning the basic philosophical standpoints of Advaita and Sāṃkhya for which there is neither textual nor rational support. The view concerns the fundamental (according to Dayakrishna) distinction between the standpoints of these schools. As per the view, according to Advaita the difference between Brahman and Ātman or the whole realm of empirical reality is false and this falsehood can be got rid of by the spiritual realisation of the identity of everything with Brahman. According to Sāṃkhya on the other hand it is the identity of the pure self with Prakṛti and its evolutes that is false and it is the realisation of the

distinction of the self from the latter that destroys the false identity. Dayakrishna has presented here his own version of the standpoint of Advaita which almost contradicts the version given by Śāṅkara, the very founder of the school. So far as Dayakrishna's reading of Sāṅkhyan viewpoint is concerned it may be broadly accepted. Samkhya treats Puruṣa's awareness of identity with Prakṛti as the cause of this bondage. It is by the dissipation of this awareness through the knowledge of his distinctive nature that Puruṣa attains release according to this school. Regarding Advaitic standpoint Dayakrishna's view is that the distinction of Brahman and the world including the Ātman is false and that this falsehood engendered by avidyā or māyā is dissipated by the realisation of the unity or identity of Brahman and the world. The grounds of such an unorthodox view of Advaita - (some of which are stated at length elsewhere by Dayakrishna) are as follows. First the distinction between the Samkhyan and Advaitic standpoints can be maintained only if these are regarded as upholding mutually-opposed views concerning falsehood (or Adhyāsa) and ultimate truth. Otherwise, both treating distinction as absolute truth and falsehood as identity (of the world and pure self) the two standpoints would merge into each other. Second, Śāṅkara, the founder of Advaita starts his Bhāṣya (commentary) on the Brahmasūtra by rebutting the possibility of mistaking the not-self for the self and thereafter defending this possibility, thereby leading (perhaps inadvertently according to Dayakrishna) to the conclusion that the identity of the Brahman and Ātman is the ultimate truth according to Upaniṣadic (if not according to Śāṅkara). Third, the Mahāvākya under consideration also points towards this conclusion as it asserts the identity of "that" and "thou" which refer to Brahman and Ātman respectively. Fourth, the Vedantic ideal of Jīvanmukhti also appears to lend support to the above view. The multifarious empirical reality of the world including the self is not dissolved and reduced to nought (as the Śāṅkarite Advaitins think) when the self is released from bondage even when it carries on its embodied existence. The world is only absorbed into the all-comprehensive reality of Brahman after the self's release, whether it takes place in the empirical or the nonempirical state. Fifth, if ultimate truth did not have a place for empirical reality then the infinite diversity of things in the world would remain unexplained in the Advaita philosophy. These are the main reasons why Advaita or the Upaniṣadic Vedānta is diametrically opposed to Śāṅkara's reading.

Before considering and rebutting these reasons we may concede the point

that the Advaitic and Sāṅkhyan stāndpoints do differ from each other in regard to what is false and what is the ultimate truth. Sāṅkhya-as explained above-regards the distinction of the pure self and Prakṛti as the ultimate truth and the identification of these as the falsehood to be got rid of. Advaita-on the other hand,treats the absolute Brahman as the ultimate truth and like Sāṅkhya-the mutual superimposition of the self and not- self as the falsehood (or empiricity) to be got over. The difference between the two standpoints consists in the fact that the world does not cease to exist after the release from bondage of the self in the Sāṅkhyan view while in the Advaitic view the world is totally dissipated when the self is released. Dayakrishna misunderstands this difference of views by treating Advaita as the upholder of the view of the unity or identity of the self and the not-self. The misunderstanding seems to be caused-as stated above-by the misreading of the introductory passage of Samkara's Bhasya. In this passage Sāṅkara introduces the subject of inquiry by first raising the question whether the inquiry is necessary at all when the distinction between the self and the not-self is universally known. Nobody ever mistakes oneself for anybody or anything other than oneself. This question is answered by Śamkara by adducing examples of the widely prevalent confusion of self and not-self with each other in common life. This confusion which Dayakrishna regards as the unity of self and notself is not the ultimte truth according to Advaita nor is the superficial empirical distinction between the self and the notself the falsehood or Adhyāsa which needs to be dissipated for attaining realse. Advaita is not at all a doctrine of unity. It is as the very etymology of the word explicitly indicates and as all the great Advaitins like Madhusudana, Saraswati. Sriharsha etc. have explained with convincing arguments-the doctrine of nondualism. Brahman is the sole reality, all else is the projection of avidyā or the cosmic ignorance, the Mahāvākya whose grammatical construction appears to lead to the verbal cognition of the identity of Brahman and Ātman is interpreted-for certain reasons as yielding the meaning of nondifference between the two entities. Dayakrishna's version of Advaita is in fact a distorted version of Viśiṣṭadvāita in which God as qualified by the self and the not-self is supposed to be the ultimate reality.

The plea that the concept of Jīvanmukti is consistent with Advaita only as it is understood by Dayayrishna is simply otiose. According to Advaita Jīvanmukti is not the summum bonum; it needs to be transcended in the highest

state of complete liberation in which not only empirical consciousness but even empirical existence is reduced to nothingness. Of course this is not to be construed as an event taking place after the occurrence of the event of liberation. Neither of these is an event. The self is eternally liberated, it is only the illusion of bondage or empiricity that needs to be sublated. Even this sublation is not an occurrence. It is the very nature and being of self.

Much of the above discussion is not quite relevant to the solution of the central problem of the paper but it had to be presented here in order to remove the misunderstanding about Advaita and Sāṃkhya created by Dayakrishna's statements about them. Now we turn to the so-called solutions of the semantic problem relating to the two statements suggested by Dayakrishna. The other and more important problem of the methodology of understanding the significance of the statements—specially the Upaniṣadic one will be discussed in our own independent consideration of these problems. Dayakrishna does not say much on this second problem except that it is by means of the existential or spiritual realisation that the identity of the Brahman and Ātman exhorted by the Upaniṣadic statement is known while in the Fregean statement the identity of the morning star and the evening star is known just by means of simple observation.

As to the solution of the semantical problem what Dayakrishna says regarding it is summed up in his following remarks :-

“The problem of the assertion of identity in the context of an illusory difference that was previously apprehended as real, has to be differentiated depending upon the types of objects between which identity is being asserted.....

The identity for example of five plus three and four plus four is an identity of a different kind that the one between “the morning star and the evening star”.

Both these statements are highly questionable if not totally wrong. First, the equality-statements in mathematical equations are radically different from the identity-statements under consideration. Equality is not the identity that is being considered here. To say that $x + y = 2$ is not to say that $x + y$ is the same as 2. Even if for arguments sake equality is regarded as identical with

identity how does an interpretation of the above equation similar to that of the identity-statements fail to yield the mathematically-correct meaning of the equation? What is wrong in saying that the figures on the right and the left sides of the equality-sign refer to the same entity although under different forms or characteristics (as the same number is viewed first as the sum of two other numbers and then as the resulting total of these numbers)? In this interpretation the difference of sense and reference is quite evident. There is therefore no need whatsoever to make any differentiation among the problems relating to identity-judgments concerning different types of objects whatever may be the type of objects referred to in the statement. If it is the identity-statement, then the identity of the referends is bound to be signified by the statement. Even if the identity signified in one statement is supposed to be of a different type than what is signified by another statement the main problem of the identity-statement is not solved. The core of the problem is "How can there be a significant identity-statement at all? If the statement, "The morning star is the morning star" is not significant how can the statement, "The morning star is the evening star" be significant? This problem can be partly tackled by distinguishing between the sense and the reference of the words "the morning star" and "the evening star".

Having thus disposed of Dayakrishna's misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the problem of the Upaniṣadic and Fregean sentences and his wrong solutions of the problems we now try to present the problem (or problems) and the solutions in the right perspective. First it needs to be noted that even the semantic problems of the two sentences are not similar. Nor are their solutions similar. As pointed out earlier the etymological referends of the words "That" and "Thou" in the Upaniṣadic sentence are different but those of the words "The morning star" and "The evening star" are not and need not be different. So the problem of identity in the case of the Fregean sentence is not as acute as it is in the case of the Upaniṣadic sentence. The solution of the problem is not as simple as it is likely to be thought. The Fregean sentence has been trotted out to highlight the need to distinguish between the sense and reference of words. The senses of the words "Morning star" and "Evening star" are respectively the properties of morning-starness and evening-starness which being different from each other the sentence is saved from being reduced to a tautology. This is broadly the solution suggested to the identity-problem. It

may here be asked, "Granting that the two properties are different how do they help the sentence-meaning to make the assertion of identity significant"? The sentence-meaning refers only to the planet that appears on the horizon both in the morning and in the evening. The properties of morning-starness and evening-starness do not figure at all in the sentence-meaning. The planet is endowed with many other properties like these two but none of these enters into the sentence-meaning. What is then the use of having the sense-meaning over and above the reference-meaning for a word? This is perhaps the core of the above semantic problem. It can be tackled only by the Navya Nyāya method of analysing the meaning of sentences. According to this method every sentence produces a determinate verbal cognition of a determinate predicate ascribed to a subject characterised by a definite property delimiting the subjecthood of the subject. In the instant case the subject is the planet as characterised by the property "morning starness" which therefore is the limitor of the subjecthood of the planet (Venus). Another property "evening starness" is the predicate ascribed to the planet as characterised by "morning starness". So both the properties invariably enter into the final meaning of the sentence. It may here be noted that the identity of the planet as one that is characterised by morning starness as well as evening starness is realised only after the full verbal (predicative) cognition has taken place. Thus sense-difference does not jeopardise the identity of the referends in the sentence.

As a matter of fact Frege need not have bothered to invent the above special sentence to illustrate and justify the distinction of sense and reference of a word. Even a common sentence like, "The pot is a material substance" would have served the purpose. When fully analysed this simple sentence means that "the pot as endowed by potness" is the same entity that is characterised by the property "material substantiveness". Thus the identity of the pot as characterised by the two properties happens to be stated (or implied) by the sentences. It is immaterial (logically though not grammatically) that the word "pot" stands for a substantive entity and the word "material substance" for a property. According to the Nyāya way of interpreting a subject-predicate sentence it is the identity with that which has the property of "being a material substance" that is attributed to the pot endowed with potness.

Now we turn to the semantic problem posed by the Upaniṣadic sentence. As stated above this problem is of a different type than that pertaining to the

Fregean sentence. In the sentence "That thou art" we are presented with the identity of apparently disparate entities. The disparity appears to be intrinsic to the things referred to. "That" cannot be "Thou". Such obviously is not the case with the "morning star" and the "evening star". The possibility of the morning star being the (same as the) evening star can be envisaged even by a person who has not observed the star (or planet) at all. After all it is only a question of a single thing possessing two different but not opposed properties. In the case of "That" and "Thou" however such a possibility can never be conceived. So the etymologically expressed identity of "That and Thou" gets jeopardised by the descriptive properties connoted by the demonstrative terms which are not only different but mutually opposed. If they were totally opposed to each other the statement of identity would simply be falsified. Since this is not the case, recourse needs to be had to the suggestive mode of meaning called "laxaṇā" in Sanskrit. This is a quite usual practice in the interpretation of sentences in which words with incompatible meaning occur, as for example in the sentence "My house is on the Ganges itself". The incompatibility of the meanings of the words "house" and "Ganges" causes the word "Ganges" to suggest the meaning "the bank of the Ganges" through the proximity of the bank to the Ganges. In the present case however the suggestive mode of meaning cannot be applied to the words directly. Neither the emaning of the word "That" is related to that of "Thou" nor the meaning of "Thou" is related to that of "That", so that by means of such relationship the two meanings could be made compatible. So what is known as 'suggestion by dropping only a part of its meaning' (in Sanskrit "Bhāṅatyāgalaxaṇā") is employed here to the words to derive a consistent meaning from the sentence. The process involved in the application of this suggestive mode is as follows: The word "Thou" in the context (of the sentence) stands for the empirical self or consciousness (of the disciple). The other word "That" stands for the absolute self or consciousness. Part of the meaning of the first word is the property of "empiricality" and part of the meaning of the other word "That" is absoluteness. Both these part-meanings being dropped the two words come to refer to or mean the same entity namely pure consciousness. The "thatness" and "thouness" characterising respectively the two meant entities in the sentence are gone. That is to say the sense-meanings or connotations of the words get totally excluded and only the referential meanings retained.

From this explanation it will be obvious that the import of the Fregean sentence is not similar to what we find in the Upaniṣadic sentence. Even the process of interpreting the sentences is not the same or similar. As we saw above the Fregean sentence is quite amenable to the normal mode of interpretation but to interpret the Upaniṣadic sentence the peculiar suggestive mode needs to be adopted. So the cognition resulting from the sentence despite being verbal is of a peculiar type. No school of philosophy other than Advaita has admitted the possibility of the occurrence of such a cognition which is absolutely indeterminate (in the sense that the pure undertermined object is apprehended in it) and also quite vivid (introspectively). Advaitins regard this verbal cognition unlike other verbal cognitions - as immediate like any perceptual cognition which is generated by sense - object contact. The wellknown theory known as Śābdaparokṣavāda is propounded by Advaita to explain the immediacy of this verbal cognition. The existential realisation that Dayakrishna speaks of while explaining the distinction between the identity-cognitions arising from the two sentences is the immediate introspective realisation of the self's nondistinction from Brahman (as pure undertermined consciousness). But the consciousness arising from the Fregean sentence is not "objective" (as Dayakrishna describes it). The consciousness being verbal it only refers to its objects but it is not objective as perceptual consciousness is. This is not the case with the consciousness generated by the Mahāvākya the reason being that the Mahāvākya is the direct exhortation of a competent spiritual teacher to a spiritually-groomed disciple. Only because of the effectiveness of the exhortative sentence in engendering the immediate introspective experience or realisation of the non-difference of self from Brahman, the Upaniṣadic sentence is called "Mahāvākya". Since this realisation is not producible except through the exhortation of the master, the words attain in this case the status of an absolutely independent means of knowledge. Neither perception nor inference can ever produce such knowledge. Moreover the knowledge produced by Mahāvākya is direct unlike the knowledge that any other combination of words produces.

This naturally provokes the query, "How can the Mahāvākya by itself produce the said realisation if verbal cognition is by nature indirect?" This query is sought to be answered by Advaitins with the help of the wellknown parable of Ten fools'. This parable highlights the important point that the non-difference of the self and Brahman is not a fact quite unknown to anybody. Everybody

knows it but only implicitly. This knowledge needs to be evoked by mobilising the process of introspective self-analysis in the mind of the disciple by the authoritative exhortation of the master. The catharsis needed for starting this self-analysis process is brought about by the masterful assertion of the master that the disciple (or his self) is no other than the universal self. The semantical exclusion of the distinctive (but unreal) properties of the self like its embodiedness, is paralleled by the psycho-spiritual process of the dissipation of the awareness of its distinctive nature by the self. A sort of spiritual inferiority complex remains entrenched in the mind of the disciple. This is gradually rooted out by means of deep introspection induced by the emphatic exhortation of the master.

N. S. DRAVID

BOOK REVIEW

In Search of a Moral Criterion, by Tirthanath Bandyopadhyay :
(Papyrus, Calcutta-4. India. 1994, p. 110. Rs. 50.00).

The title suggests the book is about the search for a moral criterion. The author begins with what may be called as a meta-ethical program. There are some things which are right and wrong and we agree about them but philosophers tend to disagree as to why these right things are right. This requires a criterion and this task is of moral philosophers. Without this criterion moral philosophy would lose its 'survival value'. The author argues that The Principle of Universalisability (PU) is the only criterion of moral maxims. This book is in a way a step towards the rationalist approach to morality looking for a kind of objectivity. The root he finds is in the word morality itself which is identified with humanity. The author may have a few affinities with Kantian theory but his formulation of PU is not Kantian. He presents his views as a philosophical position to be considered in its own merit. The author is very humble in his claim; he is not intending to present the solution of the problem of 'The Moral Criterion' by saying that PU is the only criterion which excludes other criteria but it is not clear whether he is suggesting that other criteria are also having some truth which should be considered as well. He uses PU but the formulation is his own device and by using this we can detect whether a particular maxim of action is morally right or morally wrong.

The neo-rationalist tradition starting with Hare's book *Language of Morals* (London, 1956) suggests two criteria of morality: prescriptivity and universalisability. These two together are considered necessary and sufficient for morality by him. The author of this book suggests that universalisability principle alone is sufficient to determine whether or not a given maxim of action is morally right. Hare talks of 'action', but author of this book talks of 'maxim of an action'. R. M. Hare's prescriptive principle he derives from a deeper commitment to humanity and to a kind of necessity interwoven in the obligatoriness itself. Any obligation by its own nature compels us to fulfil it leading to action (it may not be actual action). But this compulsion also allows freedom to act otherwise. I am not sure if in any way this helps us better than Hare's.

The action, as the author argues, is different from the maxim of an action. The universalisability criterion is meant to determine whether an act with certain feature is one that we can regard as morally right or wrong. For the author, it is a criterion of 'some maxims of action actually proposed or conceived in definite terms, as a candidate for moral assessment' (p. 68). If it is a criterion of a maxim then I would tend to think that it is even getting away from the actual action. We may agree with the moral maxim 'Tell the truth' and we may be far away from acting upon this maxim. Hare tries to bridge the gap between maxim and action by taking help of prescriptivity but here the gap is never bridged.

A maxim is a rule which a man makes for himself but it is not identical with moral principle; if it accords with PU then it is morally right, otherwise it is morally wrong. He maintains that a maxim, if morally right, is universalisable and if a maxim of action is not universalisable, it may be amoral. But maxim like 'I take my dinner at 6. p.m.' is not identical with any moral principle; universalized, it will become morally right maxim. At the same time, if I do not agree that it is a moral principle, which it is not (generally speaking), then it does not prove that it is morally wrong to take dinner at 6 p.m. The question of taking the dinner at some particular time is not morally relevant. Thus it is a rule or a maxim which is not identical with moral principles and my agreeing to accord with PU neither makes it morally right nor makes it morally wrong. Further, the problems related to patriotism, that 'I ought to defend my country' is a maxim of action but if universalized goes against the concept of morality - the common good for all and not my good for my country. Its not clear in what way the PU would explain the patriotism-a virtue.

PU is presented in two versions; the will version and the maxim version. It is impossible for the agent to will consistently that the maxim be practised by everyone. Whether someone really in practice wills or not is irrelevant. Conducting thought experiment of asking himself - what happens if everyone else does follow the maxim? This is all one is required to consider. If the consequence is an inconsistency or undesirable result, the maxim in question cannot be accepted as universalisable maxim. But author also on P. 19 talks of 'purpose of PU which purports to show that no morally wrong maxim is universalisable'. My question is - PU used as a criterion to distinguish between morally right maxim and morally wrong maxim, if, in turn, requires us to know

beforehand, what is morally wrong and what is morally right, are we not begging the question of criterion? To put it precisely, if I want to know whether maxim of deceiving others or maxim of inflicting pointless pain is a moral maxim, in turn requires that I must know whether 'deceiving others' and 'inflicting pain' are morally wrong, does PU help me anyway as criterion?

PU maintains that if a certain maxim is deemed to be an ought maxim in a given situation, then the maxim has to be deemed so in all situations that are 'typically similar' to that situation and if what is right in one case and may be wrong in another then the two cases must be dissimilar and hence different moral oughts. (P.24). The author explains what is meant by 'typically similar' - not identical but certain distinctive features of s but not so distinctive which would turn it to definite description and make PU vacuous. The problem is perceived rightly, we need a guideline to understand clearly 'certain distinctive features of s but not so distinctive'. But the guideline presented by the author does not seem to guide much. If two situations have same obligation structure i.e. render it morally obligatory for me 'to do, say A, thenthey would be typically similar to each other'. To take his own example, lending cash to a father who needs it for his hungry family is wrong when the father is known to be compulsive gambler or alcoholic shows that we need to capture the difference of the situation by making a distinction between a morally relevant and a morally irrelevant difference. Handing cash to a father who needs it for his hungry family is right and would still be right, knowing lot of other things about him so as to how he dresses up etc. which may be considered as morally irrelevant facts about his life. But a single morally relevant fact may make this moral maxim different; I may conclude differently; quite often just the opposite. To distinguish between the two, a deep sense of morality and understanding is required at every level which he clearly spells out as a 'sincere commitment to a morally right stand' (p. 52). The question remains what we really consider as 'morally right stand'? Answering this the author almost passionately identifies 'being moral' and 'being human'. To quote, "Indeed a maxim gathers moral connotation (i.e., moral rightness and wrongness) for us (i.e., human beings) ultimately in terms of how it concerns us as human persons. This explains why only moral lapses are called human lapses and moral qualities human qualities. Moral assessment is assessment as human beings". I am in absolute agreement with him on this point. But the problem still remains as to what if others do

not agree with me as to what would be counted as 'human'.

Chapter III deals with the question whether imperativehood or oughtness of morally right actions or maxims of action is intrinsic or potential. To put it differently, a person recognizes that a particular action is morally right but is he in any sense obliged to act accordingly? The author believes that by using PU and distinguishing between moral and immoral maxims would not help us much if the result is not followed. "The task of reaching for a moral criterion makes sense only if it is assumed that it is in some sense necessary to follow it". (p. 29). But to a real amoralist no amount of theoretical arguments can help, but to be human is to hardly remain systematically callous to moral requirements. Thus if someone acknowledges the intrinsic dignity of moral life, then when he recognizes that a given action ought to be done, it is not conceivable that he remain totally uninfluenced-this is the necessity he is obliged to follow it-no matter whether he actually follows it or not.

I ought to be moral - due to a purely moral interest as Kant taught us and not for any 'external' grounds such as polity or contract or agreement or happiness or loss and gain calculation. Author also emphasizes on the necessity of being moral from the practical perspective but that does not undermine the need for being moral which is intertwined with the very notion of being human. Moral realm requires man to realize his obligation and possibility to defy moral obligations. To reject the first would lead to not being part of the social structure or human and the rejection of second would lead to 'being moral' to a mere play with words.

Coming back to the issue whether PU alone is sufficient criterion, the author is of the opinion that it is sufficient and we need to consider 'whether it effects our lives in ways we find morally important'. 'While alone sing' may be universalisable but it is not a moral maxim; it is a morally neutral maxim. I feel, it all depends how we look at it, for example, 'While alone sing as loudly as you can', would still be wrong. Author realizes this difficulty and accepts that there is nothing in PU that can settle the issue of determining whether a given maxim is morally assessable or not and it may be due to PU being too wide. But if PU fails to exclude morally neutral maxims from its scope, which means it includes every maxim moral and amoral then we are just claiming that 'maxims are universalisable' and not that 'only moral maxims are

universalisable' which is quite acceptable thesis, and the very purpose of calling upon a 'criterion' is defeated. To put it more clearly, 'stealing is wrong' is a moral maxim iff 'stealing is right' is non-universalisable in the sense that it leads to the situation which no 'human' would like to have. Therefore, 'stealing is right' is immoral or not a moral maxim. But, I do not see how we would convince a person who maintains that 'stealing is right when there is no other way to get' as a moral maxim and therefore that stealing is right is not an immoral maxim.

Morality is not the field of radical choice - the moral dilemmas are real dilemmas due to moral obligations involving different moral claims and having a rational force to follow. Universalisability is a rational requirement but prescriptivity is related with freedom. Realizing this tension between the two the author discusses different problems related with this, such as the moral privatism and rejecting it on the ground that such a view would pose a serious danger to society and would lead to anarchy. How would one know whether the maxim of egoism can be taken as moral maxim or not? If it means 'selfishness' then it cannot be universalized, consequently, cannot be considered as moral maxim. A rational, normal human using universalisability would be able to distinguish between a moral maxim and a non-moral maxim. Maxims of committing suicide, everyone should be thorough going egoist, and never help anyone, cannot be universalized in the sense of will version of universalisability.

Morality demands humanity (p. 59). PU intends to view morality from human perspective. This way of looking at the question of maxim being right or wrong for us is to be answered by us, ultimately the human nature (p. 60). The question remains how are we to look at the human nature; they are often different; we are back to the starting point without much progress.

Further, it seems the author is working on the axiom of non-naturalistic conception of moral knowledge, providing an understanding of moral intuitions which require a mysterious faculty or a mysterious subject matter. He seems to be in good company of a group of British moral realists. (Mark Platts, *Ways of Meaning*, Chap. 10, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979, John McDowell "Virtue and Reason", *The Monist*, 62, 1979) Their intuition-cum-realism is different from American realism which is essentially naturalistic. But the

difficulty in this arises that it is difficult to maintain the thesis they advocate for; a special moral perspective like capacity, an ability is required to apprehend and appreciate the moral facts, the relation between the moral facts and natural facts of "fixing" but not of deducing etc.

At the end, the book presents a lively discussion on the moral criterion problem and a fresh outlook on PU as rooted in 'humanity' and 'rationality' and 'dignity of man' basing morality on human nature which is basically the Hindu view of morality. It is exciting to see a wonderful way of defending universalisability which may be incompatible with relativistic way of seeing morality but I think the attraction is not much sustaining. The book nevertheless provides numerous important and original contributions to an on-going debate.

ASHA MUKHERJEE

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
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